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
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COMMENTARIES
ON
AMERICAN LAW.

BY JAMES KENT.

VOLUME III.

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Southern District of New-York, ss.

BE IT REMEMBERED, That on the ninth day of October, A. D. 1828, in the fifty-third year of the Independence of the United States of (L. S.) America, JAMES KENT, of the said district, has deposited in this office the title of a Book, the right whereof he claims as author; in the words following, to-wit:

"Commentaries on American Law. By JAMES KENT. Vol. III."

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PART V.

OF THE LAW CONCERNING PERSONAL PROPERTY.

(CONTINUED FROM THE SECOND VOLUME.)

LECTURE XLII.

OF THE HISTORY OF MARITIME LAW.

BEFORE we enter more at large upon the subject of commercial and maritime law, it may tend to facilitate and enlighten our inquiries, if we take a brief view of the origin, progress, and successive improvements of this branch of legal learning. This will accordingly be attempted in the present lecture.

The marine law of the United States is the same as the marine law of Europe. It is not the law of a particular country, but the general law of nations; and Lord Mansfield applied to its universal adoption the expressive language of Cicero, when speaking of the eternal laws of justice: *Nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athænis; alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes, et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna, et immortalis continebit.*^a

*In treating of this law, we refer to its pacific character as the law of commerce and navigation in time

^a *Frag. de Repub.* lib. 3.

of peace. The respective rights of belligerents and neutrals in time of war constitute the code of prize law, and that forms a distinct subject of inquiry, which has already been sufficiently discussed in a former volume. When Lord Mansfield mentioned the law-merchant as being a branch of public law, it was because that law did not rest essentially for its character and authority on the positive institutions and local customs of any particular country, but consisted of certain principles of equity and usages of trade, which general convenience, and a common sense of justice had established, to regulate the dealings of merchants and mariners in all the commercial countries of the civilized world.^a

(1.) *Of the maritime legislation of the ancients.*

Though the marine law of modern Europe had its foundations laid in the jurisprudence of the ancients, there is no certain evidence that either the Phœnicians, Carthaginians, or any of the states of Greece, formed any authoritative digest of naval law. Those powers were distinguished for navigation and commerce, and the Athenians in particular were very commercial, and they kept up a busy intercourse with the Greek colonies in Asia Minor, and on the borders of the Euxine and the Hellespont, in the islands of the Ægean sea, and in Sicily and Italy. They were probably the greatest naval power in all antiquity. Themistocles had the sagacity to discern the wonderful influence and controlling ascendancy of naval power. It is stated by Diodorus Siculus, that he persuaded the Athenians to build twenty new ships every year. He established the Piræus as a great commercial

^a The usage of merchants is alluded to in sacred writ, as early as the time of Abraham, upwards of 1800 years before the Christian era. He purchased the cave of Machpelah for four hundred shekels of silver *current money with the merchant*. Gen. xxiii. 16.

emporium and arsenal for Athens, and the cultivation of her naval superiority and glory was his favourite policy ; for he held the proposition, which Pompey afterwards adopted, that the people, who were masters of the sea, would be masters of the world.^a The Athenians encouraged, by their laws, navigation and trade ; and there *was a particular jurisdiction at Athens for the *3 cognizance of contracts, and controversies between merchants and mariners. There were numerous laws relative to the rights and interests of merchants, and of their navigation ; and in many of them there was an endeavour to remove, as much as possible, the process and obstacles which afflicted the operations of commerce. In a pleading of Demosthenes against Lacritus, we find the substance of a loan upon bottomry, with all the provisions and perils appertaining to such a contract, carefully noted.^b As a consequence of the commercial spirit and enterprise of the Greeks, their language was spoken throughout all the coasts of the Mediterranean and Euxine seas. Cicero was struck with the comparison between the narrow limits in which the Latin language was confined, and the wide extent of the Greek.^c The universality and stability of the Greek tongue, were owing, no doubt, in a considerable degree, to the conquests of Alexander, to the loquacity of the Greeks, and the inimitable excellence of the language itself ; but it is essentially to be imputed to the commercial genius of the people, and to the colonies and factories which they established, and the trade and correspondence which they maintained throughout the then known parts of the eastern world.

^a *Cic. Epist. ad Atticum*, lib. 10. epist. 8.

^b 1 *Potter's Greek Antiq.* 84. *Voyage du jeune Anacharsis*, tom. v. ch. 55.
 2 *Mitf. Hist.* 182—185. The profession of merchandise, says Plutarch in his *Life of Solon*, was honourable in Greece.

^c *Græca leguntur in omnibus fere gentibus : Latina suis finibus, exiguis sane, continentur. Orat. pro Archia Poeta*, s. 5.

The Rhodians were the earliest people that actually created, digested, and promulgated a system of marine law. They obtained the sovereignty of the seas about nine hundred years before the Christian era, and were celebrated for their naval power and discipline. Their laws concerning navigation were received at Athens, and in all the islands of the Ægean sea, and throughout the

coasts of the Mediterranean, as part of the law of nations. Cicero, who in early life studied rhetoric *at

Rhodes, says,^a that the power and naval discipline of that republic continued down within his time of memory, in vigour and with glory. We are indebted to the Roman law for all our knowledge of the commercial jurisprudence of the Rhodians. Not only their arts and dominion have perished, but even their nautical laws and usages would have entirely and for ever disappeared in the wreck of nations, had it not been for the superior wisdom of their masters the Romans; and one solitary title in the pandects,^b contains all the fragments that have floated down to modern times, of their once celebrated maritime code. The collection of laws, under the title of *Rhodian laws*, published at Basle, in 1561, and at Frankfort, in 1596, were cited as genuine by such civilians as Cujas, Godefroi, Selden, Vinnius,^c and Gravina; and yet it has since been discovered and declared by equally learned jurists, as Bynkershoeck,^d Heineccius,^e Emerigon,^f and Azuni,^g

^a *Orat. pro Lege Manilia*, ch. 13.

^b *Dig.* 14. 2. *De Lege Rhodia de Jactu*.

^c *Pecku Comm. ad rem nauticam cum notis Vinnii. Lugd.* 1647.

^d *Opera*, tom. 2. *De Lege Rhodia*, ch. 8.

^e *Hist. Jur. Civilis Rom. ac Germ.* lib. 1. s. 296.

^f *Traité des Assurances*, Pref.

^g *Maritime Law of Europe*, vol. i. 277—295, N. Y. Edit. In the note to p. 286, William Johnson, Esq., the learned translator of Azuni, detects many gross errors in the pretended collection of Rhodian laws, contained in the English “complete body of Sea Laws.” Mr. Johnson’s opinion is, of itself, of great authority; and his notes to his translation of Azuni, show a familiar and accurate acquaintance with legal and classical antiquities. Yet,

that the collection of laws which had been thus recognised as the ancient Rhodian laws, (and of which a translation was given in the collection *of sea laws *5 published at London in the reign of Queen Anne,) are not genuine, but spurious. The emperor Augustus first gave a sanction to the laws of the Rhodians, as rules for decision in maritime cases at Rome; and the emperor Antoninus referred one of his subjects, aggrieved by the plunder of his shipwrecked property, to the maritime laws of Rhodes, as being the laws which, he said, were the sovereign of the sea.^a The Rhodian laws, by this authoritative recognition, became rules of decision in all maritime cases in which they were not contrary to some express provision of the Roman law. They were truly, as Valin has observed, the cradle of nautical jurisprudence.

We are, therefore, to look to the collections of Justinian, for all that remains to us of the commercial law of the ancients. The Romans never digested any general code of maritime regulations, notwithstanding they were pre-eminently distinguished for the cultivation, method, and system which they gave to their municipal law. They seem to have been contented to adopt as their own the regulations of the republic of Rhodes. The genius of the Roman government was military, and not commercial. Mercantile professions were despised, and nothing was esteemed honourable but the plough and the sword. They encouraged corn merchants to import provisions from Sardinia, Sicily, Africa, and Spain; but this was necessary for the subsistence of the inhabitants

notwithstanding all the authority against the authenticity of that collection, *M. Boulay Paty*, in his *Cours de Droit Commercial Maritime*, tom. i. p. 10—21, does not hesitate to give a succinct analysis of that collection, as containing *at least* the sense and spirit of the original laws, and as being an exposition of the true text.

^a *Dig.* 14. 2. 9.

of Rome, as the slaves of Italy, (and who were almost exclusively the cultivators of the soil,) did not afford a sufficient supply for the city. The Romans prohibited commerce to persons of birth, rank, and fortune;^a and *6 no senator was allowed to own a vessel larger *than a boat sufficient to carry his own corn and fruits.^b The navigation which the Romans cultivated, was for the purposes of war, and not of commerce, except so far as was requisite for the supply of the Roman market with provisions.^c This is the reason, that amidst such

^a *Code* 4. 63. 3. The decree in the code speaks contemptuously of commerce, and as being fit only for plebeians, and not for those who were *honorum luce conspicues, et patrimonio ditiores*. Even Cicero regarded commerce as being inconsistent with the dignity of the masters of the world: *nolo eundem populum Imperatorem, et Portitorem esse terrarum*. The *Liberti* or freedmen carried on the lucrative and mechanical trades and arts.

^b *Livy*, lib. 21. ch. 63. *Dig.* 50. 5. 3. Cicero, *Orat. in Verrem*, lib. 5. s. 18.

^c Huet, *Histoire du Com. et de la Navig. des Anciens*, p. 278, 279. Polybius in his *General History*, b. 3. c. 3, gives the substance of a very remarkable commercial treaty, between Rome and Carthage, made the *very first year after the banishment of the Turquins*. It goes to prove that the Romans were then a great commercial people. Polybius says he translated it from the original brazen tables existing in the capitol in the apartment of the *Ædiles*, and in a language so very obsolete as to be difficult of interpretation. By that treaty, neither the Romans nor their allies were to sail beyond the fair promontory which forms the eastern boundary of the Gulf of Carthage. If forced beyond it, they were not allowed to take or purchase any thing, except necessities for refitting their vessels, and for sacrifice, and they were to depart within five days. The object of this provision, was to exclude the Romans and their allies from trading with Egypt and the countries on the lesser Syrtis. But the Roman merchants were to have free access to Sardinia, Sicily, Carthage, and the western coast of Africa, and to pay no customs, but only the usual fees to the scribe and crier. The sale of their cargoes was to be effected by public auction, and the public faith of Carthage was pledged to the foreign merchant for his payment of the amount of such sales. The Carthagenians engage, on their part, not to offer any injury to the Roman allies in Italy, nor build any fortresses in the Latin territory. This treaty, as Niebuhr sagaciously observes, (*History of Rome*, vol. i. 433,) divalges the fact of the commercial greatness of Rome before the expulsion of Tarquin; but the liberal and enlarged spirit of commerce which inspired the Romans under their kings, was soon after lost in the passion for war and conquest. Mr. Hocke, in his "dissertation on the credibility of the History of the first five hundred years of Rome," very plausibly suggests that Polybius was probably mistaken in the date of this commercial treaty with Carthage, and that

a vast collection of wise regulations as are embodied in the Roman law, affecting almost every interest and relation in human life, we meet with only a few brief and borrowed details on the interesting subject of maritime affairs. But those titles atone for *their brevity, *7 by their excellent sense and practical wisdom. They contain the elements of those very rules which have received the greatest expansion and improvement in the maritime codes of modern nations. Whatever came from the pens of such sages as Papinian, Paul, Julian, Labeo, Ulpian, and Scævola, carried with it demonstrative proofs of the wisdom of their philosophy, and the elegance of their taste.^a

it was made after the year 415, instead of the year 244 A. U. B. But as both Niebuhr and Mitford (*Hist. of Greece*, vol. ii. 151,) and Heeren, in his *Reflections*, &c., vol. i. 485, assume the antiquity of the treaty as stated by Polybius to be correct, no higher modern authority for that point can be produced. There was a second commercial treaty between Rome and Carthage 161 years after the other, and which is also mentioned by Polybius, and it contains cautionary restrictions, and some fair and liberal terms of commerce between those two great rival republics.

^a It may be useful to cast the eye for a moment over the most material principles and provisions in the Roman law, relative to maritime rights.

The title *Nautæ, Caupones, Stabularii, ut recepta restituant*, (*Dig.* 4. 9.) related to the responsibility of mariners, inn, and stable keepers; and we meet here with the principle which pervades the maritime law of all modern nations, for it has been as generally adopted, and as widely diffused, as the Roman law. Masters of vessels were held responsible, as common carriers, for every loss happening to property confided to them, though the loss happened without their fault, unless it proceeded from some peril of the sea, or inevitable accident; *nisi si quid damno fatali contingit, vel vis major contigerit*. Ulpian placed the rule on the ground of public policy, as it was necessary to confide largely in the honesty of such people, who have uncommon opportunity to commit secret and impenetrable frauds. The master was responsible for the acts of his seamen, and each joint owner of the vessel was answerable in proportion to his interest.

The title *Furti adversus Nautas, Caupones, Stabularios*, (*Dig.* 47. 5.) related to the same subject, and the owner and master were therein held answerable for thefts committed by any person employed under them in the ship. But the law distinguished between thefts by mariners and by passengers, and the master was not liable for thefts by the latter.

The title *De Exercitoria actione* (*Dig.* 14. 1.) treated of the responsibility of ship owners for the acts of the master. This, said Ulpian, was a very reasonable and useful provision, for as the shipper was obliged to deal with masters of

(2.) *Of the maritime legislation of the middle ages.*

Upon the revival of commerce, after the destruction of the Western empire of the Romans, maritime rules became necessary. The earliest code of modern sea

vessels, it was right that the owner, who appointed the master, and held him out to the world as an agent worthy of confidence, should be bound by his acts. This responsibility extended to every thing that the master did in pursuance of his power and duty as master. It extended to his contracts for wages, provisions, and repairs for the ship, and for the loan of money for the use of the ship. The owner was not responsible, except for acts done by the master in his character of master; but if he took up money for the use of the ship, and afterwards converted it to his own use, the owner was bound to respond, for he first gave credit to the master. A case of necessity for the money must have existed; and in that case only, the power to borrow came within the master's general authority. The lender was obliged to make out, at his peril, the existence of such necessity; and then he was entitled to recover of the owner, without being obliged to prove the actual application of the money to the purposes of the voyage. So, if the master went beyond his ordinary powers, as for instance, if he was appointed to a vessel employed to carry goods of a particular description, as hemp or vegetables, and he took on board shafts of granite or marble, the owner was not answerable for his acts; for there were vessels destined on purpose to carry such articles, and others to carry passengers, and some to navigate on rivers, and others to go to sea. If several owners were concerned in the appointment of the master, they were each responsible *in solido* for his contracts.

The title *De Lege Rhodia de Jactu* (Dig. 14. 2.) is the celebrated fragment of the Rhodian law on the subject of jettison.

It was ordained, that if goods were thrown overboard, or a mast cut away in a storm, or other common danger, to lighten and save the vessel, and the vessel be saved by reason of the sacrifice, all concerned must contribute to bear the loss, as it was incurred voluntarily for the good of all, and it was extremely equitable that all should ratably bear the burden according to the value of their property. There were some reasonable limitations to the rule. It did not apply to the *persons* of the free passengers on board, for the body of a freeman was said not to be susceptible of valuation; and it did not apply to the provisions which were used in common. The goods sacrificed were to be estimated at their actual value, and not at the anticipated profit; but the goods saved were to be estimated for the sake of contribution, not at the price for which they were bought, but at that for which they might sell.

The title *De Nautico Fœnore*, (Dig. 22. 2. Code 4. 33.) regulated maritime loans. The lender was allowed to take extraordinary interest, because he staked his principal on the success of the voyage and the safety of the vessel, and took as his security a pledge of the ship or cargo. The maritime interest ceased upon the arrival of the vessel; and if she was lost by reason of seizure, for having contraband goods of the debtor on board, the lender was still entitled to his principal and interest, because the loss arose from the fault of the debtor.

The title *De Incendio, Ruina, naufragio, Ræte, nave expugnata*, (Dig. 47. 9.) related to the plunder of vessels in distress; and it did great honour to the

laws was compiled *for the free and trading republic of Amalphi, in Italy, about the time of the first crusade, towards the end of the eleventh century. This compilation, which has been known by the name of the Amalphitan Table, superseded the ancient laws; and its authority and equity were acknowledged by all the states of Italy, though the whole work has now passed into irretrievable oblivion.^a Other states and cities began to form *collections of maritime law; and a *10 compilation of the usages and laws of the Mediterranean powers was made and published, under the title of the *Consolato del mare*. This commercial code is said to have been digested at Barcelona, in the Catalan tongue, during the middle ages, by order of the kings of Arragon. The Spaniards vindicate the claim of their country to the honour of this compilation; and the opinion of Casaregis, who published an Italian edition of it at Venice in 1737, with an excellent commentary, and of Boucher, who, in

justice and humanity of the Roman law. The edict of the prætor gave fourfold damages to the owner, against any person who, by force or fraud, plundered a ship in distress. The guilty persons were liable not only to be punished criminally on behalf of the government, but to make just retribution to the aggrieved party; and the severity of the rule, said Ulpian, was just and necessary, in order to prevent such abuses in cases of such calamity. The same provision was extended to losses by those means during a calamity by fire. The law applied equally to the fraudulent receiver and original taker of the shipwrecked articles, and he was held to be equally guilty.

This cursory view of the leading doctrines of the Roman maritime law, (for I have not thought it necessary to take notice of all the refined and intelligent distinctions,) is sufficient to show how greatly the maritime codes of the moderns are indebted to the enlightened policy and cultivated science of the Roman lawyers. The spirit of equity, in all its purity and simplicity, seems to have pervaded those ancient institutions.

^a *Azuni's Maritime Law*, vol. i. 376. Mr. Swinburne, who visited Amalphi on his excursion to the ruins of Pæstum, in 1779, found the city in great decay, with only the wrecks of its former grandeur. Its trade withered with the loss of its liberty, and passed to Pisa, Genoa, and Venice. It was conquered by the Normans, and plundered by the Pisons, who carried away a copy of the Pandects found there, and we hear no more of the Amalphitan Table, or of the high reputation of the maritime tribunals of Amalphi.—*Swinburne's Travels in the two Sicilies*, vol. ii. 133—150.

1808, translated the *Consolato* into French, from an edition printed at Barcelona in 1494, are in favour of the Spanish claim.^a But the origin of the work is so far involved in the darkness of those ages, as to render the source of it very doubtful; and Azuni, in a laboured article,^b endeavours to prove that the *Consolato* was compiled by the Pisans, in Italy, during the period of their maritime prosperity. Grotius,^c on the other hand, and Marquardus, in his work *De Jure Mercatorum*, hold it to be a collection made in the time of the crusades, from the maritime ordinances of the Greek emperors, of the emperors of Germany, the kings of France, Spain, Syria, Cyprus, the Baleares, and from those of the republics of Venice and Genoa.^d It was probably a compilation made by private persons; but whoever may have been the authors of it, and at whatever precise point of time the *Consolato* may have been compiled, it is certain that it became the common law of all the commercial powers of Europe.

*11 *The marine laws of Italy, Spain, France, and England were greatly affected by its influence; and it formed the basis of subsequent maritime ordinances.^e It has been translated into the Castilian, Italian, German, and French languages; and an entire translation of it into English has long been desired and called for by

^a Hallam, in his *View of Europe during the Middle Ages*, vol. ii. 278. thinks the reasoning of Boucher, in his *Consulat de la Mer*, tom. i. 70—76. to be inconclusive, and that Pisa first practised those usages, which a century or two afterwards were formally digested and promulgated at Barcelona.

^b *Maritime Law*, vol. i. 326—372.

^c *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, lib. 3. ch. 1. §. 5. note.

^d Boulay Paty, in his *Cours de droit Commercial Maritime*, tom. i. 60. insists, that Azuni has refuted Grotius and the other publicists on this point in a triumphant manner.

^e Casaregis, who was one of the most competent and learned of commercial lawyers, says, in one of his discourses, (*Dis.* 213. n. 12.) that the *Consolato* had, in maritime matters, by universal custom, the force of law among all provinces and nations.

those scholars and lawyers who were the most competent to judge of its value.^a

We are naturally induced to overlook the want of order and system in the *Consolato*, and the severity of some of its rules, and to justify Emerigon and Boucher in their admiration of the good sense and spirit of equity which dictated its decisions upon contracts, when we consider that the compilation was the production of a barbarous age.^b It is, undoubtedly, the most authentic and venerable monument extant, of the commercial usages of the middle ages, and especially among the people who were concerned in the various branches of the Mediterranean trade. It was as comprehensive in its plan as it was liberal in its principles. It treated of maritime courts, of shipping, of the ownership and equipment of ships, of the duties and responsibilities of the owners and master, of freight and seamen's wages, of the duties and government of seamen, of ransoms, salvage, jettisons, and average contributions. It treated also of maritime captures, and of the mutual *rights of neutral and belligerent vessels; and, in *12 fact, it contained the rudiments of the law of prize. Emerigon very properly rebukes Hubner for the light and frivolous manner in which he speaks of the *Consolato*; and he says in return, that its decisions are founded on the law of nations, and have united the suffrages of mankind.^c

The laws of Oleron were the next collection in point of time and celebrity.^d They were collected and pro-

^a There has been a translation of two chapters on prize by Dr. Robinson, and of some chapters on the ancient or commercial courts, and on recaptures, inserted in the 2d, 3d, and 4th volume of Hall's *American Law Journal*.

^b Bynkershoeck, in his *Quæstiones Jur. Pub. lib. 1. ch. 5.* praises the justice of some of its rules, while he, at the same time, speaks disrespectfully and unjustly of the work at large, as a *farrago legum nauticarum*.

^c *Traité des Assurances*, Pref.

^d Mr. Justice Ware, (*Ware's Rep.* 201.) says that the laws of Oleron, at least

mulgated in the island of Oleron, on the coast of France, in or about the time of Richard I. The French lawyers in the highest repute, such as Cleirac, Valin, and Emerigon, have contended, that the laws of Oleron were a French production, compiled under the direction of Queen Eleanor, Dutchess of Guienne, in the language of Gascony, for the use of the province of Guienne, and the navigation on the coasts of the Atlantic; and that her son, Richard I., who was King of England, as well as Duke of Guienne, adopted and enlarged this collection. Selden, Coke, and Blackstone, on the other hand, have claimed it as an English work, published by Richard I. in his character of King of England.^a It is a proof of the obscurity that covers the early history of the law, that the author of such an important code of legislation as the laws of Oleron, should have been left in so much obscurity as to induce profound antiquaries to adopt different conclusions, in like manner as Spain and Italy have asserted rival claims to the origin of the *Consolato*. The laws of Oleron were borrowed from the Rhodian laws, and the *Consolato*, with alterations and additions,

*13 adapted to the trade of western Europe. They *have served as a model for subsequent sea laws, and have at all times been extremely respected in France, and perhaps equally so in England, though not under the impulse of the same national feeling of partiality. They

in the form in which we now have them, were a code earlier than the Consulate. But Cleirac says that when Queen Eleanor, on her return from the Holy Land, prepared the Project of the laws of Oleron, the Customs of the Sea of the Levant, inserted in the Consulate, were *at the same time* in vogue and in credit in all the East. *Les Us et Coutumes de la Mer*, p. 2.

^a The question is of no sort of moment to us at the present day, but it is quite amusing to observe the zeal with which Azuni, Boucher, and Boulay Paty, engage in the contest. They insist, that the pretension, as they term it, of such men as Selden and Blackstone, was founded on a desire to flatter the English nation, and to deprive the French of the glory of the composition of those nautical ordinances.

have been admitted as authority on admiralty questions in the courts of justice in this country.^a

The laws of Wisbuy were compiled by the merchants of the city of Wisbuy, in the island of Gothland, in the Baltic sea, about the year 1288. It had been contended by some writers, that these laws were more ancient than those of Oleron, or even than the *Consolato*. But Cleirac says, they were but a supplement to the laws of Oleron, and constituted the maritime law of all the Baltic nations north of the Rhine, in like manner as the laws of Oleron governed in England and France, and the provisions of the *Consolato* on the shores of the Mediterranean. They were, on many points, a repetition of the judgments of Oleron, and became the basis of the ordinances of the Hanseatic league.^b

^a See *Walton v. the Ship Neptune*, 1 *Peters' Adm. Dec.* 142. *Natterstrom v. Ship Hazard*, in the District Court of Massachusetts, 2 *Hall's L. J.* 359. *Sims v. Jackson*, 1 *Peters' Adm. Dec.* 157. all of which were decided on the authority of the laws of Oleron. In 1647, it was resolved by the popular government of Rhode Island, that the laws of Oleron should be in force for the benefit of seamen. (1 *Pitkin's History*, 49.) Cleirac published, in the middle of the seventeenth century, the laws of Oleron, in his work entitled, *Les Us et Coutumes de la Mer*, with an excellent commentary. They were translated into English, with the notes of Cleirac, considerably abridged, and published in the collection of sea laws made in the reign of Queen Anne. They have likewise been published in this country in the appendix to the first volume of *Peters' Admiralty Decisions*, from the copy in the *Sea Laws*. There is, likewise, annexed to these reports, a copy of the laws of Wisbuy, of the Hanse Towns, and of the marine ordinances of Louis XIV., and they have given increased interest to a valuable publication.

^b Cleirac, in his preamble to the ordinances of Wisbuy, (*Les Us et Coutumes de la Mer*, p. 136.) gives from Johannes Magnus, and his brother Olaus, the historians of Sweden, and the Goths, a very glowing account of the former wealth and commercial prosperity of Wisbuy, the ancient capital of Gothland, and then a free and independent city. In the eleventh and twelfth centuries it was the most celebrated and flourishing emporium in Europe, and merchants from all parts came there to traffic, and had their shops and warehouses, and enjoyed the same privileges as the native inhabitants. In Cleirac's time, this bright vision had vanished, and the town, with its trade and riches, was destroyed, and little was to be seen but heaps of ruins, the sad evidence of its former splendour and magnificence. Here is one ground for the melancholy admonition of the poet, "That trade's proud empire hastes to swift decay."

The renowned Hanseatic association was begun at least as early as the middle of the thirteenth century, and it originated with the cities of Lubeck, Bremen, and Hamburgh. The free and privileged Hanse Towns became the asylum of commerce, and the retreats of civilization, when the rest of Europe was subjected to the iron sway of the feudal system, and the northern seas were infested by "savage clans, and roving barbarians." Their object was mutual defence against piracy by sea, and pillage by land. They were united by a league offensive and defensive, and with an intercommunity of citizenship and privileges. The association of the cities of Lubeck, Brunswick, Dantzick, and Cologne, commenced in the year 1254, according to Cleirac, and in 1164, according to Azuni; and it became so safe and beneficial a confederacy, that all the cities and large towns on the Baltic, and on the navigable rivers of Germany, to the number of eighty-one, acceded to the union. One of the means adopted by the confederates to insure prosperity to their trade, and to protect them from controversies with each other, was the formation of a code of maritime law. The consuls and deputies of the Hanseatic league, in a general convention at Lubeck in 1614, added to their former ordinances of 1597, (or 1591, as Azuni insists,) from the laws of Oleron, and of Wisbuy, and established a second and larger Hanseatic ordi-

But the logic of the muse is entirely refuted by the stability of commercial power in other illustrious examples. The ancient paved streets, walls, towers, churches, and other public edifices of Wisbuy, the sure evidence of the great commerce, prosperity, wealth, taste, and splendour of this city of the middle ages, still partly exist in considerable preservation, and are objects of deep curiosity and veneration. Mr. Laing, who recently visited this "mother of the Hanseatic cities," gives a very interesting account (*Tour in Sweden in 1838*,) of its present desolate condition, and of its varied and majestic ruins. Wisbuy has long been so insignificant, and so little visited by travellers, that it had almost disappeared from modern Geography, and Mr. Laing's account of it strikes us with somewhat of the freshness and novelty of the discoveries of magnificent ruins in the midst of Syrian and Arabian deserts.

nance, under the *title of the *Jus Hanseaticum Maritimum*, and which was published at Hamburgh in 1667, with a commentary by Kuricke. This digest of nautical usages and regulations, was founded evidently on those of Wisbuy and Oleron, and from the great influence and character of the confederacy, it has always been deemed a compilation of authority.^a

(3.) *Of the maritime legislation of the moderns.*

But all the former ordinances and compilations on maritime law, were in a great degree superseded in public estimation, their authority diminished, and their lustre eclipsed, by the French ordinance upon commerce in 1673, which treated largely of negotiable paper; and more especially by the celebrated marine ordinance of 1681. This monument of the wisdom of the reign of Louis XIV., far more durable and more glorious than all the military trophies won by the valour of his arms, was erected under the influence of the genius and patronage of Colbert, who was not only the minister and secretary of state to the king, but inspector and general superintendent of commerce and navigation. It was by the special direction of that minister, and with a view to illustrate *the ad- *16

^a *Les Us et Coutumes de la Mer*, p. 157—165. Ward, in his *History of the Law of Nations*, vol. ii. 276—290. adduces proofs, that the Hanseatic league exercised the rights of sovereignty as a federal republic, and with considerable strength and vigour, until the fifteenth century. No less than four commercial treaties were concluded between England and the Hanse Towns in the space of three years, from the year 1472 to 1474. But the league was dissolved as soon as the great powers of Europe withdrew their cities from the association; and the members of this confederacy are now reduced to the cities of Lubeck, Hamburgh, and Bremen. *Rym. Fæd.* tom. ix. cited in *Henry's Hist. of Great Britain*, b. 5. ch. 6. *Putter's Constitutional History of Germany*, vol. ii. p. 203. Those Hanseatic cities had a diplomatic representative at Washington in 1827, and in the year following a Convention of "Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, between the United States and the free Hanseatic Republics of Lubeck, Bremen, and Hamburgh," was concluded.

vantages of the commerce of the Indies, that Huet wrote his learned history of the commerce and navigation of the ancients.^a The vigilance and capacity of the ministry of Louis, communicated uncommon vigour to commercial inquiries. They created a marine which shed splendour on his reign, and corresponded in some degree with the extent of his resources. It required such a work as the ordinance to which I have referred, to consolidate the establishment of the maritime power which had been formed by the sagacity of his counsels.

That ordinance, says Valin, was executed in a masterly manner. It was so comprehensive in its plan, so excellent in the arrangement of its parts, so just in its decisions, so wise in its general and particular policy, so accurate and clear in its details, that it deserves to be considered as a model of a perfect code of maritime jurisprudence. The whole law of navigation, shipping, insurance, and bottomry, was systematically collected and arranged. It required the greatest extent of knowledge, and the most correct discernment and liberality of views, to form and execute such a work. It was necessary to examine the commercial usages of all other nations, and select from amidst a contrariety of practice the most approved rules. It was necessary to retrench that which was superfluous, to enlighten that which was obscure, and to supply those things which had escaped the observation of the earlier founders of nautical law, or been recommended by the lights of experience. It is, however, an extraordinary fact, that the able civilians, and perhaps the distinguished merchants, who assumed the task of legislators, and compiled this ordinance, are unknown to fame; and though the event be of so recent a date, and occurred at the most polished and literary era

^a *Hist. du Comm. et de la Navig. des Anciens*, Pref.

in French history, neither letters, nor gratitude, nor national vanity, have been able to rescue their names from oblivion.^a

*Valin supposed he had discovered the source of *17 the materials of the ordinance in a curious and vast compilation of ancient maritime laws, among the manuscript collections in the library of the Duke of Penthièvre. The compilation consisted of the Rhodian and Roman law; of the *Consolato*, and of the use and customs of the sea; of the ordinances of Charles V. and Philip II., kings of Spain; of the judgments of Oleron; of the ordinance of Wisbuy, and of the Teutonic Hanse; of the insurance codes of Antwerp and Amsterdam; of the Guidon, and of all the French ordinances prior to the year 1660. This magnificent repository of commercial science is supposed to have been the true and solid foundation of the fabric erected by artists who had too much modesty to make their work the vehicle of their own immortality. Every commercial nation has rendered homage to the wisdom and integrity of the French ordinance of the marine; and they have regarded it as a digest of the maritime law of civilized Europe. Valin has written a commentary upon every part of it; and it almost rivals the ordinance itself in the weight of its authority, as well as in the equity of its conclusions.^b

^a Valin's *Com. sur l'ord.* Pref. p. 4.

^b The ordinance has been translated and printed in England, and published in the collection entitled *Sea Laws*; and it is annexed to the second volume of Judge Peters' *Admiralty Decisions* in the District Court of Pennsylvania. It has been redigested, with some few modifications and additions, in the new *Commercial Code of France* of 1807; and that code was translated by Mr. Rodman, and published in the city of New-York in 1814. The commercial code was presented to the French legislative body by the counsellors of state in 1807, as having been conceived, meditated, discussed, and established, *by the inspiration of the greatest man in history, the Hero-Pacifier of Europe, while he was bearing his triumphant eagles to the banks of the astonished Vistula*; and yet, in contradiction to much of this adulation and incense, the code will be found, upon sober examination, to be essentially a republication, in a new form, of the

In addition to these general codes of commercial legislation, there have been a number of local ordinances of distinguished credit, relating to nautical matters and marine insurance, such as the ordinances of Barcelona, Florence, Amsterdam, Antwerp, Copenhagen, and Königsberg. There have also been several treatises on nautical subjects by learned civilians in the several countries of Europe, which are of great authority and reputation.^a

The English nation never had any general and solemnly enacted code of maritime law, resembling those which have been mentioned as belonging to the other European nations, and promulgated by legislative authority. This deficiency was supplied, not only by several extensive private compilations,^b but it has been more eminently and more authoritatively supplied by a series of judicial decisions, commencing about the middle of the last century. Those decisions have shown, to the admiration of the world, the masterly acquaintance of the English judiciary with the principles and spirit of commercial policy and general jurisprudence, and they have afforded undoubted proofs of the entire independence, impartiality, and purity of the administration of justice. The numerous cases in the books of reports which have arisen

ordinance of 1673, relative to negotiable paper, and of the marine ordinance of 1681, digested under the orders of Colbert, and illustrated by the commentaries of Valin. It is entitled, however, to the merit of some improvements on the former ordinances, and of being more comprehensive in its plan and execution; for it embraces the subjects of partnership, common carriers, bankruptcy, insolvency, and stoppage *in transitu*.

^a Those ordinances are collected by Magens, in the second volume of his *Essay on Insurances*; and Mr. Cushing, in a learned note to his translation of Pothier on *Maritime Contracts of Letting to Hire*, published at Boston in 1821, has alluded to the most distinguished writers in Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, Germany, and Sweden, on maritime law.

^b Among the private treatises, the most distinguished are those of Malynes, Molloy, Beawes, Postlewaite, Magens, Wesket, Millar, Park, Marshall, Abbott, Chitty, Holt, Lawes, and Benecke.

upon maritime questions, resemble elementary treatises in the depth, extent, and variety of their researches, while they *partake, at the same time, of the pre- *19cision and authority of legislative enactments.

Lord Mansfield, at a very early period of his judicial life, introduced to the notice of the English bar, the Rhodian laws, the *Consolato del mare*, the laws of Oleron, the treatises of Roccus, the laws of Wisbuy, and, above all, the marine ordinances of Louis XIV., and the commentary of Valin. These authorities were cited by him in *Luke v. Lyde*,^a and from that time a new direction was given to English studies, and new vigour, and more liberal and enlarged views, communicated to forensic investigations. Since the year 1798, the decisions of Sir William Scott (now Lord Stowell) on the admiralty side of Westminster Hall, have been read and admired in every region of the Republic of letters, as models of the most cultivated and the most enlightened human reason. The English maritime law can now be studied in the adjudged cases with at least as much profit, and with vastly more pleasure, than in the dry and formal didactic treatises and ordinances professedly devoted to the science. The doctrines are there reasoned out at large, and practically applied. The arguments at the bar, and the opinions from the bench, are intermingled with the gravest reflections, the most scrupulous morality, the soundest policy, and a thorough acquaintance with all the various topics that concern the great social interests of mankind.

Nor has our learned profession in this country been wanting in the study and cultivation of maritime law. Our improvement has been rapid and our career illustrious, since the adoption of the present constitution of the United States. There have been several respecta-

ble treatises on subjects of commercial law, and some of them we may notice, when we are upon the branches to which they are applied. The decisions in the federal courts, in commercial cases, have done credit to the moral and intellectual character of the nation; and the admiralty courts in particular have displayed great *20 *research, and a familiar knowledge, of the principles of the marine law of Europe. But I should omit doing justice to my own feelings, as well as to the cause of truth, if I were not to select the decisions in *Gallison's* and *Mason's Reports*, as specimens of pre-eminent merit. They may fairly be placed upon a level with the best productions of the English admiralty, for deep and accurate learning, as well as for the highest ability and wisdom in decision.

The reports of judicial decisions in the several states, and especially in the states of Massachusetts, New-York, and Pennsylvania, evince great attention to maritime questions; and they contain abundant proofs, that our courts have been dealing largely with the business of an enterprising and commercial people. Maritime law became early and anxiously an object of professional research. If we take the reports of New-York in chronological order, we shall find, that the first five volumes occupy the period when Alexander Hamilton was a leading advocate at our bar. That accomplished lawyer (for it is in that character only that I am now permitted to refer to him) showed, by his precepts and practice, the value to be placed on the decisions of Lord Mansfield. He was well acquainted with the productions of Valin and Emerigon; and if he be not truly one of the founders of the commercial law of this state, he may at least be considered as among the earliest of those jurists who recommended those authors to the notice of the profession, and rendered the study and citation of them popular and familiar. His arguments on commercial, as well as on

other questions, were remarkable for freedom and energy; and he was eminently distinguished for completely exhausting every subject which he discussed, and leaving no argument or objection on the adverse side unnoticed and unanswered. He traced doctrines to their source, or probed them to their foundations, and at the same time paid the highest deference and respect to sound authority. The reported cases do no kind of justice to his close and accurate logic; to his powerful and comprehensive intellect; *to the extent of *21 his knowledge, or the eloquence of his illustrations.

We may truly apply to the efforts of his mind, the remark of Mr. Justice Buller, in reference to the judicial opinions of another kindred genius, that "principles were stated, reasoned upon, enlarged and explained, until those who heard him were lost in admiration at the strength and stretch of the human understanding."

LECTURE XLIII.

OF THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP.

PARTNERSHIP contracts have been found, by experience, to be convenient to persons engaged in trade, and useful to the community. Merchants are thereby enabled to consolidate their credit, and extend their business. With the aid of joint counsel and accumulated capital, a spirit of enterprise is sensibly awakened, and boldness of plan and vigour of exertion communicated to mercantile concerns. Partnerships have grown with the growth, and multiplied with the extension of trade; and the law by which they are regulated has been improved by the study and adoption of the best usages which the genius of commerce has introduced. It has also been cultivated and greatly enlarged, under a course of judicial decisions, until the law of partnership has at last attained the precision of a regular branch of science, and forms a distinguished part of the code of commercial jurisprudence.

In treating of this subject, I shall consider, (1.) The nature, creation, and extent of partnerships; (2.) The rights and duties of partners, in their relation to each other, and to the public; (3.) The dissolution of the contract.

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(1.) *Of the nature, creation, and extent of partnerships.*

Partnership is a contract of two or more persons, to place their money, effects, labour, and skill, or some, or

all of them, in lawful commerce or business, and
 *24 to divide the profit, and *bear the loss, in certain proportions.^a The two leading principles of the contract are, a common interest in the stock of the company, and a personal responsibility for the partnership engagements. The common interest of the partners applies to all the partnership property, whether vested in the first instance by their several contributions to the common stock, or acquired afterwards in the course of the partnership business; and *that* property is first liable for the debts of the company; and after they are paid, and the partnership dissolved, then it is subject to a division among the members, or their representatives, according to agreement. If one person advances funds, and another furnishes his personal services or skill, in carrying on a trade, and is to share in the profits, it amounts to a partnership.^b But each party must engage to bring into the common stock something that is valuable; and a mutual contribution of that which has
 *25 value, and can be appreciated, is *of the essence

^a *Puffendorf, Droit de la Nat.* liv. 5. ch. 8. s. 1. *Pothier, Traité du Contrat de Société*, No. 1. *Repertoire de Jurisprudence*, art. *Société*. The French ordinance of 1673, required the contract of partnership to be reduced to writing and registered; but that was the introduction of a new rule; and the regulation had gone into disuse in the time of Pothier, though he considered it to be a sage provision. (*Pothier, ibid.* No. 79. 82. 93.) The new French commercial code has retained the regulation of the ordinance, and it requires an abstract of the articles of partnership to be attested, and publicly registered; but the omission, though injurious to the parties as between themselves, does not affect the rights of third persons. (*Code de Com.* art. 39—44.) So, by the commercial *Ordinances of Bilboa*, confirmed by Philip V. in 1737, edit. N. Y. 1824, ch. 10. sec. 4. it was made necessary, in every partnership, to reduce the articles to writing, and acknowledge them before a notary, and file a copy with the university, and house of trade. This would seem not to be now the general law in Spain; for it is admitted, that partnerships may be formed, as in the English law, tacitly as well as expressly. (*Institutes of the Civil Law of Spain* by Asso & Manuel, b. 2. c. 15., translated by Johnston, London, 1825.) In Missouri no person or co-partnership shall deal as a merchant without a license. *R. S. of Missouri*, 1835, p. 403.

^b *Dob v. Halsey*, 16 *Johns. Rep.* 34.

of the contract.^a It would be a valid partnership, notwithstanding the whole capital was, in the first instance, advanced by one party, if the other contributed his time and skill to the business, and although his proportion of gain and loss was to be very unequal. It is sufficient that his interest in the profits be not intended as a mere substitute for a commission, or in lieu of brokerage, and that he be received into the association as a merchant, and not as an agent.^b A joint possession renders persons tenants in common, but it does not, of itself, constitute them partners; and, therefore, surviving partners, and the representatives of a deceased partner, are not partners, notwithstanding they have a community of interest in the joint stock.^c There must be a communion of profit to constitute a partnership as between the parties. They must not be jointly concerned in the purchase only, but jointly concerned in the future sale. A joint purchase, with a view to separate and distinct sales by each person on his own account, is not sufficient. If several persons, who had never met and contracted together as partners, agree to purchase goods in the name

^a *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Soc.* No. 3, 9, 10. *Ferrière, sur Inst.* 3. 26. *Code Napoleon*, No. 1833.

^b *Reid v. Hollinshead*, 4 *Barnew. & Cress.* 367. The test of partnership is a community of profit, a specific interest in the profits, *as profits*, in contradistinction to a stipulated portion of the profits as a compensation for services. *Loomis v. Marshall*, 12 *Conn. Rep.* 69. *Champion v. Bostwick*, 18 *Wendell*, 175. *Vandenburgh v. Hull*, 20 *ibid.* 70. To be a partner, one must have such an interest in the profits as will entitle him to *an account*, and give him a specific lien or preference in payment over other creditors. There is a distinction between a stipulation for a compensation for labour proportioned to the profits which does not make a person a partner, and a stipulation for an interest in such profits, which entitles the party to an account as a partner. 1 *Rose R.* 91. *Carey on Partnerships*, 11. n. 1.; and this Mr. Chancellor Walworth held to be a sound distinction as regards the rights of third persons. 18 *Wendell*, 184, 185. It is further a general principle in partnerships that no one partner is entitled to compensation for his services to the firm, nor for interest upon moneys advanced to, or deposited with the firm for its use, without a special agreement, or some very peculiar circumstances to justify it. *Lee v. Lashbrooke*, 3 *Dana*, 214.

^c *Pearce v. Chamberlain*, 2 *Vesey*, 33.

of one of them only, and to take *aliquot* shares of the purchase, and employ a common agent for the purpose, they do not, by that act, become partners, or answerable to the seller in that character, provided they are not to be jointly concerned in the resale of their shares, and have not permitted the agent to hold them out as jointly answerable with himself.^a The same distinction was known in the

civil law: *qui nolunt inter se contendere, solent per nuntium rem emere in commune; quod a societate longe remotum.*^b It has been repeatedly recognised in this country, and may be considered as a settled rule.^c

If the purchase be on separate, and not on joint account, yet if the interests of the purchasers are afterwards mingled, with a view to a joint sale, a partnership exists from the time that the shares are brought into a common mass.^d A participation in the loss or profit, or holding himself out to the world as a partner, so as to induce others to give credit on that assurance, renders a person responsible as a partner.^e A partnership necessarily implies a union of two or more persons; and if a single individual, for the purpose of a fictitious credit, was to assume a co-partnership name or firm, the only real partnership principle that could be applicable to his case, would be the preference to be given to creditors dealing with him under that description, in the distribution of his effects. But that would be inadmissible, and contrary to the grounds upon which partnerships are created and sustained; and so the law on this point has, in another country, been understood and declared.^f If the partnership consists of a

^a Hoare v. Dawes, *Doug.* 371. Coope v. Eyre, 1 *H. Blacks.* 37. Gibson v. Lupton, 9 *Bingham*, 297.

^b *Dig.* 17. 2. 33.

^c Holmes v. United Insurance Company, 2 *Johns. Cases*, 329. Post v. Kimberly, 9 *Johns. Rep.* 470. Osborne v. Brennan, 2 *Nott & M'Cord*, 427.

^d Sims v. Willing, 8 *Serg. & Rawle*, 103.

^e Lord Ellenborough. M'Iver v. Humble, 16 *East*, 173.

^f Nairn v. Sir William Forbes, *Bell's Commentaries on the Law of Scotland*, vol. ii. 625.

large unincorporated association, or joint stock company, trading upon a joint stock, it is usually regulated by special agreement; but the established law of the land, in reference to such partnerships, is the same as in ordinary cases, and every member of the company (whatever private arrangement there may be to the contrary between the members, and which is only a mischievous delusion) is liable for all the debts of the concern.^a

It is, however, the judicial language *in some of the *27 cases,^b that the members of a private association *may* limit their personal responsibility, if there be an explicit stipulation to that effect, made with the party with whom they contract, and clearly understood by him at the time. But stipulations of that kind are looked upon unfavourably, as being contrary to the general policy of the law; and it would require a direct previous notice of the intended limitation to the party dealing with the company, and his clear understanding of the terms of the limitation. Incorporated companies, though constituted expressly for the purposes of trade, are not partnerships, or joint traders, within the purview of the law of partnership, and the stockholders are not personally responsible for the company's debts or engagements, and their property is affected only to the extent of their interest in the company. To render them personally liable, requires an express provision in the act of incorporation; and a disposition to create such an extended responsibility, seems to be increasing in our country, and is calculated to check the enterprise of such institutions, and impair the credit and value of them as safe investments of capital.

^a The King *v.* Dodd, 9 *East*, 516. *Holmes v. Higgins*, 1 *Barnw. & Cress.* 74. *Hess v. Werts*, 4 *Serg. & Rawle*, 356. *Carlen v. Drury*, 1 *Ves. & Bea.* 157. *Keasley v. Codd*, cited in a note to the case of *Perring v. Hone*, 2 *Carr. & Payne*, 401. *Vigers v. Sainet*, 13 *Louisiana Rep.* 300.

^b *Gibson, J.*, *Hess v. West*, 4 *Serg. & Rawle*, 491. *Platt, J.*, *Skinner v. Dayton*, 19 *Johnson*, 537.

A contract of partnership need not be in writing. Though there be no express articles of co-partnership, the obligation of a partnership engagement may equally be implied in the acts of the parties; and if persons have a mutual interest in the profits and loss of any business carried on by them, or if they hold themselves out to the world as joint traders, they will be held responsible as partners to third persons, whatever may be the real nature of their connexion, or of the agreement under which they act. If a person partakes of the profits, he is answerable as a partner for losses, on the principle, that by taking a part of the profits, he takes from the creditors a part of the fund which is the proper security for the payment of their debts.^a

*28 *It is not essential to a legal partnership, that it be confined to commercial business. It may exist between attorneys, conveyancers, mechanics, owners of a line of stagecoaches, artisans, or farmers, as well as between merchants and bankers.^b The essence of the association is, that they be jointly concerned in profit and loss, or in profit only, in some honest and lawful business, not immoral in itself, nor prohibited by the law of the land; and this is a principle of universal reception.^c The contract must be for the common benefit of all the parties

^a *Voet. Comm. ad Pand.* 17. 2. 1. *De Grey*, Ch. J., *Grace v. Smith*, 2 *Blacks. Rep.* 998. *Eyre*, Ch. J., *Waugh v. Carver*, 2 *H. Blacks.* 247. *Cheap v. Cramond*, 4 *Barnw. & Ald.* 663. *Peacock v. Peacock*, 16 *Vesey*, 49. *Spencer, J.*, *Dob v. Halsey*, 16 *Johns. Rep.* 40.

^b *Willet v. Chambers*, *Cowp.* 314. *Gould, J.*, *Coope v. Eyre*, 1 *H. Blacks.* 43. *Pothier, Traité de Soc.* No. 55. *Fromont v. Coupland*, 2 *Bingham*, 170. Associations for buying or selling personal property as factors or brokers, or for carrying personal property for hire in ships, are in the *Louisiana Code*, art. 2796, termed commercial partnerships. There may be a partnership to trade in land, and limited to purchasing, and the profit and loss divisible as stock. This result does not necessarily follow from a joint purchase. *Campbell v. Colhoun*, 1 *Penn.* 140.

^c *Dig.* 18. 1. 35. 2. *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Soc.* n. 14. *Briggs v. Lawrence*, 3 *Term Rep.* 454. *Aubert v. Maze*, 2 *Bos. & Pull.* 371. *Griswold v. Waddington*, 16 *Johns. Rep.* 489.

to the association; and though the shares need not be equal, yet, as a general rule, all must partake of the profit in some ratable proportion; and that proportion, as well as the mode of conducting the business, may be modified and regulated by private agreement, at the pleasure of the parties. If there be no such agreement on the subject, and no evidence to the contrary, the general conclusion of law is, that the partnership losses are to be equally borne, and the profits equally divided;^a and this would be the rule, *even though the contribution between the *29 parties consisted entirely of money by one, and entirely of labour by another. In equity, according to Pothier, each partner should share in the profit in proportion to the value of what he brings into the common stock, whether it be money, goods, labour, or skill; and he should share in the loss in a ratio to the gain to which he would, in a prosperous issue to the business, have been entitled. He admits, however, that the proportion of gain and loss may be varied by agreement; and the agreement may render the extra labour of one of the concern, equal to the risk of loss, and a substitute for his share of loss.^b

It is not necessary that every member of the company should, in every event, participate in the profits. It would be a valid partnership, according to the civil law, if one of the members had a reasonable expectation of profit, and was, in consequence of his particular art and calling, employed to sell, and to have a share of the profits if they exceeded a certain sum, provided this was granted to him by reason of his pains and skill, and not as a gratuity.^c So, one partner may retire under an agreement

^a *Inst.* 3. 26. 1. *Pothier, ub. sup.* n. 73. *Peacock v. Peacock*, 16 *Vesey*, 49. *Gould v. Gould*, 6 *Wendell*, 263.

^b *Pothier, ub. sup.* No. 15—19. n. 25.

^c *Dig.* 17. 2. 44. *Pothier, ub. sup.* n. 13.

to abide his proportion of risk of loss, and take a sum in gross for his share of future uncertain profits; or he may take a gross sum as his share of the presumed profits, with an agreement that the remaining partners are to assume all risks of loss.^a But a partnership, in which the entire profit was to belong to some of them, in exclusion of others, would be manifestly unjust; and as between the parties themselves, it would not be a proper partnership.^b It would be what the Roman lawyers called *societas leonina*, in allusion to the fable of the lion, *30 who, having entered into *a partnership with the other animals of the forest, in hunting, appropriated to himself all the prey.^c

There may be a general partnership at large, or it may be limited to a particular branch of business, or to one particular subject.^d There may be a partnership in the goods in a particular adventure, or it may be confined to the profits thereof.^e If two persons should draw a bill of exchange, they are considered as partners in respect to the bill, though in every other respect they remain distinct. By appearing on the bill as partners, the person to whom it is negotiated is to collect the relation of the parties from the bill itself, and they are not permitted to deny the conclusion.^f This principle has not been extended to the case of two persons signing a joint note,^g

^a *Pothier, Traité de Soc.* n. 25, 26.

^b *Lowry v. Brooks*, 2 *M'Cord's Rep.* 421. *Bailey v. Clark*, 6 *Pick.* 372.

^c *Dig.* 17. 2. 29. 2. *Pothier, ub. sup.* No. 12. *Institutes of the Laws of Holland*, by J. Vander Linden, translated by J. Henry, Esq., p. 571. 2 *Bell's Comm.* 615.

^d Lord Mansfield. *Willet v. Chambers*, *Cowp.* 816. *Code Napoléon*, No. 1841.

^e *Solomons v. Nissen*, 2 *Term.* 675. *Ex parte Gellar*, 1 *Rose*, 297. *Holmes v. Higgins*, 1 *Barnw. & Cress.* 72. *Mayer v. Sharpe*, 5 *Taunton*, 74. *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Soc.* No. 54.

^f *Carvick v. Vickery*, *Doug.* 653. note. *De Berkorn v. Smith*, 1 *Esp.* 29.

^g *Hopkins v. Smith*, 11 *Johns. Rep.* 161.

though it is not easy to perceive a distinction between the cases.^a

*There is no difficulty, in the ordinary course of *31 business, with the case of an actual partner, who appears in his character of an *ostensible* partner. The question as to the person on whom the responsibility of partner ought to attach in respect to third persons, arises in the case of *dormant* partners, who participate in the profits of the

^a The Roman law, which has been followed in France, distinguished between two kinds of universal partnership, the one *universorum bonorum*, and the other *universorum quæ ex quæstu veniunt*. By the first, the parties put into common stock all their property, real and personal, then existing, or thereafter to be acquired. All future acquisitions by purchase, gift, legacy, or descent, went into this partnership as of course, without assignment, unless the gift or legacy was declared to be under the condition of not being placed there. Such a partnership was charged with all the debts of the parties at its commencement, and with all the future debts, and personal and family expenses. The validity of such a partnership was not questioned, notwithstanding it might be extremely unequal, and one might bring much more property into it than another, and acquire ten times as much by gift, purchase, or succession, and notwithstanding one partner might have a family of children, and another be destitute of any. (*Pothier, Traité du Con. de Soc.* No. 28—42.) We need not be apprehensive that such a partnership will become infectious, for it appears to be fruitful in abuse and discord; and in the *Code Napoleon*, No. 1837, the more forbidding features of the connexion are removed. Though it embraces all the existing property of the parties, and every species of gains, it does not, under the code, extend to property to be acquired by gift, legacy, or inheritance, and every stipulation to that effect is prohibited. The *Civil Code of Louisiana*, which has throughout closely followed the *Code Napoleon*, has recognised these universal partnerships applying to all existing property; but they must be created in writing, and registered, and they are under the checks mentioned in the French code. *Civil Code of Louisiana*, No. 2800—2805.

The other species of universal partnership applies only to future profits, from whatever source they may be derived; and it is formed when the parties agree to a partnership without any further explanation. In this case, the separate acquisitions of each, by legacy or inheritance, are kept separate, and do not enter into the common mass; nor does it embrace present real property, but only the future issues and profits of it; and it is not, of course, chargeable with existing debts, though it was formerly chargeable with them when made in that part of France, under the *Droit Coutumier*. (*Pothier, ub. sup.* n. 43—52. *Code Napoleon*, No. 1838.) The same kind of general partnerships, embracing all the present and future property of the parties, is known in the laws of Spain and of Holland. *Institutes of the Civil Law of Spain*, by Doctors Asso & Manuel, b. 2. c. 15. *Institutes of the Laws of Holland*, by J. Vander Linden, translated by J. Henry, Esq., p. 573.

trade, and conceal their names. They are equally liable when discovered, as if their names had appeared in the firm, and although they were unknown to be partners at the time of the creation of the debt.^a The question *32 arises also in the case of a *nominal* or implied *partner, who has no actual interest in the trade, or its profits, and he becomes responsible as a partner by voluntarily suffering his name to appear to the world as a partner, by which means he lends to the partnership the sanction of his credit.^b There is a just and marked distinction between partnership as respects the public, and partnership as respects the parties; and a person may be held liable as a partner to third persons, although the agreement does not create a partnership as between the parties themselves. Though the law allows parties to regulate their concerns as they please in regard to each other, they cannot, by arrangement among themselves, control their responsibility to others; and it is not competent for a person, who partakes of the profits of a trade, however small his share of those profits may be, to with-

^a Robinson v. Wilkinson, 3 *Price's Exch. Rep.* 538. Lord Loughborough, 1 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 48. Pitts v. Waugh, 4 *Mass. Rep.* 424. Duncan, J., 8 *Serg. & Rawle*, 55. Porter, J., 5 *Miller's Louis. Rep.* 406, 408. A dormant partner cannot join as plaintiff in an action, for there is no privity of communication between him and the party who contracted with the firm. He is nevertheless suable as a defendant, because he participated in the profits of the contract. Lloyd v. Archbold, 2 *Taunton*, 324. Boardman v. Keeler, 3 *Vermont Rep.* 65. If one partner borrows money in his individual name, a dormant partner is equally liable, if the borrower represented it to be for the use of the partnership, though without such a representation, the creditor must prove that the money went to a partnership use. Etheridge v. Binney, 9 *Pink.* 272. Lloyd v. Ashby, 2 *Carr. & Payne*, 138. The statute law of New-York, of 1833, (*Laws N. Y.* sess. 56. ch. 281.) has checked the use of fictitious firms, by declaring that no person shall transact business in the name of a partner not interested in his firm; and that where the designation "and company" or "& Co." is used, it shall represent an actual partner or partners, and the violation of the provision is made a penal offence.

^b Guidon v. Robson, 2 *Campb.* 802. Young v. Axtell, cited in 2 *H. Blacks.* 242. Porter, J., 5 *Miller's Louis. Rep.* 408, 409. Fox v. Clifton, 6 *Bingham*, 776.

draw himself from the obligations of a partner.^a Each individual member is answerable *in solido* to the whole amount of the debts, without reference to the proportion of his interest, or to the nature of the stipulation between him and his associates. Even if it were the intention of the parties that they should not be partners, and the person to be charged was not to contribute either money or labour, or to receive any part of the profits, yet, if he lends his name as a partner, or suffers his name to continue in the firm after he has ceased to be an actual partner, he is responsible to third persons as a partner, for he may induce third persons to give that credit to the firm which otherwise it *would not receive, nor perhaps deserve. *33 This principle of law inculcates good faith and ingenuous dealing, and it is now regarded by the English courts as a fundamental doctrine.^b It has been explicitly asserted with us, and is now incorporated in the jurisprudence of this country.^c So strict is the law on this point, that even if executors, in the disinterested performance of a trust, continue the testator's share in a partnership concern in trade, for the benefit of his infant children, they may render themselves personally liable as dormant partners.^d

^a *Waugh v. Carver*, 2 *H. Blacks.* 235. *Hesketh v. Blanchard*, 4 *East*, 144. Nor can a partner exonerate himself from personal responsibility for the existing engagements of the company, by assigning or selling out his interest in the concern. *Perring v. Hone*, 2 *Carr. & Payne*, 401.

^b *Hoare v. Dawes*, *Doug. Rep.* 371. *Grace v. Smith*, 2 *Wm. Blacks. Rep.* 998. *Waugh v. Carver*, 2 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 235. *Baker v. Charlton*, *Peake's N. P. Rep.* 30. *Hesketh v. Blanchard*, 4 *East*, 144. Ex parte Hamper, 17 *Vesey*, 404. Ex parte Langdale, 18 *Vesey*, 300. *Carlen v. Drury*, 1 *Ves. & Bea.* 157. *Cheap v. Cramond*, 4 *Barnw. & Ald.* 663. *Best, J., Smith v. Watson*, 2 *Barnw. & Cress.* 401. *Lacy v. Woolcott*, 2 *Dowling & R.* 458.

^c *Purviance v. M'Clintee*, 6 *Serg. & Rawle*, 259. *Gill v. Kuhn*, *ibid.* 333. *Thompson, J., in Post v. Kimberly*, 9 *Johnson*, 489. *Dob v. Halsey*, 16 *Johns. Rep.* 40. *Shubrick v. Fisher*, 2 *Desauss. Ch. Rep.* 148. *Osborne v. Brennan*, 2 *Nott & M'Cord*, 427.

^d *Wightman v. Townroe*, 1 *Maule & Selw.* 412. The better way would be, for the executors, in such cases, to have the trade carried on for the benefit of

A person may be allowed, in special cases, to receive part of the profits of a business without becoming a legal or responsible partner. Thus a party may by agreement receive, by way of rent, a portion of the profits of a farm or tavern, without becoming a partner.^a So, to allow a clerk, or agent, a portion of the profits of sales as a compensation for labour, or a factor such a per centage on the amount of sales, does not render the agent or factor a partner, when it appears to be intended merely as a mode of payment adopted to increase and secure exertion, and when it is not understood to be an

*34 *interest in the profits in the character of profits, and there is no mutuality between the parties. So, seamen take a share by agreement with the ship-owner, in the profits of a whale fishery or coasting voyage, by way of compensation for their services; and shipments from this country to India, upon half profits, are usual, and the responsibility of partners has never been supposed to flow from such special agreements.^b This distinction seems to be definitely established by a series of decisions, and it is not now to be questioned; and yet Lord Eldon regarded the distinction with regret, and mentioned it frequently, with pointed disapprobation, as being too refined and subtle, and the reason of which, he said, he could not well comprehend.^c

the infants, under the direction of the Court of Chancery, as has frequently been done in England. See 4 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 627.

^a *Perrine v. Hankinson*, 6 *Halst.* 181.

^b *Dixon v. Cooper*, 3 *Wils.* 40. *Cheap v. Cramond*, 4 *Barnw. & Ald.* 670. *Benjamin v. Porteus*, 2 *H. Blacks.* 590. *Meyer v. Sharpe*, 5 *Taunton*, 74. *Hesketh v. Blanchard*, 4 *East*, 144. *Dry v. Boswell*, 1 *Campb. N. P.* 329. *Wilkenson v. Frazier*, 4 *Esp. N. P.* 182. *Mair v. Glennie*, 4 *Maule & Selw.* 240. *Geddes v. Wallace*, 2 *Bligh*, 270. *Muzzy v. Whitney*, 10 *Johns. Rep.* 226. *Rice v. Austin*, 17 *Mass. Rep.* 206. *Lowry v. Brooks*, 2 *M' Cord*, 421. *Baxter v. Rodman*, 3 *Pick.* 435. *Cutler v. Winsor*, 6 *Pick.* 335. *Hardin v. Foxcroft*, 6 *Greenleaf*, 76. *The Crusader*, *Ware's Rep.* 437. See also *supra*, p. 25. n. 6.

^c *Ex parte Hamper*, 17 *Vesey*, 404. *Ex parte Rowlandson*, 1 *Rose*, 89. *Ex parte Watson*, 19 *Vesey*, 458. *Miller v. Bartlet*, 15 *Serg. & Rawle*, 137.

The English law does not admit of partnerships with a restricted responsibility. In many parts of Europe, limited partnerships are admitted, provided they be entered upon a register.^a Thus, in France, by the ordinance of 1673, limited partnerships (*la Société en commandite*) were established, by which one or more persons, responsible *in solido* as general partners, were associated with one or more sleeping partners, who furnished a certain proportion of capital, and were liable only to the extent of the funds furnished. This kind of partnership has been continued and regulated by the new code of commerce;^b and it is likewise introduced into the *Louisianian code, under the title of partnership in *35 *commendam*.^c It is supposed to be well calculated to bring dormant capital into active and useful employment; and this species of partnership has, accordingly, been authorized by statute in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Indiana, and Michigan, as well as in New-York. It is declared, in the latter state,^d that a limited partnership for the transaction of any mercantile, mechanical, or manufacturing business within the state,^e may consist of one or more persons jointly and severally

Mr. Cary, in his recent treatise on the *Law of Partnership*, p. 11, vindicates the principle on which the above distinction is founded, and insists that it is perfectly clear and just. *Collyer* also, in a still more recent treatise on the *Law of Partnership*, p. 17, is in favour of the reasonableness of the distinction in the cases where there is, and where there is not, a mutual interest in the profits.

^a Lord Loughborough, 1 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 43.

^b *Repertoire de Jurisprudence, par Merlin*, tit. *Société*, art. 2. *Code de Commerce*, b. 1. tit. 3. sec. 1.

^c *Civil Code of Louisiana*, art. 2810.

^d *Laws of N. Y.* April, 1822, sess. 45. ch. 244, and sess. 50. ch. 238; re-enacted by *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 764, with some slight variations.

^e In New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, South Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, and Connecticut, the business of banking and insurance is specially excepted.

responsible according to the existing laws, who are called *general* partners, and one or more persons who furnish certain funds to the common stock, and whose liability shall extend no further than the fund furnished, and who are called *special* partners. The names of the special partners are not to be used in the firm, which shall contain the names of the general partners only, without the addition of the word *company*, or any other general term; nor are they to transact any business on account of the partnership, or be employed for that purpose as agents, attorneys, or otherwise; but they may, nevertheless, advise as to the management of the partnership concern. Before such a partnership can act, a registry thereof must be made in the clerk's office of the county, with an accompanying certificate signed by the parties, and duly acknowledged, and containing the title of the firm, the general nature of the business, the names of the partners, the amount of capital furnished by the special partners, and the period of the partnership. The capital advanced by the special partners must be in cash, and an affidavit filed stating the fact. Publication must likewise be made for at least six weeks of the terms of the partnership, and due publication for four weeks of the dissolution of the partnership by the act of the parties prior to the time specified in the certificate. No such partnership can make assignments or transfers, or create any lien, with the intent to give preference to creditors. The special partners may receive an annual interest on the capital invested, provided there be no reduction of the

*36 original capital; but they cannot be permitted to claim as creditors, in case of the insolvency of the partnership.^a It is easy to perceive, that the provisions

^a It has been ruled in *Hubbard v. Morgan*, U. S. D. C. for N. Y., May, 1839, that the special partner must, at his peril, see that the law is complied with in all its essentials, or he will be liable as a general partner.

of the act have been taken, in most of the essential points, from the French regulations in the commercial code ; and it is the first instance in the history of the legislation of New-York, that the statute law of any other country than that of Great Britain, has been closely imitated and adopted. The provision for limited partnerships in the other states (and which were subsequent in point of time to that in New-York) is essentially the same.

It is a general and well established principle, that when a person joins a partnership as a member, he does not, without a special promise, assume the previous debts of the firm, nor is he bound by them. To render persons jointly liable upon a contract as partners, they must have a joint interest contemporary with the formation of the contract.^a If, however, goods are purchased in pursuance of a previous agreement between two or more persons, that one of them should purchase the goods on joint account, in a foreign adventure, they are all answerable to the seller for the price, as partners, even though their names were not announced to the seller ; for the previous agreement made the partnership precede the purchase, and a joint interest attached in the goods at the instant of the purchase.^b

II. *Of the rights and duties of partners in their relation to each other, and to the public.*

(1.) *Of the interest of partners in their stock in trade.*

Partners are joint tenants of their stock in trade, but without the *jus accrescendi*, or right of survivorship ; and this, according to Lord Coke,^c was part of the law-merchant, for the advancement and continuance of commerce

^a Saville v. Robertson, 4 Term Rep. 720. Young v. Hunter, 4 Taunt. Rep. 582. Poindexter v. Waddy, 6 Munf. Rep. 418.

^b Gouthwaite v. Duckworth, 12 East, 421.

^c Co. Litt. 182. a.

and trade. It would seem, however, to have been a point of some doubt as late as the middle of the seventeenth century, whether the doctrine of survivorship did not apply; for the Lord Keeper, *in *Jeffereys v. Small*,^a observed, that it was common, at that time, for traders, in articles of co-partnership, to provide against survivorship, though he declared that the provision was clearly unnecessary. On the death of one partner, his representatives become tenants in common with the survivor, and with respect to *choses in action*, survivorship so far exists at law, that the remedy to reduce them into possession vests exclusively in the survivor, for the benefit of all the parties in interest.^b But no partner has an exclusive right to any part of the joint stock, until a balance of accounts be struck between him and his co-partners, and the amount of his interest accurately ascertained. The interest of each partner in the partnership property, is his share in the surplus, after the partnership accounts are settled, and all just claims satisfied.^c

If partnership capital be invested in land for the benefit of the company, though it may be a joint tenancy in law, yet equity will hold it to be a tenancy in common, and as forming part of the partnership fund; and the better opinion would seem to be, that equity will consider the person in whom the legal estate is vested, as trustee for the whole concern, and the property will be entitled to be distributed as personal estate.^d The

^a 1 Vern. 217.

^b *Martin v. Crompe*, 1 Lord Raym. 340. Daniel, J., in *Proctor v. Pool*, 4 Dev. N. C. Rep. 369.

^c *Nicoll v. Mumford*, 4 Johns. Ch. Rep. 522. *Fox v. Hanbury*, Cowp. Rep. 445. *Taylor v. Fields*, 4 Vesey, 396. 15 Vesey, 559. note, S. C. Parsons, Ch. J., in *Pierce v. Jackson*, 6 Mass. Rep. 242.

^d *Thornton v. Dixon*, 3 Bro. Ch. Cas. 199. Lord Loughborough, in *Smith v. Smith*, 5 Vesey, 189. *Ripley v. Waterworth*, 7 Vesey, 424. *Featherstengah v. Fenwick*, 17 Vesey, 298. Lord Eldon, in *Townsend v. Devaynes*,

point has been extensively discussed and *considered in this country, and the cases are not inconsistent with this principle, when they admit, upon grounds of reason and policy, that real estate, acquired with partnership funds, and held by partners in common, may be conveyed or charged by one partner, on his private account, to the extent of his legal title, whether that legal title covers the whole, or a part of the estate; provided the purchaser or mortgagee dealt with him *bona fide*, and without notice of the partnership rights, and there was nothing in the transaction from which notice might reasonably be inferred.^a In Tennessee, an estate so held in joint tenancy by partners for the purposes of trade, may be sold by the survivor, in whom is the legal title; but he will be subject to account to the representatives of the deceased partner for their proportion of the proceeds.^b

cited in *Gow on Partnership*, 54. edit. Phil. 1825; in *Selkirk v. Davies*, 2 *Dow*, P. C. 242. and in *Crawshay v. Maule*, 1 *Swanston*, 521. *Sigourney v. Munn*, 7 *Conn. Rep.* 11. *Hoxie v. Carr*, 1 *Sumner*, 182—186. Ex parte Banks, *Newfoundland Rep.* 396. *Contra*, Sir Wm. Grant, in *Bell v. Phyn*, 7 *Vesey*, 453. and *Balmain v. Shore*, 9 *Vesey*, 500. *Gow on Partnership*, 54, 55. In *Sigourney v. Munn*, the English and American authorities were fully examined and the subject discussed; and the doctrine declared that real estate acquired with partnership funds, for partnership purposes, would be regarded in equity as partnership stock, and liable to all the incidents of partnership property. It might also by agreement of the parties be regarded as personal stock of the company. The English Vice-Chancellor, in *Randall v. Randall*, 7 *Simons*, 271, reviewed, among others, the cases of *Thornton v. Dixon*, *Ripley v. Waterworth*, *Bell v. Phyn*, *Balmain v. Shore*, and *Crawshay v. Maule*, above-mentioned, together with the cases of *Phillips v. Phillips*, 1 *Mylne & Keene*, 649, and *Broom v. Broom*, 3 *ibid.* 443, and came to the conclusion declared in *Sigourney v. Munn*, that the English chancery doctrine considering real estate as personal property, was applicable only to lands purchased with partnership capital for the purposes of a partnership trade.

^a *Forde v. Herron*, 4 *Munf.* 316. *McDermot v. Laurence*, 7 *Serg. & Rawle*, 438. In *Hoxie v. Carr*, 1 *Sumner*, 173, it was held, that where a purchaser of real estate, having actual, or is chargeable with constructive notice, that it was partnership property, the estate is chargeable in his hands with the payment of the partnership debts, even though he had no notice of the partnership debts.

^b *McAlister v. Montgomery*, 3 *Hayw.* 96. In *Yestman v. Woods*, 6 *Yerger*, 20, real estate held by partners, for partnership purposes, was held to descend and vest, upon the death of one of the partners, in his heirs at law, as *real*

In New-York, the Supreme Court, upon the strength of the ultimate opinion of Lord Thurlow, in *Thornton v. Dixon*, and of the opinion of the Master of the Rolls, in *Balmain v. Shore*, declared, in *Coles v. Coles*,^a that the principles and rules of law applicable to partnerships, and which govern and regulate the disposition of the partnership property, did not apply to real estates; and that *in the absence of special covenants between the parties*, real estate owned by partners, was to be considered and treated as such, without any reference to the partnership. The

language of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts *39 *in *Goodwin v. Richardson*,^b is nearly to the same effect; and it seemed to be considered, that partners, purchasing an estate out of the joint funds, and taking one conveyance to themselves as tenants in common, would hold their undivided moieties in separate and independent titles, and that the same would go, on the insolvency of the firm, or on the death of either, to pay their respective creditors at large.

These latter cases, and particularly the one in New-York, go to the entire subversion of the equity doctrine now prevalent in England; but the other American decisions are more restricted in their operation, and are not inconsistent with the most correct and improved view of the English law. Their object is to secure the rights of purchasers and encumbrancers without notice, from being affected by a claim of partnership rights of which they

estate. This was upon the strength of the case in 3 *Haywood*, but with an evident reluctance in the Chancellor to depart from the English rule in equity, which now holds such estate to be *personal* stock, and distributable as such. In South Carolina, one party cannot transfer the real estate of the firm, and used for its business, by deed, unless it be in a case in which the buying and selling of real estate is the object of the partnership. *Robinson v. Crowder*, 4 *M'Cord*, 519.

^a 15 *Johns. Rep.* 159.

^b 11 *Mass. Rep.* 469.

were ignorant. In *Edgar v. Donnally*,^a a right to land had been acquired with partnership stock, and a title taken in the name of the surviving partner, and a claimant

^a 2 *Munf.* 337. But in *Deloney v. Hutchinson*, 2 *Randolph*, 183, the appropriation of partnership lands as assets to partnership debts in preference to other debts was denied; and it was held, that lands purchased by partners for partnership purposes, was an estate in common both at law and equity; and that a surviving partner had no other remedy as a creditor than any other creditor. Other American cases hold a different language; thus, in *Winslow v. Chiffelle*, *State Reports in Equity in S. C.*, (1824,) it was held, that lands held and used by partners, in the business of a mill, was co-partnership property, and subject to be applied, like other partnership property, to the payment of partnership debts, in preference to the claims of separate creditors. So, in *Greene v. Greene*, 1 *Hammond's Ohio Rep.* 535, it was held, that lands purchased with partnership funds for partnership purposes, and under articles that the partnership property should be sold for the payment of debts, were to be considered and applied as personal assets of the partnership as between the partners and their creditors, and were not subject to the dower of the widow of a deceased partner as against partnership debts. And again in *Marvin v. Trumbull*, 1 *Wright's Ohio Rep.* 386, real estate purchased and held as partnership property, was held to be subjected to the debts of the firm, in preference to the debt of an individual member of it, the creditor having notice. And in *Hoxie v. Carr*, 1 *Sumner*, 173, it was declared, that real estate purchased for partnership purposes, and on partnership account, would in equity be deemed partnership property and personal estate, though at law it would be dealt with according to the legal title. The general principle now declared in the English law is, that real estate acquired for the purpose of a trading concern, is to be considered as partnership property, and to be first applied in satisfaction of the demands of the partnership. *Fereday v. Wightwick*, 1 *Russell & Mylne*, 45. It is taken to be personal estate, and retains that character as between the real and personal representatives of a deceased partner. *Townsend v. Devaynes*, *Crawshay v. Maule*, and *Selkrig v. Davies*, cited *supra*, p. 37. note d. *Phillips v. Phillips*, 1 *Mylne & Keene*, 649. *Story, J.*, in *Hoxie v. Carr*, 1 *Sumner*, 183—186. The Vice Chancellor in New-York, in *Smith v. Jackson*, 2 *Edward's Rep.* 28, reviews all the conflicting cases on this point, and he follows the Supreme Court of New-York, and holds, that though real estate be purchased with joint funds for partnership purposes, there is no survivorship as to the real estate, and the share of a deceased partner as a tenant in common, descends to his heirs, unless there be an agreement among the partners, that the lands so purchased shall be considered as personal property; and that then, upon the foot of that agreement, and not without it, equity would apply the lands to pay partnership debts. Nay, he gives the wife her dower in the partnership share of the husband so descended. The decisions on this side of the question, appear to me to be a sacrifice of a principle of policy, and above all, a principle of justice, to a technical rule of doubtful authority. There is no need of any other agreement than what the law will necessarily imply, from the fact of an investment of partnership funds, by the firm, in real estate, for partnership purposes. If the partners mean to deal honestly, they cannot have any other intention than

under the deceased partner was held entitled in equity to a moiety of the land, against a purchaser from the survivor, with notice of the partnership right. This was a recognition of the true rule of equity on the subject.

In *Nicoll v. Mumford*,^a it was held, that ship-owners were tenants in common, and were not to be considered as partners, nor liable each *in solido*, nor entitled in
 *40 the settlement *of accounts, on the principle of partnership. The doctrine of Lord Hardwicke, on this point, in *Doddington v. Hallet*,^b was considered to be overruled by the modern decisions in chancery,^c and by the universal understanding in the commercial world. But when the case of *Nicoll v. Mumford* was reviewed in the Court of Errors,^d the doctrine of Lord Hardwicke was considered, by the majority of the judges, to be the better doctrine; and no doubt there may be a special partnership in a ship, as well as in the cargo, in regard to a particular voyage or adventure. It was assumed by the court, in *Lamb v. Durant*,^e that vessels, as well as

the appropriation of the investment, if wanted, to pay the partnership debts. Mr. Collyer, in his treatise on the *Law of Partnership*, first published in London, in 1832, concludes his review of the cases, with holding it to be the better opinion, that although the legal estate in freehold property purchased by partners, for the purposes of their trade, will go in the ordinary course of descent without survivorship, yet the equitable interest in such property will be held to be part of the partnership stock, and distributable as personal estate. *Collyer on Part.* 76.

^a 4 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 522.

^b 1 *Vesey*, 497.

^c See 5 *Vesey*, 575. 2 *Ves. & Bea.* 242. 2 *Rose*, 76. 78. 1 *Montagu on Partnership*, 102. note. *Merrill v. Bartlett*, 6 *Pick.* 47. In this last case it was declared, that part ship-owners had no lien upon the part of a bankrupt companion, for his proportion of the advances of the outfit. Part owners, or tenants in common, are not answerable for each other's debts.

^d 20 *Johns. Rep.* 611.

^e 12 *Mass. Rep.* 54. So also, in *Seabrook v. Rose*, 2 *Hill's S. C. Ch. Rep.* 555, 556. Ch. De Saussure held, according to the doctrine in the N. Y. Court of Errors, that owning a ship employed in trade by several persons, in distinct shares, constituted a partnership, with all its legal incidents; but the Court of Appeals, (p. 558.) while they admitted that every species of property might be held in partnership, gave no opinion on the question whether a ship, owned in

other chattels, might be held in strict partnership, with all the control in each partner incident to commercial partnerships. We find it also stated by Lord Tenterden,^a that in case of the death of any part owner, after an injury received, the right of action survives in general to the surviving part owners, who must afterwards pay to the personal representatives of the deceased the value of his share. This rule, as to the remedy, gives to the ownership of vessels one of the essential attributes of a partnership.

(2.) *Acts by which one partner may bind a firm.*

The act of each partner in transactions relating to the partnership, is considered the act of all, and binds all. He can buy and sell partnership effects, and make contracts in reference to the business of the firm, and pay and receive, *and draw and endorse, and ac- *41
cept bills and notes. Acts in which they all unite, differ in nothing in respect to legal consequences, from transactions in which they are concerned individually; but it is the capacity by which each partner is enabled to act as a principal, and as the authorized agent of his co-partners, that gives credit and efficacy to the association. The act of one partner, though on his private account, and contrary to the private arrangement among themselves, will bind all the parties, if made without knowledge in the other party of the arrangement, and in a matter which, according to the usual course of dealing, has reference to business transacted by the firm.^b

distinct shares, and employed in trade, was, as between the owners, partnership property, or liable to be so regarded by creditors, beyond certain specified limits.

^a *Abbott on Shipping*, 81. edit. *Boston*, 1829.

^b *Hope v. Cust*, cited in 1 *East's Rep.* 53. *Swan v. Steele*, 7 *East's Rep.* 210. *Rothwell v. Humphreys*, 1 *Esp. N. P.* 406. *Abbott*, Ch. J., *Sandilands v. Marsh*, 2 *Barnw. & Ald.* 673. *Ex parte Agace*, 2 *Cox's Cases*, 312. *Shippen, J.*, *Gerard v. Basse*, 1 *Dallas' Rep.* 119. *Parker*, Ch. J., in *Lamb v. Durant*,

The books abound with numerous and subtle distinctions on the subject of the extent of the power of one partner to bind the company; and I shall not attempt to do more than select the leading rules, and give a general analysis of the cases.

In all contracts concerning negotiable paper, the act of one partner binds all; and even though he signs his individual name, provided it appears, on the face of the paper, to be on partnership account, and to be intended to have a joint operation.^a But if a bill or note be drawn by one partner, in his own name only, and without appearing to be on partnership account, or if one partner borrow money on his own security, the partnership is not bound by the signature, even though it was made for a partnership purpose, or the money applied to a partnership use. The borrowing partner is the creditor of the firm, and not the original lender.^b If, however,
 *42 *the bill be drawn by one partner in his own name, upon the firm, on partnership account, the act of drawing has been held to amount, in judgment of law, to an acceptance of the bill by the drawer in behalf of the firm, and to bind the firm as an accepted bill.^c And though the partnership be not bound at law in such a case, it is held, that equity will enforce payment from it, if the bill was actually drawn on partnership account.^d

12 *Mass. Rep.* 56, 57. *Mills v. Barber*, 4 *Day's Rep.* 428. *Le Roy, Bayard & Co. v. Johnson*, 2 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 186. *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Soc.* No. 96—105.

^a *Mason v. Rumsey*, 1 *Campb. N. P.* 384. One partner may be liable in tort for the acts of his co-partner in the prosecution of the co-partnership business, as well as upon contracts for the benefit of the joint concern. *Wayland v. Elkins*, 1 *Starkie's Rep.* 272.

^b *Siffkin v. Walker*, 2 *Campb.* 308. *Ripley v. Kingsbury*, 1 *Day's Rep.* 150. note. *Emly v. Lye*, 15 *East's Rep.* 7. *Loyd v. Freshfield*, 2 *Carr. & Payne*, 325. *Bevan v. Lewis*, 1 *Simons*, 376. *Jaques v. Marquand*, 6 *Cowen*, 497. *Willis v. Hill*, 2 *Dev. & Battle*, 231.

^c *Dougal v. Cowles*, 5 *Day's Rep.* 511.

^d *Van Reims Dyk v. Kane*, 1 *Gall. Rep.* 630.

Even if the paper was made in a case which was not in its nature a partnership transaction, yet it will bind the firm if it was done in the name of the firm, and there be evidence that it was done under its express or implied sanction.^a But if partnership security be taken from one partner, without the previous knowledge and consent of the others, for a debt which the creditor knew at the time was the private debt of the particular partner, it would be a fraudulent transaction, and clearly void in respect to the partnership.^b So, if from the subject matter of the contract, or the course of dealing of the partnership, the creditor was chargeable with constructive knowledge of that fact, the partnership is not liable.^c There is no distinction in principle upon this point between general and special partnerships; and the question, in all cases, is a question of notice, express or constructive. All partnerships are more or less limited. There is none that embraces, at the same time, every branch of business; and when a person deals with one of the partners in a matter not within the scope of the partnership, the intendment of law *will be, unless there be circum- *43 stances or proof in the case, to destroy the presumption, that he deals with him on his private account, notwithstanding the partnership name he assumed.^d The conclusion is otherwise, if the subject matter of the con-

^a Ex parte Peele, 6 Vesey, 602.

^b Arden v. Sharpe, 2 Esp. N. P. 524. Shirreff v. Wilks, 1 East's Rep. 48. Ex parte Bonbonus, 8 Vesey, 540. Livingston v. Hastie, 2 Caines' Rep. 246. Lansing v. Gaine & Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Rep. 300. Baird v. Cochran, 4 Serg. & Rawle, 397. Chazournes v. Edwards, 3 Pick. 4. Cotton v. Evans, 1 Dev. & Battle Eq. C. 234. Frankland v. M'Gusty, 1 Knapp's Cases before the Privy Council, p. 301. 306.

^c Greene v. Deakin, 2 Starkie's N. P. 347. New-York Fire Insurance Company v. Bennett, 5 Conn. Rep. 574.

^d Ex parte Agace, 2 Cox, 312. Livingston v. Roosevelt, 4 Johns. Rep. 251. 277, 278. Spencer, J., Dob v. Halsey, 16 Johns. Rep. 38. Foot v. Sabin, 19 ibid. 154. Laverty v. Burr, 1 Wendell, 529. U. S. Bank v. Binney, 5 Mason, 176. Davenport v. Runlett, 3 N. H. Rep. 386.

tract was consistent with the partnership business; and the defendants in that case would be bound to show that the contract was out of the regular course of the partnership dealings.^a When the business of a partnership is defined, known, or declared, and the company do not appear to the world in any other light than the one exhibited, one of the partners cannot make a valid partnership engagement, except on partnership account. There must be at least some evidence of previous authority beyond the mere circumstance of partnership, to make such a contract binding. If the public have the usual means of knowledge given them, and no acts have been done or suffered by the partnership to mislead them, every man is presumed to know the extent of the partnership with whose members he deals; and when a person takes a partnership engagement, without the consent or authority of the firm, for a matter that has no reference to the business of the firm, and is not within the scope of its authority, or its regular course of dealing, he is, in judgment of law, guilty of a fraud.^b It is a well established doctrine that one partner cannot rightfully apply the partnership funds to discharge his own pre-existing debts, without the express or implied assent of the other partners. This is the case even if the creditor had no knowledge at the time of the fact of the fund being partnership property. The authority of each partner to dispose of the partnership funds, strictly and rightfully extends only to the partnership business, though in the case of *bona fide* purchasers, without notice, for a valuable consideration, the partnership may, in certain cases, be bound by the act of one partner.^c

^a Doty v. Bates, 11 Johns. Rep. 544.

^b Abbott, Ch. J., and Bayley, J., Sandilands v. Marsh, 2 Barnw. & Ald. 673. Dickinson v. Valpy, 1 Lloyd & Welsby, 6. Livingston v. Roosevelt, 4 Johns. Rep. 278, 279.

^c Ex parte Goulding, before Sir John Leach, and confirmed on appeal by Lord

But if the negotiable paper of a firm be given by one partner on his private account, and that paper, issued within the general scope of the authority of the firm, passes into the hands of a *bona fide* holder, who has no notice, either actually or constructively, of the consideration of the instrument ; or if one partner should purchase, on his private account, an article in which the firm dealt, or which had an immediate *connexion with *44 the business of the firm, a different rule applies, and one which requires the knowledge of its being a private, and not a partnership transaction, to be brought home to the claimant. These are general principles, which are considered to be well established in the English and American jurisprudence.^a

With respect to the power of each partner over the partnership property, it is settled, that each one, in ordinary cases, and in the absence of fraud on the part of the purchaser, has the complete *jus disponendi* of the whole partnership interests, and is considered to be the authorized agent of the firm. He can sell the effects, or compound or discharge the partnership debts. This power results from the nature of the business, and is indispensable to the safety of the public, and the successful operations of the partnership.^b A like power in each partner

Lyndhurst, *Collyer on Partnership*, 283, 284. *Dob v. Halsey*, 16 *Johns.* 34. *Evernghim v. Ensworth*, 7 *Wendell*, 326. *Rogers v. Batchelor*, 12 *Peters*, 221.

^a *Ridley v. Taylor*, 13 *East's Rep.* 175. *Williams v. Thomas*, 6 *Esp. N. P.* 18. Lord Eldon, *Ex parte Peele*, 6 *Vesey*, 604, and *Ex parte Bonbonus*, 8 *Vesey*, 544. *Arden v. Sharpe*, 2 *Esp. N. P.* 524. *Wells v. Masterman*, *ibid.* 731. *Bond v. Gibson*, 1 *Campb. N. P.* 185. *Usher v. Dauncey*, 4 *ibid.* 97. *Livingston v. Roosevelt*, 4 *Johns. Rep.* 251. *New-York Fire Insurance Company v. Bennett*, 5 *Conn. Rep.* 574.

^b *Fox v. Hanbury*, *Cowp. Rep.* 445. Best, J., in *Barton v. Williams*, 5 *Barnew. & Ald.* 395. *Pierson v. Hooker*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 68. One partner may assign over the partnership effects and credits in the name of the firm, to pay the debts of the firm. *Harrison v. Sterry*, 5 *Cranch*, 289. *Mills v. Barber*, 4 *Day's Rep.* 428. *Lamb v. Durant*, 12 *Mass. Rep.* 54. *Pothier, Traité*

exists in respect to purchases on joint account; and it is no matter with what fraudulent views the goods were purchased, or to what purposes they are applied by the purchasing partner, if the seller be clear of the imputation of collusion. A sale to one partner, in a case within the

scope and course of the partnership business, is, in
 *45 judgment of law, *a sale to the partnership.^a But

if the purchase be contrary to a stipulation between the partners, and that stipulation be made known to the seller, or if, before the purchase or delivery, one of the partners expressly forbids the same on joint account, it has been repeatedly decided, that the seller must show a subsequent assent of the other partners, or that the goods came to the use of the firm.^b This salutary check to the power of each partner to bind the firm, was derived from the civil law. *In re pari potiore causam esse prohibentis constat.*^c It has been questioned, however, whether the dissent of one partner, where the partnership consists of more than two, will affect the validity of a partnership contract in the usual course of business, and within the scope of the concern, made by the majority of the firm. The efficacy of the dissent was, in some small degree,

du Con. de Soc. No. 67. 69. 72. 90. *Robinson v. Crowder*, 4 *M'Cord's S. C. Rep.* 519. *Hodges v. Harris*, 6 *Pick.* 360. *Deckard v. Case*, 5 *Watts' Rep.* 22. He may give a preference to one creditor over another; though, whether it might be made to a trustee for that purpose, against the known wishes of the co-partner, was left as an unsettled point, in *Egberts v. Wood*, 3 *Paige*, 517. But that point was afterwards settled in *Havens v. Hussey*, 5 *Paige*, 30, and it was decided that there was no implied authority in one partner to appoint a trustee for the partnership by a general assignment of the partnership effects for the benefit of creditors, and giving preferences. Such an assignment would be illegal, inequitable, and void.

^a *Willett v. Chambers*, *Cowp. Rep.* 814. *Rap v. Latham*, 2 *Barnw. & Ald.* 795. *Bond v. Gibson*, 1 *Campb. N. P.* 185. *Baldwin, J.*, 5 *Day's Rep.* 515. *Spencer, J.*, 15 *Johns. Rep.* 422.

^b *Willis v. Dyson*, 1 *Starkie's N. P.* 164. *Galway v. Matthew*, 1 *Campb. N. P.* 403. 10 *East's Rep.* 264. *S. C.* *Leavitt v. Peck*, 3 *Conn. Rep.* 124.

^c *Dig.* 10. 3. 28. *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Soc.* No. 90.

shaken by the Court of Exchequer, in *Rooth v. Quin*;^a and in *Kirk v. Hodgson*,^b it was considered, that the act of the majority, done in good faith, must govern in co-partnership business, and control the objection of the minority, unless special provision in the articles of association be made to the contrary. But this last decision related only to the case of the management of the interior concerns of the partners among themselves, and to that it is to be confined. The weight of authority is in favour of the power of a majority of the firm, acting in good faith, to bind the minority in the ordinary transactions of the partnership, and when all have been consulted.^c It seems also to be the better opinion, that it is in the power of any one partner to interfere and arrest the firm from the obligation of an inchoate purchase which is deemed injurious.^d This is the rule in ordinary cases in France; and yet, if by the terms of the partnership, *the manage- *46 ment of its business be confided to one of the partners, the exercise of his powers in good faith, will be valid, even against the will, and in opposition to the dissent, of the other members.^e

A partner may pledge, as well as sell, the partnership effects, in a case free from collusion, if done in the usual mode of dealing, and it has relation to the trade in which the partners are engaged, and when the pawnee had no knowledge that the property was partnership property.^f But this principle does not extend to part owners engaged in a particular purchase; for they are regarded as tenants in common, and no member can convey to the pawnee a

^a 7 *Price's Rep.* 193.

^b 3 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 400.

^c *Const v. Harris, Turner & Russ.* 516. 525. *Collyer on Partnership*, 105.

^d *Willis v. Dyson*, 1 *Starkie*, 164. *Leavitt v. Peck*, 3 *Conn. Rep.* 124.

^e *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Soc.* No. 71. 90.

^f *Raba v. Ryland*, 1 *Gow's N. P.* 132. *Tupper v. Haythorne*, in Chancery, reported in a note to the case in *Gow*.

greater interest than he himself has in the concern.^a And if one partner acts fraudulently with strangers in a matter within the scope of the partnership authority, the firm is, nevertheless, bound by the contract. The connexion itself is a declaration to the world of the good faith and integrity of the members of the association, and an implied undertaking to be responsible for the acts of each within the compass of the partnership concerns.^b

It was formerly understood, that one partner might bind his co-partners by a guaranty, or letter of credit, in the name of the firm ;^c and Lord Eldon, in the case *Ex parte Gordon*,^d considered the point too clear for argument. But a different principle seems to have been adopted ; and it is now held, both in England and in this country, that one partner is not authorized to bind the partnership by a guaranty of the debt *of a third person, without a special authority for that purpose, or one to be implied from the previous course of dealing between the parties, unless the guaranty be afterwards adopted and acted upon by the firm. The guaranty must have reference to the regular course of business transacted by the partnership, and then it will be obligatory upon the company, and this is the principle on which the dis-

^a Barton v. Williams, 5 Barnw. & Ald. 395.

^b Willet v. Chambers, Cowp. Rep. 814. Rap v. Latham, 2 Barnw. & Ald. 795. Longman v. Pole, Dawson & Lloyd, 126. Bond v. Gibson, 1 Campb. 185. Hadfield v. Jameson, 2 Munf. 53. But a tort, or even a fraud, committed by one of the partners, will not bind the partnership, if it be not in a matter of contract, and there be no participation in it. Parsons, Ch. J., Pierce v. Jackson, 6 Mass. Rep. 245. Sherwood v. Marwick, 5 Greenleaf, 295. There are exceptions, however, to this rule. Partners are responsible for the tortious negligences of their servants, and a partner himself may sometimes act in that capacity. Moreton v. Hardern, 4 Barnw. & Cress. 223. Attorney General v. Stanneyforth, Bunbury's Rep. 97. Collyer on Partnership, 252—254. But the servant must be employed by one of them in the prosecution of the business of the partnership. Wayland v. Elkins, 1 Starkie's N. P. Rep. 272. Bostwick v. Champion, 11 Wendell, 571.

^c Hope v. Cust, cited in 1 East's Rep. 53.

^d 15 Vesey, 286.

tion rests.^a The same general rule applies when one partner gives the co-partnership as a mere and avowed surety for another without the authority or consent of the firm; for this would be pledging the partnership responsibility in a matter entirely unconnected with the partnership business.^b

Nor can one partner charge the firm by deed, with a debt, even in commercial dealings. It would be inconsistent with technical rules, and contrary to the general policy of the law; for the execution of a deed requires a special authority; and such a power has been deemed by the English courts to be of dangerous tendency, as it would enable one partner to give to a favourite creditor a mortgage or a lien on the real estates of the other partners.^c But one partner, by the special authority of his co-partners under seal, and if in their presence, by parol authority, may execute a deed for them in a transaction in which they were all interested. It amounts, in judgment of law, to an execution of the deed by all the partners, though sealed by one of them only;^d and the general doctrine of the English law on this point has been clearly recognised and settled by numerous decisions in our *American courts.^e The more recent cases *48

^a *Duncan v. Lowndes*, 3 *Campb. N. P.* 478. *Sandilands v. Marsh*, 2 *Barnw. & Ald.* 673. *Crawford v. Stirling*, 4 *Esp. N. P.* 207. *Sutton and M'Nickle v. Irwine*, 12 *Serg. & Rawle*, 13. *Ex parte Nolte*, 2 *G. & Jameson*, 295. *Hamill v. Purvis*, 2 *Penn. Rep.* 177.

^b *Foote v. Sabin*, 19 *Johns. Rep.* 154. *New-York Fire Insurance Company v. Bennett*, 5 *Conn. Rep.* 574.

^c *Harrison v. Jackson*, 7 *Term Rep.* 207.

^d *Ball v. Dunsterville*, 4 *Term Rep.* 313. *Williams v. Walsby*, 4 *Esp. N. P.* 220. *Steiglitz v. Egginton*, 1 *Holt's N. P.* 141. *Brutton v. Burton*, 1 *Chitty's Rep.* 707.

^e *Gerard v. Basse*, 1 *Dallas' Rep.* 119. *Green v. Beals*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 254. *Clement v. Brush*, 3 *Johns. Cas.* 180. *Mackay v. Bloodgood*, 9 *Johns. Rep.* 285. *Anon.*, 2 *Hayw. N. C. Rep.* 99. *Mills v. Barber*, 4 *Day's Rep.* 428. *Garland v. Davidson*, 3 *Munf. Rep.* 189. *Hart v. Withers*, 1 *Penn. Rep.* 235. *Posey v. Bullitt*, 1 *Blackford's Ind. Rep.* 99. *Skinner v. Dayton*, 19 *Johns. Rep.* 515. 1 *Wendell*, 326. 9 *ibid.* 439. *Nunnely v. Doherty*, 1 *Yerger's Tenn. Rep.* 26.

have very considerably relaxed the former strictness on this subject; and while they profess to retain the rule itself, they qualify it exceedingly, in order to make it suit the exigencies of commercial associations. An absent partner may be bound by a deed executed on behalf of the firm, by his co-partner, provided there be either a previous parol authority or a subsequent parol adoption of the act.^a

One partner may by deed execute the ordinary release of a debt belonging to the co-partnership, and thereby bar the firm of a right which it possessed jointly. This is within the general control of the partnership funds, and within the right which each partner possesses, to collect debts and receive payment, and to give a discharge. The rule of law and equity is the same; and it must be a case of collusion for fraudulent purposes, between the partner and the debtor, that will destroy the effect
 *49 of the release.^b A release by one partner, to a *partnership debtor, after the dissolution of the partnership, has been held to be a bar of any action at law against the debtor.^c So, also, in bankruptcy, one partner may execute a deed, and do any other act requisite in

^a *Cady v. Shepherd*, 11 *Pick.* 405, 406. In *Jackson v. Porter*, 20 *Martin's L. Rep.* 200, it was admitted, that where a deed was executed by one partner in the name of the firm, parol evidence was receivable to show the *written* assent of the other partner. The case of *Gram v. Seton and Bunker*, in the city of New-York, (1 *Hall, N. Y. Rep.* 262,) goes a great deal further, and holds that one partner may execute, in the name of the firm, an instrument under seal, necessary in the usual course of business, which will be binding upon the firm, provided the partner had previous authority for that purpose; and such *authority need not be under seal, nor in writing, nor specially communicated for the specific purpose, but it may be inferred from the partnership itself, and from the subsequent conduct of the co-partner implying an assent to the act.*

^b Tooker's case, 2 *Co.* 68. Ruddock's case, 6 *Co.* 25. Lord Kenyon, in *Perry v. Jackson*, 4 *Term.* 519. *Hawkshaw v. Parkins*, 2 *Swanst. Rep.* 576—580. *Pierson v. Hooker*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 68. *Bruen v. Marquand*, 17 *Johns. Rep.* 58. *Salmon v. Davis*, 4 *Binney*, 375. *Halsey v. Whitney*, 4 *Mason*, 206. 232. *Smith v. Stone*, 4 *Gill & Johns.* 310.

^c *Salmon v. Davis*, 4 *Binney*, 375.

proceedings in bankruptcy, and thereby bind the partnership. This is another exception to the general rule, that one partner cannot bind the company by deed.^a Nor can one partner bind the firm by a submission to arbitration, even of matters arising out of the business of the firm. The principle is, that there is no implied authority, except so far as it is necessary to carry on the business of the firm.^b

The acknowledgment of an antecedent debt by a single partner, during the continuance of the partnership, will bind the firm equally with the creation of the debt in the first instance; and it will take the case out of the statute of limitations, if it be a clear and unqualified acknowledgment of the debt. Whether any such acknowledgment, or promise to pay, if made by one partner after the dissolution of the partnership, will bind a firm, or take a case out of the statute, as to the other partners, has been for some time an unsettled, and quite a vexed question, in the books. In *Whitcomb v. Whiting*,^c it was held, that the admission of one joint maker of a note took the case out of the statute as to the other maker, and that decision has been followed in this country.^d The doctrine of that case has even been extended to acknowledgments by a partner after the dissolution of the partnership, in relation to antecedent transactions, on the *ground, *50 that, as to them, the partnership still continued.^e

^a *Ex parte Hodgkinson*, 19 *Vesey*, 291.

^b *Stead v. Salt*, 3 *Bingham's Rep.* 101. *Karthauss v. Ferrer*, 1 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 221.

^c *Doug. Rep.* 652.

^d *Bound v. Lathrop*, 4 *Conn. Rep.* 336. *Hunt v. Bridgham*, 2 *Pick. Rep.* 581. *Ward v. Howell*, 5 *Harr. & Johns.* 60.

^e *Wood v. Braddick*, 1 *Taunt. Rep.* 104. *Lacy v. McNeill*, 4 *Dowl. & Ryl.* 7. *Cady v. Shepherd*, 11 *Pick.* 408. *Austin v. Bostwick*, 9 *Conn. Rep.* 496. *Hendricks v. Campbell & Clark*, 1 *Bailey, S. C. Rep.* 522. *Simpson v. Geddes*, 2 *Bay's Rep.* 533. *Fisher v. Tucker*, 1 *McCord's Ch. Rep.* 190.

But there have been qualifications annexed to the general principle; for, after the dissolution of a partnership, the power of the members to bind the firm ceases, and an acknowledgment of a debt will not, of itself, be sufficient, inasmuch as that would, in effect, be keeping the firm in life and activity.^a To give that acknowledgment any force, the existence of the original partnership debt must be proved, or admitted *aliunde*; and then the confession of a partner, after the dissolution, is admissible, as to demands not barred by the statute of limitations.^b Of late, however, the decision in *Whitcomb v. Whiting* has been very much questioned in England; and it seems now to be considered as an unsound authority by the court which originally pronounced it.^c And we have high authority in this country for the conclusion, that the acknowledgment by a partner, after the dissolution of the partnership, of a debt, barred by the statute of limitations, will be of no avail against the statute, so as to take the debt out of it as to the other partner, on the ground, that the power to create a new right against the partnership, does not exist in any partner after the dissolution of it; and the acknowledgment of a debt, barred by the statute of limitations, is not the mere continuation of the original promise,

Fellows *v.* Guimarin, *Dudley's Geo. Rep.* 100. Brewster *v.* Hardeman, *ibid.* 140. Greenleaf *v.* Quincy, 3 *Fairfield*, 11.

^a Hackley *v.* Patrick, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 536. Walden *v.* Sherburne, 15 *ibid.* 409. Baker *v.* Stackpole, 9 *Cowen*, 420. Shelton *v.* Cocke, 3 *Munf.* 191. Chardon *v.* Colder, 2 *Const. Rep.* S. C. 685. Fisher *v.* Tucker, 1 *M'Cord's Ch. Rep.* S. C. 177. 190. Walker *v.* Duberry, 1 *Marsh. Rep.* 189.

^b Smith *v.* Ludlows, 6 *Johns. Rep.* 267. Johnson *v.* Beardslee, 15 *ibid.* 3. Cady *v.* Shepherd, 11 *Pick.* 400. Brisban *v.* Boyd, 4 *Paige*, 17. Greenleaf *v.* Quincy, 3 *Fairfield*, 11.

^c Atkins *v.* Tredgold, 2 *Barnw. & Cress.* 23. But in Perham *v.* Raynall, 9 *Moore's C. B. Rep.* 566, the authority of the case of *Whitcomb v. Whiting* is reinstated; and it was held to contain sound doctrine to the extent, that an acknowledgment within the six years, by one of two makers of a joint, and several note, revives the debt against both, though the other had signed the note as a surety. Pease *v.* Hirst, 10 *Barnw. & Cress.* 122. Pritchard *v.* Draper, 1 *Russell & Mylne*, 191. S. P.

but a new contract springing out of, and supported by, the original consideration. This is the doctrine, not only in New-York, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Georgia, but in the Supreme Court of the United *States;^a and *51 the law in England, and in this country, seem equally to be tending to this conclusion.^b But there is a distinction between an acknowledgment which goes to create a new contract, and the declarations of a partner, made after the dissolution of the partnership, concerning facts which transpired previous to that event; and declarations of that character are held to be admissible.^c

If, however, in the terms of dissolution of a partnership, one partner be authorized to use the name of the firm in the prosecution of suits, he may bind all by a note for himself and his partners, in a matter concerning judicial proceedings.^d

The business and contracts of a partner, distinct from, and independent of, the business of the partnership, are on his own account; and yet it is said, that one partner cannot be permitted to deal on his own private account in any matter which is obviously at variance with the business of the partnership, and that the company would

^a *Bell v. Morrison*, 1 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 351. *Levy v. Cadet*, 17 *Serg. & Rawle*, 126. *Searight v. Craighead*, 1 *Penn. Rep.* 135. *Yandes v. Lefavour*, 2 *Blackf. Ind. Rep.* 371. *Hopkins v. Banks*, 7 *Cowen*, 650. *Baker v. Stackpoole*, 9 *ibid.* 420. *Brewster v. Hardeman*, *Dudley's Rep.* 138.

^b This is contrary to a decision in North Carolina, in *M^cIntyre v. Oliver*, 2 *Hawks*, 200, and recognised in *Willis v. Hill*, 2 *Dev. & Battle*, 234, but it may now be considered as the better and more authoritative, and perhaps the settled doctrine. By the English statute of 9th May, 1828, entitled, "An act for rendering a written memorandum necessary to the validity of certain promises and engagements," it is declared, in reference to acknowledgments and promises offered in evidence to take cases out of the statute of limitations, that joint contractors, or executors, or administrators of any contractor, shall not be chargeable in respect of any written acknowledgment of his co-contractor, &c., though such co-contractor, his executors, &c., may be rendered liable by virtue of such new acknowledgment or promise.

^c *Parker v. Merrill*, 6 *Greenleaf*, 41.

^d *Burton v. Issit*, 5 *Barnw. & Ald.* 267.

be entitled to claim the benefit of every such contract. The object of this rule is to withdraw from each partner the temptation to bestow more attention, and exercise a sharper sagacity, in respect to his own purchases
 *52 and sales, than to the concerns of the partnership *in the same line of business.^a The rule is evidently founded in sound policy ; and the same rule is applied to the case of a master of a vessel, charged with a cargo for a foreign market, and in which he has a joint concern.^b But a person may become a partner with one individual of a partnership, without being concerned in that partnership ; for though A. & B. are mercantile partners, A. may form a separate partnership with C., and the latter would have no right to a share in the profits, nor would he be bound for the engagements of the house of A. & B. because his partnership would only extend to the house of A. & C.^c But such involved partnerships require to be watched with a jealous observation, and especially if they relate to business of the same kind, inasmuch as the attention of the person belonging to both firms might be

^a *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Soc.* No. 59. *Glassington v. Thwaites*, 1 *Sim. & Stu.* 133. *Featherstenaugh v. Fenwick*, 17 *Vesey*, 298. *Burton v. Wookey, Madd. & Geld.* 367. In the case from *Vesey*, one partner had secretly, for his own benefit, obtained a renewal of the lease of the premises where the joint trade was carried on, and the lease was held to be a trust for the benefit of the co-partnership.

^b *Boulay Paty, Cours de Droit Com.* tom. ii. 94.

^c Ex parte Barrow, 2 *Rose's Cases in Bankruptcy*, 252. Lord Eldon there refers to the case of Sir Charles Raymond, as containing the doctrine. It was also the doctrine of the civil law, and is the law of those countries which follow the civil law. *Socii mei socius, meus socius non est*, Dig. 17. 2. 20. *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Soc.* No. 91. *Ersk. Inst.* vol. ii. 6. 3. sec. 22. *Bell's Comm.* vol. ii. 654. *Civil Code of Louisiana*, art. 2842. There can be no doubt, said Lord Ch. J. Eyre, 1 *Bos. & Pull.* 546, that, as between themselves, a partnership may have transactions with an individual partner, or with two or more of the partners, having their separate estate engaged in some joint concern, in which the general partnership is not interested ; and that they may convert the joint property of the general partnership into the separate property of an individual partner, or into the joint property of two or more partners, or *e converso*.

distracted in the conflicts of interest, and his vigilance and duty in respect to one or the other of the concerns much relaxed. Partners are bound to conduct themselves with good faith, and to apply themselves with diligence in the business of the concern, and not to divert the funds to any purpose foreign to the trust.^a

III. *Of the dissolution of partnership.*

If a partnership be formed for a single purpose or transaction, it ceases as soon as the business is completed ; and nothing can be more natural and reasonable than the rule of the civil law, that a partnership in any business should cease when there was an end put to the business itself.^b If the *partnership be for a *53 definite period, it terminates of course when the period arrives. But in that case, and in the case in which the period of its duration is not fixed, it may terminate from various causes, which I shall now endeavour to explain, as well as trace the consequences of the dissolution.

A partnership may be dissolved by the voluntary act of the parties, or of one of them, and by the death, insanity, or bankruptcy of either, and by judicial decree, or by such a change in the condition of one of the parties as disables him to perform his part of the duty. It may also be dissolved by operation of law, by reason of war between the governments to which the partners respectively belong, so as to render the business carried on by the association impracticable and unlawful.^c

^a *Stoughton v. Lynch*, 1 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 470. *Long v. Majestre*, *ibid.* 305. *Faucett v. Whitehouse*, cited in *Collyer on Partnership*, 96.

^b *Inst.* 3. 26. 6. *Extincto subjecto, tollitur adjunctum.* *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Soc.* No. 140—143, illustrates this rule in his usual manner, by a number of plain and familiar examples. 16 *Johns. Rep.* 491. S. P.

^c *Inst.* 3. 26. sec. 7, 8. *Vinnius*, h. t. 3. 26. 4. *Hub. in Inst.* lib. 3. tit. 26. sec. 6. *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Soc.* No. 147, 148. 11 *Vesey*, 5. 1 *Swanst. Rep.* 480. 508. 16 *Johns. Rep.* 491.

(1.) *Dissolution by the voluntary act of either partner.*

It is an established principle in the law of partnership, that if it be without any definite period, any partner may withdraw at a moment's notice, when he pleases, and dissolve the partnership.^a The civil law contains the same rule on the subject.^b The existence of engagements with third persons does not prevent the dissolution by the act of the parties, or either of them, though those engagements will not be affected, and the partnership will still continue as to all antecedent concerns, until they are duly adjusted and settled.^c

*54 the dissolution might be very *advantageous to the company, but it is not requisite; and a partner may, if he pleases, in a case free from fraud, choose a very unseasonable moment for the exercise of his right. A sense of common interest is deemed a sufficient security against the abuse of the discretion.^d Though the partnership be constituted by deed, a notice in the gazette by one partner, is evidence of a dissolution of the partnership as against the party to the notice, even if the partnership articles require a dissolution by deed.^e

But if the partners have formed a partnership by articles, for a definite period, in that case it is said, that it cannot be dissolved without mutual consent before the period arrives.^f This is the assumed principle of law by

^a *Peacock v. Peacock*, 16 *Vesey*, 49. *Featherstehaugh v. Fenwick*, 17 *Vesey*, 298. Lord Eldon, in 1 *Swanst. Rep.* 508.

^b *Inst.* 3. 26. 4. *Code*, 4. 37. 5.

^c *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Soc.* No. 150, says, that the dissolution by the act of a party ought to be done in good faith, and seasonably—*debet esse facta bona fide et tempestive*. He states the case of an advantageous bargain for the partners being in contemplation, and one of them, with a view to appropriate the bargain to himself, suddenly dissolves the partnership. A dissolution at such a moment, he justly concludes, would be unavailing. This was also the doctrine of the civil law, *Inst.* 3. tit. 26. *Dig.* 17. 2. 65. 4.

^d 17 *Vesey*, 308, 309.

^e *Doe and Waithman v. Miles*, 1 *Starkie's N. P.* 181.

^f *Gow on Partnership*, 303. 305. edit. *Phil.* 1825.

Lord Eldon, in *Peacock v. Peacock*,^a and in *Crawshay v. Maule*,^b and yet, in *Marquand v. The New-York Man. Company*,^c it was held, that the voluntary assignment by one partner, of all his interest in the concern, dissolved the partnership, though it was stipulated in the articles, that the partnership was to continue until two of the partners should demand a dissolution, and the other partners wished the business to be continued, notwithstanding the assignment. And in *Skinner v. Dayton*,^d it was held by one of the judges,^e that there was no such thing as an indissoluble partnership. It was revocable in its own nature, and each party might, by giving *due *55 notice, dissolve the partnership as to all future capacity of the firm to bind him by contract; and he had the same legal power, even though the parties had covenanted with each other that the partnership should continue for such a period of time. The only consequence of such a revocation of the partnership power in the intermediate time, would be, that the partner would subject himself to a claim of damages for a breach of the covenant. Such a power would seem to be implied in the capacity of a partner, to interfere and dissent from a purchase or contract about to be made by his associates; and the commentators on the Institutes lay down the principle as drawn from the civil law, that each partner has a power to dissolve the connexion at any time, notwithstanding any convention to the contrary, and that the power results from the nature of the association. They hold every such convention null, and that it is for the public interest that no partner should be obliged to continue in such a partnership against his will, inasmuch

^a 16 *Vesey*, 56.

^b 1 *Swanst. Rep.* 495.

^c 17 *Johns. Rep.* 525. 1 *Wharton*, 381. 388. S. P.

^d 19 *Johns. Rep.* 538.

^e Mr. Justice Platt.

as the community of goods in such a case engenders discord and litigation.^a

The marriage of a *feme sole* partner would likewise operate as a dissolution of the partnership; because her capacity to act ceases, and she becomes subject to the control of her husband; and it is not in the power of any one partner to introduce, by his own act, the agency of a new partner into the firm.^b

(2.) *By the death of a partner.*

The death of either party is, *ipso facto*, a dissolution of the partnership, however numerous the association may be. The personal qualities of each partner enter
 *56 into the consideration *of the contract, and the survivors ought not to be held bound without a new assent, when, perhaps, the abilities and skill, or character and credit of the deceased partner, were the inducements to the formation of the connexion.^c Pothier says, that the representatives of the deceased partner are bound by new contracts made in the name of the partnership, by the survivor, until notice be given of the death, or it be presumed to have been received.^d But Lord Eldon was of opinion that the death of the partner did, of itself, work the dissolution; and he was not prepared to say, notwithstanding all he had read on the subject, that a deceased partner's estate became liable to the debts of the continuing partners, for want of notice of such dis-

^a *Adeo autem visum est ex natura esse societatis unius dissensu totam dissolvi, ut quamvis ab initio convenerit, ut societas perpetuo duraret, aut ne liceret ab ea resilire invitis cæteris; tamen tale pactum, tanquam factum contra naturam societatis, cujus in æternum nulla coitio est contemnere licet.* Vinnius in *Inst.* 3. 26. 4. pl. 1. Ferriere, *ibid.* tom. v. 156. Dig. 17. 2. 14.

^b *Nerot v. Burnand*, 4 *Russ.* 260.

^c *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Soc.* No. 146. *Inst.* 3. 26. 5. Vinnius, h. t. *Pearce v. Chamberlain*, 2 *Vesey, sen.* 33. Lord Eldon, 3 *Merivale*, 614. 1 *Swanst. Rep.* 509, and note, *ibid.*

^d *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Soc.* No. 156, 157.

solution.^a In the Roman law, and in the commentaries of the civilians, every subject connected with the doctrine of partnership is considered with admirable sagacity and precision; but, in this instance, the rule was carried so far, that even a stipulation that, in the case of the death of either partner, the heir of the deceased should be admitted into the partnership, was declared void.^b The provision in the Roman law was followed by Argou, in his institutes of the French law.^c Pothier was of opinion, however, that the civil law abounded in too much refinement on this point; and that if there be a provision, in the original articles of partnership, for the continuance of the rights of partnership in the representatives of the deceased, it would be valid.^d His opinion has been followed in the *Code Napoleon*;^e and in the English law, such a provision in the articles of partnership for *the benefit of the representatives of a deceased *57 partner, is not questioned; and it was expressly sustained by Lord Talbot.^f

^a *Crawshay v. Collins*, 15 *Vesey*, 223. *Kinder v. Taylor*, cited in *Gow on Partnership*, 240. *Vulliamy v. Noble*, 3 *Merivale*, 614.

^b *Dig.* 17. 2. 35. 52. 59.

^c *Inst. au Droit Francois*, l. 3. ch. 23.

^d *Pothier, ut. sup.* No. 145.

^e Art. 1863.

^f *Wrexham v. Hudleston*, 1 *Swanston*, 514. note. See, also, *Pearce v. Chamberlain*, 2 *Vesey, sen.* 33. *Balmain v. Shore*, 9 *Vesey*, 500. *Warner v. Cunningham*, 3 *Dow's Parl. Cas.* 76. *Gratz v. Bayard*, 11 *Serg. & Rawle*, 41. *Scholefield v. Eichelberger*, 7 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 586. If one partner, by will, continues his share of stock in a partnership for a definite period, and the partnership be continued after his death, and becomes insolvent, the partnership creditors have no claim over the general creditors to the assets in the hands of the representatives of the deceased, except as to the assets vested in the partnership funds. *Ex parte Garland*, 10 *Vesey*, 110. *Pitkin v. Pitkin*, 7 *Conn. Rep.* 307. *Thompson v. Andrews*, 1 *Mylne & Keene*, 116. In the case of the *Louisiana Bank v. Kenner's succession*, 1 *Miller's Louis. Rep.* 384, after an extensive examination of the commercial laws and usages of Europe and the United States, it was considered to be a doubtful point, whether stipulations in contracts of partnership, that they may be continued after the death of one of the partners, for the benefit of the heirs, were binding

A community of interest still exists between the survivor and the representatives of the deceased partner; and those representatives have a right to insist on the application of the joint property to the payment of the joint debts, and a due distribution of the surplus. So long as those objects remain to be accomplished, the partnership may be considered as having a limited continuance. If the survivor does not account in a reasonable time, a Court of Chancery will grant an injunction to restrain him from acting, and appoint a receiver, and direct the accounts to be taken.^a If the surviving partner be insolvent, the effects in the hands of the representatives of the deceased partner are liable, in equity, for the partnership debts; and it is no objection to the claim that the creditor has not used due diligence *58 in prosecuting the surviving partner, before *his insolvency; for the debt is joint and several, and equally a charge upon the assets of the deceased partner, and against the person and estate of the survivor.^b

(3.) *By the insanity of a partner.*

Insanity does not work a dissolution of partnership, *ipso facto*. It depends upon circumstances under the

on the latter without their consent. They were not so binding in Louisiana at the time of the adoption of the code of 1808. The better opinion is, that they are not any where absolutely binding. It is at the option of the representatives, and if they do not consent, the death of the party puts an end to the partnership. If no notice or dissent be given, it is said that a continuation of the partnership will be presumed. *Pigott v. Bagley, M'Clel. & Younge*, 569. *Kershaw v. Matthews*, 2 *Russ.* 62. *Collyer on Partnership*, 120—122.

^a *Ex parte Ruffin*, 6 *Vesey*, 126. *Hartz v. Schroder*, 8 *Vesey*, 317. *Ex parte Williams*, 11 *Vesey*, 5. *Peacock v. Peacock*, 16 *Vesey*, 57. *Wilson v. Greenwood*, 1 *Swanst. Rep.* 480. *Crawshay v. Maule*, *ibid.* 506. *Murray v. Mumford*, 6 *Cowen*, 441. 16 *Johns. Rep.* 493.

^b *Hamersly v. Lambert*, 2 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 508. *Miss Sleaf's case*, in *Devaynes v. Noble*, 1 *Merivale's Rep.* 539. The creditor of the firm may sue the surviving partner, and the representatives of the deceased partner, for payment out of the assets of the deceased, and without showing that the surviving partner was insolvent. *Wilkinson v. Henderson*, 1 *Myline & Keene*, 582.

sound discretion of the Court of Chancery. But if the lunacy be confirmed and duly ascertained, it may now be laid down as a general rule, notwithstanding the decision of Lord Talbot to the contrary, that, as partners are respectively to contribute skill and industry, as well as capital, to the business of the concern, the inability of a partner, by reason of lunacy, is a sound and just cause for the interference of the Court of Chancery to dissolve the partnership, and have the accounts taken, and the property duly applied.^a

(4.) *By bankruptcy of a partner.*

Bankruptcy, or insolvency, either of the whole partnership, or of an individual member, dissolves a partnership; and the assignees become, as to the interest of the bankrupt or insolvent partner, tenants in common with the solvent partners, subject to all the rights of the other partners; and a community of interest exists between them, until the affairs of the company are settled. The dissolution of the partnership follows necessarily, under those statutes of bankruptcy, which avoid all the acts of the bankrupt from the day of his bankruptcy, and from the necessity of the thing, as all the property of the bankrupt is vested in *his assignees, who cannot *59 carry on the trade.^b A voluntary and *bona fide* assignment by a partner of all his interest in the partnership stock, has the same effect, and dissolves the partnership. This is upon the principle that a partner-

^a Wrexham v. Hudleston, cited 1 *Swanst. Rep.* 514. note. Sayer v. Bennet, 1 *Cox's Cas.* 107. Waters v. Taylor, 2 *Ves. & Bea.* 301. Jones v. Noy, 2 *Mylne & Keene*, 125. Milne v. Bartlett, *Atkin & Wyatt's Rep.*, April, 1839. See vol. ii. lec. 41. *ad finem*. The general rule mentioned by Spencer, J., in 15 *Johns.* 57, that insanity works a dissolution of a partnership, must be taken with the limitations in the text.

^b Fox v. Hanbury, *Cowp.* 445. Lord Eldon, Ex parte Williams, 11 *Vesey*, 5. Wilson v. Greenwood, 1 *Swanst. Rep.* 482. Marquand v. N. Y. Man. Co. 17 *Johns. Rep.* 525.

ship cannot be compelled by the act of one partner to receive a stranger into an association which is founded on personal confidence.^a The dissolution takes place, and the joint tenancy is severed, from the time that the partner, against whom the commission issues, is adjudged a bankrupt, and the dissolution relates back to the act of bankruptcy. The bankruptcy operates to prevent the solvent partner from dealing with the partnership property as if the partnership continued; but, in respect to the past transactions, he has a lien on the joint funds for the purpose of duly applying them in liquidation and payment of the partnership debts, and is entitled to retain them until the partnership accounts be taken.^b If all the interest of a partner be seized and sold on execution, that fact will likewise terminate the partnership, because all his share of the joint estate is transferred, by act of law, to the vendee of the sheriff, who becomes a tenant in common with the solvent partners. I have not met with any adjudication upon the point in the English law, though it is frequently assumed;^c but it follows, as a necessary consequence, from the sale of his interest, and it is equivalent, in that respect, to a voluntary assignment. It was a rule of the civil law, that the partnership was dissolved by the insolvency of one of the members, and an assignment of his property to his creditors, *or by a compulsory sale of them by judicial process on behalf of his creditors.^d

^a *Inst.* 3. 26. 8. *Marquand v. N. Y. Man. Co.* 17 *Johns.* 525. *Ex parte Barrow*, 2 *Rose*, 255. *Murray v. Bogart*, 14 *Johns.* 318. *Mumford v. M'Kay*, 8 *Wendell*, 442. *Kingman v. Spurr*, 7 *Pick.* 235.

^b *Harvey v. Crickett*, 5 *M. & Selw.* 336. *Barker v. Goodair*, 11 *Vesey*, 78. *Dutton v. Morrison*, 17 *Vesey*, 193.

^c So stated *arguendo* in *Sayer v. Bennet*, 1 *Montagu on Part.* note 16. *Gow on Partnership*, 310.

^d *Dict. du Digest*, par *Thevenot Dessaules*, art. *Société*, No. 56. 70. A discharge of one partner under a bankrupt commission, is no discharge of the other,

(5.) *By judicial decree.*

We have seen, that the partnership may be dissolved by the decree of the Court of Chancery, in the case of insanity. It may also be dissolved at the instance of a member, and against the consent of the rest, when the business for which it was created is found to be impracticable, and the property invested liable to be wasted and lost.^a It may be dissolved when the whole scheme of the association is found to be visionary, or founded upon erroneous principles.^b So, if the conduct of a partner be such as renders it impracticable to carry on the business, or there be a gross abuse of good faith between the parties, the Court of Chancery, on the complaint of a partner, may, in its discretion, dissolve the association, notwithstanding the other members object to it. But the court will require a strong case to be made out, before it will dissolve a partnership, and decree a sale of the whole concern. It may restrain a single partner from doing improper acts in future; but the parties, as in another kind of partnership, enter into it for better and worse, and the court has no jurisdiction to make a

and the creditor can sue the other partner for the balance of his debt, notwithstanding he proves his debt under the bankrupt commission. 2 *Mau. & Selw.* 25. 444. Mansfield, Ch. J., in 4 *Taunton*, 328. Even a release to one partner will not deprive the creditor of his remedy against the other, if attended with a proviso that it should not affect his remedy against the other. *Solly v. Forbes & Ellerman*, cited by Bayley, J., in *Twopenny & Boys v. Young*, 3 *Barnw. & Cress.* 208. Though an absolute technical release of one joint debtor releases all, yet a mere covenant not to sue one, does not so operate. 7 *Johns. Rep.* 207. 4 *Greenleaf's Rep.* 421. 6 *Taunton*, 289. 9 *Cowen*, 37. A creditor may, therefore, unite in a petition for a discharge of one joint partner, under the insolvent acts in this country, without destroying his right of action against a solvent partner.

^a *Baring v. Dix*, 1 *Cox's Cas.* 213.

^b *Buckley v. Cater*, and *Pearce v. Piper*, referred to for that purpose by Lord Eldon, in 3 *Ves. & Bea.* 181. See, also, to the same point, *Reeve v. Parkins*, 2 *Jacob & Walk.* 390. In these cases of a bill in chancery, for the dissolution of a partnership, all the members, however numerous, must be parties to the bill, for they all have an interest in the suit. *Long v. Younge*, 2 *Simons*, 369.

separation between them for trifling causes, as because one of them is less good tempered or accommodating than the other. The conduct must amount to an exclusion of one partner from his proper agency in the house, or be such as renders it impossible to carry on the business

*61 upon the *terms stipulated.^a A breach of covenants in articles which is important in its consequences, or when there has been a studied and continued inattention to a covenant, and to the application of the associates to observe it, will be sufficient to authorize the court to interfere by injunction to restrain the breach of the covenant, or, under circumstances, to dissolve the partnership.^b The French law also allowed of a dissolution within the stipulated period, if one of the parties was of such bad temper that the other could not reasonably live with him, or if his conduct was so irregular as to cause great injury to the society.^c A mere temptation to abuse partnership property is not sufficient to induce the court to interfere by injunction;^d but when a partner acts with gross impropriety or folly, and there is a strong probability that the safety of the firm, and the rights of creditors, depend upon the interference of chancery, it forms a proper case for the protection of that jurisdiction to be thrown over the concern.^e

In some instances, chancery will restrain a partner from an unseasonable dissolution of the connexion, and on the same principle that it will interfere to stay waste and prevent an irreparable mischief; and such a power was assumed by Lord Apsley, in 1771, without any ques-

^a *Waters v. Taylor*, 2 *Ves. & Bea.* 299. *Goodman v. Whitcomb*, 1 *Jacob & Walk.* 569.

^b *Marshall v. Colman*, 2 *Jacob & Walk.* 266.

^c *Inst. au Droit Francois*, par *Argou*, tom. ii. 249.

^d *Glassington v. Thwaites*, 1 *Simon & Stu.* 124.

^e *Tilghman*, Ch. J., 11 *Serg. & Rawle*, 48.

tion being made as to the fitness of the exercise of it.^a In the civil law, it was held by the civilians to be a clear point, that an action might be instituted by, or on behalf of, the partnership, if a partner, in a case in which no provision was made by the articles, should undertake to dissolve the partnership at an unseasonable moment; *and they went on the ground, that the good *62 of the association ought to control the convenience of any individual member.^b But such a power, acting upon the strict legal right of a party, is extremely difficult to define, and I should think rather hazardous and embarrassing in its exercise.

(6.) *By the inability of the parties to act.*

Pothier says, that if a partnership had been contracted between two persons, founded on the contribution of capital by the one, and of personal labour and skill by the other, and the latter should become disabled by the palsy to afford either the labour or skill, the partnership would be dissolved, because the object of it could not be fulfilled.^c This conclusion would be extremely reasonable, for the case would be analogous in principle to that of insanity, and equally proper for equitable relief.

If the partners were subjects of different governments, a war between the two governments would at once interrupt, and render unlawful, all trading and commercial intercourse, and, by necessary consequence, work a dissolution of all commercial partnerships existing between the subjects of the two nations residing within their respective dominions. A state of war creates disabilities, imposes restraints, and exacts duties, altogether incon-

^a *Clavany v. Van Sommer*, cited in 3 *Wood. Lec.* 416, and 1 *Swanst. Rep.* 511. note.

^b *Dig.* 17. 2. 65. 5. *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Soc.* No. 150, 151.

^c *Traité du Con. de Soc.* No. 142.

sistent with the continuance of every such relation. This subject has been largely discussed, and the doctrine explicitly settled and declared by the courts of justice in New-York.^a

(7.) *Consequences of the dissolution.*

When a partnership is actually ended by death, notice, or other effectual mode, no person can make use
 *63 of the joint *property in the way of trade, or inconsistently with the purpose of settling the affairs of the partnership, and winding up the concern. The power of one partner to bind the firm, ceases immediately on its dissolution; and the partners, from that time, become distinct persons, and tenants in common of the joint stock. One partner cannot endorse bills and notes previously given to the firm, nor accept a bill previously drawn on it, so as to bind it. If the paper was even endorsed before the dissolution, and not put into circulation until afterwards, all the partners must unite in putting it into circulation, in order to bind them.^b But until the purpose of finishing the prior concerns be accomplished, the partnership, as we have already seen, may be said to continue; and if the object be in danger of being defeated, by the unjustifiable acts or conduct of any of the partners, a court of equity will interfere, and appoint a manager, or receiver, to conduct and settle the business.^c

^a *Griswold v. Waddington*, 15 *Johns. Rep.* 57. S. C. 16 *Johns. Rep.* 438.

^b *Kilgour v. Finlyson*, 1 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 155. *Abel v. Sutton*, 3 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 108. *Lansing v. Gaine and Ten Eyck*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 300. *Sanford v. Mickles*, 4 *ibid.* 224. *Foltz v. Pourie*, 2 *Desauss. Ch. Rep.* 40. *Fisher v. Tucker*, 1 *M'Cord's Ch. Rep.* 173. *Poignard v. Livermore*, 17 *Martin*, 324. *Tombeckbe v. Dumell*, 5 *Mason*, 56. *Woodford v. Dorwin*, 3 *Vermont Rep.* 82.

^c *Wilson v. Greenwood*, 1 *Swanst. Rep.* 480. *Crawshay v. Maule*, *ibid.* 506. 528. After the dissolution, each partner becomes a *trustee* for the others, as to the partnership funds in his hands, in order to effect a fair settlement and just distribution of the effects. But if any one pays over the funds in his possession to the *acting partner*, or general receiver of the trust, he is not liable for the insolvency of the latter, if the payment was not made in bad faith. *Allison v. Davidson*, 2 *Dev. N. C. Equity Cases*, 79. 84.

A dissolution is, in some respects, prospective only, and either of the former partners can receive payment of debts due to the firm, and give a release.^a On the dissolution by death, the surviving partner settles the affairs of the concern, and the Court of Chancery will not arrest the business from him, and appoint a receiver, unless confidence be destroyed by his mismanagement or improper conduct.^b The surviving partner is alone suable at law, and he is entitled to the possession and disposition of the assets, to enable *him to discharge *64 the debts and settle the concern.^c But relief may be had in equity against the representatives of the deceased partner having assets, if the surviving partner be insolvent:^d and it is now held, that a partnership contract, upon the death of a partner, is in equity to be considered joint and several, and to be treated as the several debt of each partner.^e Each party may insist on a sale of the joint stock;

^a Platt, J., 19 *Johnson*, 143. *King v. Smith*, 4 *Carr & Payne*, 108. By the New-York Statute of April 18th, 1838, ch. 257, entitled "an act for the relief of partners and joint debtors," on the dissolution of any co-partnership firm, by consent or otherwise, any individual thereof may make a compromise with all or any of the creditors, and obtain a discharge, as far as respects himself only; but such composition or compromise shall not impair the right of the creditor making it to his remedy against the other members of the firm; nor impair the right of the other co-partners to call on such partner for his ratable proportion of such partnership debt. This statute provision extends equally to joint debtors, any one of whom may compound for his joint indebtedness, under the same limitations. The proper remedy for one partner against the other, is by a bill in chancery, or an action of account at law.

^b *Philips v. Atkinson*, 2 *Bro. Ch. Cas.* 272.

^c *Barney v. Smith*, 4 *Harr. & Johns.* 485. *Murray v. Mumford*, 6 *Cowen*, 441. In Louisiana, the surviving partner does not possess the right, until he is authorized by the Court of Probates, to sue for or receive partnership debts. *Flower v. O'Conner*, 7 *Louisiana Rep.* 194. This is an anomaly in the law of partnership.

^d *Simpson v. Vaughan*, cited in 2 *Vesey*, 101. *Jenkins v. De Groot*, 1 *Caines' Cases in Error*, 122. *Van Reims Dyk v. Kane*, 1 *Gall. Rep.* 371. 630. *Hamersly v. Lambert*, 2 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 508.

^e *Vulliamy v. Noble*, 3 *Merivale*, 593. *Wilder v. Keeler*, 3 *Paige*, 167. A joint creditor may file a bill against the representatives of a deceased partner, though the survivor be not insolvent. He is not compelled to sue the survivor in

and when a court of equity winds up the concerns of a partnership, it is done by a sale of the property, and a conversion of it into money. If, however, before a sale or a settlement of the joint concern, the partner in possession of the capital continues the trade with the joint property, he will be bound to account with the other partner, or the representatives of a deceased partner, for the profits of the trade, subject to just allowances.^a The good will of a trade is not partnership stock. It has been decided to be the right of the survivor, and which the law gives him, to carry on the trade, and that the representatives of a deceased partner cannot compel a division of it.^b But it was afterwards doubted whether the good will did survive, and could be separated from the lease of the establishment, and especially if the survivor continued the trade with the joint funds.^c

The joint creditors have the primary claim upon the joint fund, in the distribution of the assets of bankrupt or insolvent partners, and the partnership debts are to be settled before any division of the funds takes place. So far as the partnership property has been acquired by means of partnership debts, those debts have, in equity, a priority of claim to be discharged; and the separate creditors are only entitled in equity to seek payment from the surplus of the joint fund after satisfaction of the

the first instance. *Wilkinson v. Henderson*, 1 *Mylne & Keene*, 582. *Devaynes v. Noble*, 1 *Merivale*, 529. *Sleech's case*, *ibid.* 563. *Collyer on Partnership*, 343—346. *Sumner v. Powell*, 2 *Merivale*, 37.

^a *Brown v. Litton*, 1 *P. Wm.* 140. *Hammond v. Douglas*, 5 *Vesey*, 539. *Crawshay v. Collins*, 15 *Vesey*, 218. *Featherstenhaugh v. Fenwick*, 17 *ibid.* 298. *Sigourney v. Munn*, 7 *Conn. Rep.* 11.

^b *Hammond v. Douglas*, 5 *Vesey*, 539. *Farr v. Pearce*, 3 *Madd. Rep.* 47. But see *Crawshay v. Collins*, 15 *Vesey*, 227, a doubt expressed as to the survivorship of a good will.

^c Lord Eldon, in *Crawshay v. Collins*, 15 *Vesey*, 224. 227. The good will of a business has been recognised in equity as a valuable interest. *Kennedy v. Lee*, 3 *Merivale*, 452. 455. By the conveyance of a shop the good will passes, though not specifically mentioned. *Chissum v. Dawes*, 5 *Russ.* 29.

joint debts. *The equity of the rule, on the other hand, equally requires that the joint creditors should only look to the surplus of the separate estates of the partners, after payment of the separate debts. It was a principle of the Roman law, and it has been acknowledged in the equity jurisprudence of Spain, England, and the United States; that partnership debts must be paid out of the partnership estate, and private and separate debts out of the private and separate estate of the individual partner. If the partnership creditors cannot obtain payment out of the partnership estate, they cannot in equity resort to the private and separate estate, until private and separate creditors are satisfied; nor have the creditors of the individual partners any claim upon the partnership property, until all the partnership creditors are satisfied.^a The basis of the general rule is, that the funds are to be liable on which the credit was given. In contracts with a partnership the credit is supposed to be given to the firm, but those who deal with an individual member rely on his sufficiency. Partnership effects cannot be taken by attachment, or sold on execution, to satisfy a creditor of one of the partners only, except it be to the extent of the interest of such separate partner in the effects, after settlement of all accounts. The sale is made subject to the partnership debts, and is in effect only a sale of the undefined surplus interest of the partner defendant, after the partnership debts are paid.^b In pursuance of this principle, it is held, that the

^a *Wilder v. Keeler*, 3 *Paige*, 167. *Morgan v. his Creditors*, 20 *Martin's L. Rep.* 599. *McCulloh v. Dashiell*, 1 *Harr. & Gill.* 96. *Payne v. Matthews*, 6 *Paige*, 19. *Hull v. Wood*, 2 *McCord*, 302.

^b *Heydon v. Heydon*, 1 *Salk.* 392. *Fox v. Hanbury*, *Cowp.* 445. *Wilson and Gibbs v. Conine*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 280. *Matter of Smith*, 16 *Johnson*, 102. *Moody v. Payne*, 2 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 548. *Jarvis v. Hyer*, 4 *Dev. N. C. Rep.* 367. *Tappan v. Blaisdell*, 5 *N. H. Rep.* 190. For the general doctrine laid down in the text, see, at large, *Emerig. Traité des Con. a la Grosse*, ch. 12. sec. 6. *Ex parte Cook*, 2 *P. Wm.* 499. *West v. Skip*, 1 *Vesey, sen.* 456.

creditor of an ostensible partner, and who gave him credit as a single individual, is not to be postponed in his attachment upon the stock in trade, to another creditor,

Ex parte Elton, 3 *Vesey*, 233. *Taylor v. Field*, 4 *Vesey*, 396. Ex parte Kensington, 14 *Vesey*, 447. Ch. De Saussure, in *Woddrop v. Ward*, 3 *Dess. Ch. Rep.* 203, and in 2 *McCord's Ch. Rep.* 302. *McCulloh v. Dashiell's Admr.* 1 *Harr. & Gill*. 96. *Barber v. Hartford Bank*, 9 *Conn. Rep.* 407. *Witler v. Richards*, 10 *ibid.* 37. *Pierce v. Jackson*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 242. *Allen v. Wells*, *Mass. Sup. Court*, April Term, 1839. *Wilder v. Keeler*, 3 *Paige*, 167. *Lyndon v. Gorham*, 1 *Gall. Rep.* 367. *Taylor v. Fields*, in Exch. 4 *Vesey*, 396. 15 *ibid.* 559. S. C. This rule is said to be a rule of convenience merely, and that it is a rule in bankruptcy, and not a rule of general equity. Lord Thurlow overruled it, in Ex parte Hodgson, 2 *Bro.* 5; but it was restored by Lord Rosslyn, and followed by Lord Eldon. The history of the rule and its fluctuations was noted in the case of *Murray v. Murray*, 5 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 73—77. In Pennsylvania, the rule has been discarded, after great consideration, as not being a general rule in equity, but one founded on the statutes of bankruptcy; and joint and separate creditors are allowed to come in under their insolvent laws, *pari passu*, for a distributive share of the estate of an insolvent partner, whether the fund be a separate or partnership fund. *Bell v. Newman*, 5 *Serg. & Rawle*, 78. In the matter of the estate of Perry, 1 *Ashmead*, 347. So, in Georgia, a judgment creditor of a partner, in his individual capacity, may levy on the partnership effects, and sell his debtor's undivided interest therein, *without reference to the claims of the creditors of the firm*. Ex parte Stebbins & Mason, *R. M. Charlton's Rep.* 77, and, in Vermont, it has been held that partnership creditors have no priority over a creditor of one of the partners, even as to the partnership effects. *Root v. Shepardson*, 2 *Vermont Rep.* 120. In Massachusetts the general doctrine relative to the claims of creditors in matters of partnership is considered to be one in equity and not at law, and it was decided, in *Allen v. Wells*, April Term, 1839, (*Law Reporter*, for August, 1839) that at law the separate estate of one partner was liable on execution for a co-partnership debt, and that the execution was not to be defeated by a subsequent attachment by a separate creditor of the individual partner. It is in equity only that joint creditors can be restrained from proceeding against the separate estate. See, also, to this point, *Marshall, Ch. J.*, in *Tucker v. Oxley*, 5 *Cranch*, 35. *McCullen v. Dashiell*, 1 *Harr. & Gill*, 96. 1 *Story's Eq. J.* 625. It is to be observed, however, that Lord Rosslyn, in 3 *Vesey*, 240, declared the rule, as stated in the text, to be settled by a variety of cases, not only in bankruptcy, but upon general equity. The rule in equity is, that the joint estate is first applicable to partnership debts, and the separate estate to the separate debts, and the weight of authority, if not of convenience and equity, seems to be decidedly in its favour. Mr. Justice Rose, in Ex parte Moulton, 1 *Deacon & Chitty*, 44. 73. S. C., 1 *Montagu*, 292, declared it to be a universal maxim in the administration of assets in equity, that the separate estate should be applied, in the first instance, to the separate creditors, and the joint estate to the joint creditors. The joint creditors must go first to the joint estate, and the separate creditors first to the separate estate; and if there be a

who may subsequently attach the same stock for a debt created equally upon the same credit, though he should have discovered a concealed partner and set up his claim as a partnership creditor.^a This claim of the joint creditors is not such a lien upon the partnership property, but that a *bona fide* alienation to a purchaser for valuable consideration, by the partners, or either of them, before judgment and execution, will be held valid. Upon a dissolution of the partnership each partner has a lien upon the partnership effects, as well for his indemnity as for his proportion of the surplus. But creditors have no lien upon the partnership effects for their debts. Their equity is the equity of the partners operating to the payment of the partnership debts. These are just and obvious principles of equity on which we need not enlarge, and they have been recognised and settled by a series of English and American decisions.^b

*To render the dissolution safe and effectual, *66 there must be due notice given of it to the world; and a firm may be bound, after the dissolution of a partnership, by a contract made by one partner in the usual

surplus of the joint estate, it is carried to the respective separate estates; or if a surplus of the separate estates, it is carried to the joint estate. In Massachusetts, a statute in 1838, ch. 163, enacted for the relief of insolvent debtors, adopted as the rule for distributing the effects of insolvent debtors, that the net proceeds of the joint property should be appropriated to pay the joint creditors, and the net proceeds of the separate estate of each partner should be appropriated to pay his separate debts. This is precisely the English rule in equity on the subject.

^a Lord *v.* Baldwin, 6 *Pick.* 348. French *v.* Chase, 6 *Greenleaf*, 166.

^b West *v.* Skip, 1 *Vesey, sen.* 456. Ex parte Ruffin, 6 *Vesey*, 119. Ex parte Fell, 10 *Vesey*, 347. Ex parte Williams, 11 *ibid.* 3. Ex parte Kendall, 17 *ibid.* 526. The Master of the Rolls, in Campbell *v.* Mullett, 2 *Swanst. Rep.* 608. 610. Ex parte Harris, 1 *Maddock's Ch. Rep.* 583. Murray *v.* Murray, 5 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 60. Woddrop *v.* Ward, 3 *Dessauss. S. C. Rep.* 203. Bell *v.* Newman, 5 *Serg. & Rawle*, 78. Doner *v.* Stauffer, 1 *Penn. Rep.* 198. White *v.* Union Insurance Company, 1 *Nott & M'Cord's Rep.* 557. Ridgely *v.* Carey, 4 *Har. & M'Henry*, 167. M'Culloh *v.* Dashiell, 1 *Harr. & Gill.* 96. Story, J., in Hoxie *v.* Carr, 1 *Sumner*, 181, 182.

course of business, and in the name of the firm, with a person who contracted on the faith of the partnership, and had no notice of the dissolution.^a The principle on which this responsibility proceeds, is the negligence of the partners in leaving the world in ignorance of the fact of the dissolution, and leaving strangers to conclude that the partnership continued, and to bestow faith and confidence on the partnership name in consequence of that belief.

What shall be sufficient constructive or implied notice of the dissolution has been a vexed question in the books. A notice in one of the public and regular newspapers of the city or county where the partnership business was carried on, is the usual mode of giving the information, and may, in ordinary cases, be quite sufficient. But even the sufficiency of that notice might be questioned in many cases, unless it was shown, that the party entitled to notice was in the habit of reading the paper. Public notice given in some such reasonable way, would not be actual and express notice; but it would be good presumptive evidence for a jury to conclude all persons who have not had any previous dealings with the
*67 *firm. As to persons who have been in the habit of dealing with the firm, it is requisite that actual notice be brought home to the creditor, or, at least, that it be given under circumstances from which actual notice may be inferred.^b If the facts are all found or ascertained, the reasonableness of notice may be a ques-

^a *Le Roy, Bayard & Co. v. Johnson*, 2 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 186. *Brisban v. Boyd*, 4 *Paige*, 17.

^b *Vernon v. The Manhattan Company*, 17 *Wendell*, 526. *Watkinson v. Bank of Pennsylvania*, 4 *Wharton*, 482. The doctrine of these cases, and that of *Rowley v. Horne*, 3 *Bingham*, 2, is that merely taking a newspaper, in which a notice is contained, is not sufficient to charge a party, for it is not to be intended that he reads the contents of all the notices in the newspapers which he may chance to take. The inference of constructive notice from such a source was pretty strongly exploded in all these cases.

tion of law for the court, and so it was held in *Mowatt v. Howland*;^a but generally it will be a mixed question of law and fact, to be submitted to a jury under the direction of the court, whether notice in the particular case, under all the circumstances, has been sufficient to justify the inference of actual or constructive knowledge of the fact of the dissolution. The weight of authority seems now to be, that notice in one of the usual advertising gazettes of the place where the business was carried on, and published in a fair and usual manner, is of itself notice of the fact as to all persons who have not been previous dealers with the partnership.^b Nor is notice, in fact, requisite, when a partnership is dissolved by operation of law. A declaration of war puts an end to the continuance of a commercial partnership, between subjects of the two countries, having each his domicile in his own country; and such an official solemn act of government is notice to all the world of the most authentic and monitory kind, and supersedes the necessity of any other.^c

When a single partner retires from the firm, the same notice *is requisite to protect from continued *68 responsibility; and even if due notice be given, yet, if the retiring partner willingly suffers his name to continue in the firm, or in the title of the firm over the door of the shop or store, he will still be holden.^d But if

^a 3 *Day's Rep.* 353.

^b *Godfrey v. Turnbull*, 1 *Esp. N. P.* 371. *Parkin v. Carruthers*, 3 *ibid.* 248. *Gorham v. Thompson*, *Peake's N. P. Cas.* 42. *Graham v. Hope*, *ibid.* 154. *Leeson v. Holt*, 1 *Starkie's Rep.* 186. *Jenkins v. Blizard*, *ibid.* 420. *Williams v. Keats*, 2 *Starkie's Rep.* 290. *Wright v. Pulham*, 2 *Chitty*, 121. *Rooth v. Quin*, 7 *Price's Rep.* 193. *Lansing v. Ten Eyck*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 300. *Ketcham v. Clark*, 6 *ibid.* 144. *Graves v. Merry*, 6 *Cowen's Rep.* 701. *Martin v. Walton*, 1 *M'Cord's Rep.* 16. *Bank of South Carolina v. Humphrey's*, *ibid.* 388. *Whitman v. Leonard*, 3 *Pick. Rep.* 177. *Prentiss v. Sinclair*, 5 *Vermont Rep.* 149. *Watkinson v. Bank of Pennsylvania*, 4 *Wharton*, 482.

^c *Griswold v. Waddington*, 15 *Johns. Rep.* 57. 16 *Johns. Rep.* 494.

^d *Williams v. Keats*, 2 *Starkie's Rep.* 290. *Brown v. Leonard*, 2 *Chitty's Rep.* 120. *Williams v. Keats*, 3 *E. C. L.* 351. *Dolman v. Orchard*, 12 *E. C. L.* 47.

the use of the name of the former firm be continued without his authority, and the retiring partner had given due notice of the dissolution of the connexion, he is not responsible for the use of his name without his consent or authority, and without any act to warrant it; and he is not bound to take legal measures to have the use of the former name of the firm discontinued. Persons must inquire, and know, at their peril, who are truly designated by the firm.^a A dormant partner may withdraw without giving public notice of the dissolution of the partnership; for, being unknown as a partner, the firm was not trusted on his account, and he is chargeable only for debts contracted during the time he was actually a partner.^b If a partner retires without notice, he is not liable for a partnership debt contracted afterwards with a person who never knew he was a partner, and when he was not so notorious as a partner, as to raise a presumption of that knowledge.^c In the case of an infant partner, his acts and contracts are of course voidable; but if, on arriving at full age, the infant does not disaffirm the partnership, and give notice of it to those with whom the partnership have had dealings, he will be responsible for subsequent debts contracted on the credit of the partnership. The ground of the rule is, that the infant acted as partner during his infancy, and when he comes of age he

*69 neglects to inform the world that he is not a partner, and suffers it to deal under mistake and delusion.^d

^a *Newsome v. Coles*, 2 *Campb. Rep.* 617.

^b *Evans v. Drummond*, 4 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 89. *Armstrong v. Hussey*, 12 *Serg. & Rawle*, 315. *Heath v. Sansom*, 1 *Neville & Manning*, 104. 4 *B. & Adolp.* 172. S. C. It seems to be the doctrine of the case of *Evans v. Drummond*, and especially of that of *Thompson v. Percival*, 3 *Neville & Manning*, 167, that if a creditor of a dissolved partnership accepts for his debt the negotiable paper of the acting partner who continues the business, and who has charge of the effects and of the settlement of the concern, it is evidence of an agreement to discharge the retiring partner.

^c *Carter v. Whalley*, 1 *B. & Adolp.* 11. 1 *Lloyd & Welsby*, 297. S. C.

^d *Goode v. Harrison*, 5 *Barnw. & Ald.* 147.

Having thus far collected and reviewed the general principles which constitute the law of partnership, and followed those principles into their practical details, the plan of these lectures will not permit me to go more minutely into the subject, or to consider the legal and equitable remedies which exist between partners, and between them and third persons, in relation to the various rights and duties which belong to the association. The questions arising upon those remedies, and particularly in respect to the settlement of the partnership estate, in the various cases of dissolution, and especially of dissolution by bankruptcy, are subtle and numerous. The decrees in equity under this head abound with minute and refined distinctions, and they form a comprehensive and very complicated part of this branch of commercial law.^a

^a Among those English treatises which enter more at large on the law of partnership, I would refer the student to a valuable summary of the law of partners, in the third volume of Mr. *Chitty's* large treatise on the *Laws of Commerce and Manufactures, and the Contracts relating thereto*; and, more especially, to the American edition of Mr. *Gow's* practical treatise on the *Law of Partnership*, from which I have derived great assistance. The American editor, Mr. Ingraham, has enriched the work by a series of learned notes, in which the American cases are diligently collected, and the force and application of them ably considered; and I think the book is to be preferred to the more recent treatise of Mr. Cary, which has nothing in particular to recommend it, except it be the addition of new cases, arising since the publication of Mr. *Gow*. Since the last edition of this work, a new treatise on the *Law of Partnership*, by Mr. *Collyer*, has appeared, with notes of American cases, by Mr. Phillips and Mr. Pickering, of Boston. It is a work of great merit, and has stated fully the principles and distinctions, and given the learning and cases which belong to the subject.

LECTURE XLIV.

OF NEGOTIABLE PAPER.

(1.) *Of the history of bills and notes.*

It is the general opinion, that the commerce of the ancients was carried on without the use of bills of exchange, and there is no vestige of them in the Roman law. A passage in the Pandects^a shows it to have been the practice with the creditor who lent money on bottomry, or respondentia, to a foreign merchant, to send his slave to receive the loan, with maritime interest, on the arrival of the vessel at the foreign port. This certainly would not have been necessary, says Pothier,^b if bills of exchange had been in use. But, however the fact may have been with the Romans, it would seem, from a passage in one of the pleadings of Isocrates, that bills of exchange were sometimes resorted to at Athens, as a safe expedient to shift funds from one country to another.^c Bills of exchange are of such *72

^a Dig. 22. 2. 4. 1.

^b *Traité du Con. de Change*, No. 6.

^c See the pleading of Isocrates, entitled, *Trapeziticus*. (*Isocratis Scripta omnia*, edit. H. Wolfius, Basle, 1537.) In that intereriting forensic argument which Isocrates puts into the mouth of a son of Sopæus, the governor of a province of Pontus, in his suit against Pasion, an Athenian banker, for the grossest breach of trust, it is stated, that the son, wishing to receive a large sum of money from his father, applied to Stratocles, who was about to sail from Athens to Pontus, to leave his money, and take a draft upon his father for the amount. This, said the orator, was deemed a great advantage to the young man, for it

indispensable use in the remittance of the value of money between distant places, without risk and expense, that foreign commerce cannot conveniently be carried on without them. They grew into use on the coasts of the Mediterranean in the fourteenth century.^a As they serve the purposes of cash, and facilitate commerce, and are the visible representatives of large masses of property, they may truly be said to enlarge the capital stock of wealth in circulation, as well as increase the trade of the country.

Promissory notes are governed by the rules that apply to bills. The statute of 3d and 4th Anne, made promissory notes payable to a person, and to his order, or bearer, negotiable like inland bills, according to the custom of merchants. That statute has been generally adopted in this country, either formally, or in effect, and promissory notes are every where negotiable.^b The effect of the

saved him the risk of remittance from Pontus, over a sea covered with Lacedæmonian pirates. It is added, that Stratocles was so cautious as to take security from Pasion for the money advanced upon the bill, and to whom he might have recourse if the governor of Pontus should not honour the draft, and the young Pontian should fail.

^a In 1394, the city of Barcelona, by ordinance, regulated the acceptance of bills of exchange; and the use of them is said to have been introduced into western Europe by the Lombard merchants, in the thirteenth century. Bills of exchange are mentioned in a passage of the Jurist Baldus, of the date of 1328. *Hallam's Introduction to the Literature of Europe*, vol. i. 63. M. Boucher received from M. Legou Deflaix, a native of India, a memoir, showing that bills of exchange were known in India from the most high antiquity. But the ordinance of Barcelona is, perhaps, the earliest authentic document in the middle ages of the establishment and general currency of bills of exchange. (*Consulat de la Mer*, par Boucher, tom. i. 614. 620.) The first bank of exchange and deposit in Europe was established at Barcelona in 1401, and it was made to accommodate foreigners as well as citizens. 1 *Prescott's Ferdinand and Isabella*, Int. p. 112. M. Merlin says, the edict of Louis XI. of 1462, is the earliest French edict on the subject; and he attributes the invention of bills of exchange to the Jews, when they retired from France to Lombardy. The Italians, and merchants of Amsterdam, first established the use of them in France. *Repertoire de Jurisprudence*, tit. *Lettre et Billet de Change*, sec. 2. In England, reference was made, in the statute of 5 Rich. II. c. 2. to the drawing of foreign bills. This was in the year 1381.

^b By the *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 768. sec. 1—6, promissory notes

statute *is to make notes, when negotiated, assume the shape and operation of bills, and to render the ana-

payable in money to any person, or to the order of any person, or to bearer, are negotiable in like manner as inland bills of exchange, according to the custom of merchants. The payee and endorsee of every such note, payable to them or their order, and the holder of every such note, payable to bearer, may sue thereon in like manner as in cases of inland bills of exchange. If such notes are made payable to the order of the maker, or to the order of a fictitious person, and be negotiated by the maker, they have the same effect and validity, as if made payable to bearer. Promissory notes are negotiable throughout the Union, and the endorsee can sue in his own name. Notes negotiable where made, are negotiable every where. This is so held in England and in this country, under the statute of 3 and 4 Anne, and its substitute. *Milne v. Graham*, 1 *Barnw. & Cress.* 192. *Hatcher v. McMorine*, 4 *Dev. N. C. Rep.* 122. So, if a note or debt be assigned or endorsed abroad, and be suable in the name of the assignee by the law of the country where it was assigned or endorsed, it would seem to be the better opinion in England, that the assignee might sue there in his own name, upon the assignment, as creating a right of action in him, and which it does upon the application of the doctrine of the *lex loci contractus*. *Innes v. Dunlop*, 8 *Term*, 595. *O'Callaghan v. Thomond*, 3 *Taunton*, 82. In Massachusetts, Connecticut, Ohio, South Carolina, Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, and most of the states, the endorsee has all the privileges of an endorsee under the law-merchant. But in Vermont, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Kentucky, Indiana, and Mississippi, his rights, under the law-merchant, are to be taken with some qualification, and especially in the states last mentioned. See *Griffith's Law Register, passim*. 1 *Minor's Alabama Rep.* 5. 296. *Revised Code of Mississippi*, 1822, p. 464. Notes or bills discounted at a bank, or deposited for collection, are placed by statute in Pennsylvania on the footing of foreign bills of exchange as to payment and remedy. *Purdon's Dig.* 103. As the English statute has not been adopted in Virginia, the last assignee of a promissory note cannot maintain an action against a remote endorser, there being neither consideration nor privity. *Dunlop v. Harris*, 5 *Call*, 16. In New-Hampshire, the statutes of 9 and 10 William III., and 3 and 4 Anne, respecting inland bills and promissory notes, were re-enacted during the colony administration. In Indiana, promissory notes payable at a chartered bank within the state, are by statute placed on the same footing as inland bills of exchange by the law-merchant. *Revised Statutes of Indiana*, 1838, p. 119. But other promissory notes are not governed by the law-merchant, which has never been applied in that state by statute to them. *Bullitt v. Scribner*, 1 *Blackford's Ind. Rep.* 14. The *lex mercatoria*, applicable to foreign and inland bills of exchange, is considered to be adopted in Indiana as part of the common law of England, which has been adopted by statute. *Piatt v. Eads*, 1 *ibid.* 81. In Pennsylvania, Missouri, and Mississippi, sealed instruments, as well as notes, are made negotiable by statute, but the same defence as set-off, payments, &c., may be made as existed prior to the assignment. In Georgia, by statute of 1799, promissory notes are made negotiable, though given for specific articles. *Daniel v. Andrews*, *Dudley's Rep.* 157.

logy between them so strong, that the rules established with respect to the one, apply to the other.^a It was a question much discussed before the statute of Anne, whether notes were not, by the principles of the law-merchant, to be treated as bills, and Lord Holt vigorously and successfully resisted every such attempt.^b The history of that struggle is no longer interesting; but there is no doubt that promissory notes were recognised as mercantile instruments, and a species of bills of exchange, by the canon law, and the usage of trade; and
 *74 even by the *French ordinance of 1673, long before Lord Holt asserted them to be of late English invention.^c

My object in the present lecture is to endeavour to take a comprehensive, and, at the same time, precise and accurate view of the general doctrine, and most material rules relative to bills and notes; and to effect this purpose, I shall point out their essential qualities; the rights of the holder; the negotiation of them, and the requisite steps to fix the responsibility of the several parties whose names are upon the paper.

(2.) *Of the essential qualities of negotiable paper.*

A bill of exchange is a written order or request, and a promissory note a written promise, by one person to another, for the payment of money, absolutely, and at all

^a Heylyn v. Adamson, 2 Burr. Rep. 669. Brown v. Harraden, 4 Term Rep. 148.

^b Clerke v. Martin, 2 Lord Raym. 757.

^c The pragmatic of Pope Pius V. *De Cambiis*, as early as 1571, is mentioned by Mr. Du Ponceau, in his dissertation on the *Nature and Extent of the Jurisdiction of the Courts of the United States*, p. 122, as proof of the early recognition of notes as negotiable instruments within the custom of merchants. I would also refer to the appendix to 1 *Cranch's Reports*, for a very elaborate argument, in favour of the position, that at common law, and before the statute of Anne, an endorsee of a promissory note could sue a remote endorser.

events.^a If A., living in New-York, wishes to receive 1000 dollars, which await his orders in the hands of B., in London; he applies to C., going from New-York to London, to pay him 1000 dollars, and take his draft on B., for that sum, payable at sight. This is an accommodation to all parties. A. receives his debt by transferring it to C., who carries his money across the Atlantic, in the shape of a bill of exchange, without any danger or risk in the transportation; and on his arrival at London, he presents the bill to B., and is paid. This is the *plain and familiar illustration of this mode of re- *75 mittance, given by Sir Wm. Blackstone; and the practice is so very convenient, and suggests itself so readily, and gives such extension to credit, and circulation to capital, that it would seem almost impossible that it should not have been in use in the earliest periods of commerce. A., who draws the bill, is called the *drawer*. B., to whom it is addressed, is called the *drawee*, and, on acceptance, he becomes the *acceptor*. C., to whom the bill is made payable, is called the *payee*.^b As the bill is payable to C., or his order, he may, by endorsement, direct the bill to be paid to D.; and, in that case, C. becomes the *endorser*, and D., to whom the bill is endorsed, is called the *endorsee*, or *holder*. A check upon a bank partakes more of the character of a bill of exchange than of a promissory note. It is transferable, like a bill of exchange. It is not a direct promise by the drawer to pay, but it is an undertaking, on his part, that the drawee shall accept and pay, and the drawer is answerable only in the event of the failure of the drawee to pay. A check payable to

^a This definition is taken from *Bayley on Bills*, p. 1, which is a concise, clear, and accurate production. The American edition, published at *Boston*, in 1826, is enriched with all the English and American decisions in its very copious notes.

^b An instrument may be a bill of exchange, though the drawer and drawee be the same person. *Harvey v. Kay*, 9 *Barnw. & Cress*. 356.

bearer passes by delivery, and the bearer may sue on it as on an inland bill of exchange.^a

A bill or note is not confined to any set form of words. A promise to *deliver*, or to be *accountable*, or to be *responsible* for so much money, is a good bill or note; but it must be exclusively and absolutely for the payment of money.^b In England, negotiable paper must be for the payment of money in specie, and not in bank notes.^c In this country it has been held, that a note payable in bank bills was a good negotiable note within the statute,
 *76 if confined to a species of paper universally *current as cash.^d But the doctrine of these cases has been met and denied,^e and I think the weight of argument is against them, and in favour of the English rule. It is essential that the bill carry with it a personal credit, given to the drawer or endorser, and that it be not confined to credit upon any future or contingent event or fund. The payment must not rest upon any contingency, except the failure of the general personal credit of the person drawing or negotiating the instrument.^f It would perplex the commercial transactions of mankind, if paper securities of this kind were encumbered with conditions and contingencies, and if the persons to whom they were

^a *Cruger v. Armstrong*, 3 *Johns. Cas.* 5. *Conroy v. Warren*, *ibid.* 259. *Woods v. Schroeder*, 4 *Harr. & Johns.* 276. Lord Kenyon, in *Bohem v. Sterling*, 7 *Term*, 430. *Walker v. Geisse*, 4 *Wharton*, 252.

^b *Morris v. Lee*, 2 *Lord Raym.* 1396. 3 *Mod. Rep.* 362. *Str.* 629. *Martin v. Chauntry*, *Str.* 1271. *Thomas v. Roosa*, 7 *Johns. Rep.* 461.

^c *Bayley on Bills*, edit. *Boston*, 1826, p. 6.

^d *Keith v. Jones*, 9 *Johns. Rep.* 120. *Judah v. Harris*, 19 *ibid.* 144.

^e *McCormick v. Trotter*, 10 *Serg. & Rawle*, 94. *Gray v. Donahoe*, 4 *Watts*, 400.

^f *Dawkes v. De Lorane*, 3 *Wils. Rep.* 207. *Beardesley v. Baldwin*, 2 *Str. Rep.* 1151. *Roberts v. Peake*, 1 *Burr.* 323. In *Palmer v. Pratt*, 9 *Moore's Rep.* C. B. it was held, that a bill of exchange drawn upon a contingency was void; but a bill may be accepted upon a contingency. A draft on the *P. M. General* is not a negotiable bill of exchange, because it is understood to be drawn against a contingent public fund, under the control of the post-office department. 2 *Wharton*, 233.

offered in negotiation, were obliged to inquire when those uncertain events would probably be reduced to a certainty. But if the event on which the instrument is to become payable, be fixed and certain, and must happen, as if the bill be drawn payable six weeks after the death of the maker's father, it is a good bill, and it is of no consequence how long the payment is to be postponed.^a Nor is it necessary *that the note should be made at home. *77 Foreign, as well as inland notes, are equally negotiable within the statute of Anne;^b and a promissory note made in England, and transferred by endorsement, or delivery in a foreign country, to a party taking it there for value, gives a title which may be asserted in England.^c

The instrument must be made payable to the payee, and to his *order* or *assigns*, or to *bearer*, in order to render it negotiable. It must have negotiable words on its face, showing it to be the intention to give it a transferable quality. Without them it is a valid instrument as between the parties, and is entitled to the allowance of the three days of grace, and may be declared on as a promissory note within the statute. But if it wants negotiable words, it cannot be transferred, or negotiated, so as to enable the

^a *Cook v. Colehan*, *Str. Rep.* 1217. It is even held, that a note payable within two months after such a ship is paid off, is a good negotiable note, as the event is morally certain; (*Andrews v. Franklin*, *Str. Rep.* 24,) but I should think such a reference was not sufficiently certain, and that the case might well have been questioned, if it had not been subsequently confirmed in 1 *Wils. Rep.* 262. 3 *ibid.* 213. The numerous English and American cases all going to the support of this one general proposition, that the money mentioned in the instrument must be payable absolutely, and at all events, and not made to depend on any uncertainty or contingency, are diligently and accurately collected in *Bayley on Bills*, edit. *Boston*, 1826, p. 8—15, and *Chitty on Bills*, edit. *Phil.* 1826, p. 42—50.

^b *Milne v. Graham*, 1 *Barnw. & Cress.* 192. *Bentley v. Northouse*, 1 *Moody & Malkin*, 66. Vide *S. P. supra*, p. 72. note b.

^c *De la Chaumette v. The Bank of England*, 9 *Barnw. & Cress.* 208. But this point seems to be still contested. See a discussion of it in the *London Law Magazine*, No. 7. p. 117.

assignee to sue upon it in his own name.^a If the name of the payee or endorsee be left blank, any *bona fide* holder may insert his own name as payee.^b

It is usual to insert the words *value received*, in a bill or note, but they are unnecessary, and value is implied in every bill, note, acceptance, and endorsement. These words are not usual in checks, which are negotiable, like inland bills, and are *governed by the same rules.^c Nor is it necessary that the maker should subscribe his name at the bottom of the note; and it is sufficient if the maker's name be in any part of the note, as if it should run, *I, A. B., promise to pay C. D., or order, one hundred dollars.*^d This is, however, so much out of the common course, that a note wanting the usual subscription would be deemed imperfect, and it would, in point of fact, destroy its currency, and the public would very reasonably conclude, that the note had been left unfinished, and had got into circulation by fraud or mistake. If the note be payable to B., or *bearer*, it need not be endorsed; and it is the same, in effect, as if the name of B. had been omitted. The bearer may sue in his own name; and if his right and title, or the consideration be called in question, he must then show that he came by the note *bona fide*, and for a valuable consider-

^a *Hill v. Lewis*, 1 *Salk. Rep.* 132. *Burchell v. Slocock*, 2 *Lord Raym.* 1545. *Smith v. Kendall*, 6 *Term Rep.* 123. *Rex v. Box*, 6 *Taunt. Rep.* 325. *Mayser v. Whitaker*, 9 *Barnw. & Cress.* 409. *Ex parte Robinson*, 1 *Deacon & Chitty*, 275. *Gerard v. La Coste*, 1 *Dallas' Rep.* 194. *Downing v. Backentoos*, 3 *Caines' Rep.* 137. In *Gadcomb v. Johnson*, 1 *Vermont Rep.* 136, it was held, that the endorsee of a note not negotiable, was nevertheless bound to follow the rules of the law-merchant, in making the demand of payment, and giving notice of non-payment.

^b *Cruchley v. Clarence*, 2 *Maule & Selw.* 90.

^c *Popplewell v. Wilson*, 1 *Str. Rep.* 264. *Emery v. Bartlett*, 2 *Lord Raym.* 1555. *Boehm v. Sterling*, 7 *Term Rep.* 423. *White v. Ledwich*, cited in *Bayley on Bills*, 25.

^d *Taylor v. Dobbins*, 1 *Str. Rep.* 399. *Elliott v. Cooper*, 2 *Lord Raym.* 1576.

ation.^a So, a bill or note, payable to a fictitious person, may be sued by an innocent endorsee, as a note payable to bearer; and such a bill or note is good against the drawer or maker, and will bind the acceptor, if the fact that the payee was fictitious was known to the acceptor.^b

(3.) *Of the rights of the holder.*

Possession is *prima facie* evidence of property in negotiable paper, payable to bearer, or endorsed in blank, and the bearer, though a mere agent, or the original payee, when the endorsement is in blank, may sue on it in his own name, without showing title, unless circumstances appear creating suspicion.^c The *bona fide* holder can recover upon the paper, though it *came to *79 him from a person who had stolen or robbed it from the true owner, provided he took it innocently, in the course of trade, for a valuable consideration, and not overdue, and under circumstances of due caution; and he need not account for his possession of it unless suspicion be raised.^d This doctrine is founded on the commercial policy of sustaining the credit and circulation of negotiable paper. Suspicion must be cast upon the title of the holder, by showing that the instrument had got into

^a *Grant v. Vaughan*, 3 *Burr. Rep.* 1516. *Bowen v. Viel*, 13 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 565. *Matthews v. Hall*, 1 *Vermont Rep.* 316, where the cases on the subject are thoroughly considered.

^b *Collins v. Emett*, 1 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 313. *Minet v. Gibson*, 3 *Term Rep.* 481. 1 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 569. *Tatlock v. Harris*, 3 *Term. Rep.* 174. *Hunter v. Blodgett*, 2 *Yeates' Rep.* 480. *Foster v. Shattuck*, 2 *N. H. Rep.* 446.

^c *Mauran v. Lamb*, 7 *Cowen*, 174. *Pearce v. Austin*, 4 *Wharton*, 489. *Barbarin v. Daniels*, 7 *Louis. Rep.* 481. *Denton v. Duplessis*, 12 *ibid.* 92. *Hill v. Holmes*, *ibid.* 96.

^d *Miller v. Race*, 1 *Burr. Rep.* 452. *Grant v. Vaughan*, 3 *ibid.* 1516. *Peacock v. Rhodes*, *Doug. Rep.* 633. *King v. Milsom*, 2 *Campb. N. P.* 5. *Solomons v. The Bank of England*, 13 *East's Rep.* 135. *in notis*. *Paterson v. Hardacre*, 4 *Taunton*, 114. *Bleaden v. Charles*, 7 *Bingham*, 246. *Cruger v. Armstrong*, 3 *Johns. Cas.* 5. *Conroy v. Warren*, *ibid.* 259. *Thurston v. McKown*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 428. *Wheeler v. Guild*, 20 *Pick.* 545.

circulation by force or fraud, before the *onus* is cast upon the holder of showing the consideration he gave for it.^a So much protection, for the sake of trade, is given to the holder of negotiable paper, who receives it fairly in the way of business, that he can recover upon it, though it has been paid, if he received it before it fell due. Where one has done a mercantile act, said Lord Ch. Baron Gilbert, he subjects himself to mercantile law.^b If, however, it appears by proof or admission that the agent to whom a negotiable note is endorsed for the use of his principal, has no interest in it, he cannot sue and recover upon it in his own name.^c There are but two cases in which a bill or note is void in the hands of an innocent endorsee for valuable consideration; and these cases are, when

*80 the consideration in the instrument is money *won at play, or it be given for a usurious debt. The English statutes against usury and gaming (and which have been adopted generally throughout the United States) are peremptory, and make the bill or note absolutely void.^d The same rule would, of course, apply to every case in which the contract is by statute declared absolutely void.

As between the original parties to negotiable paper,

^a *Collins v. Martin*, 1 *Bos. & Pull.* 648. *Reynolds v. Chettle*, 2 *Campb. N. P.* 596. *Munroe v. Cooper*, 5 *Pick.* 412. So, if there was no original consideration for the bill, the holder must show that either he or the original endorsee gave value for it. *Thomas v. Newton*, 2 *Carr. & Payne*, 606.

^b *Gilbert's Lex Prætoria*, 288, 289.

^c *Thatcher v. Winslow*, 5 *Mason*, 58.

^d *Bowyen v. Bampton*, *Str. Rep.* 1155. Lord Mansfield, in *Peacock v. Rhodes*, *Doug. Rep.* 636. *Lowe v. Walker*, *ibid.* 736. *Ackland v. Pearce*, 2 *Campb. N. P.* 599. Since the above decisions, the statute of 58 Geo. III. c. 98, was passed, which protects bills and notes in the hands of an endorsee, for valuable consideration, and without notice, though founded on usury; and as there seems to be a strong disposition, at the present day, to free usury from civil impediments, it is probable there is a relaxation on this point in some parts of this country. The provisions of that statute on this point have been adopted in the *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 772. sec. 5.

these provisions in favour of the *bona fide* assignee do not apply, and the consideration of a bill, note, or check, may be inquired into. It may be inquired into between the maker and payee, and between the endorser and endorsee, and the consideration of the endorsement also may be shown, for the latter are, in this view, treated as original parties.^a The rule equally applies when the endorsee took the paper with notice of the illegal consideration, or of the want of it, or of any circumstances which would have avoided the note in the hands of the endorser;^b or when taken not in the course of mercantile *business, or after it was due, or under circum- *81 stances which ought to have led to an inquiry.^c It was admitted, in *Bay v. Coddington*,^d that negotiable paper could be assigned or transferred by an agent, or any other person, fraudulently, so as to bind the true owner as against the holder, if it was taken by him in the usual course of trade, and for a fair and valuable consideration, without notice of the fraud. But it was held, that if the paper be not negotiated in the usual course of business, nor in payment of any antecedent and existing debt, nor for cash, or property advanced upon it, nor for any debt created, or responsibility incurred, upon

^a *De Bras v. Forbes*, 1 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 117. *Ashhurst, J.*, 2 *Term Rep.* 71. *Herrick v. Carman*, 10 *Johnson*, 224. *Hill v. Ely*, 5 *Serg. & Rawle*, 363. *Johnson v. Martinus*, 4 *Halsted*, 144. *Hill v. Buckminster*, 5 *Pick.* 391. *Lawrence v. Stonington Bank*, 6 *Conn. Rep.* 521. In this last case it was held, that if the holder received the bill without consideration, as where successive endorsees were merely agents of the drawer, for the collection and transmission of the money, he is said to be in privity with the first holder, and is accountable for the proceeds of the bill.

^b *Steers v. Lashley*, 6 *Term Rep.* 61. *Wifen v. Roberts*, 1 *Esp. N. P.* 261. *Perkins v. Challis*, 1 *N. H. Rep.* 254.

^c *Brown v. Davis*, 3 *Term Rep.* 80. *Down v. Halling*, 4 *Barnw. & Cress.* 330. *Ayer v. Hutchins*, 4 *Mass. Rep.* 370. *Thompson v. Hale*, 6 *Pick.* 259.

^d 5 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 56. S. C. 20 *Johns. Rep.* 637. The Supreme Court of Tennessee in *Kimbrow v. Lytle*, 10 *Yerger*, 428, says that this case has carried the restrictions upon the negotiability of commercial paper, to where the Tennessee court is willing to carry it, and where it is disposed to leave it.

the credit of the note, but was taken from the agent of the owner of the note after he had stopped payment, and as security against contingent responsibilities previously incurred, the rights of the true owner were not barred. Such a case did not come within the reason or necessity of the rule which protects the purchaser of paper fraudulently assigned, because it was not a case in the course of trade, nor was credit given, or responsibility assumed, on the strength of the paper. In any case in which the endorsee takes the paper under circumstances which might reasonably create suspicions that it was not good, he takes it at his peril. The rule is usually applied to the case of notes over due, but the principle is of general application.^a In *Gill v. Cubitt*,^b the Court of K. B. made a strong application of the principle, and held, that if an endorsee takes a bill heedlessly, and without due caution,

and under circumstances which ought to have ex-
 *82 cited the suspicions *of a prudent and careful man,
 the maker or acceptor may be let in to his defence.

It was deemed material for the interests of trade, that a person should be deemed to take negotiable paper at his peril, if he takes it from a stranger without due inquiry how he came by the bill. He is bound to exercise a reasonable caution, which prudence would dictate in such a case; and it is a question of fact for a jury, whether the owner of the lost or stolen bill had used due diligence in apprizing the public of the loss, and whether the purchaser of the paper had, under the circumstances

^a *Ayer v. Hutchins*, 4 *Mass. Rep.* 370. *Napier v. Elam*, 6 *Yerger's Tenn. Rep.* 108. *Hunt v. Sanford*, *ibid.* 387.

^b 3 *Barnw. & Cress.* 466. See, also, to the same point, *Beckwith v. Corral*, 2 *Carr. & Payne*, 261. *Snow v. Peacock*, 3 *Bingham*, 406. *Strange v. Wigney*, 6 *ibid.* 677. *Slater v. West*, 1 *Dawson & Lloyd*, 15. *Easley v. Crockford*, 10 *Bingham*, 243. *Nicholson v. Patton*, 13 *Louisiana Rep.* 213. 216. In this last case the court said they took the case of *Gill v. Cubitt* for their guide.

of the case, exercised a reasonable discretion, and acted with good faith and sufficient caution, in the receipt of the bill. The doctrine of Lord Kenyon, in *Lawson v. Weston*,^a that the *bona fide* purchaser of a lost bill, was at all events to recover, is expressly overruled. This new doctrine, imposing upon the owner due diligence in giving to the public notice of the loss, and upon the purchaser of the bill due caution and inquiry, is supposed to be calculated to increase the circulation and security of negotiable paper, and to render it more difficult for thieves and robbers to pass it off.^b

(4.) *Of the acceptance of the bill.*

There is no precise time fixed by law in which bills payable at sight, or a certain number of days after sight, must be presented to the drawee for acceptance, though there must not be any unreasonable delay, for that might discharge the drawer and endorser. A bill payable on a day certain after date, need not be presented for acceptance before the day of payment; and if not presented previously for acceptance, the right to require acceptance becomes merged in, or as Pardessus says, confounded with the right to demand payment; but if presented before it becomes due, and acceptance be refused, it is dishonoured, and notice must then be given forthwith to the

^a 4 *Esp. N. P.* 56. But in *Backhouse v. Harrison*, 3 *Neville & Manning*, 188, the case required the endorser, who lost his bill by accident, to show in his defence, *gross negligence* imputable to the holder, in order to impeach his title. The same principle was followed in *Crook v. Jadis*, 3 *Neville & Manning*, 257. 2 *Mylne & Keene*, 633. *Goodwin v. Harvey*, 6 *Neville & Manning*, 372, so that the case of *Gill v. Cubitt*, seems to be somewhat weakened.

^b If a check be so filled up, through ignorance or carelessness, as to enable the holder conveniently to insert three hundred before fifty, and the banker is thereby misled to pay the inserted sum, the loss must fall on the drawer of it, and not on the banker. *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Change*, part 1. c. 4. sec. 99. *Young v. Grote*, 4 *Bingham*, 253.

parties whom it is intended to charge.^a There is a distinction made in the cases between the owner of the bill and his agent on this point. Though the owner is not bound to present the bill payable at a day certain, for acceptance before the day, the agent employed to collect the bill, or to get it accepted and paid, or accepted, must act with due diligence to have the bill accepted as well as paid. He has not the discretion and latitude of time given to the owner, and for any unreasonable delay on his part, he would be held responsible for all the damages which the owner may have sustained by reason thereof.^b

A bill payable sixty days after sight, means sixty
 *S3 days after acceptance, *and such a bill, as well as
 a bill payable on demand, must be presented in a reasonable time, or the holder will have to bear the loss proceeding from his default.^c

^a *Bank of Washington v. Triplett*, 1 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 25. *Townsley v. Sumrall*, 2 *ibid.* 170. *Pardessus, Cours de Droit Com.* tom. ii. sec. 358, 359. *Walworth Ch.*, in *Allen v. Suydam*, 20 *Wendell*, 323, 324.

^b *Allen v. Suydam*, 17 *Wendell*, 368. *S. C.* 20 *ibid.* 321. *Van Wart v. Woolley*, 5 *Dowl. & Ry.* 374. 3 *Barnw. & Cress.* 439. *Chitty on Bills*, 300. *Pothier, Traité du Contrat de Change*, No. 128. *The Bank of Scotland v. Hamilton*, *Bell's Com.* vol. i. 409. note.

^c *Marius on Bills*, 19. *Smith v. Wilson*, *Andrew's Rep.* 187. *Chamberlyn v. Delarive*, 2 *Wils. Rep.* 353. *Muilman v. D'Eguino*, 2 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 565. *Aymar v. Beers*, 7 *Cowen's Rep.* 705. *Wallace v. Agry*, 4 *Mason*, 336. In this last case, the bill was drawn in Havana, upon London, at sixty days' sight, and it was held that it might be sent for sale to the United States, according to the course of trade, and need not be sent from Cuba directly to London. But in *Camidge v. Allenby*, 6 *Barnw. & Cress.* 373, the vendee paid vendor of goods in notes of a country bank payable on demand to bearer. The bank, at the time, had stopped payment, but the fact was unknown to both parties. The vendor kept the notes for a week, without circulation or demand of payment, and it was held that he made the notes his own by this negligence. The French Commercial Code requires a bill drawn from the continent or isles of Europe, and payable within the European possessions of France, to be presented within six months from the date, and in default, the holder loses all recourse over. *Code de Comm.* liv. 1. tit. 8. sec. 11. There is no such fixed rule in the English law. In *Mellish v. Rawdon*, 9 *Bingham*, 416, it was held, that there must be no unreasonable delay in forwarding for acceptance, a bill drawn on a person abroad, and payable at so many days' sight. What would amount to an unreasonable

The acceptance may be by parol, or in writing, and general or special.^a Though a bill comes into the hands of a person with a parol acceptance, and he takes it in ignorance of such an acceptance, he may avail himself of it afterwards. If the acceptance be special, it binds the acceptor *sub modo*, and according to the acceptance. But any acceptance varying the absolute terms of the bill, either in the sum, the time, the place, or the mode of payment, is a *conditional acceptance, which *84 the holder is not bound to receive; and if he does not receive it, the acceptor is not liable for more than he has undertaken. The doctrine of qualified acceptances as to part of the money, is spoken of in Marius and Molloy;^b and in the case of *Rowe v. Young*, in the House of Lords, it was established to be the true construction of the contract, and the true rule of the law-merchant, that if a bill be accepted, payable at a particular place, the holder is bound to make the demand at that place.^c The rule is also settled, that a promise to accept, made before

delay, so as to cast upon the holder the loss arising from the failure of the drawee before acceptance, would depend upon the circumstances of the case, and was a question of fact for a jury.

^a *Lumley v. Palmer*, *Str. Rep.* 1000. *Powell v. Monnier*, 1 *Atk. Rep.* 612. By statute 1 and 2 Geo. IV. c. 73, no acceptance of any inland bill of exchange is sufficient to charge any person, unless such acceptance be in writing on the bill. So, by the *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 768. sec. 6. 9, no person within the state is chargeable as an acceptor on a bill of exchange, unless his acceptance be in writing, signed by himself or his lawful agent; and the holder may require the acceptance to be upon the bill, and a refusal to comply will be a refusal to accept. An acceptance in writing, if not on the bill, does not bind, except it be in favour of the person who, on the faith of it, received the bill. (*Ibid.* sec. 7.) So, an unconditional promise in writing to accept the bill, before it be drawn, is an acceptance in favour of the person who receives the bill on the faith of it, for a valuable consideration; (*Ibid.* sec. 8.) and every drawee who refuses to return a bill, within twenty-four hours, to the holder, shall be deemed to have accepted it. (*Ibid.* sec. 11.) See also *Bank of Michigan v. Ely*, 17 *Wendell*, 508. The statute law of Missouri has followed the provisions in the N. Y. statute as to acceptances. *Revised Statutes of Missouri*, 1835. p. 97.

^b *Marius*, 17. 21. *Molloy*, b. 2. ch. 10. sec. 21.

^c 2 *Brod. & Bing.* 165.

the acceptance of the bill, will amount to an acceptance in favour of the person to whom the promise was communicated, and who took the bill on the credit of it.^a In *Coolidge v. Payson*,^b all the cases were reviewed, and it was held, that a letter, written within a reasonable time before or after the date of the bill, describing it, and promising to accept of it, is, if shown to the person who afterwards takes the bill upon the credit of that letter, a virtual acceptance, and binding upon the person who makes the promise. The same doctrine was also held by the Supreme Court of New York in *Goodrich v. Gordon*,^c and it was there decided, that if a person, in writing, authorizes another to draw a bill of exchange, and stipulates to honour the bill, and the bill be afterwards drawn, and taken by a third party, on the credit of that letter, it is tantamount to an acceptance of the bill. The doctrine rests upon the decision of Lord Mansfield, in *Pillans and Rose v. Van Mierop and Hopkins*,^d where he laid down the broad principle, that a promise to accept, previous to the existence of the bill, amounted to an acceptance. It is giving credit to the bill, and which may be done as entirely by a letter written before, as by one written after the date of the bill. A parol promise to accept a bill already drawn, or thereafter to be drawn, is binding if the bill be purchased in consideration of the promise. It is an original promise, not coming within the objects or the mischiefs of the statutes of frauds; but whether such a valid *parol* promise to accept a non-existing bill, would, in the view of the law-mer-

^a *Miln v. Prest*, 4 *Campb. Rep.* 393.

^b 2 *Wheat. Rep.* 66. See, also, to S. P. 1 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 264, and 4 *ibid.* 121.

^c 15 *Johns. Rep.* 6. *Parker v. Greele*, 2 *Wendell*, 545. S. P. *Kendrick v. Campbell*, 1 *Bailey's S. C. Rep.* 522. S. P.

^d 3 *Burr. Rep.* 1663.

chant, amount to an acceptance of the bill when drawn, is a question not necessarily connected with the validity of the promise.^a

Every act giving credit to the bill amounts to an acceptance.^b There is no doubt that an acceptance, once fairly and fully made and consummated, cannot be revoked; but to render it binding, the acceptance must be a complete act, and an absolute assent of the mind; for though the drawee writes his name on the bill, yet, if before he has parted with the bill, or communicated the fact, he changes his mind, and erases his acceptance, he is not bound.^c The acceptance may be impliedly as well as expressly given. It may be inferred from the act of the drawee, in keeping the bill a great length of time, contrary to his usual mode of dealing; for this is giving credit to the bill, and inducing the holder to consider it accepted.^d If the bill be accepted in a qualified degree only, *and not absolutely, accord- *86
ing to the tenor of it, the holder may assent to it, and it will be a good acceptance, *pro tanto*; or he may insist upon an absolute acceptance, and for the want of it protest the bill. It is in the discretion of the holder whether or no he will take any acceptance varying from the terms of the bill. This doctrine was settled in England upwards of a century ago, and in opposition to the distin-

^a Townsley v. Sumrall, 2 Peters' U. S. Rep. 170.

^b Powell v. Monnier, 1 Atk. 611. Wynne v. Raikes, 5 East's Rep. 514. Fairlee v. Herring, 3 Bingham, 625.

^c Cox v. Troy, 5 Barnw. & Ald. 474. Emerigon, tom. i. 45, cites Dupuy de la Serra, art. des lettres de change, ch. 10, as laying down the maxim, that while the acceptor is master of his signature, and before he has parted with the bill, he can cancel his acceptance. This doctrine of La Serra is cited with particular approbation by Pothier, Traité du Con. de Change, n. 44, and his opinion was mentioned with great respect by the K. B. in the case last referred to, and there is now entire harmony on the point in the jurisprudence of the two nations.

^d Harvey v. Martin, 1 Campb. 425. note.

guished argument of Sir John Strange, and it has continued unshaken to this day.^a

The acceptor of a bill is the principal debtor, and the drawer the surety, and nothing will discharge the acceptor but payment or a release. He is bound, though he accepted without consideration, and for the sole accommodation of the drawer.^b Accommodation paper is now governed by the same rules as other paper. This is the latest and the best doctrine, both in England and in this country.^c These are the strict obligations of the acceptor

^a *Wegerslofe v. Keene*, 1 *Str. Rep.* 214. *Smith v. Abbott*, 2 *ibid.* 1152.

^b A plea that the acceptance was without consideration, held bad on demurrer. *Lowe v. Chifney*, 1 *Bing. N. C.* 267. The acceptor of a forged bill is bound by his acceptance, for that act precludes him from afterwards disputing the bill, as he is bound to know, and is presumed to know, his drawer's hand. *Price v. Neal*, 3 *Burr.* 1354. *Buller, J.*, 1 *Term*, 655. *Levy v. Bank U. S.*, 1 *Binney*, 27. So, if a bank pay a forged check, the holder being innocent, the bank must bear the loss, and on the same principle the bank is bound to know the hand of its own customers, and a want of due diligence and caution exists. *Levy v. Bank U. S.*, 1 *Binney*, 27. *Smith v. Mercer*, 6 *Taunton*, 76. *Bank of St. Albans v. F. & M. Bank*, 1 *Shaw's Vermont Rep.* N. S. 141. The court considered the case of *Price v. Neal*, as decisive. So, payment to a bank innocently in its own forged paper, binds the bank. It is bound to know its own paper. *U. S. Bank v. Bank of Georgia*, 10 *Wheaton*, 333. On the other hand the general rule is, that payment of a debt in a forged note, both parties being innocent, is no payment, and the same rule applies if a forged note be discounted. *Marble v. Hatfield*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 455. *Young v. Adams*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 182. *Eagle Bank v. Smith*, 5 *Conn. Rep.* 71. *Jones v. Ryde*, 5 *Taunton*, 488. *U. S. Bank v. Bank of Georgia*, 10 *Wheaton*, 333. But the loser cannot recover back unless he uses diligence to detect the forgery and give notice. *Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank*, 17 *Mass. Rep.* 33. *Pope & Hickman v. Nance*, 1 *Minor's Ala. Rep.* 299. Nor can he recover if he agrees at the time of the bargain and sale to receive certain notes drawn and endorsed by third persons in payment, for he took the risk. *Ellis v. Wild*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 321. It is held in one case, (*Ontario Bank v. Lightbody*, 13 *Wendell's Rep.* 101,) that payment of a debt in bills of an insolvent bank, both parties being ignorant of the fact, is no payment. But there is a decision in another case (*Lowrey v. Murrell*, 2 *Porter's Ala. Rep.* 280,) directly to the contrary, and the point remains unsettled in our American law.

^c *Fentum v. Pocock*, 5 *Taunton*, 192. The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland *v. Beresford*, 6 *Dow's Parl. Cas.* 234. *Bank of Montgomery County v. Walker*, 9 *Serg. & Rawle*, 229. *Murray v. Judah*, 6 *Cowen*, 484. *Clopper v. The Union Bank of Maryland*, 7 *Harr. & Johns.* 92. *Church v. Barlow*, 9 *Pick.* 547. *Grant v. Ellicot*, 7 *Wendell*, 227. *Marr v. Johnson*, 9 *Yerger*, 1.

in relation to the other parties to the bill, and they do not apply in all their extent as between the drawer and the party who endorses or lends his name to the bill as surety for the accommodation of the drawer. In such a case, the party who endorses is not entitled to damages from the drawer beyond what he has actually sustained.^a If the acceptor alters the bill on acceptance, he vacates it as against the drawer and endorsers; but if the holder acquiesces in such alteration and acceptance, it is a good bill as between the holder and acceptor.^b

A third person, after protest for non-acceptance by the *drawee, may intervene, and become a *87 party to the bill, in a collateral way, by accepting and paying the bill for the honour of the drawer, or of a particular endorser. His acceptance is termed an acceptance *supra protest*, and he subjects himself to the same obligations as if the bill had been directed to him. He has his remedy against the person for whose honour he accepted, and against all the parties who stand prior to that person. If he takes up the bill for the honour of the endorser, he stands in the light of an endorsee paying full value for the bill, and has the same remedies to which an endorsee would be entitled against all prior parties, and he can, of course, sue the drawer and endorser.^c The acceptance, *supra protest*, is good, though it be done at the request, and under the guaranty of the drawee

^a Dorsey v. his Creditors, 19 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 498.

^b Paton v. Winter, 1 *Taunton*, 420.

^c Mulford v. Walcott, 1 *Lord Raym.* 574. Mertens v. Winnington, 1 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 112. *Bayley on Bills*, 209. The person who pays a protested bill, *supra protest*, for the honour of the endorser, has no remedy against the endorser, if the latter was already discharged by reason of the want of notice of the non-acceptance. *Chitty on Bills*, 213, 4. 234. 257. 330. Higgins v. Morrison, 4 *Dana's Ken. Rep.* 102. The payer, *supra protest*, must give reasonable notice to the party that he has made such payment for his credit, otherwise that party will not be obliged to refund. *Wood v. Pugh and others*, 7 *Ohio Rep.* part 2. p. 164.

after his refusal, and the party for whose honour it is paid is equally liable.^a The policy of the rule granting these privileges to the acceptor, *supra protest*, is to induce the friends of the drawer or endorser to render them this service, for the benefit of commerce and the credit of the trader, and a third person interposes only when the drawee will not accept. There can be no other acceptor after a general acceptance by the drawee. A third person may become liable on his collateral undertaking, as guarantying the credit of the drawee, but he will not be liable in the character of acceptor. It is said, however, that when the bill has been accepted, *supra protest*, for the honour of one party to the bill, it may, by another individual, be accepted, *supra protest*, for the honour of another.^b The holder is not bound to take an acceptance,

ance, *supra protest*,^c but he would be bound to accept an offer to pay, *supra protest*. *The protest is necessary, and should precede the collateral acceptance or payment;^d and if the bill, on its face, directs a resort to a third person, in case of refusal by the drawee, such direction becomes part of the contract.^e

As between the holder of a check and the endorser, it ought to be presented for acceptance with due diligence;^f

^a *Konig v. Bayard*, 1 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 250.

^b *Beawes*, tit. *Bills of Exchange*, pl. 42. *Jackson v. Hudson*, 2 *Campb.* 447.

^c *Mitford v. Walcot*, 12 *Mod. Rep.* 410.

^d *Pothier*, h. t. pl. 170.

^e *Pothier*, h. t. pl. 137. *Holland v. Pierce*, 14 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 499. An acceptance for honour is not an absolute, but a conditional acceptance, and an averment of presentment to the drawee for payment is necessary. *Williams v. Germaine*, 7 *Barnw. & Cress.* 463.

^f *Rickford v. Ridge*, 2 *Campb.* 537. *Beeching v. Gower*, 1 *Holt*, 313. note of the reporter. *Clark v. Stackhouse*, 2 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 327. *Mohawk Bank v. Broderick*, 10 *Wendell*, 304. *Mohawk Bank v. Broderick*, 13 *Wendell*, 133. Where the parties resided in the same place, six days' delay was held to discharge the endorser. *Gough v. Staats*, *ibid.* 549. In *Boddington v. Schlencher*, 1 *Neville & Manning*, 540. S. C. 4 *B. & Adol.* 752, it was held, that the holder was bound to present it for payment on the day following that on which he receives it. *Moule v. Brown*, 4 *Bingham*, N. C. 266. *Smith v. Janes*, 20 *Wendell*, 192. S. P.

but as between the holder and the drawer, a demand at any time before suit brought will be sufficient, unless it appears that the drawee has failed, or the drawer has, in some other manner, sustained injury by the delay.^a The drawee ought to accept or refuse acceptance, as soon as he has had a reasonable opportunity to inform his judgment. If he cannot be found at the proper place, the holder may cause the bill to be protested; and if the drawee be dead, the bill may be presented to his executor or administrator.^b

(5.) *Of the endorsement.*

A valid transfer may be made by the payee, or his agent. In the case of a bill made or endorsed to a *feme sole*, who afterwards marries, the right to endorse it belongs to the husband. So, the assignee of an insolvent payee, or the executor or administrator of a deceased payee, are entitled to endorse the paper.^c And if a bill be made payable to a mercantile *house *89 consisting of several partners, an endorsement by any one of the partners is deemed the act of the firm. If the bill be made payable to A., for the use of B., the legal title is in A., and he must endorse it.

The bill cannot be endorsed for a part only of its con-

^a *Cruger v. Armstrong*, 3 *Johns. Cas.* 5. *Conroy v. Warren*, *ibid.* 259. *Rothschild v. Corney*, 9 *Barnw. & Cress.* 388. *Sutherland, J.*, in *Murray v. Judah*, 6 *Cowen*, 490, and *Savage, Ch. J.*, in *Mohawk Bank v. Broderick*, 10 *Wendell*, 306.

^b *Molloy*, b. 2. c. 10. sec. 34. *Bayley on Bills*, 128.

^c *Parker, Ch. J.*, in 1 *P. Wm.* 255. *Conner v. Martin*, cited in 3 *Wils. Rep.* 5. *Rawlinson v. Stone*, *ibid.* 1. In *Harper v. Butler*, 2 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 239, it was admitted, that an endorsement of a negotiable note by the executor of the payee, and good in the state where he was appointed and endorsed it, will enable the endorsee to sue in his own name in any other state. But a contrary doctrine was held in *Stearns v. Burnham*, 5 *Greenleaf*, 261, and *Thompson v. Wilson*, 2 *N. H. Rep.* 291.

tents, unless the residue has been extinguished; for a personal contract cannot be apportioned, and the acceptor made liable to separate actions by different persons.

Blank endorsements are common, and they may be filled up at any time by the holder, even down to the moment of trial in a suit to be brought by him as endorsee; but no other use can be made of a blank endorsement in filling it up, than to point out the person to whom the bill or note is to be paid. A note endorsed in blank is like one payable to bearer, and passes by delivery, and the holder may constitute himself, or any other person, assignee of the bill. The courts never inquire whether he sues for himself, or as trustee for some other person.^a Even a bond made payable to bearer, has been held to pass by delivery, in the same manner as a bank note payable to bearer, or a bill of exchange endorsed in blank.^b The holder may strike out the endorsement to him, though full, and all prior endorsements in blank, except the first, and charge the payee, or maker. When the endorser takes up the note, he becomes the holder, as entirely as though he had never parted with it.^c There is no necessity for any negotiable words in the endorsement. A bill originally negotiable, continues so in the hands of the endorsee, unless the general negotiability be restrained by a special endorsement

^a Peacock *v.* Rhodes, *Doug. Rep.* 633. Francis *v.* Mott, cited in *ibid.* 634. *Bull. N. P.* 275. Livingston *v.* Clinton, and Cooper *v.* Kerr, cited in 3 *Johns. Cas.* 264. Lovell *v.* Everton, 11 *Johns. Rep.* 52. Duncan, J., in 13 *Serg. & Rawle*, 315. Kiersted *v.* Rogers & Garland, 6 *Harr. & Johns.* 232. Evans *v.* Gee, 11 *Peters*, 80. In Sprigg *v.* Cuny's Heirs, 19 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 253, it was held, that the holder of a negotiable note, endorsed in blank, might sue on it, without filling it up to himself. Under the French law an endorsement, in blank, of a promissory note is not valid. *Code de Comm.* art. 137, 138. Nor can the holder of a bill drawn and endorsed in France, in blank, recover against the acceptor in the English Courts. Trimbe *v.* Vignier, 1 *Bing. N. C.* 151.

^b Gorgier *v.* Mieville, 3 *Barnw. & Cress.* 45.

^c Smith *v.* Clarke, *Peake's N. P. Rep.* 225. United States *v.* Barker, 1 *Paine's Rep.* 156. McDonald *v.* M'Gruder, 3 *Peters' Rep.* 474.

by the payee. He may stop its negotiability by a special endorsement, but no subsequent endorsee can restrain the negotiable quality of the bill.^a The first endorser is liable to every subsequent *bona fide* holder, even though the bill or note be forged, or fraudulently circulated.^b If a blank note or check be endorsed, it will bind the endorser to any sum, or time of payment, which the person to whom he intrusts the paper chooses to insert in it.^c This only applies to the case in which the body of the instrument is left blank. If negotiable paper, regularly filled up, be endorsed in blank, the endorser is holden only in the character of endorser, and according to the terms and legal operation of the instrument.^d

In the case of blank endorsements, possession is evidence of title ; but if the endorsements be all filled up, the first endorsee cannot sue without showing that he had taken up the bill or note. The acceptor or maker is liable only to the last endorsee. The prior endorsers have parted with their interest in the paper, and are presumed to have received a valuable consideration for it. But if the last endorsee protests the bill for non-

^a *Edie v. East India Company*, 2 *Burr Rep.* 1216. *Ancher v. The Bank of England*, *Doug. Rep.* 637. *Smith v. Clarke*, 1 *Esp. Rep.* 180.

^b *Lambert v. Pack*, 1 *Salk. Rep.* 127. *Putnam v. Sullivan*, 4 *Mass. Rep.* 45. *Codwise v. Gleason*, 3 *Day's Rep.* 12.

^c *Russel v. Langstaffe*, *Doug. Rep.* 514. *Violett v. Patton*, 5 *Cranch*, 142. In Indiana, the endorser of a note is understood to warrant two things:—1. That the note is valid, and the maker *liable* to pay it. 2. That the maker is solvent, and *able* to pay it. *Howell v. Wilson*, 2 *Blackf. Ind. Rep.* 418.

^d See *Jackson v. Richards*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 343. In *Beckwith v. Angell*, 6 *Conn. Rep.* 315, it was held, that if a promissory note be endorsed in blank, under a parol promise to guaranty the payment, the holder may fill up the blank pursuant to the special agreement, and prove that agreement by parol. The endorser will be liable, under such circumstances, without proof of the demand and notice requisite in other cases. There have been decisions to the same effect in *Josselyn v. Ames*, 3 *Mass. Rep.* 274. *Ulen v. Kittredge*, 7 *ibid.* 233. *Moies v. Bird*, 11 *ibid.* 436. *Nelson v. Dubois*, 13 *Johnson*, 175. *Campbell v. Butler*, 14 *ibid.* 349.

payment, and it be paid by a prior endorser, the *latter acquires, by such payment, a new title to the instrument.^a

Though the holder of paper fairly negotiated, be entitled to recover, and to shut out almost every equitable defence, yet the rule applies only to the case of negotiable paper taken *bona fide* in the course of business before it falls due. If taken after it is due and payable, the presumption is against the validity of the demand, and the purchaser takes it at his peril, and subject to every defence existing against it before it was negotiated.^b But it has been a question, when a note, payable upon demand, is to be deemed a note out of time, so as to subject the endorsee, upon a subsequent negotiation of it, to the operation of the rule. When the facts and circumstances are ascertained, the reasonableness of time is a matter of law, and every case will depend upon its special circumstances. Eighteen months, eight months, seven months, five months, even two months and a half, have been held, when unexplained by circumstances, an unreasonable delay; and if the demand be not made in a reasonable time by the holder, the endorser is dis-

^a *Mendez v. Carreroon*, 1 *Lord Raym.* 742. *Gorgerat v. M'Carty*, 2 *Dallas' Rep.* 144.

^b *Brown v. Davies*, 3 *Term Rep.* 80. *Tinson v. Francis*, 1 *Campb. Rep.* 19. *Sargent v. Southgate*, 5 *Pick.* 312. 317. 319. A stricter course is observed in the case of bills and notes than in that of checks, and a party taking a check over-due, does not necessarily take it subject to all the infirmities of the previous title, provided he exercises a reasonable caution in taking it; and that is a question of fact for a jury. *Rothschild v. Corney*, 1 *Dawson & Lloyd*, 325. *Mohawk Bank v. Broderick*, 13 *Wendell*, 133. A bill may be endorsed after it is due, for it continues negotiable *ad infinitum* until paid or discharged, provided the subsequent circulation does not prejudice any of the endorsers. *Hubbard v. Jackson*, 4 *Bingham*, 300. *Callow v. Lawrence*, 3 *Maule & Selw.* 95. In *Burrough v. Mess*, 10 *Barnw. & Cress.* 558, the rule in the text was restricted to all equities arising out of the note transaction itself; and it was held not to extend to protect a set-off, in respect of a debt due from the endorser to the maker, arising out of collateral matters.

charged.^a On the other hand, in *Thurston v. M'Kown*,^b a note payable on demand, and endorsed within seven days after it was made, was held to be endorsed in season to close all inquiry into the origin of the *note. And when a note is negotiated in season, it *92 may afterwards pass from one endorsee to another, after it is due, and the holder will be equally with the first endorsee protected in his title.^c There is no certain time in which a bill or note, payable at sight, or a given time thereafter, or on demand, must be presented for acceptance. It must not be locked up for any considerable time; it must be presented for payment within a reasonable time; but, if put into circulation, the courts are very cautious in laying down any rule as to the time in which it must be presented; and, in one case, it was allowed to be kept in circulation, without acceptance, so long as the convenience of the successive holders might require.^d That was the case of a foreign bill; and an inland bill may also be put in circulation before acceptance, and it may be kept a reasonable time before acceptance; but what would be a reasonable time cannot be precisely defined, and depends upon the particular circumstances of each case.^e If a bill or note be absolutely assigned so as to pass the whole interest in the instrument to the endorsee, its negotiable quality would pass with it; and the better opinion would seem to be, that its negotiability could not be impeded by any restriction contained in the endorsement.^f But where the

^a *Furman v. Haskin*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 369. *Losee v. Dunkin*, 7 *Johns. Rep.* 70. *Field v. Nickerson*, 13 *Mass. Rep.* 131. *Sice v. Cunningham*, 1 *Cowen's Rep.* 397. *Martin v. Winslow*, 2 *Mason's Rep.* 241.

^b 6 *Mass. Rep.* 428.

^c *Chalmers v. Lanion*, 1 *Campb. Rep.* 383.

^d *Goupy v. Harden*, 7 *Taunt. Rep.* 159.

^e *Fry v. Hall*, 4 *Taunt. Rep.* 396. *Muilman v. D'Eguino*, 2 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 565.

^f *Parsons, Ch. J.*, 3 *Mass. Rep.* 228.

endorsement is a mere authority to receive the money for the use, or according to the directions of the endorser, it would be evidence that the endorsee did not give a valuable consideration, and was not the absolute owner.^a

A negotiable instrument may be endorsed so as to exempt the endorser from liability, as if the endorser should add,

at his own risk, or without recourse. In that case, the

*93 maker or acceptor, and prior endorsers, would *be holden, according to the rules and usages of commercial paper, but the immediate endorser would be exempted from responsibility by the special contract.^b

If the bill or note be negotiated after it is due, and be thereby opened to every equitable defence, yet a demand must be made upon the drawee or maker within a reasonable time, and notice given to the endorser in order to charge him, equally as if it had been a paper payable at sight, or negotiated before it was due.^c

(6.) *Of the demand and protest.*

The demand of acceptance of a foreign bill is usually made by a notary, and in case of non-acceptance he protests it, and this notarial protest receives credit in all courts and places by the law and usage of merchants without any auxiliary evidence; and it is a requisite step, by the custom of merchants, in the case of a foreign bill, and must be made promptly upon refusal. It must be made at the time, in the manner, and by the persons

^a Sigourney, *v. Lloyd*, 8 *Barnw. & Cress.* 622. 1 *Dawson & Lloyd*, 132. S. C. 1 *Atk.* 249. 2 *Burr.* 1227. S. P.

^b Dallas, J., in *Goupy v. Harden*, 7 *Taunt. Rep.* 163. *Rice v. Stearns*, 3 *Mass. Rep.* 225. *Welch v. Lindo*, 7 *Cranch's Rep.* 159. *Ersk. Inst. of the Scotch Law*, vol. ii. 463. *Bell's Comm. on the Scotch Law*, vol. i. 402.

^c *McKinney v. Crawford*, 8 *Serg. & Rawle*, 351. *Berry v. Robinson*, 9 *Johns. Rep.* 121. *Bishop v. Dexter*, 2 *Conn. Rep.* 419. *Dwight v. Emerson*, 2 *N. H. Rep.* 159. *Rugely v. Davidson*, 3 *S. C. Const. Rep.* 33. *Allwood v. Haseldon*, 2 *Bailey's S. C. Rep.* 457.

prescribed, in the place where the bill was payable.^a It is sufficient, however, to note the protest on the day of the demand, and it may be drawn up in form at a future period. The protest is necessary for the purpose of prosecution, and it must be stated and proved in a suit on the bill.^b On inland bills no protest was required by

^a In Kentucky, by statute, in 1798, protested foreign bills are accounted, after the death of the drawer or endorser, of equal dignity with a judgment; and executors and administrators, of every such drawer or endorser, are compelled to suffer judgment to pass against them, before any bond, bill, or other debt of equal or inferior dignity. In France a protest, though usual, is not necessary to enable the holder of a *note* to sue the maker. The law was satisfactorily shown to be so by proof, in *Trimbey v. Vignier*, 6 *Carr & Payne*, 25. In England, by the statute of 2 and 3 William IV. ch. 98, all bills of exchange, wherein the drawers shall direct them to be payable in any place, other than the place expressed therein to be the residence of the drawee, and which shall not, on presentment, be accepted, may, without presentment, be protested for non-payment, in the place so payable.

^b *Tassell v. Lewis*, 1 *Lord Raym.* 743. *Rogers v. Stevens*, 2 *Term Rep.* 713. *Buller, J.*, 4 *Term Rep.* 175. *Gale v. Walsh*, 5 *Term Rep.* 239. *Chaters v. Bell*, 4 *Esp. Rep.* 48. *Townsley v. Sumrall*, 2 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 170. *Chitty on Bills*, h. t. *Bryden v. Taylor*, 2 *Harr. & Johns.* 396. The certificate of a foreign notary, under his hand and seal of office, of the presentment by him of a bill or note for acceptance or payment, and of his protest thereof for non-acceptance or non-payment, is received in all courts, by the usage and under the courtesy of nations, as presumptive evidence of the facts. *Chitty on Bills*, edit. 1836, p. 642. *Halliday v. M'Dougall*, 20 *Wendell*, 85. In New-York and Mississippi, a similar certificate of having given the requisite notice of such presentment, demand, and default, to the parties to be charged, is also made, by statute, presumptive evidence of the fact. *Laws N. Y.* sess. 56. ch. 271. sec. 8. *Laws of Mississippi*, 1833, ch. 70. If the notary omits to give the requisite notice, the bank who employed him is not responsible for his negligence, for their agency in the case of notes deposited with them for collection merely, is gratuitous. *Bellemire v. Bank U. S.* 4 *Wharton*, 105. But in the New-York Court of Errors, in December, 1839, in the case of *Allen v. the Merchants' Bank of N. Y.*, it was decided differently. In that case a bill drawn by a New-York merchant, upon a Philadelphia house, was deposited with the defendants for collection, who transmitted it to their correspondent bank in Philadelphia, and, acceptance being refused, the notary of the Philadelphia bank neglected to give notice to the holder and endorser at New-York, in consequence of which payment was lost. The court held that the defendants were liable for the loss or damage arising from the default of their Philadelphia agent, and that there was an implied undertaking by a bank or banker, receiving negotiable paper deposited for collection, to take the necessary measures to charge the drawer, maker, or other proper parties, upon the default or refusal to accept or pay. This was so decided in *Smedes v. Bank of Utica*, 20 *Johnson*, 372.

the common law, and it was only made necessary in England, in certain cases, by the statutes of 9th *94 and 10th Wm. III. *and 3d and 4th Anne; and yet, notwithstanding the language of those statutes, it has long been the settled rule and practice not to consider the protest of an inland bill as necessary or material.^a Nor is a protest of an inland bill generally deemed necessary in this country, though the practice is to have bills drawn in one state on persons in another, protested by a notary, and the act of the state of Kentucky of 1798, ch. 57. seemed to require it.^b It is also necessary in Vir-

McKinstre v. the same, 9 *Wendell*, 46. 11 *ibid.* 473. The use of the funds, thus temporarily obtained, formed a valuable consideration for the undertaking. The court declared that whether the note or bill was received for collection in the same or a distant place, the bank was liable for the neglect, omission, or misconduct of the bank or agent it employed in the collection, unless there was some express or implied agreement to the contrary. It is to be observed, however, that this decision was against the opinion of the chancellor and a considerable minority of the senate, and that it reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court and of the Superior Court in the City of New-York. This does not destroy the authority, while it lessens the weight and value of the decision.

^a *Bayley on Bills*, 167. edit. Boston, 1826. *Wendle v. Andrews*, 2 *Barnw. & Ald.* 696. *Rice v. Hogan*, 8 *Dana*, 135.

^b *Townsley v. Sumrall*, 2 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 170. But in *Rice v. Hogan*, 8 *Dana*, 135, it was held, that a protest was not necessary, even in the case of a foreign bill, as between the drawer and acceptor under the act of Kentucky of 1837. *Miller v. Hackley*, 5 *Johns. Rep.* 375. In this last case it was said, that a bill drawn in New-York, on Charleston, or any other place within the United States, was an inland bill. But in South Carolina and in Pennsylvania, a bill drawn in one state, upon a person residing in another, is considered in the light of a foreign bill, requiring a protest. (*Duncan v. Course*, 1 *S. C. Const. Rep.* 100. *Cape Fear Bank v. Stinemetz*, 1 *Hill*, 44. *Lonsdale v. Brown*, 4 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 148.) The opinion in New-York was not given on the point on which the decision rested; and it was rather the opinion of Mr. Justice Van Ness, than that of the court; but he was supported by Dr. Tucker, (see *Tucker's Blackstone*, vol. ii. 467. note 22.) and also by *Marius on Bills*, p. 2, who holds that bills between England and Scotland were inland bills. The decision in South Carolina was a solemn adjudication, after argument, on the very question; and the weight of American authority is, therefore, on that side. In *Buckner v. Finley & Van Lear*, 2 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 586, it was decided, that bills of exchange drawn in one state, on persons living in another, were to be treated as foreign bills; and this decision, I apprehend, puts the point at rest. *Phoenix Bank v. Hussey*, 12 *Pick.* 493. *Brown v. Ferguson*, 4 *Leigh's Rep.* 37. *Dickins v. Beal*, 10 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 573. *Bank of U. S. v. Daniel*, 12 *Peters' Rep.* 54. *Rice v. Hogan*, 8 *Dana*, 134. *Halliday v. McDougall*, 20 *Wendell*, 81.

ginia, and the omission to give notice of the protest of an inland bill, causes the loss of interest and damages.^a After the protest for non-acceptance, immediate notice must be given to the drawer and endorser, in order to fix them, and the omission would not be cured by the bill being presented for payment, and subsequent notice of the non-payment, as well as non-acceptance.^b The drawer or endorser may be sued forthwith upon the protest for non-acceptance, without waiting until the bill is also presented *for payment, and refused.^c The *95 English law, requiring protest, and notice of non-acceptance of foreign bills, has been adopted and followed as the true rule of mercantile law in the states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New-York, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and South Carolina.^d But the Supreme Court of the United States, in *Brown v. Barry*,^e and in *Clarke v. Russel*,^f held, that in an action on a protest for non-payment on a foreign bill, protest for non-acceptance, or a notice of the non-acceptance, need not be shown, inasmuch as they were not required by the custom of merchants in this country, and those decisions have been followed in Pennsylvania; protest for non-payment is sufficient.^g It becomes, therefore, a little difficult to know what is the true rule of the law-merchant in the United

^a Willock v. Riddle, 5 Call, 358.

^b Roscow v. Hardy, 3 Camp. Rep. 458. United States v. Barker, 4 Wash. Cir. Rep. 464. Thompson v. Cumming, 2 Leigh's Rep. 321.

^c Milford v. Mayor, Doug. Rep. 55. Ballingalls v. Gloster, 3 East's Rep. 481. Wallace v. Agry, 4 Mason, 336. Evans v. Gee, 11 Peters' Rep. 80. Evans v. Bridges, 4 Porter's Ala. Rep. 348.

^d Watson v. Loring, 3 Mass. Rep. 557. Sterry v. Robinson, 1 Day's Rep. 11. Mason v. Franklin, 3 Johns. Rep. 202. Weldon v. Buck, 4 ibid. 144. Winthrop v. Pepon, 1 Bay's Rep. 468. Philips v. M'Curdy, 1 Harr. & Johns. 187. Thompson v. Cumming, 2 Leigh's Rep. 321. 1 Hawk. Rep. 195.

^e 3 Dallas' Rep. 365.

^f Cited in 6 Serg. & Rawle, 358.

^g Read v. Adams, 6 Serg. & Rawle, 356. .

States, on this point, after such contradictory decisions. The Scotch law is the same as the English,^a and it appears to me, that the English rule is the better doctrine, and the most consistent with commercial policy.

If the bill has been accepted, demand of payment must be made when the bill falls due; and it must be made by the holder or his agent upon the acceptor, at the place appointed for payment, or at his house or residence, or upon him personally if no particular place be appointed, and it cannot be made by letter through the post *96 office.^b But there is a great deal of perplexity and confusion in the cases on this subject, arising from refined distinctions and discordant opinions; and it becomes very difficult to know what is precisely the law of the land, as to the sufficiency of the demand upon the maker of the note, or the acceptor of the bill. If there be no particular and certain place identified and appointed, other than a city at large, and the party has no residence there, the bill may be protested in the city on the day without inquiry, for that would be an idle attempt.^c The general principle is, that due diligence must be used to find out the party, and make the demand; and the inquiry will always be, whether, under the circumstances of the case, due diligence has been used. The agent of the holder, in one case, used the utmost diligence, for several weeks, to find the residence of the endorser, in order to give him notice of the dishonour of the bill, and then took a day to consult his principal before he gave the notice, and it was held sufficient.^d If the party has ab-

^a 1 *Bell's Comm.* 408.

^b *Saunderson v. Judge*, 2 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 509. *Stedman v. Gooch*, 1 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 3. *Berkshire Bank v. Jones*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 524. *State Bank v. Hurd*, 12 *ibid.* 172. *Mason v. Franklin*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 202. *Whittier v. Grafam*, 3 *Greenleaf*, 82. *Stuckert v. Anderson*, 3 *Wharton*, 116.

^c *Boot v. Franklin*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 207.

^d *Firth v. Thrush*, 8 *Barnw. & Cress.* 387.

sconded, that will, as a general rule, excuse the demand.^a If he has changed his residence to some other place, within the same state or jurisdiction, the holder must make endeavours to find it, and make the demand there; though if he has removed out of the state, subsequent to the making of the note or accepting the bill, it is sufficient to present the same at his former place of residence.^b If there be no other evidence of the maker's residence than the date of the paper, the holder must make inquiry at the place of date; and the presumption is, that the maker resides where the note is dated, and that he contemplated payment at that place.^c But it is presumption *only; and if the maker resides elsewhere *97 within the state when the note falls due, and that be known to the holder, demand must be made at the maker's place of residence.^d

The rule in the English law is, that if a bill or promissory note be made payable at a particular place, the demand must be made at the place, because the place is made part and parcel of the contract.^e If, however, the place appointed be deserted or shut up, it amounts to a refusal to pay, and a demand would be inaudible and useless;^f or if the demand be made upon the maker elsewhere, and no objection be made at the time, it will be deemed a waiver of any future demand.^g

In New-York it has been decided, that though a bill or

^a 4 *Mass. Rep.* 45. 4 *Serg. & Rawle*, 480.

^b *Anderson v. Drake*, 14 *Johns. Rep.* 114. *M'Gruder v. Bank of Washington*, 9 *Wheat. Rep.* 598. *Bayley on Bills*, edit. *Boston*, 126. *Gillespie v. Hannahan*, 4 *M'Cord*, 503.

^c *Stewart v. Eden*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 127. *Duncan v. M'Cullough*, 4 *Serg. & Rawle*, 480.

^d *Anderson v. Drake*, 14 *Johns. Rep.* 114. *Galpin v. Hard*, 3 *M'Cord*, 394.

^e *Saunderson v. Judge*, 2 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 509. *Sanderson v. Bowes*, 14 *East's Rep.* 500. *Dickinson v. Bowes*, 16 *ibid.* 110. *Butterworth v. Le Despenser*, 3 *Maule & Selw.* 150. *Gibb v. Mather*, 3 *Bingham*, 214.

^f *Howe v. Bowes*, 16 *East's Rep.* 112.

^g *Herring v. Sanger*, 3 *Johns. Cas.* 71.

note be made payable at a particular place, it is not requisite for the holder to aver or prove a demand of payment *at the place*.^a This would appear to be contrary to the rule as now understood and established in the English law; and it would seem to be contrary to the opinion of the Court of Errors of New-York, in the case of *Woodworth v. The Bank of America*,^b where the rule of the English law was recognised, that if the place of payment be designated in the note, demand must be made there.

*98 But if the person, at whose *place or house the note or bill is made payable, be the holder of the paper, in that case it has been held by the Supreme Court of the United States,^c to be sufficient for the holder to examine the accounts, and ascertain that the party who is to pay there has no funds deposited. The maker or acceptor is in default by not appearing and paying, and no formal demand is necessary. The cases of *Saunderson v. Judge*, and *Berkshire Bank v. Jones*,^d were deemed to be controlling authorities on the point. If the defendant was ready to pay at the time and place designated in the note

^a *Wolcott v. Van Santvoord*, 17 *Johns. Rep.* 248. *Caldwell v. Cassidy*, 8 *Cowen's Rep.* 271. *Haxtun v. Bishop*, 3 *Wendell*, 1. But if the maker was ready to pay at the time and place specified, that would be matter of defence. The same doctrine is held in *Carley v. Vance*, 17 *Mass.* 389. *Bacon v. Dyer*, 3 *Fairfield*, 19. *Remick v. O'Kyle*, *ibid.* 340. *Weed v. Van Houten*, 4 *Halsted*, 189. *Conn. v. Gano*, 1 *Ohio Rep.* 483. *McNairy v. Bell*, 1 *Yerger*, 502. *Mulherrian v. Hannum*, 2 *ibid.* 81, and *Irvine v. Withers*, 1 *Stewart's Ala. Rep.* 234. And it is so declared, by statute, in Indiana, in 1836. But in Louisiana, after a full discussion, the English rule has been adopted as most convenient and most agreeable to the contract. *Mellon v. Croghan*, 15 *Martin*, 423. 12 *Louisiana Rep.* 455. S. P. So, also, in the case of the Bank of Wilmington *v. Cooper*, in Delaware, the English rule was followed. 1 *Harrington's Rep.* 10.

^b 19 *Johns. Rep.* 391.

^c *United States Bank v. Smith*, 11 *Wheat. Rep.* 171. *United States Bank v. Carneal*, 2 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 543.

^d 2 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 509. 6 *Mass. Rep.* 524. *Rahm v. Philadelphia Bank*, 1 *Rawle*, 335. S. P. The note itself must be present, ready for surrender when the demand for payment is made, and in default of it, the demand will be insufficient to fix the endorser. *Eastman v. Potter*, 4 *Vermont*, 313.

for payment, it is matter of defence, and will go to discharge him from interest and costs.^a The case of *Caldwell v. Cassidy*,^b adopted a further distinction on this already subtle and embarrassing point, and held, that though, in the case of a note payable *at a particular place*, demand at that place need not be averred; yet if the note be made payable *on demand at a particular place*, a demand must be made at the place before suit brought. With respect to the addition of memoranda to a bill or note, designating the place of payment, there have been much litigation and difficulty in the cases. It is stated as a general rule,^c that a memorandum upon a note, as to where it should be payable, was not a part of it; and in *Exon v. Russell*,^d such a memorandum at the bottom of the note was held to be no part of it. On the other hand, in *Cowie v. Halsall*,^e after a bill had been accepted generally, the drawer, without the consent of the acceptor, added a place of payment, and it was held, that the condition *was *99 a material variation, and discharged the acceptor. In the case of *The Bank of America v. Woodworth*,^f a note was endorsed for the accommodation of the maker, and returned to him to be negotiated. It had no place of payment, and before the maker had parted with it, he added in the margin a place of payment, and negotiated it, and the *bona fide* holder made the demand there. The Supreme Court held, that the memorandum was no part of the contract, but merely an intimation to the holder where to look for the maker and his funds. But the Court of Errors decided otherwise, and overturned this very

^a *Haxtun v. Bishop*, 3 *Wendell*, 1.

^b 8 *Cowen*, 271.

^c *Bayley on Bills*, 25.

^d 4 *Maule & Selw.* 505. *Williams v. Waring*, 10 *Barnw & Cress.* 2. S. P.

^e 4 *Barnw. & Ald.* 197. *Desbrowe v. Wetherly*, 1 *Moody & Robinson*, 438. S. P.

^f 13 *Johns. Rep.* 315. S. C. 19 *Johns. Rep.* 390.

reasonable, and established the very rigorous doctrine, that the memorandum was, in that case, a material alteration of the contract, which discharged the endorser. The Supreme Court of New-York have since decided^a that where the endorser commits a negotiable note to the maker, with a blank for the date, or sum, or time of payment, there is an implied agency given by the endorser to the maker to fill up the blanks. The principle of the decisions in Massachusetts is, that if the endorsement be made at the time of making the note, the endorser is to be treated as an original promiser, because he is supposed to participate in the consideration.^b

If a bill of exchange, though drawn generally, be accepted, payable at a particular place, it is a special or qualified acceptance, which the holder is not bound to take; but if he does take it, the demand must be made at the place appointed, and not elsewhere. This is the plain sense of the contract, and the words *accepted payable at a given place*, are equivalent to an exclusion of a demand elsewhere.^c

^a Mitchell v. Culver, 7 Cowen's Rep. 336. Mechanics' and Farmers' Bank v. Schuyler, *ibid.* 337. note.

^b Parker, Ch. J., in Tenney v. Prince, 4 Pick. 385.

^c This point has been the subject of great litigation and discussion in the English courts, and judges of high professional character, and of great professional learning, have entertained directly opposite opinions on the question. In Ambrose v. Hopwood, 2 Taunt. Rep. 61, the C. B. held, that the bill must be presented at the place specified in the acceptance, and not elsewhere. This was in 1809. In Callaghan v. Aylett, 3 Taunt. Rep. 397, in 1811, the same court followed the same doctrine, and, after more discussion, declared, that where the bill was accepted, payable at a particular place, it was a qualified acceptance, and the presentment must be averred and proved to have been made there. There may, in the act of acceptance, be a qualification of the place, as well as of the time, of acceptance. In Fenton v. Goundry, 13 East's Rep. 459, in 1811, the same question arose in the K. B., and was decided differently; and it was held, that though the bill was accepted payable at a place certain, it was still to be taken to be payable generally and universally, and wherever demanded. Afterwards, in Gammon v. Schmoll, 5 Taunt. Rep. 344, the Court of C. B., notwithstanding the decision of the K. B., adhered, with determined purpose, to their former doctrine; and, in Bowes v. Howe, on

Three days of grace apply equally, according to the custom of merchants, to foreign and inland bills and promissory notes, and as between the endorser

error from the K. B., into the Exchequer Chamber, 5 *Taunt. Rep.* 30, the doctrine of the C. B. was established. It being of great importance to the mercantile world that the law on this subject should be fixed and known, the same point was brought into review before the House of Lords, in 1820, in the case of *Rowe v. Young*, 2 *Bro. & Bing. Rep.* 165, and the opinions of the twelve judges were taken for the information of the lords. The point was elaborately discussed in the separate opinions of the judges, which displayed all the learning and acuteness of investigation of which such a narrow and dry question was susceptible. A majority of the judges were in favour of the opinion of the K. B., and they held, that such a special acceptance need not be averred and proved in the first instance, and that the non-presentment at the place was matter of defence, and to be taken advantage of in pleading. But Lord Eldon and Lord Redesdale, and four out of the twelve common law judges, were of opinion, that such a qualified acceptance must be averred, and presentment according to it proved, and that opinion prevailed. The House of Lords reversed the judgment of the K. B., and overthrew their doctrine, and established the rule, that if a bill of exchange be accepted, payable at a particular place, it was necessary to aver and prove presentment of the bill at that place, and the party so accepting is not liable to pay on a demand made elsewhere. The defendant was not to be subjected to the inconvenience of pleading a tender, and bringing the money into court. Lord Eldon's opinion, in the House of Lords, was distinguished for being clear, nervous, pertinent, logical, and conclusive; and he very well observed, that he could not understand the good sense of the distinction of the K. B., that if a promissory note be payable at a particular place, the demand must be made there, because the place, being in the note, is a part of the contract; but if a bill be accepted, payable at a particular place, it is not a part of the acceptance, and the presentment need not be made there. Soon after this decision was made, the statute of 1 and 2 George IV. ch. 77, was passed, declaring that an acceptance, payable at a particular place, had the effect of a general acceptance, and the holder was not bound to present the bill at any particular place, and the acceptor might be called on elsewhere, as well as at the place indicated. So far the rule was thrown back by statute into the situation in which it was placed by the K. B.; but the statute further provided, that if the bill was accepted, payable at a specified place *only, and not elsewhere*, it was then to be considered a qualified acceptance, and demand must be made at the specified place. The Supreme Court of the United States, in *U. S. Bank v. Smith*, 11 *Wheat. Rep.* 171, were inclined to think that, as against the acceptor of a bill or maker of a note, no averment or proof of demand of payment at the place designated in the instrument was necessary. They withheld a decided opinion on the point. But as against the endorser, such demand and proof were held to be indispensable. Afterwards in *Wallace v. McConnell*, 13 *Peters*, 136, the Supreme Court discussed the point upon a full examination of the American as well as English authorities, and settled the question. They held that where a bill or note was made payable at a specified time and

and endorsee of a negotiable *note;^a and the acceptor or maker has within a reasonable time of the end of business, or bank hours, of the third day of grace, (being the third day after the paper falls

place, it was not necessary to aver in the declaration, or prove at the trial, that a demand of payment was made *at the place*. If the maker or acceptor was ready at the time and place to pay, that was matter of defence. In *Fayle v. Bird*, 2 *Carr. & Payne*, 303, it was held, that on a bill drawn payable in *London*, presentment must be made at some place there; but it is stated in *Selby v. Eden*, 11 *Moore*, that presentment need not be averred in the declaration. In *Indiana*, they follow the rule that if a promissory note be payable at a particular place, a demand of payment at that place must be averred and proved. 1 *Blackford's Rep.* 323. As evidence of the endless refinements and distinctions on this subject, we may refer to the case of *Mitchell v. Baring*, (4 *Carr. & Payne*, 35. 10 *Barnw. & Cress.* 4. S. C.) where it was held, that if a bill, payable in *London*, be accepted for honour, to be paid if protested and refused when due, it must be protested at *Liverpool*, where the drawee resided. In *Picquet v. Curtis*, 1 *Sumner*, 478, Mr. Justice Story considered the principle settled by the decision in the House of Lords, in the case of *Rowe v. Young*, as irresistible, and that in the case of foreign or inland bills, made payable at a particular place, the demand and the dishonour must be there. But the decision in 13 *Peters*, above cited, settled the question the other way, and the whole current of American authorities, as referred to in that decision, are on the same side. *Claudite Jam Rivos*.

^a *Brown v. Harraden*, 4 *Term Rep.* 148. *Bussard v. Levering*, 6 *Wheat. Rep.* 102. *Lindenberger v. Beall*, *ibid.* 104. *Crenshaw v. McKiernan*, 1 *Minor's Ala. Rep.* 295. The period of grace varies in different countries. In France, by the ordinance of 1673, tit. 5. art. 4, it was ten days; but by the new code, art. 135, all days of grace are abolished. In Massachusetts a promissory note was held not entitled to grace, unless it be an express part of the contract. *Jones v. Fales*, 4 *Mass. Rep.* 245. But in 1824, by statute, the days of grace were given, on all bills of exchange payable at sight, or on a future day certain, within the state, and on promissory negotiable notes, orders, and drafts, payable at a future day certain, within the state, in like manner as on foreign bills, by the custom of merchants. The provision does not extend to bills, notes, or drafts, payable on demand. The law was re-enacted in the revised statutes of 1835. See, also, *Perkins v. Franklin Bank*, 21 *Pick.* 433. In the state of Maine, by statute of 1824, ch. 272, the drawer of inland bills of exchange, and the endorser of a promissory note, as well as the acceptor and maker, are entitled to three days of grace, if the bill or note be discounted by a Bank or left there for collection. Foreign bills are governed by the usage of merchants, and the acceptor has the three days of grace without any statute provision. In Vermont, on the other hand, the days of grace were taken away, by statute, in 1833. In New-Hampshire the three days of grace are allowed to the maker of a negotiable note. *Dennie v. Walker*, 7 *N. H. Rep.* In *Broddie v. Searcy*, *Peck's Tenn. Rep.* 183, the law-merchant and the three days of grace were considered applicable to negotiable promissory notes, and applied with as much accuracy and strictness as in the most commercial states.

due,) *to pay. It has been said,^a that the acceptor was bound to pay the bill on demand, on any part of the third day of grace, provided the demand be made within reasonable hours. Lord Kenyon thought otherwise. The question will be governed, in a degree, by the custom of the place; and if, in a commercial city, payments are made at the banks, they must be made within bank hours. The maker or acceptor is entitled to the uttermost convenient time allowed by the custom of business of that kind, in the place where the bill is presented, and he is not entitled to any further time.^b If the third day of grace falls on Sunday, or a great holy-day, as the fourth of July, or a day of public rest, the demand must be made on the day preceding.^c The three days of grace apply equally to bills payable at sight;^d but

^a Buller, J., 4 *Term Rep.* 174. The opinion of Buller, J., has been adopted in *Greeley v. Thurston*, 4 *Greenleaf*, 479.

^b It was held in *Osborn v. Moncure*, 3 *Wendell*, 170, that the maker had the whole of the third day of grace to make payment, if he thinks proper to seek the holder. If a presentment of a bill for payment be to a private individual, and not to a bank or banker, it is sufficient to make the demand in the evening of the day of payment. *Triggs v. Newnham*, 10 *Moore*, 249.

^c *Tassel v. Lewis*, 1 *Lord Raym.* 743. *Jackson v. Richards*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 343. *Lewis v. Burr*, 2 *Caines' Cas. in Error*, 195. *Bussard v. Levering*, 6 *Wheat. Rep.* 102. Statute of Massachusetts, 1838, ch. 182. Act of Louisiana, 1838, No. 52. The usage is settled in commercial matter, that if the day of payment falls on Sunday, payment is to be made on Saturday, and in *Kilgour v. Miles*, 6 *Gill & Johnson*, 268, it was held that the same rule applied to all other contracts. But the weight of authority is the other way, and in all contracts, except where the three days of grace are allowed by the custom of merchants, if the day of performance falls on Sunday, the performance may be on Monday. *Avery v. Stewart*, 2 *Conn. Rep.* 69. *Salter v. Burt*, 20 *Wendell*, 205. But by statute in Vermont, 1837, if a contract falls due on Sunday it is payable on Monday.

^d *Colman v. Sayer*, 1 *Barnard's K. B.* 303. *Bayley on Bills*, 151. *Chitty on Bills*, 344, 345. *Dehers v. Harriot*, 1 *Show*, 160. *L'Anson v. Thomas*, cited in *Chitty on Bills*, 345. On the other hand, though the weight of authority would seem greatly to preponderate in favour of the rule as laid down in the text, yet it may be considered as a point not entirely settled, and a different rule is laid down in *Beawe's L. M.* pl. 256, and in *Kyd on Bills*, p. 10. In France, while days of grace were allowed under the ordinance of 1673, Pothier agreed with M. Jousse, in his commentary, that a bill payable at

a bill, note, or check payable on demand, *or where no time of payment is expressed, is payable immediately on presentment, and is not entitled to the days of grace.^a A bill payable at so many days' sight, means so many days after legal sight, or acceptance;^b and when the time is to be computed by days, as so many days after sight, the day of the date of the instrument is, by the modern practice, excluded.^c

It is equally unseasonable, to demand payment before the expiration of the third day of grace, as after the day. The demand must be made on the third day of grace, or on the second, if the third day be a day of public rest; and in default of such demand, the drawer of the bill, and the endorser of the note, are discharged.^d If, however,

sight had no days of grace; and he justly observed, that it would be unreasonable and inconvenient for a person who takes a draft, for his accommodation, on his journey, payable at sight, to be obliged to wait the days of grace for his money. *Traité du Con. de Change*, art. 172.

^a *Cammer v. Harrison*, 2 *M'Cord's Rep.* 246. *Bayley on Bills*, 141. *Chitty on Bills*, 5th edit. 336. 345. *Sommerville v. Williams*, 1 *Stewart's Ala. Rep.* 484. So, if a note be payable on 1st May *fixed*, it means that no days of grace are intended, and there are none allowed. *Durnford v. Patterson*, 7 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 460.

^b *Mitchell v. De Grand*, 1 *Mason's Rep.* 176. If a bill payable at so many, say sixty days' sight, be *accepted, payable upon a given day, say November 3d*, in which the three days of grace were, in fact, included, though the day of acceptance did not appear on the bill, the demand is to be made on the day specified in the acceptance. The acceptor is bound to that day, and it being in point of fact the true day, the drawer and endorsers would also be bound, on protest and due notice of default of payment on that day. (*Kenner and others v. their Creditors*, 20 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 36. 1 *Miller's Louis. Rep.* 280. S. C.)

^c *Bayley on Bills*, 155.

^d *Coleman v. Sayer*, *Str. Rep.* 329. *Wiffen v. Roberts*. 1 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 261. *Leavitt v. Simes*, 3 *N. H. Rep.* 14. *Mills v. United States Bank*, 11 *Wheaton*, 431. A bill payable at so many days after date, must be presented by the period of its maturity. If payable at so many days after sight, it must be presented in a reasonable time under the circumstances. *Story, J.*, 4 *Mason*, 345. In *Grant v. Long*, 12 *Louis. Rep.* 402, it was held, that a bill of exchange, payable ninety days after date, must be presented for payment the day it became due, or the drawer would be discharged. The court held to the rule so strictly, as not even to admit any excuse, even of two days, from the last day of grace, derived from the irregularities of the mail. See *supra*, p. 82.

a note be made for negotiation at a bank, whose custom is to demand payment, and to give notice, on the fourth day, that custom forms a part of the law of the contract, and the parties are presumed to agree to be governed, in that case, by the usage.^a

The *same rule applies, when a bank, by usage, *104 treats a particular day as a holyday, though not legally known as such, and make demands, and give notice, on the day preceding ; the parties to a note discounted there, and conusant of the usage, are bound by it.^b Though a bill, payable at a given time, has never been presented to the drawee for acceptance, the demand upon the drawee for payment is to be made on the third day of grace ; for, by the usage of the commercial world, which now enters into every bill and note of a mercantile character, except where it is positively excluded, a bill does not become due on the day mentioned on its face, but on the last day of grace.^c

(7.) *Of the steps requisite to fix the drawer and endorsers.*

There is no part of the learning relating to negotiable paper, that has been more critically discussed, or in which the rules are laid down with more precision, than that which concerns the acts requisite to fix the responsibility of the drawer and endorsers, and the acts and omissions which will operate to discharge them. True policy consists in establishing some broad plain rules, easy to be understood, and steady in their obligation.

The holder must not only show a demand, or due diligence to get the money of the drawee of the bill or check,

^a Renner v. Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheat. Rep. 591. Mills v. United States Bank, 11 *ibid.* 431. Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Peters' U. S. Rep. 25. Bank of Columbia v. Fitzhugh, 1 Harr. & Gill, 239.

^b City Bank v. Cutter, 3 Pick. Rep. 414.

^c Bank of Washington v. Triplett, 1 Peters' U. S. Rep. 25.

and of the maker of the note, but he must give reasonable notice of their default to the drawer and endorsers, to entitle himself to a suit against them.^a The object *105 of the notice is to afford an *opportunity to the drawer and endorsers to obtain security from those persons to whom they are entitled to resort for indemnity. Notice to one of several partners, or to one of several joint drawers or endorsers, is notice to them all.^b What is reasonable notice to the drawer or endorser, is sometimes said to be a question of law, and at other times to be a question of fact. The question of reasonable notice is usually compounded of law and fact, and proper for the decision of a jury, under the advice and direction of the court; and the mixed question requires the application of the powers of the court and jury.^c The elder cases did not define what amounted to due diligence in giving notice of the dishonour of a bill,

^a Heylyn v. Adamson, 2 Burr. Rep. 669. Rushton v. Aspinwall, Doug. Rep. 679. Williams v. United States Bank, 2 Peters' U. S. Rep. 96. The demand and notice to the endorser are equally requisite, though he endorse the note after it is due. Stockman v. Riley, 2 M'Cord's Rep. 398. Poole v. Tolleson, 1 ibid. 199.

^b Porthouse v. Parker, 1 Campb. Rep. 82.

^c Tindal v. Brown, 1 Term Rep. 167. Darbshire v. Parker, 6 East's Rep. 3. Hilton v. Shepherd, 6 East's Rep. 14. in notis. Bateman v. Joseph, 12 East's Rep. 433. Chesapeake Ins. Co. v. Stark, 6 Cranch's Rep. 273. Mar. Ins. Co. v. Ruden, ibid. 338. Taylor v. Brigden, 8 Johns. Rep. 173. In Brahan v. Ragland, 1 Minor's Ala. Rep. 85, what is reasonable notice to an endorser was held to be a question of fact for a jury. In Aymar v. Beers, 7 Coven's Rep. 705, and the Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence, 1 Peters' U. S. Rep. 578, it was held, that the reasonableness of notice, or demand, or due diligence, when the facts were settled, was a question of law for the court, and not a question of fact for a jury. But the question is so mixed up with circumstances, and is so compounded of the ingredients of law and fact, that it will be found, in practice, very difficult to retain on the bench the exclusive jurisdiction of the question. In Ohio, by act of 1820, bonds, bills, and notes for money, and payable to order, or bearer, or assigns, are declared to be negotiable by endorsement thereon, so as to enable the assignee to sue in his own name; and if demand be made at the time the same becomes due, or within a reasonable time thereafter, it shall be adjudged due diligence, sufficient to charge the endorser. Statutes of Ohio, 1831. Chase's Statutes of Ohio, vol. ii. 1137.

with that exactness and certainty which practical men, and the business of life, required. According to the modern doctrine, the notice must be given by the first direct and regular conveyance.^a This means, the first *mail that goes after the day next to the third *106 day of grace; so that if the third day of grace be on Thursday, and the drawer or endorser reside out of town, the notice *may*, indeed, be sent on Thursday, but *must* be put into the post-office, or mailed, on Friday, so as to be forwarded as soon as possible thereafter; and if the parties live in the same town, the rule is the same, and the notice must be sent by the penny-post, or placed in the office on Friday.^b The law does not require excessive diligence, or that the holder should watch the post-office constantly, for the purpose of receiving and transmitting notices. Reasonable diligence and attention is all that the law exacts;^c and it seems to be now settled, that

^a Until an act of the Assembly since 1823, in Louisiana, the post-office was not, in that state, a proper place of deposit for notice to endorsers. 19 *Martin*, 491. It is not now, in those post-towns where the endorser lives within three miles of the post-office, and there is no penny-post establishment. *Louisiana State Bank v. Rowell*, 18 *ibid.* 506. *Clay v. Oakley*, 17 *ibid.* 137. This is also the rule in Tennessee, and notice through the post-office is not sufficient under like circumstances. *Bank v. Bennett*, 1 *Yerger*, 166. In Louisiana, if the residence of the party to be charged cannot be found, after due inquiry, notice lodged at the nearest post-office, addressed to the party at the place where the contract was made, is sufficient. *Preston v. Daysson*, 7 *Louis. Rep.* 7.

^b Notice *may* be given on the same day that the paper is payable and is duly dishonoured, and it *must*, if possible, be given on the next day, or put in the post-office for that purpose, so as to go by the mail of the morning thereafter. *Corp v. McComb*, 1 *Johns. Cas.* 328. *Bussard v. Levering*, 6 *Wheaton*, 102. 104. *Johnson v. Harth*, 1 *Bailey's S. C. Rep.* 482. *Shed v. Brett*, 1 *Pick. Rep.* 401. *Osborn v. Moncure*, 3 *Wendell*, 170. 1 *Minor's Ala. Rep.* 295. *Talbot v. Clarke*, 8 *Pinck.* 54. *Bixley v. Franklin Ins. Co.* *ibid.* 86. *United States v. Barker*, 4 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 464. *Townsley v. Springer*, 1 *Miller's Louis. Rep.* 122. 515. *Williams v. Smith*, 2 *Barnw. & Ald.* 496. *Farmers' Bank of M. v. Duval*, 7 *Gill & Johns.* 78.

^c In North Carolina the rule respecting notice is made to vary with the pursuits of the parties, and the same strictness is not required between farmers in the country, as between merchants in town. The reasonableness of notice, or due diligence, is to be left to the jury, under the direction of the court. *Brown v. Johnson*, 1 *Devereux*, 293.

each party into whose hands a dishonoured bill may pass, shall be allowed one entire day for the purpose of giving notice.^a If the demand be made on Saturday, it is sufficient to give notice to the drawer or endorser on Monday;^b

and putting the notice by letter into the post-office
 *107 is sufficient, though the letter *should happen to miscarry. If the holder uses the ordinary mode of conveyance, he is not required to see that the notice is brought home to the party.^c Nor is it necessary to send by the public mail. The notice may be sent by a private

^a *Bray v. Hadwen*, 5 *Maule & Selw.* 68. *Flack v. Green*, 3 *Gill & Johns.* 474. *Brown v. Ferguson*, 4 *Leigh*, 37.

^b *Jackson v. Richards*, 2 *Caines*, 343. Lord Alvanley, in *Haynes v. Birks*, 3 *Bos. & Pull.* 601. In *Hawkes v. Salter*, 4 *Bingham*, 715, and *Bray v. Hadwen*, 5 *Maule & Selw.* 69, and *Geill v. Jeremy*, 1 *Moody & Malkin*, 61, it was held, that the holder had, in such a case, *the whole* of Monday to write the notice, and that a letter by the Tuesday morning post was sufficient. This is now the English rule, and it appears to be a more definite construction, or else a relaxation of the strictness required by the former rule. See *Haynes v. Birks*, 3 *Bos. & Pull.* 599. *Jackson v. Swinton*, 2 *Taunton*, 224. *Smith's Compendium of Mercantile Law*, 147. The latter says, that if A. draws a bill in favour of B., who endorses to C., and demand and refusal be made on Monday, C. has all Tuesday to give notice to B., and if there had been a prior endorser, B. has all Wednesday to give notice to him, and Sunday is not included in any of the computations. In *Lennox v. Roberts*, 2 *Wheaton*, 373, the rule was laid down too strictly, when it stated that the demand of payment should be made upon the last day of grace, and notice of the default be put into the post-office *early enough to be sent by the mail of the succeeding day*. This rule is mentioned, and, as it would seem, with approbation, by the court, in the case of the Bank of Alexandria *v. Swann*, 9 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 33, but the decision only is, that notice need not be put in the post-office *on the day of the default*, and it is sufficient to send it by the mail on the next day. This leaves the point to rest on the former decision, and yet the principle declared is, that ordinary reasonable diligence is sufficient, and the law does not regard the fractions of the day in sending notice. This principle will sustain the rule as it is now generally and best understood in England and in the commercial part of the United States, that notice put into the post-office on the next day, *at any time of the day*, so as to be ready for the first mail that goes *thereafter*, is due notice, though it may not be mailed in season for to go by the mail *of the day after the default*. So, in *Firth v. Thrush*, 8 *Barnw. & Cress.* 387, an attorney was employed to give notice. He was not informed of the endorser's residence for several weeks after the bill was dishonoured, though he had used due diligence. He then took a day to consult the holder before he sent the notice, and it was held to be a valid notice.

^c *Dickins v. Beal*, 10 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 573.

conveyance, or special messenger, and it would be good notice, though it should happen to arrive a little behind the mail. Where the parties live in the same town, and within the district of the letter-carrier, it is sufficient to give notice by letter through the post-office. If there be no penny-post that goes to the quarter where the drawer lives, the notice must be personal, or by a special messenger sent to the dwelling-house; and it is necessary, in that case, that the notice be personally given to the party to be charged, or at his dwelling-house or place of business, and the duty of the holder does not require him to give notice at any other place. The notice, in all cases, is good, if left at the dwelling-house of the party, in a way reasonably calculated to bring the knowledge of it home to him; and if the house be shut up by a temporary absence, still the notice may be left there. If the parties live in different towns, the letter must be forwarded to the post-office nearest to the party, though, under certain circumstances, a more distant post-office may do; but the cases have not defined the precise distance from a post-office at which the party must reside, to render the service of notice through the post-office good.^a The law

^a Grose, J., and Lawrence, J., in *Darbishire v. Parker*, 6 *East's Rep.* 10. *Scott v. Lifford*, 9 *ibid.* 347. *Smith v. Mullet*, 2 *Campb.* 208. *Hilton v. Fairclough*, *ibid.* 633. *Williams v. Smith*, 2 *Barnw. & Ald.* 496. *Bancroft v. Hall*, 1 *Holt's N. P.* 476. *Bray v. Hawden*, 5 *Maule & Selw.* 63. *Jackson v. Richards*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 343. *Stewart v. Eden*, *ibid.* 121. *Corp v. M'Comb*, 1 *Johns. Cas.* 328. *Ireland v. Kip*, 10 *Johns. Rep.* 490, and 11 *ibid.* 231. *Lenox v. Roberts*, 2 *Wheat. Rep.* 373. *Bussard v. Levering*, 6 *ibid.* 102. *Lindenberger v. Beall*, *ibid.* 104. *Shed v. Brett*, 1 *Pick. Rep.* 401. *Mead v. Engs*, 5 *Cowen's Rep.* 303. *Whittier v. Graffam*, 3 *Greenleaf's Rep.* 82. *Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence*, 1 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 578. *Williams v. United States Bank*, 2 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 96. *United States Bank v. Carneal*, *ibid.* 543. *Gallagher v. Roberts*, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 191. *Davis v. Williams*, *Peck's Tenn. Rep.* 191. *The N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 769, 770. sec. 12—17, make provision for presentments and notices on negotiable paper, in special cases, as when part of the city of New-York is the seat of an infectious disease, and the residence of parties becomes disturbed. By Act of N. Y. April 23d, 1835, ch. 141, notice of non-acceptance of a bill, or of non-payment of a bill,

does not presume that the holder of the paper is acquainted with the residence of the endorsers ; and if the holder or notary, after diligent inquiry as to the residence of the endorser, cannot ascertain it, or mistakes it, and gives the notice a wrong direction, the remedy against the endorser is not lost.^a

*108 *The notice must specify that the bill is dishonoured, and the design of it is, that the drawer may be enabled to secure his claim against the acceptor, and the endorser against the maker, and the notice may come from any person who is a party to the bill.^b So, any agent, having possession of the bill, may give the notice, and it need not state at whose request it was given, nor who was the owner of the bill. There is no precise form of the notice. It is sufficient that it state the fact of non-payment, and it is not necessary to state expressly, for it is justly implied, that the holder looks to the endorser.^c It is sufficient for an agent to give notice to his principal of the dishonour of a bill, and it then becomes necessary for the principal to give the requisite

note, or other negotiable instrument, may be directed to the city or town where the person to be charged resided at the time of drawing, making, or endorsing the same, unless the person, at the time of his signature, specify thereto the post-office to which notice is to be addressed.

^a *Chapman v. Lipscombe*, 1 *Johnson's Rep.* 294. *Barr v. Marsh*, 9 *Yerger*, 253.

^b *Jameson v. Swinton*, 2 *Campb. Rep.* 373. *Solarte v. Palmer*, 7 *Bingham*, 530. *Chapman v. Keane*, 4 *Neville & Manning*, 607. 3 *Adolphus & Ellis*, 193. S. C. and it overrules *Tindal v. Brown*, in 1 *Term*, on the point as to the person giving the notice. *Maro v. Johnson*, 9 *Yerger*, 6. Mr. Justice Cowen, in *Halliday v. McDougall*, 20 *Wendell*, 85, considers it to be the duty of the notary to give the notice.

^c *Shed v. Brett*, 1 *Pick. Rep.* 401. *Mills v. United States Bank*, 11 *Wheat. Rep.* 431. *United States Bank v. Carneal*, 2 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 543. In *Chanoine v. Fowler*, 3 *Wendell*, 173, it was held, that the notice of non-acceptance or non-payment cannot be given by a stranger, but it may be by any person who is a party to the bill, or who would, on its return to him, have a right of action on it. But the case of *Shed v. Brett*, and *Mills v. United States Bank*, lay down the law concerning notice in the broad terms stated in the text.

notice, with due diligence, to the parties to be fixed.^a The party receiving notice is bound to give notice likewise to those who stand behind him, and to whom he means to resort for indemnity; and if a second endorser, on receiving notice of the dishonour of the bill, should *neglect to give the like notice, with due *109 diligence, to the first endorser, the latter would not be liable to him.^b It is not necessary, in the case of notice of the non-acceptance, or non-payment of a bill, that a copy of the bill and protest should accompany the notice. It is sufficient to give notice of the fact.^c If several parts, as is usual, of a bill of exchange, be drawn, they all contain a condition to be paid provided the others remain unpaid, and they collectively amount to one bill, and a payment to the holder of either is good, and a payment of one of a set is payment of the whole. The drawer or endorser, to be charged on non-acceptance or non-payment, is entitled, in the case of a foreign bill, to call for the protest, and the identical bill, or number of the set protested, before he is bound to pay; and it would be sufficient to produce it at the trial, or account for its absence.^d His rights attach to the bill that has been dis-

^a Haynes v. Birks, 3 Bos. & Pull. 599. Tunno v. Lague, 2 Johns. Cas. 1. Colt v. Noble, 5 Mass. Rep. 167. Firth v. Thrush, 8 Barnw. & Cress. 387. An agent of the holder is allowed one day to give notice to his principal of a default, and the principal one day thereafter to give notice to the drawer or prior endorser. *Ibid.*

^b Morgan v. Woodworth, 3 Johns. Cas. 89. Pothier, *Traité du Con. de Change*, No. 153. But if the first endorser has, in point of fact, had due notice from any subsequent holder, it is sufficient. Stafford v. Yates, 18 Johnson, 327. Stanton v. Blossom, 14 Mass. Rep. 116. Bayley on Bills, 4 edit. 163. Each endorser successively, is allowed a day to give notice to the endorser before him. Johnson v. Harth, 1 Bailey's S. C. Rep. 482.

^c Cromwell v. Hynson, 2 Esp. N. P. Rep. 511. Chaters v. Bell, 4 *ibid.* 48. Robins v. Gibson, 1 Maule & Selw. 289. Lenox v. Leverett, 10 Mass. Rep. 1. Wallace v. Agry, 4 Mason, 336. Goodman v. Harvey, 6 Neville & Manning, 372. S. C. 4 Adolp. & Ellis, 870.

^d Powell v. Roach, 6 Esp. N. P. Rep. 76. Beawes, 420. 424. sec. 74. Kenworthy v. Hopkins, 1 Johns. Cas. 107. Wells v. Whitehead, 15 Wendell, 527.

honoured, and he is entitled to call for it. He may want it for his own indemnity, and without it he might be exposed to claims from some *bona fide* holder, or person, who had paid it, *supra protest*, for his honour. He is not bound to produce the other parts of the set, or to account for their non-production.^a

There are many cases in which notice is not requisite, or the want of it waived.

If the drawee refuses to accept, because he has no effects of the drawer in hand, and the drawer had no right to draw, and no right to expect his bill would be paid, notice to the drawer is not necessary.^b This exception to the general rule proceeds on the ground of fraud in the drawer, or that notice to him would
 *110 be useless; *but the courts have regretted the existence of the exception, and they confine it strictly to the case of want of effects, and where the drawee is not indebted to the drawer, and to other cases in which the drawer had no right to expect that his bill would be honoured. Notice is requisite, if the want of it would produce detriment; as if, in case notice had been given, and the bill taken up, the drawer would have had his remedy over against some third person; or if it was drawn with a *bona fide* expectation of assets in the hands of the drawee, as upon the faith of consignments not come to hand, or upon the ground of some fair mercantile agreement.^c The exception applies only to the drawer,

^a Downes v. Church, 13 *Peters' Rep.* 205.

^b Bickerdike v. Bollman, 1 *Term Rep.* 405. French v. Bank of Columbia, 4 *Cranch*, 153. 164. Dickens v. Beal, 10 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 572.

^c Rogers v. Stephens, 2 *Term Rep.* 713. Corney v. Da Costa, 1 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 302. Staples v. Okines, *ibid.* 332. Clegg v. Cotton, 3 *Bos. & Pull.* 239. Brown v. Maffey, 15 *East's Rep.* 216. Rucker v. Hiller, 16 *ibid.* 43. Cory v. Scott, 3 *Barnw. & Ald.* 619. French v. Bank of Columbia, 4 *Cranch's Rep.* 141. Cathell v. Goodwin, 1 *Harr. & Gill*, 468. Eichelberger v. Finley, 7 *Harr. & Johns.* 381. Farmers' Bank v. Vanmeter, 4 *Randolph*, 553. Norton v. Pickering, 8 *Barnw. & Cress.* 610. Lafitte v. Slatter, 6 *Bingham*, 623. Dickens v. Beal, 10 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 572.

and not to the endorser of a bill drawn without funds;^a and it is now settled in England, in France, and in this country, that neither the insolvency of the drawer, or drawee, or acceptor, or the fact that the drawee had absconded, does away the necessity of a demand of payment, and notice to the drawer or endorser; nor does knowledge in the endorser, when he endorsed the paper, of the insolvency of the maker of the note, or drawee of the bill, do away the necessity of notice, in order to charge him.^b It was left undecided in **Rhode v. Proctor*,^c whether, in the case of the bankruptcy of the party entitled to notice, the holder was bound to give notice to the assignees; though the intimation in that and other cases is, and it is clearly the better opinion, that the notice to the assignees would be proper, if assignees had been chosen when notice was to be given.^d If a bank check be taken in the ordinary course of business, it is not an absolute payment, but only the means to procure the money, and the holder is bound to present it for payment with ordinary diligence, and the next day will be in season. But if the bank be totally prohibited, by process of law, from the exercise of its functions, before the check can, with due diligence, be presented, no

^a Wilkes v. Jacks, *Peake's N. P. Cas.* 202. Leach v. Hewett, 4 *Taunton*, 730. Ramdulollday v. Darieux, 4 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 61.

^b Nicholson v. Gouthit, 2 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 609. Esdaile v. Sowerby, 11 *East's Rep.* 114. Howe v. Bowes, 5 *Taunt. Rep.* 30. Rhode v. Proctor, 4 *Barnw. & Cress.* 517. Jackson v. Richards, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 343. French v. Bank of Columbia, 4 *Cranch*, 141. Sandford v. Dillaway, 10 *Mass. Rep.* 52. Buck v. Cotton, 2 *Conn. Rep.* 126. Juniata Bank v. Hall, 16 *Serg. & Rawle*, 157. Groton v. Dallheim, 6 *Greenleaf*, 476. Hill v. Martin, 12 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 177. Jewey v. Wilbur, 1 *Bailey's S. C. Rep.* 453. Hightower v. Ivy, 2 *Porter's Ala. Rep.* 303. Mr. Bell, in his *Commentaries*, vol. i. 413, mentions a number of Scotch decisions to the same effect. See, also, *Pardessus*, part 6. tit. 8. ch. 3. sec. 4, to the same point.

^c 4 *Barnw. & Cress.* 517.

^d See, Ex parte Moline, 19 *Vesey's Rep.* 216, and *Thompson on Bills*, p. 535, as cited to that point by Mr Justice Bayley, in *Rhode v. Proctor*. See, also, *Bell's Comm.* vol. i. 421.

demand need be made, or notice given; and the holder may waive the check altogether; and resort to his original demand.^a So, if the maker of the check has no funds in the bank at the date of the check, it need not be presented for payment previous to a suit upon it.^b

Giving time by the holder to the acceptor of a bill or maker of a note, will discharge the other parties; but the agreement for delay must be one having a sufficient consideration, and binding in law upon the parties; mere indulgence will work no prejudice.^c If the holder gives time to the endorser, knowing that the note was made for his accommodation, he does not thereby discharge *112 *the drawer.^d Simply forbearing to sue the acceptor, or taking collateral security from him, is no discharge; but giving him new credit and time, or accepting a composition in discharge of the acceptor, will produce that result. The principle is, that the drawer and endorser are in the light of sureties for the acceptor, and the holder must do nothing to impair the right which they have to resort by suit to the acceptor for indemnity, or which would amount to a breach of faith in him towards the acceptor.^e If the liability of the surety be varied, it discharges him, or if he can sue the acceptor, in consequence of the resort over to him by the holder, notwithstanding the time given to, or the composition

^a *Cromwell & Wing v. Lovett*, 1 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 56.

^b *Franklin & Smith v. Vanderpool*, 1 *Hall*, 78.

^c *McLemore v. Powell*, 12 *Wheat. Rep.* 554. *Planters' Bank v. Sellman*, 2 *Gill & Johns*. 230. *Bank v. Myers*, 1 *Bailey's S. C. Rep.* 412. Giving indulgence to the acceptor, after judgment against the drawer, does not discharge him. *Pole v. Ford*, 2 *Chitty's Rep.* 125.

^d *Walker v. Bank of Montgomery County*, 12 *Serg. & Rawle*, 382. *S. C.* 9 *ibid.* 229.

^e *Philpot v. Briant*, 4 *Bingham*, 717. *Planters' Bank v. Sellman*, 2 *Gill & Johns*. 230. *Nolte v. his Creditors*, 19 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 9. Same law in respect to the endorser of a note. *Couch v. Waring*, 9 *Conn. Rep.* 261. Mere delay by the payee of a note due, in enforcing payment against the principal, does not discharge the surety. *Freeman's Bank v. Rollins*, 13 *Maine Rep.* 202.

made with, the acceptor, by the holder, the latter is enabled indirectly to violate his contract with the acceptor.^a But receiving part of the debt from the acceptor of a bill, or maker of a note, works no prejudice to the holder's right against the drawer or endorsers, for it is in aid of all parties who are eventually liable.^b All that the rule requires, is, that the holder shall not so deal with the acceptor of the bill, or maker of the note, by giving time, or compounding, or giving credit, as to prejudice the right of the other parties to the bill, without their assent, in the exercise of their right of recourse against the maker or acceptor. The holder may give time to an immediate endorser, and proceed against the parties behind him. A prior party to a bill is not discharged by a release of a subsequent party. But the holder cannot reverse this order, and compound with prior parties without the consent of subsequent ones, for it varies the rights of the subsequent parties, and *discharges them. *113 The parties to a bill are chargeable in different order. The acceptor is first liable, and the endorsers in the order in which they stand on the bill; and taking new security, or giving time, or discharging, or compounding with a subsequent endorser, cannot prejudice a prior endorser, because he has no rights against a subsequent endorsee.^c

If due notice of non-acceptance or non-payment be not given, or a demand on the maker of a promissory note be not made, yet a subsequent promise to pay, by the party entitled to notice, will amount to a waiver of the want of

^a *Ex parte Smith*, 3 *Bro.* 1. *Walwyn v. St. Quintin*, 1 *Bos. & Pull.* 652. *English v. Darley*, 2 *ibid.* 61. *Clark v. Devlin*, 3 *ibid.* 36. *Ex parte Wilson*, 11 *Ves. Rep.* 410. *Gould v. Robson*, 3 *East's Rep.* 576. *Pring v. Clarkson*, 1 *Barnw. & Cress.* 14.

^b *Lynch v. Reynolds*, 16 *Johns. Rep.* 41.

^c *English v. Darley*, 3 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 49. *S. C.* 2 *Bos. & Pull.* 61. *Smith v. Knox*, 3 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 46. *Sargent v. Appleton*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 85. *Clopper v. Union Bank of Maryland*, 7 *Harr. & Johns.* 100.

demand or notice, provided the promise was made clearly and unequivocally, and with full knowledge of the fact of a want of due diligence on the part of the holder.^a The weight of authority is that this knowledge may be inferred, as a fact, from the promise under the attending circumstances, without requiring clear and affirmative proof of the knowledge.^b So, if the endorser has protected himself from loss by taking collateral security of the maker of the note, or an assignment of his property, it is a waiver of his legal right to require proof of demand and notice.^c

*114 *If the endorser comes again into possession of the bill, he is to be regarded *prima facie* as the owner, and may sue and recover, though there be on it subsequent endorsements, and no receipt or endorsement back to him, and he may strike out the subsequent names.^d To maintain a suit against the endorser, the holder must show, as we have seen, due demand of the maker or acceptor, or a presentment for acceptance, and due notice to him of the default; and he need not prove any prior endorsement, nor the hand of the drawer.^e

^a Goodall v. Dolley, 1 *Term Rep.* 712. Hope v. Alder, 6 *East's Rep.* 16. *in notis.* Borradaile v. Lowe, 4 *Taunt. Rep.* 93. Stevens v. Lynch, 2 *Campb. N. P.* 332. 12 *East*, 38. S. C. Miller v. Hackley, 5 *Johns. Rep.* 375. Martin v. Winslow, 2 *Mason's Rep.* 241. Fotheringham v. Price, 1 *Bay's Rep.* 291. Thornton v. Wynn, 12 *Wheat. Rep.* 183. Pate v. McClure, 4 *Randolph*, 164. Otis v. Hussey, 3 *N. H. Rep.* 346. Reynold v. Douglass, 12 *Peters*, 497. Farrington v. Brown, 7 *N. H. Rep.* 271.

^b Lundie v. Robertson, 3 *East*, 231. Piersons v. Hooker, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 68. Hopkins v. Liswell, 12 *Mass. Rep.* 52. Breed v. Hillhouse, 7 *Conn. Rep.* 523. Williams v. Robinson, 13 *Louisiana Rep.* 421. *Contra*, Trimble v. Thorne, 16 *Johnson*, 152.

^c Mead v. Small, 2 *Greenleaf's Rep.* 207. Bond v. Farnham, 5 *Mass. Rep.* 170. Prentiss v. Danielson, 5 *Conn. Rep.* 175.

^d Dugan v. United States, 3 *Wheat. Rep.* 172. Norris v. Badger, 6 *Cowen's Rep.* 499.

^e Critchlow v. Parry, 2 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 182. By the law of Virginia and Kentucky, the holder of a promissory note must make every reasonable effort, and due and legal diligence, to recover of the drawer before he can sue the endorser, on the ground of non-payment and notice. Demand on drawer, and

But in the suit against the acceptor, the holder need not show notice to any other person. The acceptor is liable at all events. Receiving part from the drawer or endorser is no discharge of the acceptor. Giving time to the drawer will not discharge the acceptor of an accommodation bill. Nothing short of the statute of limitations, or payment, or a release, or an express declaration of the holder, will discharge the acceptor. He is bound, like the maker of a note, as a principal debtor. His acceptance is evidence that the value of the bill was in his hands, or had been received by him from the drawer. He is liable to the payee, to the drawer, and to every endorser. He is the first person, and the last person liable, and there is no difference in this respect between an acceptance given for accommodation, and one given for value. He is liable to an innocent holder, though the drawer's hand be forged, and in the suit against him it is not necessary to prove any hand but that of the first endorser.^a Though a bill, payable to a fictitious *payee, be strictly void, yet, *115 if the fact was known to the acceptor, he may be sued by an innocent endorsee, equally as upon a note payable to bearer.^b And if the holder of a bank bill cuts it into two parts, for the sole purpose of transmitting it by mail with greater safety, this does not affect his rights upon

due notice to endorser, is not sufficient. The legal means against drawer must first be resorted to. In Georgia, the endorser is held bound as a surety without any previous demand and notice, though this departure from commercial usage is not to apply to notes negotiated at any incorporated bank, or deposited there for collection. The endorser is likewise discharged, if, after a request upon the holder for that purpose, he does not within three months proceed to collect the debt. *Statute of Georgia*, December 26, 1826. 2 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 338. note. *Ibid.* 345. See, also, to the same point, *United States Bank v. Tyler*, 4 *ibid.* 366. *Johnson v. Lewis*, 1 *Dana's Ken. Rep.* 182.

^a *Simmonds v. Parminter*, 1 *Wils. Rep.* 185. *Dingwall v. Dunster*, *Doug. Rep.* 247. *Smith v. Chester*, 1 *Term Rep.* 654. *Fentum v. Pocock*, 5 *Taunt. Rep.* 192. *Farquhar v. Southey*, 2 *Carr. & Payne's N. P. Rep.* 497. *Lambert v. Sandford*, 2 *Blackf. Ind. Rep.* 137.

^b *Gibson v. Minet*, 1 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 569. S. C. 3 *Term Rep.* 481.

the bill, and he may recover upon the production of only one of the parts, provided he shows that he is owner of the whole, and accounts for the absence of the other part. The parts of a divided bank bill are not separately negotiable.^a

(8.) *Of the measure of damages.*

The engagement of the drawer and endorser of every bill is, that it shall be paid at the proper time and place; and if it be not, the holder is entitled to indemnity for the loss arising from this breach of contract. The general law-merchant of Europe authorizes the holder of a protested bill immediately to redraw from the place where the bill was payable, on the drawer or endorser, in order to reimburse himself for the principal of the bill protested, the contingent expenses attending it, and the new exchange which he pays. His indemnity requires him to draw for such an amount as will make good the face of the bill, together with interest from the time it ought to have been paid, and the necessary charges of protest, postage, and broker's commission, and the current rate of exchange at the place where the bill was to be
 *116 demanded or *payable, on the place where it was drawn or negotiated. The law does not insist upon an actual redrawing, but it enables the holder to recover what would be the price of another new bill, at the place where the bill was dishonoured, or the loss on

^a *Patton v. Bank of S. C.* 2 *Nott & M'Cord*, 464. *Martin v. United States Bank*, 4 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 253. *United States Bank v. Sill*, 5 *Conn. Rep.* 106. *Farmers' Bank v. Reynolds*, 4 *Randolph*, 186. *Bullet v. Bank of Pennsylvania*, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 172. *Hinsdale v. Bank of Orange*, 6 *Wendell*, 378. The owner of the two parts of a note, cut in two for transmission, was allowed to recover in equity the whole amount, upon producing one half part, and showing the other lost, and offering an indemnity. *Wycoff v. State Bank*, 1 *Dev. & B. Eq. Cas.* 1. In Scotland, a very summary remedy is given to the holder of bills of exchange and promissory notes protested for non-payment, by allowing the protest to be recorded under an implied consent of the debtor. This authorizes a decree by consent, called a decree of registration, and a summary execution. 1 *Bell's Comm.* 4. 387.

the re-exchange ; and this it does by giving him the face of the protested bill, with interest, and the necessary expenses, including the amount or price of the re-exchange.^a But the endorser of a bill is not entitled to recover of the drawer the damages incurred by the non-acceptance of the bill, unless he has paid them, or is liable to pay them.^b Nor is the acceptor liable for the extra charges on the re-exchange. He is only chargeable for the sum specified in the bill, with interest according to the rate established at the place of payment. The claim for the re-exchange is against the drawer, who undertakes to indemnify the holder if the bill be not paid.^c

In this country a different practice from that of re-exchange was introduced while we were English colonies, and it has continued to this day. Our usages on this subject form an exception to the commercial law of Europe.

In New-York, the rule had uniformly been, to allow twenty per cent. damages on the return of foreign bills protested for non-acceptance or non-payment ; and the damages were computed on the principal sum, with interest on the aggregate amount of the bill and damages, from the time that notice of the protest was duly given to the drawer or endorser. The mercantile usage was, to consider the twenty per cent. an indemnity for consequential damages, and to require the bill *to *117 be paid at the rate of exchange at the time of return, or a new bill to be furnished upon the same prin-

^a *Mellish v. Simeon*, 2 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 378. *De Tastet v. Baring*, 11 *East's Rep.* 265. *Parsons*, Ch. J., in *Grimshaw v. Bender*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 157. *Code de Commerce*, b. 1. tit. 3. art. 177. 186. *Van Leeuwen's Commentaries*, 440.

^b *Kingston v. Wilson*, 4 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 310.

^c *Woolsey v. Crawford*, 2 *Campb.* 445. *Napier v. Schneider*, 12 *East*, 420. In France, the claim for the re-exchange is deemed good against the acceptor. *Pothier, Traité du Con. de Change*, No. 117.

ciples. But the Supreme Court^a considered the twenty per cent. to be in lieu of damages in case of re-exchange, and the demand, with that allowance, was to be settled at the par of exchange. This doctrine was overturned by the Court of Errors,^b and the holder was held to be entitled to recover, not only the twenty per cent. damages, together with interest and charges, but also the amount of the bill liquidated by the rate of exchange, or price of bills on England, or other place of demand in Europe, at the time of the return of the dishonoured bill, and notice to the party to be charged; and this rule was subsequently followed in the courts of law.^c

The rate of damages on bills drawn and payable within the United States, or other parts of North America, was

^a *Hendricks v. Franklin*, 4 *Johns. Rep.* 119. *Weldon v. Buck*, *ibid.* 144.

^b *Graves v. Dash*, 12 *Johns. Rep.* 17.

^c *Denston v. Henderson*, 13 *Johns. Rep.* 322. The proper rule, in cases of debt payable in a foreign country, in England for instance, and sued in the United States, is to allow that sum in the currency of the country which approximates most nearly to the amount to which the party is entitled in the country where the debt is payable, and calculated by the real or established, and not by the nominal par of exchange; and in the United States, the pound sterling is valued at \$4 86, that being the par value of the pound sterling as fixed by Act of Congress, June 28, 1834. But the creditor is also entitled to have an amount equal to what he must pay in order to *remit* it to the place where it was payable. He ought to have just as much allowed him where he sues, as he could have had if the contract had been duly performed. He ought to have the rate of exchange allowed, if the exchange be above par, and a proportionate deduction made, if the exchange be below par, in order to have his money replaced, in England, at exactly the same amount which he would have been entitled to receive in a suit there. This is the manifest equity, and the better law of the case. *Scott v. Bevan*, 2 *Barnw. & Adolph.* 78. Lord Eldon, in *Carl v. Kennion*, 11 *Vesey*, 316. *Story on the Conflict of Laws*, p. 255—260. *Smith v. Shaw*, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 167. *Grant v. Healey*, *U. S. Cir. C. Mass.* May, 1839. The cases of *Martin v. Franklin*, 4 *Johns. Rep.* 125. *Scofield v. Day*, 20 *ibid.* 102. *Adams v. Cordis*, 3 *Pick. Rep.* 260, declared a contrary rule, and that a debt payable in England, and recovered in the courts of this country, was to be paid at the par, and not at the rate of exchange. The weight of authority, if we connect the English and American cases together, as well as the justice of the point, is, however, in favour of the claim of the foreign creditor to be paid at the rate of exchange. Upon this rule only can the creditor be put in the same situation, as if the debtor had punctually complied with his contract, and paid at the place where he had contracted to pay.

subsequently, in 1819, regulated in New-York by statute,^a and the damages fixed at five, or seven and a half, or ten per cent., according to the distance or situation of the place on which the bill was drawn. But by the new revised statutes, which went into operation on the 1st of January, 1830, the damages on bills, foreign and inland, were made the subject of a more extensive regulation. They provide,^b that upon bills drawn or negotiated within the state, upon any person, at any place within the six states east of New-York, or in New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, or the District of Columbia, the damages to be allowed and paid upon the usual protest for non-acceptance or non-payment, to the holder of the bill, as purchaser thereof, or of some interest therein, for a valuable consideration, shall be *three per cent. upon the principal sum specified *118 in the bill; and upon any person at any place within the states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, five per cent.; and upon any person in any other state or territory of the United States, or at any other place on, or adjacent to, this continent, and north of the equator, or in any British or foreign possessions in the West Indies, or elsewhere in the Western Atlantic Ocean, or in Europe, ten per cent. The damages are to be in lieu of interest, charges of protest, and all other charges incurred previous to, and at the time of, giving notice of non-acceptance or non-payment. But the holder will be entitled to demand and recover interest upon the aggregate amount of the principal sum specified in the bill, and the damages, from the time of notice of the protest for non-acceptance, or notice of a demand and protest for non-payment. If

^a *Laws of New-York*, sess. 42. ch. 34.

^b *New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 770, 771.

the contents of the bill be expressed in the money of account of the United States, the amount due thereon, and the damages allowed for the non-payment, are to be ascertained and determined, without reference to the rate of exchange existing between New-York and the place on which the bill is drawn. But if the contents of the bill be expressed in the money of account or currency of any foreign country, then the amount due, exclusive of the damages, is to be ascertained and determined by the rate of exchange, or the value of such foreign currency, at the time of the demand of payment.

The laws and usages of the other states vary essentially on the subject of damages on protested bills.^a In some cases, the regulations of states approximate to each other, while in others they are widely different. In some cases the law or rule is unlike, but the result is nearly similar; while between other states the result varies from four and a half to fifteen per cent. In *Massachusetts*, the usage was to recover the amount of the protested bill, at the par of exchange, and interest, as in England, from the time payment of the dishonoured bill was demanded of the drawee, and the charges of the protest, and *119 ten per cent. damages in lieu of the price of exchange.^b But this rule has been changed, by statute, in 1825, 1835, and 1837; and bills drawn or endorsed in that state, and payable without the limits of the United States, and duly protested for non-acceptance or non-payment, are now settled at the current rate of

^a The general rule is, that the drawer of a bill is liable to the damages provided by the laws of the country in which it is drawn, and to no other. *Astor v. Benn, Stuart's Lower Canada Rep.* 69. But this must be taken with some explanation, for the holder of a *foreign* bill, protested for non-acceptance or non-payment, is entitled by the law-merchant to the settled rule of damages, (when none other is agreed to) on re-exchange *at the place* where the bill was dishonoured. *Vide supra*, p. 115, 116, and *Bank of U. S. v. Daniel*, 12 *Peters' S. C. Rep.* 33. 54.

^b *Grimshaw v. Bender*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 157.

exchange and interest, and five per cent. damages ; and if the bill be drawn upon any place beyond the Cape of Good Hope, twenty per cent. damages. The rate of damages in Massachusetts, on inland bills, payable out of the state, and drawn or endorsed within the state, and duly protested for non-acceptance or non-payment, is two per cent. in addition to the contents of the bill, with interest and costs, if payable in any other New-England state, or New-York ; and three per cent. if payable in New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware and Maryland ; and four per cent. if payable in Virginia, District of Columbia, North Carolina, South Carolina, or Georgia ; and five per cent, if payable in any other of the United States or the territories thereof. The rule of damages in *Connecticut*, on bills returned protested, and drawn on any person in New-York, is two per cent. upon the principal sum specified in the bill ; in New-Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New-York, (city of New-York excepted,) New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, or territory of Columbia, three per cent. ; in North Carolina, South Carolina, Ohio, or Georgia, five per cent. ; in any other part of the United States, eight per cent. upon such principal sum, and to be in lieu of interest and all other charges, and without any reference to the rate of exchange.^a In *Rhode Island*, the rule formerly was, according to the revised code, in 1776, on bills returned from beyond sea, protested for non-acceptance or non-payment, ten per cent. damages, besides interest and costs. In *Pennsylvania*, the rule, for a century past, was twenty per cent. damages, in lieu of re-exchange ; but by statute, in 1821, five per cent. damages were allowed upon bills drawn upon any person in any other of the United States, except Louisiana ;

^a *Statutes of Connecticut*, 1838, p. 477.

if on Louisiana, or any other part of North America, except the north-west coast and Mexico, ten per cent.; if on Mexico, the Spanish Main, or the islands on the coast of Africa, fifteen per cent.; and twenty per cent. upon protested bills on Europe, and twenty-five per cent. upon other foreign bills, in lieu of all charges, except the protest, and the amount of the bill is to be ascertained and determined at the rate of exchange. In *Maryland*, the rule, by statute, is fifteen per cent. damages, and the amount of the bill ascertained at the current rate of exchange, or the rate requisite to purchase a good bill of the same time of payment upon the same place. In *Virginia* and *South Carolina*, the damages, by statute, are fifteen per cent.^a The damages on bills drawn in the state of *Alabama*, on any person resident within the state, are ten per cent.; and on any person out of it and within the United States, are fifteen per cent.; and on persons out of the United States, twenty per cent. on the sum drawn for, together with incidental charges and interest. In *Louisiana*, in 1838, the rate of damages upon the protest for non-acceptance or non-payment of bills of exchange drawn on and payable in foreign countries, was declared by statute to be ten per cent.; and in any other state in the United States, five per cent., together with interest on the aggregate amount of principal and damages. On protested bills, drawn and payable within the United States, the damages include all charges, such as premiums, and expenses, and interest on those damages, but nothing for the difference of exchange.^b In *North Carolina*, by statute, in 1828, damages on protested bills, drawn or endorsed in that state, and payable in any other part of the United States, except Louisiana, are six per cent.; payable in any other part of North America, ex-

^a *Revised Statutes of Virginia*, edit. 1814, vol. i. 158.

^b *Robert v. Comm. Bank*, 13 *Louis. Rep.* 528.

cept the West India Islands, ten per cent. ; payable in South America, the African Islands, or Europe, fifteen per cent. ; and payable elsewhere, twenty per cent. In *Kentucky*, the damages on foreign bills protested for non-acceptance or non-payment, are ten per cent.^a The damages in *Tennessee*, by statute, in 1830, on protested bills, over and above the principal sum, and charges of protest, and interest on the principal sum, damages and charge of protest from the time of notice, are three per cent. on the principal sum, if the bill be drawn upon any person in the United States ; and fifteen per cent. if upon any person in any other place or state in North America bordering on the Gulf of Mexico, or in the West Indies ; and twenty per cent. *if *120 upon a person in any other part of the world. These damages are in lieu of interest, and all other charges, except the charges of protest, to the time of notice of the protest, and demand of payment. The damages in *Georgia*, by statute, in 1827, on bills drawn on a person in another state, and protested for non-payment, is five per cent. ; and on foreign bills protested for non-payment, are ten per cent., together with the usual expenses and interest, and the principal to be settled at the current rate of exchange.^b The damages in *Indiana*

^a There have been conflicting decisions in Kentucky, under their act of 1798, as to the character of the bills to which the ten per cent. damages applied ; and the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the Bank of the U. S. v. Daniel, 12 *Peters' Rep.* 33. 53, felt itself bound reluctantly to follow the narrowest of the decisions.

^b See *Griffith's Law Register, passim*, under the head of " bills of exchange and promissory notes." *Revised Laws of Illinois*, 1833. *Prince's Dig. of Statutes of Georgia*, 1837, 2d edit. p. 454. 462. *Revised Statutes of Indiana*, 1833. And see *Report of Mr. Verplanck*, from the select committee in the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, on the subject of foreign bills, made March 22d, 1826. *American Jurist*, No. 4. 398. *Ibid.* No. 6. 398. *Statutes of Connecticut*, 1821, p. 360. In Ohio, the damages on protested bills of exchange, drawn on any person without the United States, as against the drawer or endorser, for non-acceptance or non-payment,

and *Illinois* on foreign bills, is ten per cent. ; and on bills drawn on any person out of the state and within the United States, is five per cent. in addition to the costs and charges. In *Mississippi*, the damages on inland bills protested for non-payment, is five per cent. ; if drawn on any person resident out of the United States, ten per cent.^a In *Missouri*, the damages on bills of exchange drawn or negotiated within the state, and protested for non-acceptance or non-payment, as against the drawer and endorser, are four per cent. on the principal sum ; if drawn on any person out of the state, but within the United States, ten per cent. ; if out of the United States, twenty per cent. : the same rate of damages as against the acceptor on non-payment.^b

The inconvenience of a want of uniformity in the rule of damages in the laws of the several states, is very great, and has been strongly felt. The mischiefs to commerce, and perplexity to our merchants, resulting from such discordant and shifting regulations, have been ably, justly, and frequently urged upon the consideration of Congress ; and the right of Congress to regulate, by some uniform rule, the rate and rule of recovery of damages upon protested foreign bills, or bills drawn in one state upon another, under the power in the constitution "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states ;" and the expediency of the exercise of that right, have been well, and, I think, conclusively shown, in the official documents which have been prepared on that subject.^c

are twelve per cent. ; and six per cent. if drawn on any person within the United States, and without the jurisdiction of the state. *Statutes of Ohio*, 1831.

^a *Digest of the Laws of Mississippi*, edit. 1839, p. 834.

^b *Revised Statutes of Missouri*, 1835, p. 98.

^c See the *Report of Mr. Verplanck*, from the select committee already referred to, and the *Report of a Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of New-York*, in February, 1828. In that last document, the Committee of the

(9.) *Of mercantile guaranties.*

A guaranty, in its enlarged sense, is a promise to answer for the payment of some debt, or the performance of some duty, in the case of the failure of another person, who, in the first instance, is liable. As this engagement is a common one in mercantile transactions, and analogous, in many respects, to that of endorser of negotiable paper, a few remarks concerning its creation and validity will not be altogether inapplicable to the subject.

In *Pillans v. Van Mierop*,^a it was held, that a note of guaranty, being in writing, and in a mercantile case, came within the reason of a bill or note, and did not require a consideration to appear upon the face of it. But there was a sufficient apparent consideration in that case, and the *dicta* of the judges were afterwards considered as erroneous, in *Rann v. Hughes*, before the House of Lords.^b The doctrine in the latter case was, that all contracts, if merely in writing, and not specialties, were to be considered as parol contracts, and a consideration must be proved.

The English statute of frauds,^c which has been adopted throughout this country, requires, that, "upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person, the agreement, or some memorandum or note thereof, must be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person

Chamber of Commerce approve of the principle of damages on foreign bills returned under protest, and they state that the practice of re-exchanges, which are so easily made between the great capitals of Europe, does not exist between Europe and the United States; nor do our business operations require them; and, until some safe and satisfactory substitute is established, the usage, in this country, of allowing damages on protested bills, ought to be continued.

^a 3 *Burr. Rep.* 1663.

^b 7 *Brown's P. C.* 550.

^c 29 Charles II. ch. 3. sec. 4.

thereunto by him lawfully authorized." An agreement to become a guarantor, or surety, for another's engagement, is within the statute; and if it be a guaranty for the subsisting debt or engagement of another person, not only the engagement, but the consideration for it, must appear in the writing. The word *agreement*, in the statute, includes the consideration for the promise, as well as the promise itself, for without a consideration *122 there is no valid agreement. This was the decision in the case of *Wain v. Warlters*;^a and though that decision has been frequently questioned,^b it has since received the decided approbation of the courts of law;^c and the Ch. J. of the C. B. observed, that he should have so decided if he had never heard of the case of *Wain v. Warlters*. The English construction of the statute of frauds has been adopted in New-York and South Carolina, and rejected in several other states.^d The decisions have all turned upon the force of the word *agreement*; and where, by statute, the word *promise* has been introduced, by requiring *the promise or agreement* to be in writing, as in Virginia and Tennessee, the construction has not been so strict.^e

^a 5 *East's Rep.* 10.

^b See *Ex parte Minet*, 14 *Ves. Rep.* 190. *Ex parte Gardom*, 15 *ibid.* 286.

^c *Saunders v. Wakefield*, 4 *Barnw. & Ald.* 595. *Jenkins v. Reynolds*, 3 *Brod. & Bing.* 14. *Morley v. Boothby*, 3 *Bing. Rep.* 107. *Newbury v. Armstrong*, 6 *Bing.* 201.

^d *Sears v. Brink*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 210. *Leonard v. Vredenburg*, 8 *ibid.* 29. 2 *Nott & M'Cord*, 372. note. *Packard v. Richardson*, 17 *Mass. Rep.* 122. *Levy v. Merrill*, 4 *Greenleaf's Rep.* 180. *S. P. ibid.* 387. *Sage v. Wilcox*, 6 *Conn. Rep.* 81. *Miller v. Irvine*, 1 *Dev. N. C. Rep.* 103. The point was extensively discussed in this last case, and the majority of the court, under the act of 1819, which followed the English statute of frauds, held, that it was not requisite under that statute that the consideration of the contract should be set forth in the written memorandum of it, and that the consideration might be shown by parol proof. The *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 135, require the special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another person, to be in writing, and the *consideration*, as well as the agreement, to be expressed.

^e *Marshall, Ch. J.*, 5 *Cranch's Rep.* 151, 152. *Taylor v. Ross*, 3 *Yerger*, 330.

Where the guaranty or promise, though collateral to the principal contract, is made at the same time with the principal contract, and becomes an essential ground of the credit given to the principal debtor, the whole is one original and entire transaction, and the consideration extends and sustains the promise of the principal debtor, and also of the guarantor. No other consideration need be shown than that for the original agreement, upon which the whole debt rested, and that may be shown by parol proof, as not being within the statute.^a If, however, the guaranty be of a previously existing *debt of another, a consideration is necessary to *123 be shown, and that must appear in writing, as part of the collateral undertaking; for the consideration for the original debt will not attach to this subsequent promise; and to such a case the doctrine in *Wain v. Warlters* applies.^b But if the promise to pay the debt of another arises out of some new and original consideration of benefit or harm moving between the newly contracted parties, it is then not a case within the statute.^c

There are no such words in the statute of frauds as original and collateral. The promise referred to is to answer for the debt or default of another. The term *debt* implies, that the liability of the principal had been precedently incurred; but a *default* may arise upon an executory contract, and a promise to pay for goods to

^a *Leonard v. Vredenburg*, 8 *Johns. Rep.* 29. *D'Wolf v. Rabaud*, 1 *Peters' Rep.* 476. The doctrine in 8 *Johns. Rep.* is confirmed in 11 *ibid.* 221, and 13 *ibid.* 175; and in *Peters' Rep.* the doctrine is said to be founded in good sense and convenience.

^b The words *value received* have been held to be a sufficient expression of consideration in a guaranty. *Watson v. M'Laren*, 19 *Wendell*, 557. But this appears to reduce the statute requisition of the setting forth a consideration, to a mere formality.

^c *Leonard v. Vredenburg*, 8 *Johns. Rep.* 29. *Bailey v. Freeman*, 11 *ibid.* 221. *Hunt v. Adams* 5 *Mass. Rep.* 358. *Williams v. Leper*, 3 *Burr. Rep.* 1886. *Atkinson v. Carter*, 2 *Chitty's Rep.* 403. *Clark v. Small*, 6 *Yerger's Tenn. Rep.* 418.

be furnished to another, is a collateral promise to pay on the other's default, provided the credit was, in the first instance, given solely to the other. If the whole credit be not given to the person who comes in to answer for another, his undertaking is collateral, and must be in writing.^a If the original debt remains a subsisting debt, a promise by a third person to pay it, in consideration of forbearance, is a collateral promise.^b

After a valid guaranty has been made, the rights of the parties in the relative character of principal and surety afford an interesting subject of inquiry, and the doctrine in the case of negotiable paper, as to demand and notice, has a feeble and qualified application to the guarantor. Thus it has been held, that the guarantor of a note could be discharged by the laches of the holder, as by neglect to make demand of payment of the maker, and give notice of non-payment to the guarantor, *provided the maker was solvent when the note fell due*, and became insolvent afterwards. The rule is not

*124 *so strict as in the case of mere negotiable paper, and the neglect to give notice must have produced some loss or prejudice to the guarantor.^c And in the

^a Leland v. Creyon, 1 *M'Cord*, 100.

^b Watson v. Randall, 20 *Wendell*, 201.

^c Oxford Bank v. Haynes, 8 *Pick.* 423. The opinion of Duncan, J., in *Canon v. Gibbs*, 9 *Serg. & Rawle*, 202, is to the same point. See, also, *Philips v. Astling*, 2 *Taunton*, 206. *Warrington v. Furber*, 3 *East*, 242. *Ruffin, J.*, in *Grice v. Ricks*, 3 *Dev. N. C. Rep.* 65. *Wildes v. Savage*, *U. S. Cir. C. for Mass.* December, 1839. It was held, in *Douglass v. Reynolds*, 7 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 113, *Cunningham v. Jones*, 12 *Peters*, 207, and in *Sollee & Warley v. Mengy*, 1 *Bailey's S. C. Rep.* 620, that the party giving a letter of guaranty has a right to know whether it is accepted, or acted upon, and credit given on the faith of it, and more especially if it be a continuing guaranty. In the case of a guaranty limited to a single transaction, the guarantor is entitled to notice of the advance or credit given under it, within a reasonable time; whereas, in the case of a continuing guaranty, in which a series of transactions is in contemplation, it will be sufficient to give notice of the amount for which the guarantor is responsible, within a reasonable time after the transactions are closed, and notice of each successive transaction as it arises need not be given. Reasonable diligence to

case of the absolute guaranty of the payment of a note, no demand or notice is requisite to fix the guarantor.^a But when the contract of a guarantor or surety is duly ascertained and understood, by a fair and liberal construction of the instrument, the principle is well settled that the case must be brought strictly within the terms of the guaranty, and the liability of the surety cannot be extended by implication. The claim against a surety is *strictissimi juris*.^b But a further pursuit of this subject of guaranty would not strictly appertain to the doctrine of negotiable paper;^c and I shall conclude the present general outline of that subject, with some notice of the principal publications on bills and notes.

(10.) *Of the principal treatises on bills and notes.*

It would have been impossible to enter into greater

make demand, and, in case of non-payment, to give notice of non-payment, is required, in the case of the guaranty of a debt, or the guarantor will be discharged, to the amount only of the loss or damage he may have sustained, from the want of such demand and notice. *Douglass v. Reynolds, supra.* *Bradley v. Carey*, 8 *Greenleaf*, 234. S. P. *Adcock v. Fleming*, 2 *Dev. & Battle*, 225. On the other hand the surety in a bond for the fidelity of a party for an indefinite period, cannot determine his liability at pleasure by giving notice, and this is the English rule both at law and in equity. *Calvert v. Gordon*, 3 *Manning & Ryl. Rep.* 124. 2 *Simmons' Rep.* 253. 4 *Russel*, 581.

^a *Breed v. Hillhouse*, 7 *Conn. Rep.* 523. A guaranty is not separately negotiable. It is a special contract which can be enforced only by a party to it. *Gibson, Ch. J.*, in *M'Doal v. Yeomans, Sup. Court, Penn.* July, 1839. *Watson v. M'Laren*, 19 *Wendell*, 557. A surety after being sued, and *before payment*, may bring a suit for his indemnity. So, he may, if the debtor is in a state of insolvency, or if the debt has become due and remains unpaid. These are statute and just provisions in the *Louisiana Civil Code*, art. 3026. See, also, *Webb v. Lansing*, 19 *Wendell*, 423. S. P.

^b *Bacon v. Chesney*, 1 *Stark. N. P. Rep.* 192. *Myers v. Edge*, 7 *Term*, 254. *Combe v. Woolf*, 8 *Bingham*, 156. *Walsh v. Baitie*, 10 *Johns. Rep.* 180. *Lanuse v. Barker, ibid.* 327, 328. *Dobbin v. Bradley*, 17 *Wendell*, 422. *Bell's Principles of the Law of Scotland*, p. 77.

^c The student will find the law concerning mercantile guaranties, and of principal and surety fully examined, and the substance of the numerous cases well digested, in *Fell's Treatise on Mercantile Guaranties*, and in *Theobald's Treatise on the Law of Principal and Surety*, published at London, in 1832, and at Philadelphia, in 1833.

detail of the distinctions and minute provisions which apply to negotiable paper, without giving undue proportion to this branch of these elementary disquisitions. The treatises and leading *cases must be thoroughly understood, before the student can expect to be master of this very technical branch of commercial law ; and a brief notice of the best works on the subject will serve to direct his inquiries.

The earliest English work on bills is in Malynes' *Lex Mercatoria*. The author was a merchant, and the work was compiled in the reign of King James I., and dedicated to the King. That part relating to bills of exchange is brief, loose, and scanty ; but it contains the rules and mercantile usages then prevailing in England, and other commercial countries. It was required, at that early day, that the bill should be presented for acceptance, and again for payment, with diligence, and at seasonable hours, and on proper days ; and the default in each case was to be noted by a notary, and information of it sent to the drawer with all expedition, to enable him to secure himself. If the drawee would not accept, any other person was allowed to accept for the honour of the bill. Malynes takes no notice of promissory notes or checks, and he even laments that negotiable notes were unknown to the law of England.

The next English treatise on the subject was that by Marius, published in the year 1651, and that treatise has been referred to by Lord Holt and Lord Kenyon, *126 as a very respectable work. *Marius followed the business of a notary public at the Royal Exchange, in London, for twenty-four years, and he had, of course, perfect experience in all the mercantile usages of the times. His work is far more particular, formal, and exact, than that of Malynes. The three days of grace were then in use ; and Marius decides the very point which has been again and again decided, and even in our

own courts, that if the third day of grace falls on Sunday, or a holyday, or no day of business, the money must be demanded on the second day, and he lays down the rule of diligence in giving notice with more severity than is consistent with the modern practice;^a for he stated, that the notice of the default of payment must be sent off by the very first post after the bill falls due. He says, likewise, that verbal acceptances were good, and that you may accept for part, and have the bill protested for the residue. It is quite amusing to perceive that many of the points which have been litigated, or stated in our courts, within the last thirty years, are to be found in Marius; so true it is, that case after case, and point after point, on all the branches of the law, are constantly arising in the courts of justice, and discussed as doubtful or new points, merely because those who raise them are not thorough masters of their profession. The next writer who treats on the subject of bills is Molloy. He was a barrister in the reign of Charles II.; and in his extensive compilation, *de jure Maritimo*, which was first published in 1676, he cast a rapid glance over the law concerning bills of exchange; but that part of his work is far inferior to the treatise of Marius.

Beawes' *Lex Mercatoria Rediviva*, is a much superior work to that of Malynes, and it appears, by its very title, to have been intended as a substitute. It contains a full, and very valuable collection, of the rules and usages of law on the subject of bills of exchange. Promissory notes were then taken notice of, though they had not been so much as alluded to in the formal and didactic treatise of Marius. They were not introduced into general use, until near the close of the reign of Charles II., and for this we have the authority of Lord Holt in *Buller v.*

^a See *ante*, p. 106.

Crisp.^a Beawes is frequently cited in our *books as an authority on mercantile customs; and a new and enlarged edition of his work was published, by Mr. Chitty, in 1813. The next work on the subject of bills and notes was by Cunningham, and it was published about the middle of the last century. It consisted chiefly of a compilation of adjudged cases, without much method and observation. It was mentioned by the English judges as a very good book; but it fell into perfect oblivion as soon as Kyd's treatise on bills and notes appeared, in the year 1790. Mr. Kyd made free use of Marius and Beawes, and he ingrafted into his work the substance of all the judicial decisions down to that time. His work became, therefore, a very valuable digest to the practising lawyer, and particularly as during the times of Lord Holt and Lord Mansfield, the law concerning negotiable paper was extensively discussed, and vastly improved. Mr. Bayley, afterwards a judge of the K. B., published in 1789, a little before the work of Kyd, a small manual or digest of the principles which govern the negotiability of bills and notes. As a collection of rules expressed with sententious brevity and perfect precision, it is admirable. In a subsequent edition, he stated also the cases from which his principles were deduced. A work of more full detail, and of a more scientific cast, seemed to be still wanting on the subject, and that was well supplied by Mr. Chitty's treatise on bills, notes, and checks, first published in 1799. He had recourse, though in a sparing degree, to the treatise of Pothier for illustration of the rules of this part of the general law-merchant; and it is obvious, that a more free and liberal spirit of inquiry distinguishes the professional treatises of the present age from those of former periods. The works of Park and

^a 6 *Mod. Rep.* 29.

Marshall on Insurance, and Abbot on Shipping, and Chitty on Bills, and Jones on Bailment, have all been enriched by the profound and classical productions of France and Italy on commercial jurisprudence.

The treatise of Pothier on Bills is finished with the same order and justness of proportion, the same comprehensiveness of plan, and clearness of analysis, which distinguish his other *treatises on contracts. *128 His work is essentially a commentary upon the French ordinance of 1673; and he had ample materials in the commentary of M. Jousse, and in the treatises on the same subject by Dupuy de la Serra, and by Savary, to which he frequently refers. He also cites two foreign works of learning on the doctrine of negotiable paper, and those are *Scacchia de Commerciis et Cambio*, and Heineccius' treatise, entitled, *Elementa Juris Cambialis*. The latter work contains very full and satisfactory evidence of the professional erudition of the Germans on subjects of maritime law. He refers to the ordinances of various German states, and of several of the Hanse towns, relating to commercial paper, and he cites eight or ten professed German treatises on bills of exchange.^a

It has been a frequent practice on the European continent, to reduce the law concerning bills, as well as concerning other maritime subjects, into system, by ordinance. The commercial ordinance of France, in 1673, digested the law of bills of exchange, and it was, with some alterations and amendments, incorporated into the commercial code of 1807. Since the publication of the new code, M. Pardessus has written a valuable commentary on this, as well as on other parts of the code. He writes without any parade of learning, and with the clearness, order, and severe simplicity of Pothier. There is

^a See Heineccii *Opera*, tom. vi. *in fine*.

also a clear and concise summary of the law concerning negotiable paper in *M. Merlin's Repertoire de Jurisprudence*, under the title of *Lettre et Billet de Change*. Thompson's treatise on the law of bills and notes in Scotland, is a superior work, and spoken of in very high terms by persons entirely competent to judge of its value. The law concerning negotiable paper has at length become a science, which can be studied with infinite advantage in the various codes, treatises, and judicial decisions; for, in them, every possible view of the doctrine, in all its branches, has been considered, its rules established, and its limitations accurately defined.

LECTURE XLV.

OF THE TITLE TO MERCHANT VESSELS.

THE utility of an outline of the code of maritime law must consist essentially in the precision, as well as in the perspicuity, with which its principles are illustrated by a series of positive rules. Every work on this subject will unavoidably become, in a degree, dry and minute in the detail ; but it would be destitute of real value, unless it were practical in its design and application. The law concerning shipping and seamen, negotiable paper, and marine insurance, controls the most enterprising and the most busy concerns of mankind ; and it consists of a system of principles and facts, in the shape of usages, regulations, and precedents, which are assimilated in the codes of all commercial nations, and are as distinguished for simplicity of design, and equity of purpose, as they are for the variety and minuteness of their provisions. I have wished (and I hope not entirely without success) to be able to give to the student a faithful summary of the doctrines of commercial jurisprudence, and to awaken in his breast a generous zeal to become familiar with the leading judicial decisions, and especially with the writings of those great masters in the science of maritime law, whose talents and learning have enabled them to digest and adorn it.

The law of shipping may be conveniently arranged

under the following general heads: 1. Of the title to vessels. 2. Of the persons employed in the navigation of merchant ships. 3. Of the contract of affreightment. This arrangement is very nearly the same with that pursued by Lord Tenterden, in his treatise on the
 *130 subject, and which, *after comparing it with the method in which these various topics have been discussed by other writers, I do not think can be essentially improved. It has been substantially adopted by Mr. Holt, in his “System of the Shipping and Navigation Laws of Great Britain;” and still more closely followed by M. Jacobsen, the Danish civilian, in his treatise on the “Laws of the Sea.” The law of shipping, as thus arranged and divided, will form the subject of this, and of the two succeeding lectures.

(1.) *Requisites to a valid title to vessels.*

The title to a ship, acquired by purchase, (for title by capture has been already considered,^a) passes by writing. A bill of sale is the true and proper muniment of title to a ship, and one which the maritime courts of all nations will look for, and, in their ordinary practice, require.^b In Scotland, a written conveyance of property in ships, has, by custom, become essential; and, in England, it is made absolutely necessary by statute, with regard to British subjects.^c Possession of a ship, and acts of ownership, will, in this, as in other cases of property, be presumptive evidence of title, without the aid of documentary proof, and will stand good until that presumption be destroyed

^a Vol. i. 101—104.

^b Lord Stowell in the *Sisters*, 5 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 155. Story, J., 1 *Mason's Rep.* 139. *Weston v. Penniman*, *ibid.* 306. 2 *ibid.* 435. *Ohl v. Eagle Insurance Company*, 4 *ibid.* 390.

^c Statute 34 George III. c. 68, and re-enacted 3 and 4 William IV. c. 55. sec. 31. See, also, *Camden v. Anderson*, 5 *Term Rep.* 709. The *Sisters*, 5 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 155. *Bell's Commentaries on the Laws of Scotland*, vol. i. 152.

by contrary proof;^a and a sale and delivery of a ship, without any bill of sale, or instrument, will be good at law, as between the parties.^b But the presumption of title arising from possession may easily be destroyed; and the general rule is, that no person can convey who has no title; and the mere fact of possession by the vendor is not, of itself, *sufficient to give a *131 title. Though the master of a ship, as we shall presently see, be clothed with great powers, connected with the employment and navigation of the ship, he has no authority to sell, unless in a case of extreme necessity; and then he has an implied authority to exercise his discretion for the benefit of all concerned.^c

It has frequently been the case, that the sale of a ship has been procured in foreign countries, by order of some admiralty court, as a vessel unfit for service. Such sales are apt to be collusively conducted; and the English courts of common law do not regard them as binding, even though made *bona fide*, and for the actual as well as the intended benefit of the parties in interest. They hold, that there is no adequate foundation for such authority in the legitimate powers of the admiralty courts. They have no such power by the law of nations, and no such power is exercised by the Court of Admiralty at Westminster.^d Lord Stowell, on the other hand, considered

^a Robertson v. French, 4 *East's Rep.* 130. Upon indictment in the Circuit Court of the U. S. of seamen for a revolt, it was held that the *ownership* of the vessel determined her national character, and that the ownership might be proved in the same manner as that of any other chattel. The vessel was registered as an American vessel, and was on a whaling voyage without a license, and the register was held to be sufficient evidence of title to sustain the indictment. United States v. Jenkins, *U. S. Cir. C.* for New-York, August, 1838.

^b Taggard v. Loring, 16 *Mass. Rep.* 336. Wendover & Hinton v. Hogeboom, 7 *Johns. Rep.* 308.

^c Hayman v. Molton, 5 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 65. Reid v. Darby, 10 *East*, 143. Robertson v. Clarke, 1 *Bingham*, 445, and see *infra*, 171.

^d Reid v. Darby, 10 *East's Rep.* 143. Morris v. Robinson, 3 *Barnw. & Cress.* 196.

the practice which obtained in the vice-admiralty courts abroad, of ordering a sale, under the superintendence of the court, to be very convenient when the fact of necessity was proved; and he seemed to consider, that it would be a defect in the law of England, if a practice so conducive to the public utility could not legally be maintained. The Court of Admiralty, feeling the expediency of the power, would go far to support the title of the purchaser.^a The proceeding which is condemned by the courts of law, is a voluntary proceeding, instituted by the master himself on petition for a sale, founded on a survey, proof, and report, of the unnavigable and irreparable condition of the vessel. It is essentially

*132 the *act of the master, under the auxiliary sanction of the court, founded merely upon a survey of the ship, to see whether she be seaworthy; and it is to be distinguished from the case in which the admiralty has regular jurisdiction of the subject, by a proceeding in *rem*, founded on some adverse claim. In such cases, the power of sale, in the sound discretion of the court, is indisputable, and binds all the world. This is a proposition of universal law, founded on the commercial intercourse of states, and the *jus gentium*. So, as we have already seen in a former volume,^b capture by a public enemy divests the title of the true owner, and transfers it to the captor, after a regular condemnation by a prize court of the sovereign of the captor.^c

Upon the sale of a ship in port, delivery of possession is requisite to make the title perfect. If the buyer suffers the seller to remain in possession, and act as owner, and

^a *Fanny and Elmira*, 1 *Edw. Adm. Rep.* 117. *The Warrior*, 2 *Dodson*, 288. 293. 295. *Story, J.*, in the case of the Schooner *Tilton*, 5 *Mason*, 474.

^b See vol. i. 102.

^c In the case of the Attorney General *v. Norstedt*, 3 *Price's Excheq. Rep.* 97, a judicial sale of a vessel as derelict by the Instance Court of the Admiralty, was held to bind even the crown's right of seizure for a previous forfeiture.

the seller should become bankrupt, the property would be liable to his creditors, and, in some cases, also to judgment creditors on execution. The same rule exists in the case of the mortgage of a ship; but where a sale is by a part owner, it is similar to the sale of a ship at sea, and actual delivery cannot take place. Delivery of the muniments of title will be sufficient, unless the part owner be himself in the actual possession.^a If the ship be sold while abroad, or at sea, a delivery of the grand bill of sale, and other documents, transfers the property, as in the case of the delivery of the key of a warehouse. It is all the delivery that the circumstances of the case admit of; and it is giving to the buyer, or mortgagee, the ability to take actual possession, and which he must do as soon as possible *on the return of *133 the ship. If the buyer takes possession of a ship sold while at sea, within a reasonable time after her arrival in port, his title will prevail against that of a subsequent purchaser or attaching creditor.^b But the buyer takes subject to all encumbrances, and to all lawful contracts made by the master respecting the employment and hypothecation of the ship prior to notice of the transfer.^c

The English cases speak of the transfer of a ship at sea by the assignment of the grand bill of sale, and that expression is understood to refer to the instrument whereby the ship was originally transferred from the builder to the owner, or first purchaser. But the American cases speak

^a Addis v. Baker, 1 *Anst. Rep.* 222. *Abbott on Shipping*, 10.

^b Ex parte Matthews, 2 *Vesey*, 272. Hall v. Gurney, *Cooke's B. L.* 231. Mair v. Glennie, 4 *Maule & Selw.* 240. Joy v. Sears, 9 *Pick.* 4.

^c Mair v. Glennie, 4 *Maule & Selw.* 240. Hay v. Fairburn, 2 *Barnw. & Ald.* 193. Atkinson v. Maling, 2 *Term Rep.* 462. Portland Bank v. Stubbs, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 422. Putnam v. Dutch, 8 *Mass. Rep.* 287. Badlam v. Tucker, 1 *Pick. Rep.* 396. As to debts which are, by the French law, privileged, and liens on the ship, see *infra*, 168.

simply of a bill of sale, and usually refer to the instrument or transfer from the last proprietor while the vessel is at sea, and which is sufficient to pass the property, if accompanied with the act of taking possession as soon as conveniently may be after the vessel arrives in port.^a

(2.) *Who is liable as owner.*

There is no doubt that the owner is personally liable for necessities furnished, and repairs made to a ship, by order of the master;^b and the great point for discussion is, who is to be regarded as contracting party, and owner *pro hac vice*.^c The ownership, in relation to this subject, is not determined by the register, and the true question, in matters relative to repairs, is, "upon whose credit was the work done."^d Nor is a regular bill of sale of the

property essential to exempt the former owner
 *134 *from responsibility for supplies furnished. But where the contract of sale is made, and possession delivered, the circumstance that the naked legal title remains in the vendor for his security, does not render him liable, as owner, on the contracts, or for the conduct of the master.^e

It has been a disputed question, whether the mortgagee of a ship, before he takes possession, be liable to the burdens and entitled to the benefits belonging to the

^a Portland Bank v. Stacey, 4 Mass. Rep. 663. Wheeler v. Sumner, 4 Mason, 183.

^b Webster v. Seekamp, 4 Barnw. & Ald. 352. The owner is, of course, liable, unless the credit is given to others. So, the captain is liable if he orders the repairs, unless the credit was given to the owner. Essery v. Cobb, 5 Carr. & Payne, 358. Cox v. Reid, 1 *ibid.* 602. For necessary supplies to a vessel, the owner, master, and charterer, are all liable; and the remedy against each remains good, unless credit be given to one exclusively. Henshaw v. Rollins, 5 Miller's Louis. Rep. 335.

^c Briggs v. Williamson, 7 Barnw. & Cress. 30.

^d Lord Tenterden, in Jennings v. Griffiths, Ryan & Moody, 43. Reeve v. Davis, 1 Adolph. & Ellis, 312.

^e Wendover v. Hogeboom, 7 Johns. Rep. 308. Leonard v. Huntington, 15 *ibid.* 298. Thorn v. Hicks, 7 Cowen's Rep. 697.

owner. In the case of *Chinney v. Blackbourne*,^a it was held by the K. B. that the mortgagor, in such a case, and not the mortgagee, was to be deemed owner, and entitled to the freight, and liable for the repairs and other expenses. The same decision was made by the C. B. in *Jackson v. Vernon*,^b But Lord Kenyon, in *Westerdell v. Dale*,^c entertained a different opinion, and he considered the mortgagee, whether in or out of possession, to be the owner, and entitled to the freight, and bound for the expenses of the ship. The weight of our American decisions has been in favour of the position, that a mortgagee of a ship out of possession is not liable for repairs or necessities procured on the order of the master, and not upon the particular credit of the mortgagee, who was not in the receipt of the freight; though the rule is otherwise when the mortgagee is in possession, and the vessel employed in his service.^d The case of *Fisher v. Willing*,^e has a strong bearing *in favour of *135 the decisions which go to charge the mortgagor; for it was held, that a mortgagee of a ship at sea did not, merely by delivery of the documents, acquire such a possession as to be liable to the master for wages accruing after the date of the mortgage. The contract was with the mortgagor, and there was no privity between the master and the mortgagee, before possession taken, sufficient to raise an assumption. A similar decision was made by Ch. J. Abbott, in *Martin v. Paxton*, and cited in

^a 1 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 117. note.

^b 1 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 114.

^c 7 *Term Rep.* 306. In *Dean v. M'Ghie*, 4 *Bingham*, 45, S. C. 12 *B. Moore*, 135, it was held, that on a mortgage of a ship at sea, and possession taken, the accruing freight passed to the mortgagee, as incident to the ship.

^d *M'Intyre v. Scott*, 8 *Johns. Rep.* 159. *Champlin v. Butler*, 18 *ibid.* 169. *Ring v. Franklin*, 2 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 1. *Tucker v. Buffington*, 15 *Mass. Rep.* 477. *Colson v. Bonzey*, 6 *Greenleaf*, 474.

^e 8 *Serg. & Rawle*, 113. A mortgagor in possession of a vessel may pledge the freight. *Keith v. Murdoch*, *Wheat. Dig.* 586. pl. 11.

the Pennsylvania case. The case of *The Mohawk Insurance Company v. Eckford*, decided in the Court of Common Pleas in the city of New-York, in 1828, and the case of *Thorn v. Hicks*,^a show that the rule is considered to be settled in New-York, that a mortgagee out of possession is not liable for services rendered, or necessities furnished, to a vessel, on the credit of the mortgagor, or other person having the equitable title. The question seems to resolve itself into the inquiry, whether the circumstances afford evidence of a contract express or implied, as regards mortgagees not in possession. If the claimant dealt with the mortgagor solely as owner, he cannot look to the mortgagee. To whom was the credit given, seems to be the true ground on which the question ought to stand.^b In a case before Lord Ellenborough, in 1816,^c he ruled, that a mortgagee, not in possession, and not known to the plaintiff, was not liable for stores supplied by the captain's order. The weight of authority is decidedly in favour of the mortgagee who has not taken possession; and if he has left the possession and control of the ship to the mortgagor, he will not be liable to the master for wages or disbursements, or to any other person, for repairs and necessities done or supplied by the master's order, where the mortgagor has been treated as owner. If, however, there

*136 has been no such dealing with the mortgagor in the character of owner, but the credit has been given to the person who may be owner, it is a point still remaining open for discussion, whether the liability will attach to the beneficial, or to the legal owner. The principle of the decision in *Trewhella v. Rowe*,^d was, that a

^a 7 Cowen's Rep. 697. *Ring v. Franklin*, 2 Hall, 1 S. P.

^b Baker v. Buckle, 7 J. B. Moore, 349.

^c Twentyman v. Hart, 1 Starkie's Rep. 366.

^d 11 East's Rep. 435.

vendee of a ship, whatever equitable title might exist in him, was not liable for supplies furnished before the legal title was conveyed to him, and registered in the manner prescribed by the registry acts, and when he was unknown to the tradesman who supplied the materials.^a

There are analogous cases which throw light upon this subject. Thus, in *Young v. Brander*,^b the legal title remained for a month after the sale in the vendor upon the face of the register, because the vendee had omitted to comply with the forms prescribed by the registry acts. But it was held, that he was not liable during that interval for repairs ordered by the captain, under the direction of the vendee, and who had no authority, express or implied, from the legal owner. The vendee ordered the repairs in his own right, and there was no privity of interest between him and the legal owner, and the credit was actually given to the vendee. So, again, the regular registered owner of a ship was held not to be liable for supplies furnished by order of the charterer, who had chartered the ship at a certain rent for a number of voyages. The owner had divested himself, in that case, of all control and possession of the vessel during the existence of the charter-party, and he had no right, under *it, to appoint the captain.^c The question *137

^a The same principle governed the decision in *Harrington v. Fry*, 2 *Bingham*, 179; and by the English statutes of 4 George IV. c. 41, and of 6 George IV. c. 110, on a transfer of a ship, or any interest therein, by mortgage or assignment, in trust, by way of *security for a debt*, the entry in the book of registry is so to state it, and the mortgagee or trustee shall not by reason thereof be deemed owner, nor the mortgagor cease to be owner, except so far as to render the security available. Under these statutes, the interest of the mortgagor and mortgagee are more distinctly severed than they were before, and a mortgagor does not cease to be owner. *Irving v. Richardson*, 2 *Barnw. & Adolph.* 193. No act of bankruptcy, committed by the mortgagor after the registry of the mortgage or assignment, to affect the security. This provision is continued in the consolidated registry statute of 3 and 4 William IV. c. 55. sec. 42, 43.

^b 8 *East's Rep.* 10.

^c *Frazer v. Marsh*, 13 *East's Rep.* 238. Registered ownership is *prima facie* evidence of liability for the repairs of a ship, but it may be rebutted

in these cases is, whether the owner, by reason of the charter-party, has divested himself of the ownership *pro hac vice*, and whether there has been any direct contract between the parties, varying the responsibility.

In *Vallejo v. Wheeler*,^a the court proceeded on the ground, that the charterer was owner *pro hac vice*, inasmuch as he appointed the master. The subject was much discussed in *M'Intire v. Brown*,^b and it was held, that where, by the terms of the charter-party, the ship-owner appoints the master and crew, and retains the management and control of the vessel, the charter was to be considered as a covenant to carry goods. But where the whole management is given to the freighter, it is more properly a hiring of the vessel for the voyage, and in such case the hirer is to be deemed owner for the voyage. In *Hallet v. The Columbian Insurance Company*,^c the owner of the vessel, by the charter-party, let the whole vessel to the master, who was to victual and man her at his own expense, and have the whole management and control of her, and he was held to be the owner for the voyage; and a similar decision was made in *Taggard v. Loring*.^d The case of *Fletcher v. Braddick*,^e adopted the same principle which had been laid down by Ch. J. Lee, in *Parish v. Crawford*;^f and it was declared, that the ownership, in respect to all third persons, remained with the original proprietor when the vessel was supplied and repaired by the owner, and navigated by a master and sailors provided and paid for by him. In that

by showing that the credit was given elsewhere. *Cox v. Reid*, 1 *Ryan & Moody*, 199.

^a *Cowp. Rep.* 143.

^b 1 *Johns. Rep.* 229.

^c 8 *Johns. Rep.* 272.

^d 16 *Mass. Rep.* 336.

^e 5 *Bos. & Pull.* 182.

^f *Str. Rep.* 1251.

case, the ship was chartered by the *commissioners of the navy, who placed a commander in the navy on board, and the master was to obey his orders ; but, with regard to third persons, it was still, notwithstanding that very important fact, considered to be the ship of the owners, and they were held answerable for damage done by the ship. This highly vexed question, and so important in its consequences to the claim of lien, and the responsibilities of ownership, depends on the inquiry, whether the lender or hirer, under a charter-party, be the owner of the ship for the voyage. It is a dry matter of fact question, who, by the charter-party, has the possession, command, and navigation of the ship. If the general owner retains the same, and contracts to carry a cargo on freight for the voyage, the charter-party is a mere affreightment sounding in covenant, and the freighter is not clothed with the character or legal responsibility of ownership. The general owner, in such a case, is entitled to the freight, and may sue the consignee on the bills of lading in the name of the master, or he may enforce his claim by detaining the goods until payment, the law giving him a lien for freight. But where the freighter hires the possession, command, and navigation of the ship, for the voyage, he becomes the owner, and is responsible for the conduct of the master and mariners ; and the general owner has no lien for the freight, because he is not the carrier for the voyage. This is the principle declared and acted upon in the greatly litigated and very ably discussed case of *Christie v. Lewis*,^a and it is the principle declared by the Supreme Court of the United States, in *Marcadier v. The Chesapeake Insurance Company*,^b and *Gracie v. Palmer*,^c and followed generally by

^a 2 *Brod. & Bing.* 410.

^b 8 *Cranch's Rep.* 39.

^c 8 *Wheat. Rep.* 605.

the courts of justice in this country.^a It may be considered as the sound and settled law on the subject.^b

*139 *(3.) *Of the custom-house documents.*

The United States have imitated the policy of England, and other commercial nations,^c in conferring peculiar privileges upon American built ships, and owned by our own citizens ; and I shall now examine the acts of Congress, so far as they go to ascertain the title to American ships, and the mode of transferring that title. The object of the registry acts is to encourage our own trade, navigation, and ship-building, by granting peculiar or exclusive privileges of trade to the flag of the United States, and by prohibiting the communication of those immunities to the shipping and mariners of other countries. These provisions are well calculated to prevent the commission of

^a *Pitkin v. Brainerd*, 5 *Conn. Rep.* 451. *Clarkson v. Edes*, 4 *Cowen's Rep.* 470. *Reynolds v. Toppan*, 15 *Mass. Rep.* 370. *Emery v. Hersey*, 4 *Greenleaf's Rep.* 407. *Lander v. Clark*, 1 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 355. *Lord Tenterden*, in *Colvin v. Newberry*, 6 *Bligh's Rep.* (N.S.) 189. *The Schooner Volunteer and cargo*, 1 *Sumner*, 568, 569. In the case of certain logs of mahogany, 2 *Sumner*, 596, 597, it was decided, that where the owner of a chartered vessel has a lien for freight, the consignee cannot, by a writ of replevin, withdraw the cargo from the jurisdiction of the admiralty court; and that the owner of the vessel is presumed to be the owner for the voyage, unless the charter-party contains clear evidence of an intention to make the charterer owner for the voyage; and that the owner has a lien on the cargo for the amount due by the charter-party, unless by the terms of the instrument, delivery of the cargo is to precede payment of the freight, and the owner is divested of the possession of the goods, without the right to claim immediate payment; that a stipulation that the freight is to be paid in five days after the return and discharge of the vessel, is not a contract to give credit so as to displace the lien; and that the stipulation to discharge the cargo, is simply to unlade, and not to deliver it.

^b In Massachusetts, the charterer of a vessel is declared to be the owner, in respect to responsibility for embezzlements by the crew, in case he navigates the vessel at his own expense. *Revised Statutes* of 1835, part 1. ch. 32. sec. 3.

^c Mr. Prescott refers to a Spanish law, or pragmatic, as early as the year 1500, prohibiting all persons, whether natives or foreigners, from shipping goods in foreign bottoms from a port where a Spanish ship could be obtained. The object of the law, like the English famous navigation act, was to exclude foreigners from the carrying trade. Another pragmatic, of 1501, prohibited the sale of vessels to foreigners. *Prescott's Ferdinand and Isabella*, vol. iii. 453.

fraud upon individuals, as well as to advance the national policy. The registry of all vessels at the custom-house, and the memorandums of the transfers, add great security to title, and bring the existing state of our navigation and marine under the view of the general government. By these regulations, the title can be effectually traced back to its origin.^a

^a A historical view of the laws of England, with regard to shipping and navigation, is given, with admirable clearness, method, and accuracy, by Mr. *Reeves*, in his "*History of the Law of Shipping and Navigation*," published in 1792; and the policy of that system he considers to have been vindicated and triumphantly sustained, in the increase of the English shipping, the extension of their foreign navigation and trade, and the unrivalled strength of their navy. The policy of the British statutes was to create skilful and hardy seamen, and to confine the privileges of English trade, as far as was consistent with the extent of it, to British built shipping. But the quantity of British built shipping was not at first adequate to carry on the whole trade of the country, and it became a secondary object to confer privileges on foreign built ships in British ownership. In proportion as British built shipping increased, the privileges conferred on foreign built ships in British ownership were from time to time restricted. The English navigation laws, prior to the famous navigation act of the republican Parliament of 1651, and adopted by the statute of 12 Charles II. c. 18, were crude and undigested. They commenced with the statute of 5 Richard II., and in the earlier acts, the preference of English ships and mariners, in English imports and exports, was given in simple and absolute terms, and they kept improving in accuracy of description and justness of policy down to the time of the registry acts. The navigation act of Charles II. described what were English built and English owned ships, and in what cases a foreign built ship, owned by an English subject, should have the privileges of an English ship. The act did not require any foreign ships to be registered; but a foreign built ship, unless registered, was to be treated as an alien ship, though owned by a British subject. The statute of 26 George III. c. 60, was framed by the elder Lord Liverpool, and it gave rise to the treatise of Mr. Reeve, who dedicated his work to that distinguished nobleman. The navigation act of Charles II. only required ships to be the *property* of British subjects; but in the progress of the system, the qualification of being British *built* was added. The one encouraged British seamen and merchants, but the other encouraged also British ship-building. The statute of 26 George III. declared that the time had come, when the policy of employing British built shipping exclusively in the commerce of that country, ought to be carried to the utmost extent, and it accordingly enacted, that no foreign built ship, except prizes, nor any ship built upon a foreign bottom, although British owned, should be any longer entitled to any of the privileges or advantages of a British built ship, or of a ship owned by British subjects. This statute likewise introduced into the European trade the necessity of a register, which had been introduced into the plantation trade by the statute of 7 and 8

The acts of Congress of 31st December, 1792, and 18th February, 1793, constitute the basis of the *141 regulations in this *country for the foreign and

William III. c. 22. The general principle established by the act of 26 George III. was, that all British ships, with some few exceptions, should be registered, and a certificate of the registry obtained, in the port to which the ship belonged. All ships entitled and required to be registered, were made subject to forfeiture for attempting to proceed to sea without a British register. All ships not entitled to the privileges of British built or British owned ships, and all ships not registered, although owned by British subjects, were to be deemed alien ships, and liable to the same penalties and forfeitures as alien ships. British subjects might still employ foreign ships in neutral trade, subject only to the alien duties. The statute further required, that upon every alteration of the property, an endorsement was to be made upon the registry, and a memorandum thereof entered at the custom-house; and that upon every transfer, in whole or in part, the certificate of the registry was to be set out in the bill of sale. The statute of 34 George III. c. 68, was an enlargement of the statute 26 George III., and it contained several provisions for granting new certificates upon a transfer of property, and it regulated those cases only in which a title to a certificate had been given, and a certificate was required to be obtained, and it required all registered vessels to be navigated by a British master, and a crew of whom three-fourths were British. The existing British regulations respecting the registration and enrolment of ships, are embodied in the act of 3 and 4 William IV. c. 55.

The navigation laws of Great Britain now form a permanent and regular code, and they were involved in a labyrinth of statutes, and not easily rendered simple and intelligible to practical men, until the statutes of 4 George IV. c. 44, 6 George IV. c. 109, 110, 7 George IV. c. 48, and 3 and 4 William IV. c. 54, 55, successively displacing each other, reduced all the former provisions, with alterations and improvements, into one consolidated system. The registry acts have peculiar simplicity and legal precision for statute productions of that kind, and they are regarded by English statesmen and lawyers as highly honourable to the talents, experience, and vigilance of Lord Liverpool, who established on solid foundations the naval power and commercial superiority of his country. The code of laws constituting the navigation system of England, may be considered as embodied in the statutes of 3 and 4 William IV., and which are said to owe much of the merit of their compilation to the industry and talents of Mr. Hume, of the board of trade. As the code previously existed, it was well digested, not only in the history of Mr. Reeves, to which I have alluded, but by Lord Tenterden, in his accurate and authoritative "*Treatise of the Law relative to Merchant Ships and Seamen*;" and still more extensively, and very ably, in Holt's "*System of the Shipping and Navigation Laws of Great Britain*." That work contains all the laws on the subject, brought down to the year 1820. His introductory essay is a clear, but brief synopsis of the history and policy of the navigation system. In the sixth and seventh chapters of the first volume of Mr. Chitty's ample "*Treatise on the Laws of Commerce and Manufactures, and Contracts relating thereto*," we have also a condensed digest of the same code of navigation laws.

coasting trade, and for the fisheries of the United States ; and they correspond very closely with the provisions of the British statutes in the reign of George III.

No vessel is to be deemed a vessel of the United States, or entitled to the privileges of one, unless registered, and wholly owned and commanded by a citizen of the United States. The American owner, in whole or in part, ceases to retain *his privileges as such owner, *142 if he usually resides in a foreign country, during the continuance of such residence, unless he be a consul, or an agent for, and a partner in some American house, carrying on trade within the United States.^a The register is to be made by the collector of the port to which such ship shall belong, or in which it shall be, and founded on the oath of one of the owners, stating the time and place where she was built, or that she was captured in war by a citizen, as prize, and lawfully condemned, or forfeited, for a breach of the laws of the States ; and stating the owners and master, and that they are citizens, and that no subject of a foreign power was, directly or indirectly, by way of trust, or otherwise, interested therein. The master is, likewise, in certain cases, to make oath touching his own citizenship.^b Previous to the registry, a certificate of survey is to be produced, and security given, that the certificate of such registry shall be solely used for the ship, and shall not be sold, lent, or otherwise disposed of. If the vessel, or any interest therein, be sold to any foreigner, and the vessel be within the United States, the certificate of the registry shall, within seven days after the sale, be delivered up to the collector of the district, in order to be cancelled ; and if the sale be made when the vessel is abroad, or at sea,

^a *Act of Congress*, 31st December, 1792, sec. 1, 2.

^b *Ibid.* sec. 3, 4, 11.

the certificate is to be delivered up within eight days after the master's arrival within the United States;^a and if the transfer of a registered vessel be made to a foreigner in a foreign port, for the purpose of evading the revenue laws of the foreign country, it works a forfeiture of the vessel, unless the transfer be made known within eight days after the return of the vessel to a port in the United States, by a delivery of the certificate of registry to the collector of the port.^b So, if a registered ship be

*143 sold, in whole or in part, *while abroad, to a citizen of the United States, the vessel, on her first arrival in the United States thereafter, shall be entitled to all the privileges of a ship of the United States, provided a new certificate of registry be obtained within three days after the master makes his final report upon her first arrival.^c If the vessel be built within the United States, the ship-carpenter's certificate is requisite to obtain the register; and when the ship is duly registered, the collector of the port shall grant an abstract, or certificate of such registry.^d There are several minute regulations respecting the change of the certificate, and the granting of a new register, which need not here be detailed;^e but when a vessel, duly registered, shall be sold or transferred, in whole or in part, to a citizen of the United States, or shall be altered in form or burthen, she must be registered anew, and her former certificate of registry delivered up, otherwise she will cease to be deemed a vessel of the United States, or entitled to any of the privileges of one. In every case of sale or transfer, there must be some instrument of writing, in the nature of a bill of sale, which

^a *Act of Congress*, 31st December, 1792, sec. 6, 7.

^b *Ibid.* sec. 7. 16. *The Margaret*, 9 *Wheat*. 421.

^c *Act of the United States*, March 2d, 1803, sec. 3.

^d *Law of the United States*, 31st December, 1792, sec. 9.

^e *Ibid.* sec. 12, 13.

shall recite at length the certificate of registry, and without it the vessel is incapable of being registered anew.^a Upon every change of master, the owner must report such change to the collector, and have a memorandum of such change endorsed upon the certificate of registry; and if any ship so registered be sold, in whole or in part, by way of trust, or otherwise, to a foreigner, and the sale be not made known as above directed, the whole, or at least the share owned by the citizen who sells, becomes forfeited.^b

Vessels enrolled and licensed, or licensed only, if under *twenty tons, are entitled to the privileges *144 of vessels employed in the coasting trade or fisheries.^c Vessels, to be enrolled, must possess the same qualifications; and the same requisites, in all respects, must be complied with, as are made necessary for the registry of ships and vessels; and the same duties are required in relation to such enrolments; and the ships enrolled, with the master and owner, are subject to the same regulations as are in those respects provided for registered vessels.^d Any vessel may be enrolled and licensed, that may be registered, upon the registry being given up; and any vessel that may be enrolled may be registered, upon the enrolment and license being given up.^e In order to obtain a license for carrying on the coasting trade, or fisheries, the owner, or ship's husband, and master, must give security to the United States, that the vessel be not employed in any trade whereby the revenue of the United States may be defrauded; and the master must make oath that he is a citizen, and that

^a *Law of the United States*, 31st December, 1792, sec. 14.

^b *Ibid.* sec. 15, 16.

^c *Act of Congress*, February 18th, 1793, sec. 1.

^d *Ibid.* sec. 2.

^e *Ibid.* sec. 3.

the license shall not be used for any other vessel, or any other employment ; and *if the vessel be less than twenty tons burthen, that she is wholly the property of a citizen of the United States.* The collector of the district thereupon grants a license for carrying on the coasting trade, or fishery.^a Vessels engaged in such a trade or business, without being enrolled and licensed, or licensed only, as the case may be, shall pay alien duties, if in ballast, or laden with goods the growth or manufacture of the United States, and shall be forfeited if laden with any articles of foreign growth or manufacture, or distilled spirits.^b If any vessel enrolled or licensed, proceed on a foreign voyage, without first surrendering up her enrolment and license,
*145 and being duly registered, *she shall, with her cargo imported into the United States, be subject to forfeiture.^c The other general provisions relative to the rights and duties appertaining to the coasting trade and the fisheries, need not here be enumerated, as my object is to consider the subject merely in reference to the documentary title to American vessels.

It is further provided, by the act of March 2, 1797, that whenever any vessel is transferred *by process of law*, and the register, certificate of enrolment, or license, is retained by the former owner, a new one may be obtained upon the usual terms, without the return of the outstanding paper. Vessels captured and condemned by a foreign power are to be considered as foreign vessels, and not entitled to a new register, even though they should afterwards become American property, unless the former owner regain his title, by purchase or otherwise.^d Every registered or unregistered vessel, owned by a citizen of

^a *Act of Congress*, February 18th, 1793, sec. 4.

^b *Ibid.* sec. 6.

^c *Ibid.* sec. 6.

^d *Act of Congress*, June 27, 1797.

the United States, and going to a foreign country, and, if an unregistered vessel, sailing with a sea-letter, is entitled to a passport, to be furnished by the collector of the district.^a But no sea-letter, certifying any vessel to be the property of a citizen of the United States, can be issued, except to ships duly registered, or enrolled and licensed, or to vessels wholly owned by citizens of the United States, and furnished with, or entitled to sea-letters, or other custom-house documents.^b

The English registry acts of 26 Geo. III., and 34 Geo. III. c. 68, required the certificate of the registry to be truly recited at length in every bill of sale of a British ship to a British subject ; otherwise such bill of sale was declared to be utterly null and void to all intents and purposes ; and this was held to be necessary, even though the ship was at sea at the time, and the vendee took the grand bill of sale, and possession of the *146 ship, immediately on her arrival in port.^c The laws of the United States do not go to that rigorous extent ; and the only consequence of a transfer, without a writing containing a recital at length of the certificate of registry, is, that the vessel cannot be registered anew, and she loses her privileges as an American vessel, and becomes subject to the disabilities incident to vessels not registered, enrolled, or licensed, as the statute prescribes. But where an American registered vessel was in part sold, by parol, while at sea, to an American citizen, and again resold, by parol, to her original owner, on her return into port, and before entry, that transaction was held not to deprive the vessel of her American privileges, or subject her to foreign duties, for, in that case, no new regis-

^a *Acts of Congress*, June 1, 1796, and March 2, 1803.

^b *Act of Congress*, March 26, 1810.

^c *Rolleston v. Hibbert*, 3 *Term Rep.* 406.

ter was requisite. It would have been, except in date, a duplicate of the old one, and perfectly useless.^a

If a ship be owned by American citizens, and be not documented according to the provisions of the registry acts, it is not liable to any forfeitures or disabilities which are not specially prescribed. The want of a register is not a ground of forfeiture, but the cause only of loss of American privileges.^b Every vessel, wherever built, and owned by an American citizen, is entitled to a custom-house document for protection, termed a passport, under the act of June 1, 1796 ; for it applies to "every ship or vessel of the United States, going to any foreign country." As our registry acts do not declare void the sale or transfer, and every contract or agreement for transfer of property in any ship, without an instrument in writing, reciting at large the certificate of registry ; and as they have not prescribed any precise form of endorsement on the certificate of registry, and rendered it indispensable in every sale, as was the case under the British statutes of 26 Geo. III. c. 60, and 34 Geo. III. c. 68, we are happily relieved from many embarrassing questions which have arisen in the English courts relative to the sale and mortgage of ships.

There has been great difficulty, and some alternation of opinion, in the English courts, in the endeavour to reconcile the strict and positive provisions of the statute with the principles of equity, and the good faith and intention of the contracting parties.^c It has even been a

^a The United States *v.* Willings and Francis, 4 *Cranch's Rep.* 48.

^b Hatch *v.* Smith, 5 *Mass. Rep.* 42. Philips *v.* Ledley, 1 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 226. Willing *v.* United States, *ibid.* 125. The register is the only document which need be on board in time of peace, in compliance with a warranty of national character. Catlett *v.* Pacific Ins. Co. 1 *Payne*, 594.

^c The cases of Rolleston *v.* Hibbert, 3 *Term Rep.* 406. Camden *v.* Anderson, 5 *ibid.* 709. Westerdell *v.* Dale, 7 *ibid.* 306. Moss *v.* Charnock, 2 *East's Rep.* 399. Heath *v.* Hubbard, 4 *East's Rep.* 110. Moss *v.* Mills, 6 *ibid.* 144. Hayton *v.* Jackson, 8 *ibid.* 511. Hibbert *v.* Rolleston, 3 *Bro.*

question of much discussion, whether the statutes of 26 and 34 Geo. III. had not destroyed the common law right of conveying a ship, by way of mortgage, like other personal property; and whether the mortgagee had not a complete title, beyond the power of redemption, after the transfer of the legal title, according to the prescribed form of the endorsement on the certificate of registry. *The language, in many of the cases,^a *148 was in favour of the conclusion, that there could be no equitable ownership of a ship distinct from the legal title, and that upon a transfer under the forms of the registry acts, the ship becomes the absolute property of the intended mortgagee, and that the terms and the policy of the registry acts were incompatible with the existence of any equity of redemption. But these opinions, or *dicta*, have been met by a series of adjudications, which assume the law to be otherwise, and that the

Rep. 571, and the opinions of Wood, B. and Heath, J., in *Hubbard v. Johnstone*, 3 *Taunt. Rep.* 177, and of Lord Eldon, in *Ex parte Yallop*, 15 *Vesey's Rep.* 60, and *Ex parte Houghton*, 17 *Vesey's Rep.* 251, and of Sir William Grant, in 11 *Vesey's Rep.* 642, may be selected as samples of the strictness with which the statutes are construed, and of the defeat of *bona fide* transfers of vessels, by failure to comply with the literal terms of the statutes. The cases of *Rolleston v. Smith*, 4 *Term Rep.* 161, *Capadose v. Codner*, 1 *Bos. & Pull.* 483, *Ratchford v. Meadows*, 3 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 69, *Bloxham v. Hubbard*, 5 *East's Rep.* 407, *Kerrison v. Cole*, 8 *East's Rep.* 231, *Robinson v. Macdonnell*, 5 *Maule & Selw.* 223, *Curtis v. Perry*, 6 *Vesey's Rep.* 739, *Mestaer v. Gillespie*, 11 *Vesey's Rep.* 621. 637, may be selected, on the other hand, as containing evidence of the influence of equity upon the severity of those provisions. But the new British registry act, of 6 Geo. IV. c. 110. sec. 31, and, again, the further amended and substituted statute of 3 and 4 William IV. c. 55, mitigated the strictness of the former provision. It required the bill of sale, or other instrument of writing of the sale of a ship after registry, to contain a recital of the certificate of registry, or the principal contents thereof, to render the transfer valid; but with a proviso, that no bill of sale should be deemed void by reason of any error in such recital, or by the recital of any former certificate of registry, instead of the existing certificate.

^a Lord Eldon scattered *ambiguus voces* to that effect in *Curtis v. Perry*, 6 *Vesey's Rep.* 739. *Campbell v. Stein*, 6 *Dow's P. C.* 116. *Ex parte Yallop*, 15 *Vesey's Rep.* 60. *Ex parte Houghton*, 17 *Vesey's Rep.* 251. *Dixon v. Ewart*, 3 *Merivale's Rep.* 333.

registry acts related only to transactions between vendor and vendee, and to cases of real ownership; and that an equitable interest in a ship might exist by operation of law, and by the contract of the parties, distinct from the legal estate; and that notwithstanding the positive and absolute terms of the endorsement upon the certificate of register, a mortgage of a ship is good and valid, according to the law as it existed before the registry acts, provided the requisites of the statutes be complied with.^a The opinion of Sir Thomas Plumer, in *Thompson v. Smith*,^b contained a very clear and masterly vindication of the validity of the mortgage of a ship consistently with the preservation of the forms of the registry acts. He effectually put to flight the alarming proposition, that since the registry acts there could be no valid mortgage of a ship; and he insisted, that the defeasance annexed to the bill of sale ought to be fully endorsed as part of the instrument on the certificate of registry, if the ship be mortgaged in port; or, if mortgaged while at sea, a copy of the whole transmitted to the custom-house; and

*149 that though the defeasance should not be noticed *in any of the forms adhered to at the office of the customs, and the instrument should be registered as an absolute bill of sale, the mortgagor's right of redemption would not suffer by the omission. But as no such questions can possibly arise under the registry acts of Congress, these discussions in the English courts are noticed only as a curious branch of the history of the English jurisprudence on this subject.^c

^a *Mair v. Glennie*, 4 *Maule & Selw.* 240. *Robinson v. Macdonnell*, 5 *ibid.* 228. *Hay v. Fairbairn*, 2 *Barnw. & Ald.* 193. *Monkhouse v. Hay*, 2 *Brod. & Bing.* 114.

^b 1 *Madd. Ch. Rep.* 395.

^c In 1823, Mr. *Trollope* published, at London, a distinct treatise, for the very purpose of vindicating the validity of mortgages of ships. It was entitled *A Treatise on the Mortgage of Ships, as affected by the Registry Acts*; and

The registry is not a document required by the law of nations as expressive of a ship's national character.^a The registry acts are to be considered as forms of local or municipal institution, for purposes of public policy. They are imperative only upon the voluntary transfer of parties, and do not apply to transfers by act or operation of law.^b They are said to be peculiar to England, and to the United States, whose maritime and navigation system is formed upon the model of that of Great Britain. But by various French ordinances, *be- *150 tween 1681 and the era of the new code, it was requisite that all vessels, in order to be entitled to the privileges of French vessels, should be built in France, under some necessary exceptions, and should be owned exclusively by Frenchmen, and foreigners were prohibited from navigating under the French flag; and a Frenchman forfeited his privileges as such owner, by marrying a foreign wife, or residing abroad, unless in connexion with a French house.^c The register is not of itself, evidence of property, unless it be confirmed by

it contains a view all the discussions on the question. The same doctrine is maintained in Mr. Patch's late *Practical Treatise on the Law of Mortgages*, p. 34. Mr. Holt, in a note to his *Reports of Cases at Nisi Prius*, vol. i. 603, fell into the current error, that upon a contract of mortgage, in respect to a British registered ship, there was no equity of redemption, and that the ship became *absolutely* the property of the mortgagee, without any relief to be afforded at law, or in equity; but subsequently, in his elaborate treatise on shipping, he adopts the doctrine in *Thompson v. Smith*, as being in conformity with the letter and spirit of the registry acts. *Holt on Shipping*, vol. i. 306—312. The statute of 6 George IV. c. 110, removed the difficulties which attended the doctrine of mortgages under the former statutes, by declaring that the transfer of ships by way of mortgage, or by assignment in trust for payment of debts, duly registered, shall be valid, and pass the interest according to the purposes of the transfer. The act of 3 and 4 William IV. c. 55, which was a substitute for the former, has a similar provision.

^a *Le Cheminant v. Pearson*, 4 *Taunt. Rep.* 367.

^b 6 *Vesey's Rep.* 739. 15 *ibid.* 68. *Bloxham v. Hubbard*, 5 *East's Rep.* 407.

^c *Pardessus, Cours de Droit Com.* tom. iii. 11, 12. *Boulay Paty*, tom. i. 257—260.

some auxiliary circumstance to show that it was made by the authority or assent of the person named in it, and who is sought to be charged as owner. Without proof to connect the party with the register as being his direct or adopted act, the register has been held not to be even *prima facie* evidence to charge a person as owner; and even then it is not conclusive evidence of ownership.^a The cases of *The Mohawk Insurance Company v. Eckford*, decided in the New-York Court of Common Pleas in 1828, and of *Ring v. Franklin*, in the Superior Court of that city in 1829,^b went upon the same ground, that the register, standing in the name of a person, did not determine the ownership of the vessel, though it might, perhaps, be presumptive evidence, in the first instance. An equitable title in one person might legally exist, consistently with the documentary title at the custom-house in another.^c

^a *Tinkler v. Walpole*, 14 *East's Rep.* 226. *M'Iver v. Humble*, 16 *ibid.* 169. *Fraser v. Hopkins*, 2 *Taunt. Rep.* 5. *Sharp v. United Insurance Company*, 14 *Johns. Rep.* 201. *Colson v. Bonzey*, 6 *Greenleaf*, 474. *Bas v. Steele*, 3 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 381. The interest that appears upon the registry is held to estop the owner from setting up a claim to any other interest; but if he deals as owner of a larger share, he is liable to others in that proportion. This is the English rule upon the policy of the registry acts. *Ex parte Yallop*, 15 *Vesey*, 60.

^b 2 *Hall's Rep.* 1.

^c By the French law, a verbal sale of a ship may do as between the parties, but not as respects the claims of third persons. It has been, at all times, the policy of their law, to require the written evidence of a sale. Formerly, every sale was required to be attested before a notary, but now a private instrument is sufficient. But the law of France places very material checks upon the transfer of ships; for, in order to bar the rights and claims of third persons, it is requisite that the vessel make one voyage at sea at the risk of the purchaser, and without opposition from the creditors of the vendor; otherwise their claims are preferred to the title of the purchaser. If the vessel be sold while on a voyage, that voyage is not computed, and it requires a new voyage subsequent to such sale, to bar the rights of privileged creditors. This privilege, under the French ordinance of 1681, applied to creditors of every description existing at the time of the sale; but under the new code of commerce, it would rather seem to be confined to the specified class of privileged creditors. *Ord. b. 2. tit. 10. Des Navires*, art. 2, 3, and *Valin's Com. ibid.* tom. i. 602. *Code de*

(4.) *Of part owners.*

The several part owners of a ship are not partners but tenants in common.^a Each has his distinct, though undivided interest; and when one of them is appointed to manage the concerns of the ship for the common benefit, he is termed the ship's husband. Valin strongly recommends the utility of these associations of part owners, in the business of navigation and maritime enterprises, in order to unite the wisdom of joint counsels, as well as to divide the risks and losses incident to a very extended maritime commerce, which is exposed to so many hazards and revolutions: *tua omnia uni nunquam navi credito*.^b The marine law of England, respecting part owners of vessels, is distinguished for the wisdom and equity of its provisions, and it has an undoubted pre-eminence over the common law doctrine concerning a tenancy in common in chattels. If there be no certain agreement among themselves, respecting the employment of the ship, the Court of Admiralty, under its long established and salutary jurisdiction, authorizes a majority in value of the part owners, to employ the ship upon any probable adventure, and, at the same time, takes care to secure the interest of the dissenting minority. The admiralty practice is dictated by the plain *reason that "ships *152 were made to plough the ocean, and not to rot by the wall."^c Ownership in a ship is, ordinarily, not like the case of joint concern, or partnership; nor does the

Com. art. 193, 194, 196. Boulay Paty, *Cours de Droit Com.* tom. i. 168. 170.

^a Ex parte Young, 2 *Ves. & Bea.* 242. 2 *Rose*, 78. note. Ex parte Harrison, 2 *Rose's Cases in Bankruptcy*, 76. Ex parte Gibson, 1 *Montagu on Partnership*, 102. note. Nicoll v. Mumford, 4 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 526. See, also, *supra*, p. 39, 40.

^b Valin's *Com.* tom. i. 584.

^c In the same way the fir tree, though originally rooted in the mountain soil, was, according to the beautiful prosopopœia of the poet, destined to witness the perils of the deep—*casus abies visura marinos*.

English law, like some of the ordinances of other countries, give power to the majority in value to control, in their discretion, the whole concern. The Court of Admiralty takes a stipulation from the majority, in a sum equal to the value of the shares of the minority, either to bring back and restore the ship, or pay the minority the value of their shares. In that case, the ship sails wholly at the charge and risk, and for the benefit of the majority. This security the minority obtain upon a warrant issued upon their application to arrest the ship. This is the only safe proceeding to the minority ; for if the ship be sent to sea by the majority without this security, and she be lost without any tortious act in the majority, the minority have no remedy in law or equity. If the minority have possession of the ship, and refuse to employ her, the majority, on a similar warrant, may obtain possession, and send the ship to sea, on giving the like security. The jurisdiction of the admiralty extends to the taking a vessel from a wrong doer, and delivering her over to the rightful owner ; and this is a most useful part of the jurisdiction of the court, and one recognised in the courts of law.^a The Court of Chancery exercises this sort of equitable jurisdiction in cases where the admiralty cannot, as where the shares are not ascertained.^b

If the part owners be equally divided in opinion
 *153 in respect *to the employment of the ship, either party may obtain the like security from the other seeking to employ her.^c It is said, that the Court of Ad-

^a *Graves v. Sawcer*, *T. Raym. Rep.* 15. *Strelly v. Winson*, 1 *Vern. Rep.* 297. *Anon.* 2 *Ch. Cas.* 36. *Ouston v. Hebden*, 1 *Wils. Rep.* 101. *Abbott on Shipping*, part 1. c. 3. *The Sisters*, 4 *Rob.* 275. *The New Draper*, *ibid.* 287. *The Experiment*, 2 *Dodson*, 38. *The Margaret*, 2 *Hag. Adm. Rep.* 276, 277. In the matter of *Blanshard*, 2 *Barnw. & Cress.* 244. In *Willings v. Blight*, 2 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 288, the general jurisdiction of the admiralty, as stated, seemed to have been assumed. See, also, *The Apollo*, 1 *Hag. Adm. Rep.* 306.

^b *Hally v. Goodson*, 2 *Merivale's Rep.* 77.

^c *Abbott on Shipping*, *ub. sup.* sec. 6.

miralty has no jurisdiction to compel an obstinate part owner to sell his share;^a and yet it was considered, in the District Court of Pennsylvania, as still an unsettled point, whether the court might not compel a sale of the shares of the minority who unreasonably refused to act.^b If a part owner sells, he can only sell his undivided right. The interest of part owners is so far distinct, that one of them cannot dispose of the share of another; and this may be considered as a settled principle.^c The language in the Court of Errors of New York, in the case which has been already mentioned, does not lead to an opposite conclusion.^d That *case only ad- *154

^a *Ouston v. Hebden*, 1 *Wils.* 101. In the case of *The Apollo*, 1 *Hag.* 306, Lord Stowell vindicated the legality of the initiatory measure of arresting a ship, on the application of a part owner, who dissents from her intended employment, and compelling security for the safe return of the vessel, or for the estimated value of his share. And while he was extremely cautious of enlarging his jurisdiction on this subject, he decreed immediate payment of the entire amount of the stipulated sum, upon the loss of the ship. The jurisdiction of the admiralty in case of part owners, having *unequal* interests and shares, never has been applied to direct *a sale*, upon any dispute between them as to the navigation of the ship engaged in maritime voyages. The majority of the owners have a right to employ the ship on giving the requisite stipulation in favour of the minority, if they require it. So the minority may employ the ship in like manner, if the majority decline to employ her. *Steamboat Orleans v. Phœbus*, 11 *Peters*, 175.

^b *Willings v. Blight*, *ub sup.* A sale was decreed upon the petition of one part owner of a vessel against another, in the District Court of South Carolina. *Skrine v. The Sloop Hope*, *Bees' Adm. Rep.* 2. The remedy for the dissenting owners, in Scotland, is to compel a sale, or that the other owners shall give or take at a price put. Mr. Bell intimates, that the English method is less harsh and perilous. *Bell's Commentaries on the Laws of Scotland*, vol. i. 503.

^c It was so declared by Mr. *Abbott*, in his elementary work on *Shipping*, p. 4; and Lord Ch. J. *Dallas* observed, in 8 *Taunt. Rep.* 774, that one part owner of a ship could not bind the rest, as in partnership cases.

^d See *ante*, p. 40. The ordinance of Rotterdam, of 1721, gave the owners of above half the ship the power to sell the same for the general account, as well as to freight her and outfit her at the common expense, and against the consent of the minority. (Art. 171, 172. 2 *Magens on Insurance*, 108.) On the other hand, the French ordinance of 1681, prohibited one part owner of a ship from forcing his companions to a sale, except in case of equality of opinions upon the undertaking of a voyage, and limited the powers of the majority to matters strictly connected with the ordinary employment of the vessel. Liv. 2. tit. 8. *Des Propriétaires*, art. 6. *Valin, ibid. Pardessus, Droit Com.* tom. iii. 47.

mitted, that a ship *might* be held, not only by part owners as tenants in common, but in partnership, by partners, as any other chattel. And though a part owner can sell only his share, yet one partner can dispose of the entire subject; and the case of vessels does not form an exception, when they are owned by a partnership, in the commercial sense, and so it has frequently been held.^a

The cases recognise the clear and settled distinction between part owners and partners. Part ownership is but a tenancy in common, and a person who has only a part interest in a ship, is generally a part owner, and not a joint tenant or partner. As part owner he has only a disposing power over his own interest in the ship, and he can convey no greater title. But there may be a partnership, as well as a co-tenancy, in a vessel; and,

in that case, one part owner, in the character of
 *155 *partner, may sell the whole vessel; and he has
 such an implied authority over the whole partnership effects, as we have already seen. The vendee, in

Valin vindicates this interdiction as conducive to the benefit of trade, though he admits it has its inconveniences, and that such is the destiny of all human laws.

^a Wright *v.* Hunter, 1 *East's Rep.* 20. Lamb *v.* Durant, 12 *Mass. Rep.* 54. In the case of Davis & Brooks *v.* The Brig Seneca, decided in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Pennsylvania, in May, 1829, on appeal from the District Court, the part owners were equally divided in opinion as to the employment of the vessel. One party, having equal interest, wished to employ her on his own terms, and by his own master, and the other party claimed the same right, and neither would recede. The District Court decided that it had no power to award a sale of the vessel. 1 *Gilpin*, 10. The Circuit Court reversed that decision, and decreed a sale. Judge Washington admitted that the English admiralty had no such jurisdiction, but he went upon broader ground, and held that the court had jurisdiction of all cases of a maritime nature, and was governed by the general maritime law of nations, and was not confined to that of England. He considered the 5th and 6th articles of the marine ordinance of Louis XIV., (liv. 2. tit. 8. *Des Propriétaires*,) and Valin's Commentary thereon, (tom. i. 585,) to be evidence of the marine law of nations, that the court could award a sale of the ship when the part owners were equally divided, as in that case. The articles in the ordinance were agreeable to the Roman law. See the report of the case in the *American Jurist*, for January, 1838, p. 486.

a case free from fraud, will have an indefeasible title to the whole ship. When a person is to be considered as a part owner, or as a partner, in a ship, depends upon circumstances. The former is the general relation between ship-owners, and the latter the exception, and requires to be specially shown.^a But as the law presumes, that the common possessors of a valuable chattel will and desire whatever is necessary to the preservation and profitable employment of the common property, part owners, on the spot, have an implied authority from the absent part owners, to order for the common concern whatever is necessary for the preservation and proper employment of the ship. They are analogous to partners, and liable as such for necessary repairs and stores ordered by one of themselves; and this is the principle and limit of the liability of part owners.^b

Whether part owners who render their companions liable for supplies furnished, or repairs made upon a ship, are to have their accounts taken, and the assets distributed, as if the ship was partnership property, or as if they had each a distinct separate interest in the vessel as tenants in common, depends, as we have already seen, upon the fact, whether the ship was held by them, in the particular case, as part owners or as partners. The law of Holland considered it to be prejudicial to trade, to carry the responsibility of part owners to the extent of the English law; and the rule there is, that each part owner shall be answerable in relation to the ship no further than

^a If part owners join in a particular adventure on which the ship is sent, they become partners in the adventure. *Holderness v. Shackels*, 8 *Barnw. & Cress.* 612. *Mumford v. Nicoll*, 20 *Johnson*, 611. *Supra*, p. 40.

^b *Holt on Shipping*, Int. p. 23, and vol. i. p. 367—369. *Wright v. Hunter*, 1 *East's Rep.* 20. *Scottin v. Stanley*, 1 *Dallas' Rep.* 129. The place where the repairs are made, becomes a material circumstance; for if the repairs are made at the port where the owners reside, they are usually considered to be made upon the credit of the owners, exclusively of the master. *Farrell v. McClea*, 1 *Dallas*, 393. *James v. Bixby*, 11 *Mass. Rep.* 34.

to the extent of his share.^a The English and
 *156 *Scotch law, as well as our own, render part owners, in all cases, responsible *in solido* as partners, for repairs and necessary expenses relating to the ship, and incurred on the authority of the master, or ship's husband.^b But where a ship has been duly abandoned to separate insurers, they are not responsible for each other as partners, but each one is answerable for the previous expenses of the ship, ratably to the extent of his interest as an insurer, and no further.^c By the French law, the majority in interest of the owners control the rest, and in that way one part owner may govern the management of the ship, in opposition to the wishes of fifty other part owners, whose interests united are not equal to his. This control relates to the equipment and employment of the ship, and the minority must contribute; but they cannot be compelled to contribute, against their will for the cargo laden on board, though they will be entitled to their portion of the freight. If the part owners be equally divided on the subject, the opinion in favour of employing the ship prevails as being most favourable to the interests of navigation. Many of the foreign jurists contend, that even the opinion of the minority ought to prevail, if it be in favour of employing the ship on some foreign voyage. Emerigon, Ricard, Straccha, Kuricke, and Cleirac, are of that opinion; but Valin has given a very

^a *Van Leeuwen's Com. on the Roman Dutch Law*, b. 4. ch. 2. sec. 9. *Vinius not. in Com. Peckii*, tit. *De Exerc.* 155. The latter says, it is neither agreeable to natural equity, nor public utility, that each part owner should be bound *in solido*, or beyond his share. In Louisiana, it is held that joint owners of a boat are not, merely from that circumstance, responsible *in solido*; though, if they be associated for the purpose of carrying goods for hire, they become responsible jointly and severally. *David v. Elói*, 4 *Miller's Louis. Rep.* 106.

^b *Bladney v. Ritchie*, 1 *Starkie's Rep.* 338. *Westerdell v. Dale*, 7 *Term Rep.* 306. *Bell's Com.* vol. i. 520. 524. *Chapman v. Durant*, 10 *Mass. Rep.* 47. *Schermerhorn v. Loines*, 7 *John's Rep.* 311. *Muldon v. Whitlock*, 1 *Cowen*, 290. *Thompson v. Finden*, 4 *Carr & Payne*, 158.

^c *The United Insurance Company v. Scott*, 1 *Johns. Rep.* 106.

elaborate consideration to the subject, and he opposes it on grounds that are solid, and he is sustained by the provisions of the old ordinance, and of the new code.^a Boulay Paty^b follows the opinion of Valin, and of the codes, and says, that the contrary doctrine would enable the minority to control the majority, contrary to the law of every association, and the plainest principles of justice. The majority *not only thus control the *157 destination and equipment of the ship, but even a sale of her by them will bind the right of privileged creditors after the performance of one voyage by the purchaser, but not the other part owners.^c

The ship's husband may either be one of the part owners, or a stranger, and he is sometimes merely an agent for conducting the necessary measures on the return of the ship to port ; but he may have a more general agency for conducting the affairs of the vessel in place of the owners, and his contracts, in the proper line of a ship's husband's duty, will bind the joint owners. His duty is, generally to see to the proper outfit of the vessel, as to equipment, provisions, and crew, and the regular documentary papers ; and though he has the powers incidental and necessary to the trust, it is held, that he has no authority to insure or borrow money for the owners, or bind them to the expenses of law suits.^d

^a *Ord. de la Marine*, liv. 2. tit. 8. art. 5. tit. *Des Propriétaires*, and Valin's *Code* *ibid* tom. i. 573—584. *Code de Commerce*, art. 220.

^b *Cours de Droit Commercial Maritime*, tom. i. 339—347. *M. Pardessus*, *Cours de Droit Com.* tom. iii. 48, speaks with less decision on the question.

^c *Boulay Paty*, *ub. sup.* 351. *Pardessus*, tom. ii. 27, is, however, of opinion, that they are equally concluded with the creditors by the sale, after one voyage. If the ship be seized for the debt of one of the part owners, and the claim of the others be put in before judgment, the right only of the part owner can be sold ; but if not until after judgment, the entire right to the ship is sold, and the other part owners reclaim their share of the proceeds. *Boulay Paty*, tom. i. 227, 228.

^d *French v. Backhouse*, 5 *Burr. Rep.* 2727. *Bell v. Humphries*, 2 *Stark.*

The rights of tenancy in common among part owners, apply to the cargo as well as to the ship, and they have not a community of interest, as partners, so as to enable one to dispose of the whole interest, and bind the rights of his co-tenants.^a

Rep. 345. *Campbell v. Stein*, 6 *Dow's Rep.* 134. *Bell's Com.* vol. i. 504. *Bell's Principles of the Law of Scotland*, sec. 449.

^a *Jackson v. Robinson*, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 138. The concluding part of *Coll-
yer on Partnership* has a valuable chapter on the law of part owners of ships,
in which the established law and doctrine of the cases on the subject are clearly
and skilfully condensed.

LECTURE XLVI.

OF THE PERSONS EMPLOYED IN THE NAVIGATION OF MERCHANT SHIPS.

(1.) *Of the authority and duty of the master.*

THE captain of a ship is an officer to whom great power, momentous interests, and enlarged discretion are necessarily confided, and the continental ordinances and jurists have, in a very special manner, required, that he should possess attainments suitable to the dignity and the vastness of his trust. He must be a person of experience and practical skill, as well as deeply initiated in the theory of the art of navigation. He is clothed with the power and discretion requisite to meet the unforeseen and distressing vicissitudes of the voyage; and he ought to possess moral and intellectual, as well as business qualifications, of the first order. His authority at sea is necessarily summary, and often absolute; and if he chooses to perform his duties, or to exert his power, in a harsh, intemperate, or oppressive manner, he can seldom be resisted by physical or moral force. He must have the talent to command in the midst of danger, and courage and presence of mind to meet and surmount extraordinary perils. He must be able to dissipate fear, to calm disturbed minds, and inspire confidence, in the breasts of all who are under his charge. In tempests, as well as in battle, the commander of a ship “must give

desperate commands ; he must require instantaneous obedience." He must watch for the preservation of the health and comfort of the crew, as well as for the safety of the ship and cargo. It is necessary that he should maintain perfect order, and preserve the most exact discipline, under the guidance of justice, moderation, and good sense. Charged frequently with the sale of the cargo, and the re-investment of the proceeds, he must be fitted to superadd the character of merchant to that of commander ; and he ought to have a general knowledge of the marine law, and of the rights of belligerents, and the duties of neutrals, so as not to expose to unnecessary hazard the persons and property under his protection.^a

^a The master of a vessel is liable for indecent and inhuman conduct towards a passenger ; and the owner of a vessel carrying passengers for hire, is liable for breaches of duty of the officer to the passengers, equally as he is in the case of merchandise committed to their care. *Keene v. Lizardi*, 5 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 431. *Cleirac*, in his *Jugemens d'Oleron*, ch. 1, says, that the title of master of a ship implies honour, experience, and morals ; *reverendum honorem sumit quisquis magistri nomen acceperit*. The French ordinances of 1584, 1681, and 1725, and the ordinances of the Hanse towns, of Bilboa, of Prussia, and Sweden, have all required the master to be previously examined and certified to be fit by his experience, capacity, and character. He was, formerly, when trade was constantly exposed to lawless rapacity, required to possess military, as well as ordinary nautical skill : *omnibus privilegiis militaribus gaudet*. *Roccus de Navibus et Naulo*, note 7. *Emerigon, Traité des Ass.* tom. i. 192. *Valin's Com.* liv. 2. tit. *Du Capitaine*, *passim*. *Jacobsen's Sea Laws*, by *Frick*, b. 2. ch. 1. *Boulay Paty, Cours de Droit Mar.* tom. i. 363. 376. 379. *Repertoire de Jurisprudence*, tit. *Capitaine de Vaisseau Marchand*.

The English writers go directly to the discussion of these subjects, which they handle dryly, and with mathematical precision ; while the foreign, and especially the French jurists, not only rival their neighbours in the accuracy of their minute details of judicial proceedings, and practical rules, but they occasionally relieve the exhausted attention of the reader, by the vivacity of their descriptions, and the energy and eloquence of their reflections. It must be admitted, however, that the decisions of Lord Stowell are remarkable for taste and elegance, and they are particularly distinguished for the justness and force with which they describe the transcendent powers, and define the delicate and imperative duties of the master. And the duties of the master, and particularly the necessity of kind, decorous, and just conduct, on the part of the captain, to the passengers and crew under his charge, and the firm purpose with which courts of justice punish, in the shape of damages, every gross violation of such duties, are

As the master is the confidential agent of the owners, he has an implied authority to bind them, without their knowledge, by contracts relative to the usual employment of the ship.^a This is a reasonable rule, and founded on just principles of commercial policy. It is to be traced to the Roman law, which gave to the master, on the voyage, in whatever matter concerned the ship, the powers of the *exercitor* or employer, and he could bind him by his acts as master; and all the foreign marine ordinances give this power, but with greater precision and more exact regulation.^b The master is appointed by the owner, and the appointment holds him forth to the public as a person worthy of trust and confidence, and the appointment may be revoked at discretion. The master is always personally bound by his contracts, and the person who deals with the captain in a matter relative to the usual employment of the ship, or for repairs or supplies furnished her, has a double remedy. He may sue the master on his own personal contract, and he may sue the owner on the contract made on his behalf, by his agent, the master. The latter may, however, exempt himself from personal responsibility, by expressly confining the

no where more forcibly stated, than, in *Chamberlain v. Chandler*, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 242, in our American admiralty.

^a *Boson v. Sandford*, *Carth. Rep.* 58. *Rich v. Coe*, *Cowp. Rep.* 636. *Ellis v. Turner*, 8 *Term Rep.* 531. *Reynolds v. Toppan*, 15 *Mass. Rep.* 370. *Webster v. Seekamp*, 4 *Barnw. & Ald.* 352.

^b By the civil law the master was the *propositus*, or agent of the owner or *exercitor*, and could bind his principal in all matters relating to the employment. The *exercitor* was bound for the acts of the master *ex contractu* and *ex delicto*. *Voet, Com. ad Pand.* 14. 1. 7. He was the employer, or person who received the earnings of the vessel. *Exercitorem autem eum dicimus ad quem obentiones et redditus omnes perveniunt. Dig.* 14. 1. 1. 15. *Ibid.* 14. 1. 1. 7. *Ibid.* 14. 1. 7. And when by the charter-party, the charterer takes the vessel into his own possession and control, and navigates her by his own master and crew, the liability of the general owner ceases, and he becomes owner *pro hac vice*, and he alone is responsible for the acts of the master *Thompson v. Snow*, 4 *Greenleaf*, 264. *Emery v. Hersey*, *ibid.* 407. *The Phebe*, *Ware's Rep.* 265. 268.

credit to the owner, and stipulating against his personal liability.^a If there was no special agreement in the case, the French law, both in the ordinance of 1681, and in the new code, gave to the owner the power to discharge the master in his discretion, and without being responsible in damages for the act. M. Delvincourt, and M. Pardessus, in their commentaries on the new code, condemn the existence of such a power, while M. Boulay Paty vindicates it, on the ground, that the appointment

of the master is an act of pure and voluntary confidence, and *the principal necessarily has that control over an agent, for whose acts he is accountable, and it is in the power of the master to provide for the case by a special contract for indemnity in case of dismissal.^b In the Scottish admiralty it is also held, that ship-owners may dismiss the master at any time, without cause assigned, and the majority may dismiss him in his character of master, even if he be a joint owner.^c The master is bound to conduct himself, in all respects, with good faith, diligence, and competent skill, and he is responsible to the owners, as their agent, for his conduct.^d His misconduct will subject him to the forfeiture of his wages, if it be gross in its circumstances, and attended with serious damage to the owner; and, in cases of a venial nature, the damages, which his unwar-

^a *Hoskins v. Slayton*, *Cases temp. Hard.* 360. Lord Mansfield, *Parmer v. Davies*, 1 *Term Rep.* 108. Lord Ellenborough, *Hussey v. Christie*, 9 *East's Rep.* 432.

^b *Ord. de la Mar. des Propriétaires*, art. 4. *Code de Commerce*, art. 218. M. Pardessus, tom. ii. 35. M. Delvincourt, *Inst. Droit Com.* tom. ii. 294. Boulay Paty, tom. i. 324—329. In the fourth edition of his *Cours de Droit Com.* tom. iii. No. 626, M. Pardessus seems to have withdrawn his objection to the owner's discretionary power to dismiss the master.

^c *Bell's Com.* vol. i. 506. 508.

^d The French law will not allow the master, in a foreign port, to pass a night from his ship, unless it be necessary in the business of his employers. *Pardessus*, tom. iii. 67.

rantable acts may have produced, will be a charge upon his wages.^a

The master may, by a charter-party, bind the ship and freight. This he may do in a foreign port in the usual course of the ship's employment; and this he may also do at home, if the owner's assent can be presumed. The ship and freight are, by the marine law, bound to the performance of the contract.^b As the admiralty has no jurisdiction in this case, unless according to the unsettled doctrine laid down in *De Lovio v. Boit*,^c and as the courts of common law cannot carry into effect the principle of the marine law, by which the ship itself, in specie, is considered as security to the charterer, it was *supposed by Mr. Abbott, that the owners may be *163 made responsible for the stipulations in a charter-party so made by the master, by a special action on the case, or by a suit in equity.^d

The master can bind the owners, not only in respect to the usual employment of the ship, but in respect to the means of employing her. His power relates to the carriage of the goods, and the supplies requisite for the ship, and he can bind the owner personally as to repairs and necessaries for the ship; and this was equally the rule

^a Willard v. Dorr, 3 *Mason*, 161. Freeman v. Walker, 6 *Greenleaf*, 68. The master of a steam-boat, employed in the transportation of passengers, like the master of a vessel engaged in the merchant service, can bind the owners in a contract for freight, to be carried according to the usual course of the boat, and he is answerable personally for the diligence of all persons, even for a pilot, appointed by the owners, and for injuries resulting from want of due care. Denison v. Seymour, 9 *Wendell*, 1. Porter v. Curry, 7 *Louis. Rep.* 233. Patton v. Magrath, 1 *Rice's S. C. Rep.* 162. In this respect, the master of a merchant vessel or steam-boat, differs from the commander of a ship of war in the public service. Nicholson v. Mounsey, 15 *East*, 383.

^b *Ord. de la Mar.* liv. 3. tit. 1. art. 11, and *Valin, ibid.* tom. i. 629. But the master cannot, merely in the character of master, bind the owners by a charter-party under seal, so as to subject them to an action of covenant. *Pickering v. Holt*, 6 *Greenleaf*, 160.

^c See vol. i. 367.

^d *Abbott on Shipping*, part 2. ch. 2. sec. 5.

in the Roman law. But the supplies must appear to be reasonable, or the money advanced for the purchase of them to have been wanting, and there must be nothing in the case to repel the ordinary presumption, that the master acted under the authority of the owners.^a If moneys be advanced to the master while abroad, it will be incumbent on the creditor, if he means to charge the owner, to show the apparent or presumed necessity of the repairs or supplies for which the money was advanced; and this strictness, requisite to the exercise of the master's authority, arises from the facility of misapplication, and the temptation to abuse, to which the power is incident. But if the money was fairly and regularly lent to supply the necessities of the ship, the misapplication of it by the master will not affect the lender's claim upon the owner. This is equally the language of the civil law, and of all the foreign civilians.^b The great case of *Cary v. White*, which underwent much discussion, established the principle of the personal responsibility of the owners, provided the creditor could show the actual existence of the necessity of those things which gave rise to his demand; and this same

*164 *doctrine is considered to be equally well established in the jurisprudence of this country.^c

^a *Dig.* 14. 1. 8. 10, 11. *Speerman v. De Grave*, 2 *Vern. Rep.* 643. *Sansom v. Braggenton*, 1 *Vesey's Rep.* 443. *Ross v. The Ship Active*, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 226. *Abbott on Shipping*, p. 102. edit. 1829. *Webster v. Seekamp*, 4 *Barnw. & Ald.* 352. *The Ship Fortitude, C. C. U. S. for Mass.* August, 1838. *The Law Reporter*, vol. i. No. 5.

^b *Dig.* 14. 1. 9. *Loccenius*, lib. 2. c. 6. n. 12. 2 *Emerig.* 440. *Boulay Paty, Cours de Droit Com.* tom. i. 119. *Roccus de Navibus*, not. 23, 24. See *Infra*, p. 171. n. d.

^c 1 *Bro. P. C.* 284. edit. 1784. *Abbott on Shipping*, part 2. ch. 3. sec. 6. *Rocher v. Busher*, 1 *Starkie*, 27. *Wainwright v. Crawford*, 4 *Dallas' Rep.* 225. *Milward v. Hallett*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 77. *James v. Bixby*, 11 *Mass. Rep.* 34. *The Jane*, 1 *Dods. Rep.* 461. *The Ship Fortitude, C. C. U. S. for Mass.* August, 1838. *The Law Reporter*, vol. i. No. 5. Good faith and an apparent necessity under the exercise of the judgement, at the time, are suffi-

Under the French ordinance of 1681, the master might hypothecate the ship and freight, and sell the cargo to raise moneys for the necessities of the ship in the course of the voyage, but he could not charge the owners personally. He could only bind their property under his charge; and the new code of commerce has followed the same regulation. It declares, that the owner is civilly responsible for the acts of the master, in whatever relates to the vessel and the voyage, but the responsibility ceases on the abandonment of the vessel and freight. The power of the master is limited to raise money for the necessities of the voyage, by borrowing on bottomry, or pledging, or selling goods to the amount of the sum wanted.^a The French civilians are zealous in the vindication of the equity and wisdom of their law, which, on abandonment of the ship and freight, discharges the owners as to the contracts, as well as to the defaults of the master. Emerigon has bestowed an elaborate discussion on the point; and this was equally the maritime law of the middle ages.^b The law on this subject is the same in Holland as in France,^c and the learned Grotius, in a work where we should hardly have expected to find such a municipal provision,^d condemns the rule in the Roman law making part owners personally bound, *in solido*, for these pecuniary contracts of the master, as very improperly introduced, and as being equally contrary to natural equity, and public utility.

*Sir William Scott, in the case of the *Gratitu-* *165

cient to justify the bottomry loan. This mitigated necessity was allowed by Mr. Justice Story, in the case last cited, after great research, to be sufficient.

^a *Ord. liv. 2. tit. 8. Des Propriétaires, art. 2. Code du Commerce, art. 216. 234.*

^b *Code, art. 216. Emerigon, Cont. a la Grosse, ch. 4. sec. 11. Boulay Paty, tom. i. 272—278.*

^c *Van Leeuwen's Com. on the Dutch Law, b. 4. ch. 2. sec. 9.*

^d *Grot. de Jure belli et pacis, b. 2. ch. 11. sec. 13.*

dine,^a doubts whether the master has authority, even in a case of consummate distress, and in a foreign port, to bind the owners beyond the value of the ship and freight. But he admits, in that case, after an admirable discussion of the principles and authorities in the marine law on the subject, that the master has power to hypothecate the cargo in a foreign port, in a case of severe necessity, for the repairs of the ship, and that the Court of Admiralty would enforce the lien. However, from the cases already referred to, it would seem to be settled in the English and American law, that the owner may be personally bound by the act of the master, in respect to the repairs and supplies necessary for the ship while abroad, and without other means to procure them; and if the owner be personally bound, it must be, as it was in the Roman law, to the extent of the requisite advances. Emerigon, while he admitted that the master might hypothecate the ship, and sell the cargo, to raise money to meet the necessities of the ship, denied that he could bind the owners personally by a bill of exchange drawn on them for the moneys raised. But Valin held otherwise, and Boulay Paty is of opinion, that the new code gives the captain a discretion on this point, and he concurs with Valin, and the ancient nautical legislation.^b

It has been a question of some doubt, and even contrariety of opinion in the books, whether the master had a lien on the ship or freight for his wages, supplies, or advances on account of the ship, either at home or abroad. But the question appears to be now clearly and definitely settled in England, that the master contracts upon the credit of the owners, and not of the ship, and he has no lien on the ship, freight, or cargo, for any debt of his own, as

^a 3 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 274.

^b 2 *Emerigon*, 458. *Valin's Com. tit. Du Capitaine*, art. 19. *Boulay Paty*, tom. ii. p. 73, 74.

for wages, or stores furnished, or repairs done at his expense, either at home or on *the voyage. *166 The principle was settled by Lord Mansfield, in the case of *Wilkins v. Carmichael*,^a against the master's claim to a lien on the ship for wages, or money expended for stores, or repairs done in England, and it was there shown to have been the previous law and usage. It was afterwards solemnly adjudged in *Hussey v. Christie*,^b that the master had no lien on the ship for money expended, or debts incurred, for repairs made to it on the voyage; and in *Smith v. Plumer*,^c it was decided, by equal authority, that the master had no lien on the freight for his wages or disbursements on account of the ship during the voyage, or for the premiums paid by him abroad for the purpose of procuring the cargo. The captain is distinguished from all other persons belonging to the ship, and he is considered as contracting personally with the owner, while the mate and mariners contract with the master on the credit of the ship. The rule has its foundation in policy, and the benefit of navigation, and it would be a great inconvenience, if, on the change of captain for misbehaviour, or any other reason, he would be entitled to keep possession of the ship until he was paid, or to enforce the lien while abroad, and compel a sacrifice of the ship. Sir William Scott, in the case of the *Favourite*,^d observed, that it had been repeatedly decided, that the master could not sue in the admiralty for his wages, because he stood on the security of his personal contract with his owner, not relating to the bottom of the ship. The language of the case of *Smith v. Plumer*, was equally

^a *Doug. Rep.* 101.

^b 9 *East's Rep.* 426.

^c 1 *Barnw. & Ald.* 575. See, also, to the same point, *Atkinson v. Cotesworth*, 5 *Dowl. & Ry.* 552.

^d 2 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 232.

that he had no lien on the cargo for money expended, or debts incurred by him, for repairs, or the necessary purposes of the voyage. He *can hypothecate and create a lien in favour of others, but he himself must stand on the personal credit of his owners.

The doctrine before us in the English law, remains yet to be definitely declared and settled in this country.

The case of the ship *Grand Turk*,^a is a decision in the Circuit Court of the United States for New-York, on the point, that the master's wages and perquisites were no lien on the ship; and it was so ruled, also, in *Fisher v. Willing*.^b In those cases, the English authorities were reviewed and cited by the court, and the principle advanced in them was not questioned, and seemed to be assumed as settled law. But, in the case of *Gardner v. The Ship New-Jersey*,^c it was rather loosely mentioned, that the master's claim for disbursements abroad was a lien on the ship; and more recently, in the Circuit Court of the United States for Massachusetts,^d the rule was laid down, that the master had a lien upon the freight for all his advances and responsibilities abroad upon account of the ship, and it seemed to be the strong inclination of the court to acknowledge the master's lien on the ship for the same object. The question, therefore, though considered to be settled in England, is still a vexed and
 *168 floating one in our own maritime law.^e *The

^a 1 *Paine's Rep.* 72.

^b 8 *Serg. & Rawle*, 118.

^c 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 227.

^d Ship Packet, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 255.

^e In the case of the Ship Packet, there is no reference to the decision in *Smith v. Plumer*, though that decision contained a critical review of all the authorities, and put at rest, in Westminster Hall, the very point as to the lien on freight, and in opposition to the rule laid down in the Ship Packet. In *Ingersoll v. Van Bokkelin*, (7 *Cowen*, 670. 5 *Wendell*, 314, S. C.) it was decided, after a review of the American authorities, that a master had a lien on the freight and cargo for his necessary advances made, and responsibilities incurred, for the use

civil law, and the law of those countries which have adopted its principles, give a lien upon the ship, without any express contract for such a claim, to the person who repairs, or fits out the ship, or advances money for that purpose, whether abroad or at home.^a

of a ship in a foreign port. The same principle had been previously assumed and declared by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in *Lane v. Penniman*, 4 *Mass. Rep.* 92. *Lewis v. Hancock & Winslow*, 11 *ibid.* 72. *Cowing v. Snow*, *ibid.* 415, and was also declared by the Supreme Court of New-Hampshire, in *Shaw v. Gookin*, 7 *New-Hampshire Rep.* 19. The general current and language of the American cases seem now to have settled the question, that the master has such a lien for his advances and responsibilities as against the owner, though there should be no question as to the owner's solvency and personal responsibility. The American cases have taken the most reasonable side of the question. In *Drinkwater v. Brig Spartan*, *Ware's Rep.* 149, it was adjudged, in the District Court in Maine, after a full and learned examination of the cases, that the master had a lien on the freight for his necessary disbursements for incidental expenses, and the liabilities which he contracts for these expenses during the voyage, and also for *his own wages*. But, by the case of *Ingersoll v. Van Bokkelen*, as settled in the Court of Errors of New York, the English law was recognised, that the master had no lien on the freight, nor on the vessel, for *his wages*. *Phillips v. Scattergood*, *Gilpin's Rep.* 1. *Steam-boat Orleans v. Phœbus*, 11 *Peters*, 175. But by the *general maritime law*, every contract of the master within the scope of his authority, as the contract of affreightment by charter-party, or bill of lading, binds the vessel, and gives the creditor a lien upon it for his security. The Paragon, *Ware's Rep.* 322.

^a *Dig.* 14. 1. 1. *Ibid.* 42. 5. 26. 34. 1 *Voet's Com.* 20. 2. 29. *Casaregis*, *Disc.* 18. 1 *Valin's Com.* 363. 367. The new French code, art. 191, gives the order of privileged debts which are liens upon the ship, and take preference to each other, and to all other debts, in the order in which they are placed. The first four items, which have preference, relate to costs of suit and port charges, as, (1.) Legal costs. (2.) Pilotage. (3.) Expenses of guarding the vessel. (4.) Storage. Then follow, (5.) The expenses of repairing the vessel at the last port. (6.) Wages of the master and crew in the last voyage. By the *Consolato*, and the ordinances of Oleron, and of 1681, the wages of sailors, for the last voyage, had the preference over all other claims. (7.) Moneys borrowed by the captain in the last voyage, for the necessary expenses of the ship, and the reimbursement of the price of the goods sold by him for the same object. If the captain made successive loans, or sales of cargo, from necessity, the last loan and sale, in point of time, is preferred, if made at a different port. (8.) Debts due to the vendor, material men, and shipwrights, if the ship has not made a voyage, and to those who furnish stores and necessary supplies before her departure, if she had already made a voyage. The *Consolato* and the ordinance of 1681, gave those creditors a preference to all others. The vendor loses his preference after the ship has sailed. (9.) Sums lent on bottomry for the reparation and equipment of the vessel before her departure.

The English law allows of such ^a a lien, from the necessity of the case, for repairs and necessities while the ship is abroad; but it has not adopted such a rule as to repairs made, and necessities furnished to the ship while at home,^a except it be in favour of the shipwright who has repaired her, and has not parted with the possession. In that case, he is entitled to retain possession until he is paid for his repairs. But if he has once parted with the possession of the ship, or has worked upon it without taking possession, he is not deemed a privileged creditor having a claim upon the ship itself.^b In this country, it was formerly, and rather loosely declared, in some of the admiralty courts of the United States, that the person who repaired, or furnished supplies for a ship, had a lien on the ship for his demand.^c But the doctrine was examined, and the rule declared, with great precision, by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the *General Smith*,^d and re-asserted in the case of the *St. Jago de Cuba*.^e The rule of the English common

(10.) Premiums of insurance on the ship for the last voyage. *Code de Commerce*, art. 191. *Pardessus, Droit Com.* tom. iii. n. 954. *Boulay Paty, Cours de Droit Com.* tom. i. 110—124. When the master is ready to sail, the ship is not liable to attachment, except for debts relative to the voyage about to be commenced. *Pardessus, Droit Com.* tom. iii. 32.

^a *Watkinson v. Barnardiston*, 2 *P. Wm.* 367. *Buxton v. Snee*, 1 *Vesey's Rep.* 154. *Ex parte Shank*, 1 *Atk.* 234. *Wilkins v. Carmichael*, *Doug.* 101. *Hussey v. Christie*, 13 *Vesey*, 594. *S. C.* 9 *East's Rep.* 426.

^b *Franklin v. Hosier*, 4 *Barnw. & Ald.* 341. *Ex parte Bland*, 2 *Rose*, 91. *Abbott on Shipping*, part 2. ch. 3. sec. 9—14, contains a history of the English cases on the point. The rule is settled in Scotland in perfect conformity to the English law. *Hamilton v. Wood*, and *Wood v. Creditors of Weir*, 1 *Bell's Commentaries*, 527, who says, that the deviation in England from that maritime rule which prevails with other nations, has proceeded rather from peculiar notions of jurisdiction than from any general principle of law or expediency, and that it has been established in Scotland by mere adoption.

^c *Stevens v. The Sandwich*, District Court for Maryland, 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 233. note. *Gardner v. The Ship New-Jersey*, *ibid.* 223.

^d 4 *Wheat. Rep.* 438.

^e 9 *Wheat. Rep.* 409. See, also, *Peyroux v. Howard*, 7 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 324. *S. P.*

law^a is explicitly adopted, that material men, and mechanics, furnishing repairs to a domestic ship, have no particular lien upon the ship itself, or its proceeds, in court, under a decree and sale, for the recovery of their demands, with the exception of the shipwright who has possession of the ship. The distinction is, that if repairs have been made, or *necessaries furnish- *170 ed, to a foreign ship, or to a ship in the port of a state to which she does not belong, the general marine law, following the civil law, gives the party a lien on the ship itself for his security, and he may maintain a suit *in rem*, in the admiralty, to enforce his right.^b But in respect to repairs and necessaries in the port or state to which the ship belongs, the case is governed by the municipal law of that state, and no lien is implied, unless it has been recognised by that law.^c If a material man

^a Buxton *v.* Snee, 1 Vesey, 154. *Knapp's Reports of Cases before the Privy Council on Appeals*, vol. iii. 95.

^b The Ship Fortitude, *C. C. U. S. for Mass.* August, 1838. The *Law Reporter*, vol. i. No. 5. It has been suggested in some of the cases, that any place where the vessel and the owner are not together, is to be deemed a foreign port, in respect to the power of the master, in a proper case, to subject the vessel to a lien. 5 *Conn. Rep.* 631. 6 *Dana's Ken. Rep.* 27, 28.

^c The General Smith, 4 *Wheaton*, 438. Story, J., in the case of the *Brig Nestor*, 1 *Sumner*, 74. 79. See, also, *supra*, vol. i. 379, 380. State laws frequently make provision for the security of material men. Thus, in Illinois, boats and vessels of all descriptions, built, or repaired, or equipped in that state, are liable to be attached for debts contracted by the owner, master, supercargo, or assignee, for work and supplies by mechanics, tradesmen, &c. *Revised Laws of Illinois*, edit. 1833, p. 95. A similar law exists in Indiana, *Revised Statutes of Indiana*, 1838, p. 120; and in Pennsylvania, *Purdon's Dig.* 79; and in Missouri, by statute, in 1838. The Supreme Court of the United States has, in the cases above cited, assumed, that the port of another state was not, as respects this rule, a home port. The Court of Sessions, in Scotland, has also held, that Hull, in England, was, in respect to Scotch owners, a foreign port. *Stewart v. Hall*, 1 *Bell's Com.* 525. note. But that decision was reversed in the House of Lords, as being a point unnecessary; and the question is still open, as to what shall be deemed a home port in respect to repairs. Mr. Bell suggests, that the natural course would be, to adopt the rule of the navigation laws, and to hold all British ports as home ports, because access to the custom-house title and communication with the owners are so easy, and may be so prompt. See *supra*, p. 94.

gives personal credit, even in the case of materials furnished to a foreign ship, he loses his lien so far as to exclude him from a suit *in rem*, yet he will be entitled, upon petition, to be paid out of the remnants and surplus remaining in the registry.^a This rule is subject to the qualification that an express contract for a stipulated sum is not of itself a waiver of the lien, unless the contract contains some stipulations inconsistent with the continuance of the lien.^b In New-York, by statute,^c shipwrights, material men, and suppliers of ships,
 *171 *have a lien for the amount of their debts, whether the ship be owned within the state or not; but the lien ceases after due security is given, or when the vessel leaves the state.

It is very clearly settled, that the master, when abroad, and in the absence of the owner, may hypothecate the

^a *Zane v. The Brig President*, 4 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 453.

^b *Peyroux v. Howard*, 7 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 324. In the case of the Brig Nestor, 1 *Sumner*, 73, it was held, that giving credit for a fixed time for supplies, did not extinguish the lien for the supplies. A lien may exist for a debt *solvendum in futuro*, and many instances of the kind were stated in the case. Nor does the fact that the master and owner are personally liable for the supplies, destroy the lien.

^c By the *New-York Revised Statutes*, debts contracted within the state, by the master, owner, agent, or consignee of every vessel, are a lien when contracted for work done or materials furnished for building, repairing, fitting, or equipping the vessel, or for provisions and stores furnished, or for wharfage and expenses of keeping the vessel in port. The lien is preferred to any other lien except mariner's wages, and it ceases after twelve days from the departure of the vessel from the port at which she was when the debt was contracted, to some other port in the state, and immediately on the vessel leaving the state. Every such vessel, unless she be under seizure, at the time, by virtue of process from an admiralty court of the United States, or had been sold by order of such court, and the debt contracted prior to such sale, may be attached and sold to satisfy the claim, together with all other claims of the like kind duly exhibited and verified. The proceedings under the process of attachment, the sale of the vessel, and distribution of the proceeds, are specially detailed and prescribed. *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 493—500. In several of the other states the lien is equally extended by statute, to repairs made in a home port. In Louisiana, the workmen who repair vessels have a lien on them, though there be no contract in writing; but the privilege is lost if they suffer the vessel to depart. *Civil Code*, art. 2748.

ship, freight, and cargo, to raise money requisite for the completion of the voyage.^a This authority is, however, limited to objects connected with the voyage, and it must appear, in this case, as well as when he binds the owner personally, that the advances were made for repairs, or supplies necessary for the voyage, or the safety of the ship, and that the repairs and supplies could not be procured upon reasonable terms, or with funds within the master's control, or upon the credit of the owner, independent of the hypothecation. The master's right exists only in cases of necessity, and when he cannot otherwise procure the money, and has no funds of the owner, or of his own, which he can command, and apply to the purpose.^b He is to act with a reasonable discretion, and is not absolutely bound to apply the money of others in hand, except it belong to the owner, in preference to a resort to bottomry; and it has been suggested, by very high authority, that there may be special cases in which the master may raise money by hypothecation, even

^a Lord Mansfield, in *Wilkins v. Carmichael*, 3 *Doug.* 101. The *Gratitudine*, 3 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 240. Sir Joseph Jekyl, in *Watkinson v. Barnardiston*, 2 *P. Wm.* 367. The case of the *Ship Fortitude*, in the *C. C. U. S. for Mass.* decided in August, 1838, contains a learned confirmation of the doctrine of the maritime law, that the master of a ship, has authority in a foreign port, to procure supplies and repairs necessary for the safety of the ship and performance of the voyage. The necessities, though not such as are absolutely indispensable, must be reasonably fit and proper, and if the master has not suitable funds, or cannot obtain money on the personal credit of the owner, he may raise it on bottomry. The lender is bound to exercise a reasonable diligence to ascertain that the supplies and repairs were necessary, or apparently so, and it is sufficient if he acts with good faith, and so will the master, if he acts with reasonable diligence, discretion, and skill. A regular survey is *prima facie* evidence of the necessity of the repairs, so as to justify the master and the lender. The presumption is in favour of the master and the lender, and the *onus probandi* to the contrary, lies on the owner who resists the bottomry bond. The *Law Reporter*, vol. i. No. 5. Boston, 1838. In that case all the foreign civilians are examined in relation to the degree of necessity that will justify the hypothecation.

^b The *Aurora*, 1 *Wheaton's Rep.* 102. The *Ship Fortitude*, *supra*. The necessity that will justify the resort to a bottomry bond, is more pressing and commanding, than the necessity which will justify the master in resort to an ordinary contract for repairs.

though he has his own money on board. But if he should raise money by bottomry in such a case, the admiralty will marshal the assets in favour of the shippers of the cargo, so as to bring their property last into contribution.^a The power of the master to charge the owners relative to the repairs and freight of the ship, does not exist when the owners are present, or when at their residence.^b

*172 *But if only a minority of the owners are present, or reside at the place, then the captain's power remains good.^c It is incumbent upon the creditor who claims an hypothecation, to prove the actual existence of the necessity, or of an apparent necessity, of those things which gave rise to his demand, after he has used reasonable diligence, and acted with good faith in his inquiries, though he need not see to the actual and *bona*

^a The Ship Packet, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 255. The lien of the master for repairs made by his means at a foreign port, may exist without any express hypothecation. *Ibid.* American Insurance Company v. Carter, 3 *Paige*, 323. It is clearly the rule of the maritime law, supported by the foreign authorities, that the owner of the cargo, sold by the master for the necessities of the ship, has an implied lien upon the ship for his indemnity, though there be no express hypothecation.

^b *Code de Commerce*, art. 232. *Ord. de la Marine*, liv. 2. tit. 1. Patton & Dickson v. The Randolph, *Gilpin's Rep.* 456. In the case of the Ship Lavinia v. Barclay, 1 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 49, it was held, that the captain could not raise money by hypothecation, when one of the owners resided at the port. But in a home port, the master may bind the owner for necessary and ordinary repairs, and equipments, under a presumed authority. Webster v. Seekamp, 4 *Barnw. & Ald.* 352. This is likewise the rule in the Scotch law. 1 *Bell's Com.* 524. It is held that a port in a state in which the owner does not reside, is not a *home port* in the maritime law, as applicable to the United States; and the master of a vessel may in such port hypothecate the vessel by a bottomry bond for necessary repairs, if the owner has no agent there, though he reside in another state. Selden v. Hendrickson, 1 *Brockenbough*, 396. Perhaps, however, the distinction between *foreign and home ports*, in relation to the master's power in these cases, ought to rest, not in relation to the government of the country, but to the proximity or remoteness, the facility or difficulty of communication between the place where the master acts, and the place where the owner resides. This was the doctrine declared, in the case of Hooper v. Whitney, in the Commercial Court at New-Orleans, 1839, and it is reasonable and just, and the other rule would be very unreasonable in many cases, as for instance, between the city of New-York and Jersey City.

^c *Boulaj Paty*, 271.

fide application of the money.^a The loan must not exceed the necessity, and it must be made in a place, and under circumstances, to afford relief.^b This power of the master to borrow money on bottomry, and hypothecate the ship for the re-payment, may exist as well at the port of destination, as at any other foreign port, when the necessity for the exercise of the right becomes manifest.^c A doubt has been raised, whether an hypothecation would be valid when made to the consignee of the owner. The power in that instance would be very liable to abuse and collusion, and the averment of the necessity and integrity of the transaction ought to undergo a severer scrutiny.^d

*The master, in the course of the voyage, and *173 when it becomes necessary, may also sell part of the cargo, to enable him to carry on the residue; and he may hypothecate the whole of it, as well as the ship and freight, for the attainment of the same object. The law does not fix any aliquot part or amount of cargo which the master may sell; nor could any restraint of that kind be safely imposed. The power must generally speaking, be adequate to the occasion. The authority of the master must necessarily increase in pro-

^a The Ship Fortitude, *C. C. U. S. for Mass.* August, 1838.

^b *Rucher v. Conyngham*, 2 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 295. *Cupisino v. Perez*, 2 *Dall. Rep.* 194. *The Aurora*, 1 *Wheat. Rep.* 96. *Rocher v. Busher*, 1 *Stark. Rep.* 27. *Roccus, De Navibus*, not. 23.

^c *Reade v. Commercial Insurance Company*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 352.

^d See *Rucher v. Conyngham*, 2 *Peters' Rep.* 307, to that point. The power given to the master to raise money while abroad, for the necessities of the ship, is the most dangerous form in which his authority can be exerted, and all the foreign authorities have recommended and enforced the same precautions, and which have been universally adopted. (*Casaregis, Disc.* 71. *Roccus, De Navibus*, n. 23. *Vinnius ad Peck.*) In *Boyle v. Adam*, in the Scotch Admiralty, in 1801, the rule that the lender, on an hypothecation bond, was not bound to see to the application of the money, was qualified in a case where the expenditure was enormous, and the master a weak man. *Bell's Com.* vol. i. 529. note.

portion to the difficulties which he has to encounter. There is this limitation only to the exercise of the power, that it cannot extend to the entire cargo; for it cannot be presumed to be for the interest of the shipper, that the whole should be sold, to enable the ship to proceed empty to her port of destination. The hypothecation of the whole may, however, be for the benefit of the whole, because it may enable the whole to be conveyed to the proper market.^a This power of the master to pledge or sell the cargo, is only to be exercised at an intermediate port, for the prosecution of the voyage; and if he unduly breaks up the voyage, he cannot sell any part of the cargo for repairs for a new voyage, and the power is entirely gone.^b But if the voyage be broken up in the course of it by ungovernable circumstances, the master, in that case, may even sell the ship or cargo, provided it be done in good faith, for the good of all concerned, and in a case of supreme necessity, which sweeps
 *174 all ordinary rules before it.^c The *merely acting

^a The *Gratitudine*, 3 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 240. 263. The United Insurance Company *v.* Scott, 1 *Johns. Rep.* 115. *Freeman v. The East India Company*, 5 *Barnw. & Ald.* 617.

^b *Watt v. Potter*, 2 *Mason's Rep.* 77.

^c *Hayman v. Molton*, 5 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 65. *Mills v. Fletcher*, *Doug. Rep.* 219. *Idle v. The Royal Exchange Insurance Company*, 8 *Taunt. Rep.* 755. *Freeman v. The East India Company*, 5 *Barnw. & Ald.* 617. *Cannon v. Meaburn*, 1 *Bingham's Rep.* 243. *Robertson v. Clarke*, *ibid.* 445. *Fanny and Elmira*, *Edw. Adm. Rep.* 117. *Read v. Bonham*, 3 *Bro. & Bing.* 147. *Scull v. Briddle*, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 150. The Schooner *Tilton*, 5 *Mason*, 476, 477. In the case of the American Insurance Company *v. Center*, 4 *Wendell*, 45, it was held, that in this country, the master's right to sell was more extensive than in England; for here, if there existed a *technical total loss*, and the master has reason to believe the owner would elect to abandon, he might sell the ship. The English rule is more strict, and it is the duty of the master to repair the vessel, unless there be an *actual total loss*, or he has no means of repairing, and cannot procure any by the hypothecation of the ship or cargo. In the cases of *Gordon v. the Mass. F. & M. Ins. Co.* 2 *Pick.* 249, and of *Hall v. The Franklin Insurance Company*, 9 *Pick.* 466, the stricter doctrine of the English law was asserted and maintained. The master's authority to sell the vessel was confined to cases of extreme necessity, and where he acts with the most perfect good faith for the interest of the owner, and when he has no opportunity to consult the

in good faith, and for the interest of all concerned, is not sufficient to exempt the sale of goods from the character of a tortious conversion, for which the ship owner and the purchaser are responsible, if the absolute necessity for the sale be not clearly made out. Nor will the sanction of a vice-admiralty court aid the sale when the requisite necessity was wanting.^a All the cases are decided and peremptory, and upon the soundest principles, in the call for that necessity. The master is employed only to navigate the ship; and the sale of it is manifestly beyond his commission, and becomes the unauthorized act of a servant, disposing of property which he was intrusted only to carry and convey.

The *master in such a case acts, *virtute officii*, as *175 master. His agency arises by operation of law, from the necessity of the case, to prevent a total loss of the property, and the law treats him, as one capable of selling in his own name, but for the benefit of the owner. He can give a sufficient title in his own name, as being by operation of law, substituted owner, *pro hac vice*. This was the view of the subject taken in the case of the *Schooner Tilton*,^b and the doctrine appears to rest on clear and solid principles of law and policy.

owner or insurer, and the necessity leaves him no alternative. This strict rule is the one best supported by reason and authority. See, also, to the same point, the case of the Brig Sarah Ann, 2 Sumner, 206, where it was held, that in a case of urgent necessity, the master had a right to sell the vessel, as well on a home as on a foreign shore, and whether the owner's residence be near or at a distance. Also, the case of the New-England Insurance Company v. The Sarah Ann, 13 Peters, 387, where the power of the master to sell, in a case of extreme necessity, and acting in good faith, is fully sustained.

^a Van Omeron v. Dowick, 2 Campb. N. P. Rep. 42. Morris v. Robinson, 3 Barnw. & Cress. 196. The French code allows the master to sell the ship in the single case of innavigability, but by the ancient ordinances the prohibition was entire and absolute. The innavigability of the ship ought, however, to be first ascertained and declared by the local magistrate of the place; or, if in a foreign country, by the French Consul. *Code de Commerce*, art. 237. *Ord. de la Marine*, tit. *Du Capitaine*, art. 19. 1 Valin's Com. 444. *Pardessus*, *Droit Com.* tom. iii. 26. *Boulay Paty*, tom. ii. 85.

^b 5 Mason, 481.

When part of the cargo is sold by the master at an intermediate port, to raise money for the necessities of the voyage, the general rule has been, to value the goods at the clear price they would have fetched at the port of destination. But, in *Richardson v. Nourse*,^a the price which the goods actually sold for at the port of necessity was adopted, and the court did not think that such a criterion of value was clearly erroneous in point of law; and with respect to these contracts of hypothecation for necessities, made by the master in a foreign port, it is the universal understanding and rule, that they are to be made in the absence of the owner, and not at his place of residence, where he may exercise his own judgment. If the liens be created at different periods of the voyage, and the value of the ship be insufficient to discharge them all, the last loan is entitled to priority in payment, as being the means of saving the ship. The contract does not transfer the property of the ship, but it gives the creditor a privilege or claim upon it, which may be enforced with all the expedition and efficacy of the admiralty process.^b

It is the duty of the master engaged in a foreign trade, to put his ship under the charge of a pilot, both on his outward and homeward voyage,
 *176 when *he is within the usual limits of the pilot's employment.^c The pilot, while on board,

^a 3 *Barnw. & Ald.* 237.

^b *Abbott on Shipping*, part 2. ch. 3. sec. 20. 22. Chase, J., *Blaine v. The Ship Charles Carter*, 4 *Cranch's Rep.* 328.

^c *Law v. Hollingworth*, 7 *Term Rep.* 160. *The William*, 6 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 316. But if the master, at a foreign port, attempts to get a pilot and fails, and then, in the exercise of his best discretion, endeavours to navigate himself into port, and grounds, the underwriter is not discharged, but remains liable for the injury. *Phillips v. Headlam*, 2 *Barnw. & Adolph.* 380. If he attempts to enter a port without a pilot, and without endeavours to procure one, and a loss happens, the underwriters would not be responsible. It would be the fault of the master, and the owners would be liable. But if the loss happens at a point beyond which the pilot's service was necessary, it would be otherwise. M'Mil-

has the exclusive control of the ship. He is considered as master *pro hac vice*, and if any loss or injury be sustained in the navigation of the vessel while under

lan v. U. Ins. Co. 1 *Rice's S. C. Rep.* 248. In the case of Bolton and others, v. American Insurance Company, tried before Ch. J. Jones, in the Superior Court of New-York, in November, 1835, it was held, that in every well appointed port, where pilots were to be had, a vessel arriving upon pilot ground, was bound to take a pilot, and the ground was to be approached carefully; and if in the night, the master was to hold out a light for a pilot, and to wait a reasonable time for one, and to approach one if he can do it with safety. If he attempted to enter the port without a pilot, or steered negligently or rashly in approaching the ground where it was unsafe to navigate without a pilot, and damages ensued, the underwriters would not be responsible for them. The duty of the master is the more imperative on the approach to New-York, which is of dangerous access, as the channel is only a mile and a half wide between the bars, and the coast is lined with shifting sand bars. In cases of great danger, as in the case of a storm, if the captain cannot wait with safety for a pilot, he must come in without one. The system of pilotage in New-York is excellent. Branch pilots are appointed by the Governor and Senate, and have to perform an apprenticeship of five years before they can become deputy pilots; and three years must elapse before they can become branch or licensed pilots. They undergo examination before the wardens of the port, and give security. See *Laws of New-York*, February 19, 1819, ch. 18, and particularly sec. 7 and 12. April 12, 1822, ch. 196. April 16, 1830, ch. 207. March 30, 1831, ch. 93. In 1837, the statute laws of New-York relative to pilots were re-digested and essentially amended, and all former statutes repealed. A board of five commissioners was established for licensing, regulating, and governing pilots and deputy pilots, and they were clothed with large powers. Applicants for license were to be examined before the commissioners as to their fitness, skill, and character, and they were to enter into recognizances with sureties for the faithful execution of their trust. *Laws of New-York*, 1837, ch. 184. Further regulations were made, and the mode and rate of compensation for pilotage established, by the act of New-York, of April 12th, 1838, ch. 197. In England, the statute of 6 George IV. c. 125, consolidated all the prior English laws, with respect to the licensing and employment of pilots; and an abridged view of its provisions is given in *M'Culloch's Com. Dict.* tit. *Pilots*. In Massachusetts, the law of pilotage is as well and carefully digested as any where else. The Governor and Council appoint the pilots, except for the harbour of Boston, and there they are commissioned by the Commissioners of Pilots. Every branch pilot may nominate his deputy pilots for the approbation of the Governor, and they all give bond, with sureties, for their faithfulness. *Revised Statutes of Massachusetts*, part 1. tit. 12. ch. 32. The pilot regulations in the other great commercial states, are doubtless of the same efficient character, and the general commercial law on the subject applies equally to all the states; though Congress may establish a system of pilotage in ports and harbours within the United States, and give the District Courts jurisdiction of the same, yet they have not done it. In Georgia, pilots are licensed by a permanent Board of Commissioners, and they are required to give bonds, with

the charge of the pilot, he is answerable, as strictly as if he were a common carrier, for his default, negligence, or unskilfulness; and the owner would also be responsible to the party injured for the act of the pilot, as being the act of his agent.^a Though some doubt had been raised by the *dictum* of Ch. J. Mansfield, in *Bowcher v. Nordstrom*,^b yet the weight of authority, and the better reason is, that the master, in such a case, would not be responsible as master, though on board, provided the crew acted in regular obedience to the pilot.^c

sureties, for the due execution of their duty, and to take a special oath in relation to the same, and the commissioners are to settle all disputes between pilots and masters of vessels, and with power to revoke licenses for incompetency, negligence, or misbehaviour. *Prince's Dig.* 1837, p. 759. The only Congressional provision on the subject, is contained in the act of Congress of August 7, 1789, ch. 9. sec. 4, which still remains in force, and in which it is declared, that "All pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbours, and ports of the United States, shall continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the states respectively, wherein such pilots may be, or with such laws as the states may respectively thereafter enact for the purpose, until further legislative provision shall be made by Congress." The cognizance, therefore, of the cases under state laws, as to pilotage, belongs, at present, to state courts. Marshall, Ch. J., in *Gibbons v. Ogden*, 9 *Wheat.* 207. The Schooner *Wave v. Hyer*, on appeal to the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Southern District of New-York, 2 *Payne's Rep.* Low v. Commissioners of Pilotage, *R. M. Charlton's Geo. Rep.* 214. But in the case of *Hobart v. Drogan*, 10 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 108, it was held, that suits for pilotage on the high seas and on tide waters were within the admiralty jurisdiction, and the state courts had only *concurrent* jurisdiction with the district courts in suits for pilotage. The act of Congress of 2d March, 1837, ch. 22, declared, that it should be lawful for the master or commander of any vessel, coming into or going out of any port situate upon the waters which are the boundary between two states, to employ any pilot duly licensed or authorized by the laws of either state bounded upon said waters. Concurrently in point of time with this act of Congress, the statute of New-Jersey was passed for establishing and regulating pilots for the ports of that state, within Sandy Hook. *Elmer's Dig.* 400.

^a *Bussy v. Donaldson*, 4 *Dallas's Rep.* 206. *Huggett v. Montgomery*, 5 *Bos. & Pull.* 446. *Yates v. Brown*, 8 *Pick.* 23. *Pilot-boat Washington v. Ship Saluda*, *U. S. District Court, S. C.*, April, 1831. *Williamson v. Price*, 16 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 399.

^b 1 *Taunt. Rep.* 568.

^c In the case of the *Portsmouth*, 6 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 317. *Snell v. Rich*, 1 *Johns. Rep.* 305. By the statute of 6 George IV. c. 125. sec. 53, owners and masters of ships are exempted from liability, for any damage arising from the

(2.) *Of the rights and duties of seamen.*

We come next to treat of the laws applicable to seamen; and it will appear, for obvious reasons, that in the codes of all commercial nations they are objects of great solicitude and of paternal care. They are usually a heedless, ignorant, audacious, but most useful class of men, exposed to constant hardships, perils, and oppression. From the nature of their employment, and their "home on the deep," they are necessarily excluded, in a great degree, from the benefits of civilization, and the comforts and charities of domestic life. Upon their native element they are habitually buffeted by winds and waves, and wrestling with tempests; and in time of war they *are exposed to the still fiercer ele- *177
ments of the human passions. In port they are the ready and the dreadful victims of temptation, fraud, and vice.^a It becomes, therefore, a very interesting topic of inquiry, to see what protection the laws have thrown around such a houseless and helpless race of beings, and what special provisions have been made for their security and indemnity.

The seamen employed in the merchant service, are made subject to special regulations, prescribed by acts of Congress. Shipping articles are contracts in writing, or in print, declaring the voyage and the term of time for which the seamen are shipped, and the rate of wages,

want of a licensed pilot, unless the want arose from a refusal to take one on board; or from wilful neglect, in not using all due means to take one on board who may offer. He is equally exempted from responsibility for the incapacity or defaults of the pilot.

^a The recklessness with which sailors dissipate their wages, and the facility with which they are cheated out of them, are proverbial; and those persons who have the superintendence of marine hospitals well know, how severely and extensively sailors are afflicted, beyond all other classes of men, by those odious diseases which so terribly chastise licentious desire. Such a scourge is far worse to them than the storms and the monsters of the ocean; than either the *præcipitem Africæ decertantem aquilonibus*, the *rabie* *noti*, the *monstra natantia*, or the *infames scopulos, acroceraunia*.

and when they are to render themselves on board ; and the articles are to be signed by every seaman or mariner, on all voyages from the United States to a foreign port, and, in certain cases, to a port in another state, other than an adjoining one.^a If there be no such contract, the master is bound to pay to every seaman who performs the voyage the highest wages given at the port for a similar voyage, within the three next preceding months, besides forfeiting for every seaman a penalty of twenty dollars. The seamen are made subject to forfeitures if they do not render themselves on board according to the contract, or if they desert the service ; and they are liable to summary imprisonment for desertion, and to be detained until the ship be ready to sail. If the mate and a majority of the crew, after the voyage is begun, but before the vessel has left the land, deem the vessel
*178 unsafe, or not duly provided, and *shall require an examination of the ship, the master must proceed to, or stop at, the nearest or most convenient port, where an inquiry is to be made, and the master and crew must conform to the judgment of the experienced persons, selected by the district judge or a justice of the peace. If the complaint shall appear to have been without foundation, the expenses and reasonable damages, to be ascertained by the judge or justice, are to be deducted from the wages of the seamen. But if the vessel be found or made seaworthy, and the seamen shall refuse to proceed on the voyage, they are subjected to imprisonment until

^a A *foreign* voyage, in the language of trade and commerce, means a voyage to some port or place within the territory of a foreign nation. The *terminus* of the voyage settles the description. In this view, neither fishing or whaling voyages are strictly foreign voyages. This is the sense in which foreign voyages are understood in the Duties Collection Act of 1799, ch. 128, and in the Acts of 1790, ch. 56, and of 1813, ch. 2, relative to shipping articles, and the above Act of 1799 still constitutes the leading statute to regulate our commercial intercourse with foreign nations. *Taber v. United States, C. C. U. S. for Mass.* October, 1839.

they pay double the advance made to them on the shipping contract.^a Fishermen engaged in the fisheries are liable to the like penalties for desertion; and the fishing contract must be in writing, signed by the shipper and the fishermen, and countersigned by the owner.^b The articles do not determine exclusively who are the owners, and the seamen may prove, by other documents, the real and responsible owners. The object of the articles is, to place the crew of a fishing vessel upon a footing with seamen in the merchant service, and to make them liable to the same restrictions, and entitled to the same remedies.^c Provision is made for the prompt recovery of seamen's wages, of which one-third is due at every port at which the vessel shall unlade and deliver her cargo, before the voyage be ended; and at the end of the voyage, the seamen may proceed in the District Court, by admiralty process, against the ship, if the wages be not paid within ten days after they are discharged.^d The seamen having like cause of complaint, may all join in one suit, and they may proceed against the vessel within the ten days, if she be about to proceed to sea: but this remedy, *in rem*, does not deprive the seamen of their remedy at common law for the *recovery of *179 their wages.^e The statutes further provide for

^a *Act of Congress*, July 20th, 1790, ch. 29. sec. 1, 2, 3. 5. 7. In the state of Missouri there are statute provisions for the regulation of *boatmen* on the navigable waters of that state, their contracts, their duties, their protection, and the remedies against them, as in the analogous cases of seamen on the high seas. *Revised Statutes of Missouri*, 1835, p. 99.

^b *Act of Congress*, June 19th, 1813, ch. 2. sec. 1, 2.

^c *Wait v. Gibbs*, 4 *Pick.* 298.

^d The voyage is ended when the vessel has arrived at her last port of destination, and is safely moored at the wharf. But the seamen may, by the terms of the contract, or the usage of the port, be bound to remain by the vessel after the voyage is ended, and assist in discharging the cargo, and their wages will be continued until that takes place. *The Mary, Ware's Rep.* 454.

^e *Act of Congress*, July 20th, 1790, ch. 29. sec. 6. The statute of 59 Geo. III. ch. 58, provided, also, an expeditious remedy for the recovery of seamen's

the safety and comfort of the seamen, by requiring that every ship belonging to a citizen of the United States, of the burthen of one hundred and fifty tons, or upwards, navigated by ten or more persons, and bound to a foreign port; or of the burthen of seventy tons, or upwards, and navigated with six or more persons, and bound from the United States to any port in the West Indies, shall be provided with a medicine chest, properly supplied with fresh and sound medicines; and if bound on a voyage across the Atlantic ocean, with requisite stores of water, and salted meat, and wholesome ship-bread, well secured under deck.^a

It is further provided by statute, for the just and benevolent purpose of affording certain and permanent relief to sick and disabled seamen, that a fund be raised out of their wages, earned on board of any vessel of the United States, and be paid by the master to the collector of the port, on entry from a foreign port, at the rate of twenty cents per month for every seaman. The like assessment is to be made and paid on the new enrolment or license for carrying on the coasting trade, and also by persons navigating boats and rafts on the Mississippi. The moneys so raised are to be expended for the temporary relief and maintenance of sick and disabled seamen, in hospitals or other proper institutions established for such purposes; and the surplus moneys, when sufficiently accumulated,

wages, by allowing them to apply to the summary jurisdiction of a justice of the peace, when the wages do not exceed £20.

^a *Act of Congress*, July 20th, 1790, sec. 8, 9, and *Ibid.* March 2d, 1805, ch. 88. The Act of Congress of July 20th, 1790, sec. 9, gives to the seamen double wages for every day that they are put on short allowance, and the vessel has not the quantity and quality of provisions required. The British statute of 43 Geo. III. ch. 56, has another very humane provision for the health and security of the passengers and crew. It provided, that no British ship should clear out from a British port with a greater number of persons on board, including children and the crew, than in the proportion of one person for every two tons of the burthen of the ship, as appearing in the certificate of registry, or of that part of the ship unladen. A penalty of £50 is forfeited for each extra person.

shall be applied to the erection of marine hospitals, for the accommodation of sick and disabled seamen. These hospitals, as far as it can be done with convenience, are to receive sick foreign seamen on a charge of seventy-five cents *per day, to be paid by the *180 master of the foreign vessel.^a And to relieve American seamen who may be found destitute in foreign places, and as evidence of the constant and paternal solicitude of the United States for the preservation and protection of their seamen abroad, it is made the duty of the American consuls and commercial agents, to provide for those who may be found destitute within their consular districts, and for their passages to some port in the United States, in a reasonable manner, at the expense of the United States; and American vessels are bound to take such seamen on board, at the request of the consul, but not exceeding two men to every hundred tons burthen of the ship, and transport them to the United States, on such terms, not exceeding ten dollars for each person, as may be agreed on. So, if an American vessel be sold in a foreign port, and her company discharged, or a seaman be discharged with his consent, the master must pay to the consul or commercial agent at the place, three months pay, over and above the wages then due, for every such seaman, two-thirds of which is to be paid over to every seaman so discharged, upon his engagement on board of any vessel to return to the United States; and the other third to be retained, for the purpose of creating a fund for the maintenance and return of destitute American seamen in such foreign port.^b

The act of Congress of March 3d, 1813, declared, that no seaman, who was not a citizen or native of the United States, should be employed on board of any public or

^a *Acts of Congress*, July 16th, 1793, March 2d, 1799, and May 3d, 1802.

^b *Act of Congress*, February 23th, 1803, ch. 62.

private vessel of the United States. But the provision against the employment of foreign seamen, is probably without any efficacy, for it applies only to those nations who shall, in like manner, have prohibited the employment of American seamen.

Greenwich hospital, in England, is a noble
*181 asylum for decayed *and disabled seamen belonging to the royal navy; but another national establishment was wanting for seamen maimed or disabled by sickness or accidental misfortunes, or worn out by age, in the merchant service. This was provided for by the statute of 20 Geo. II. c. 38, which created a corporation attached to Greenwich hospital, and laid the foundations of a magnificent charity, with liberal, careful, and minute provisions, some of which have been copied into our own statutes; and it is sustained by an assessment similar to our own, of sixpence sterling per month out of seamen's wages. In one respect, the English charity is much broader than ours, for it reaches to the poor widow, and infant children of every seaman who perishes in the service, and who shall be found to be proper objects of charity.^a

^a The contributions from merchant ships to the trustees of Greenwich hospital, in 1828 and 1829, exceeded £20,000 sterling a year, and yet there was not on the establishment a single individual who had been *exclusively* employed in the merchant service. The statute of 4 and 5 Wm. IV. c. 34, directed, therefore, that the contribution of sixpence per month by seamen in the merchant service should cease from 1st January, 1835, and that £20,000 a year should be advanced from the consolidated fund to the hospital to make good the deficiency. The act of Wm. IV. repealed the statute of 20 Geo. II, except so far as it related to the establishment of the corporation; and it repealed so much of the act of 37 Geo. III. c. 73, as related to the wages of seamen dying while employed in the West India trade, and it introduced a new system. This system provides contributions for a new fund; and every master and owner of a British merchant ship or vessel are to pay 2s. per month, and every seaman serving on board such ship or vessel 1s. per month; and the institution is to provide in its hospital for seamen becoming incapable by sickness, wounds, or other accidental misfortunes, or worn out by age, and in certain cases for their widows and children. The masters and owners, and their widows and children, being objects

With respect to the behaviour of the master and seamen, and the discipline on board of merchant ships, it is held, that the master is personally responsible in damages for any injury or loss to the ship or cargo, by reason of his negligence or misconduct. Being responsible over to others for his conduct as master, the law, as well on that account as from the necessity of the case, has intrusted him with great authority over the mariners on board. Such authority is requisite to the safe navigation of the ship, and the preservation of good order and discipline. He may imprison, and also inflict reasonable corporal punishment upon a seaman, for disobedience to reasonable commands, or for disorderly, riotous, or insolent conduct; and his authority, in that respect, is analogous to *that of a master on *182 land over his apprentice or scholar.^a The books

of charity as aforesaid, are to partake of the bounty; the contributions to the fund are estimated to amount hereafter to £50,000 sterling a year. *McCulloch's Com. Dict. tit. Seamen.*

The ancient Romans never provided any asylum for the poor. Humanity was no part of their national character. Its cultivation, as a public duty, is one of the inestimable blessings of the introduction of Christianity. There did not exist in the Roman legislation any provision for them, unless, says *Hugo*, (*History of the Roman Law*, sec. 154,) we may consider the law of the twelve tables, which regulated funeral expenses, to have been introduced in their favour, as a means to prevent the ruin of families. But there was a provision in favour of the Roman soldiers, which shows the wise policy, if not humanity, of the Roman discipline. Half of the donatives of the soldiers was withdrawn and placed in security in camp for their use, to prevent its being wasted in extravagance and debauchery. *Vegetius* considered it a *divine* institution. There was likewise a contribution by each soldier to a common fund in camp, to defray his funeral expenses. *Vegetius, De Re Militari*, l. 2. ch. 20. Chelsea hospital, in England, for the reception of sick and superannuated soldiers, has infinitely better pretensions than the Roman provision, to be regarded as *divinitus institutum*.

^a *Molloy*, b. 2. ch. 3. sec. 12. *Thorne v. White*, 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 168. *Rice v. The Polly and Kitty*, 2 *ibid.* 420. *The United States v. Smith*, 3 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 525. *Michaelson v. Denison*, 3 *Day's Rep.* 294. *Comersford v. Baker*, before Lord Stowell, June, 1825. *The United States v. Dewey*, *New-York Circuit*, June, 1828. Lord Stowell, in the case of the *Agincourt*, 1 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 272. *The Lowther Castle*, *ibid.* 384. *The United States v. Freeman*, 4 *Mason's Rep.* 512. *Turner's case*, 1 *Ware*, 83. *Butler v.*

unite in the lawfulness and necessity of the power. Without it, authority could not be maintained, nor navigation made safe. Subordination is essential to be strictly enforced, among a class of men whose manners and habits partake of the attributes of the element on which they are employed. Disobedience to lawful commands is a more noxious offence, and the most dangerous in its nature, for it goes at once to the utter annihilation of all authority. But care must be taken that the punishment be administered with due moderation. The law watches the exercise of discretionary power with a jealous eye. If the correction be excessive or unjustifiable, the seaman is sure to receive compensation in damages on his return to port, in an action at common law.^a And it must be an extreme case that will justify a master to confine a seaman in a
 *183 common gaol in a foreign port. He cannot do *it

M'Lellan, District Court in Maine, *ibid.* 219. *Bangs v. Little*, *ibid.* 506. Though the maritime codes of continental Europe, such as the *Consolato*, the laws of Oleron, of Wisbuy, of the Hanse Towns, and of Denmark, carefully avoid the direct mention of any legal authority of the captain to correct, by corporal chastisement, the misbehaviour of mariners; yet, as the learned judge of the District Court of Maine observed, in a case above-mentioned, this power in the master seems either to have been inferred, or to have become silently established by usage. *Casaregis* (*Disc.* 136. n. 14.) admits that the master may inflict slight chastisement, by analogy to the power of a father or domestic master; and the ordinance of Louis XIV. (liv. 2. tit. 1. art. 22.) confers a strong power of personal punishment on the captain, in aggravated cases, and acting under the advice of the mate and pilot. The *Act of Congress*, 3d March, 1835, ch. 40. sec. 3, makes it an indictable offence, punishable by fine and imprisonment, for the master or other officer of any American vessel, on the high seas or other waters, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, from malice, hatred, or revenge, and without justifiable cause, to beat, wound, or imprison any of the crew, or withhold from them suitable food and nourishment, or inflict upon them any cruel and unusual punishment. In the case of the *United States v. Proctor*, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New-York, in November, 1835, it was held, that, as a general rule, seamen must obey the *last* order coming from any officer, as it may arise from some sudden emergency requiring it; and that for unjustifiable disobedience moderate personal punishment might be inflicted.

^a *Watson v. Christie*, 2 *Bos. & Pull.* 224.

as a punishment, but only by way of precaution under the existing circumstances.^a The master may also confine a passenger who refuses to submit to the necessary discipline of the ship.^b

The master has also the right to discharge a seaman for just cause, and put him ashore in a foreign country; but the causes must be, not slight but aggravated, such as habitual disobedience, mutinous conduct, theft, or habitual drunkenness; and he is responsible in damages if he discharges him without just cause.^c This power of discharge extends to the mate and subordinate officers, as well as to the seamen, for the master must be supreme in the ship, and subordination and discipline are indispensable to the safety and welfare of the service. But it would require a case of flagrant disobedience, or gross negligence, or palpable want of skill, to authorize the captain to displace a mate, who is generally chosen with the consent of the owners, and with a view to the better safety of the ship, and the security of their property.^d The marine law requires the master to receive back a seaman whom he has discharged, if he repents and offers to return to his duty and make satisfaction; and if the master refuses, or if the seaman has been unduly discharged, he may follow the ship, and recover his wages for the voyage, and *the expenses of his *184

^a *United States v. Ruggles*, 5 *Mason's Rep.* 192. The subordinate officers have no authority to punish a seaman when the master is on board, unless by his orders. *Elwell v. Martin*, *Ware's Rep.* 53. *Butler v. M'Lellan*, *ibid.* 219.

^b *Boyce v. Bayliffe*, 1 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 53.

^c *Relf v. The Ship Maria*, 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 186. *Black v. The Ship Louisiana*, 2 *ibid.* 268. *Hulle v. Heightman*, 2 *East's Rep.* 145. Sir William Scott, in the case of the *Exeter*, 2 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 261. The French law affords peculiar protection to seamen, and among other things in this, that it prohibits the master from discharging a seaman, in any case, in a foreign country. This was by a royal declaration of 18th December, 1728, art. 1, mentioned in 1 *Valin's Com.* 734; and it is adopted in the *Code de Commerce*, art. 270.

^d *Atkins v. Burrows*, 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 244. *Thompson v. Bush*, 4 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 333.

return.^a The laws of the United States make it highly penal, and subject the master to fine and imprisonment, if, without justifiable cause, he maliciously forces an officer or mariner on shore while abroad, or leaves him behind in any foreign port or place, or refuses to bring home those whom he took out, and are in a condition and willing to return.^b

It was a question which received a profound discussion, and led to a learned research, in *Harden v. Gordon*,^c whether a seaman, who became sick and disabled on the voyage, was entitled to medical advice and aid, such as medicine, sustenance, and attendance, at the expense of the ship. It was there shown and decided, that the expense of curing a sick seaman in the course of the voyage, was a charge upon the ship according to the maritime law of Europe,^d and the rule recommended itself as much by its intrinsic equity and sound policy, as by the sanction of its general authority. Such an expense was in the nature of additional wages during sickness, and it constituted a material ingredient in the just remuneration of seamen for their labour and services. The statute law of the United States^e has not changed the maritime law and exempted the vessel, except so far as respects medicines and medical advice, and which must be borne by the seamen and not by the owner, when there was a proper medicine chest, and medical directions, on board the ship; and it does not apply to nursing, diet, and lodging, or even medical ad-

^a *Laws of Oleron*, art. 13. *Laws of Wisbuy*, art. 25. *Code de Commerce*, art. 270. *Relf v. The Ship Maria*, 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 193, 194. *Hutchinson v. Coombs*, District Court of Maine, *Ware's Rep.* 65. *The Nimrod*, *ibid.* 9.

^b *Act of Congress*, 3d March, 1825, ch. 67. sec. 10.

^c 2 *Mason's Rep.* 541.

^d *Laws of Oleron*, art. 7. *Laws of Wisbuy*, art. 19. *Laws of the Hanse Towns*, art. 45. *Code de Commerce*, art. 262, 263.

^e *Vide supra*, 179.

vice if the seaman be carried ashore, and which, under the general maritime law, are to be borne by the vessel.^a The claim for such expenses, equally with a claim for wages, may be enforced in the courts of admiralty; and Judge Story, in the case of *Harden v. Gordon*, with great force, and moving on solid principles, vindicated the admiralty jurisdiction over the whole *com- *185 pensation, in all its varied forms, when due to seamen for their maritime services.^b

The act of Congress requires, that in seamen's shipping articles, the voyage, and term of time for which the seamen may be shipped, be specified.^c The regulation relates to voyages *from* a port in the United States, and it does not apply to a voyage commencing from a foreign port to the United States. The voyage within the intendment of the statute, means one having a definite commencement and end. The *terminus a quo*, and the *terminus ad quem*, must be stated precisely; and in a case of a general adventure, the term of service must be specified. A voyage from New-York to Curacoa, *and elsewhere*, means, in shipping articles, a voyage from New-York to Curacoa, and the word elsewhere is rejected as being void for uncertainty.^d

Seamen, in the merchant service, are usually hired at a certain sum, either by the month, or for the voyage.

^a The *Nimrod*, 1 *Ware's Rep.* 19. The *Forest*, *ibid.* 420.

^b This subject received ample discussion, in *Reed v. Canfield*, 1 *Sumner*, 195, and it was shown to be a settled principle of maritime policy, that a seaman was entitled to be cured at the expense of the ship, of all sickness and all injuries sustained in the service of the ship. The rule applied, not only during the voyage, but when the vessel was in her home port, either at the commencement or termination of the voyage, so long as the seaman was in the service of the ship, and as one of the crew. The acts of Congress, *supra*, p. 179, for the relief of sick and disabled seamen, were deemed to be auxiliary to the maritime law.

^c *Act of Congress*, 20th July, 1790, ch. 29.

^d Decision in the District Court of Maryland, by Judge Winchester, 1 *Hall's L. J.* 209. *Magee v. The Moss*, *Gilpin*, 219.

In the fishing trade the seamen usually serve under an engagement to receive a portion of the profits of the adventure. The share, or profits of the voyage, are a substitute for regular wages; and the act of Congress^a extends the admiralty jurisdiction to the cognizance of suits for shares in whaling voyages, in the same form and manner as in ordinary cases of wages in the merchant service.^b

Every seaman engaged to serve on board a ship, is bound, from the nature and terms of the contract, to do his duty in the service to the utmost of his ability, and, therefore, a promise made by the master when the ship is in distress, to pay extra wages, as an inducement to extraordinary exertion, is illegal and void. It would be the same if some of the crew had deserted, or
 *186 were sick, or dead, and peculiar efforts *became requisite; for the general engagement of the seamen is to do all they can for the good of the service, under all the emergencies of the voyage. Lord Kenyon puts the illegality of such a promise on the ground of public policy, and Lord Ellenborough on the want of consideration.^c It requires the performance of some service not within the scope of the original contract, as by becoming a voluntary hostage upon capture, to create a valid claim, on the part of the seaman, to compensation, on a promise by the master, beyond the stipulated wages.^d So, no wages can be recovered when the hiring has been for an illegal voyage, or one in violation of a statute. The

^a *Act of Congress*, 19th June, 1813, ch. 2. sec. 1, 2.

^b In whaling voyages from the New-England States, three-tenths of the earnings of the ship are the share of the seamen.

^c *Harris v. Watson*, *Peake's N. P. Rep.* 72. *Stilk v. Myrick*, 2 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 317. The same rule applies to a promise by a passenger to any of the crew of a wrecked vessel. *Mesner v. Suffolk Bank, Mass. U. S. D. C.* 1838.

^d *Yates v. Hall*, 1 *Term Rep.* 73.

law will not countenance a contract *ex turpi causa*, nor permit any one to lay claim to the wages of iniquity.^a

A seaman is entitled to his whole wages for the voyage, even though he be unable to render his service by sickness, or bodily injury, happening in the course of the voyage, and while he was in the performance of his duty. This is not only the invariable usage in the English admiralty, but a provision of manifest justice, pervading all the commercial ordinances.^b He will equally be entitled to his wages to the end of the voyage, when wrongfully discharged by the master in the course of it.^c The marine law very equitably distinguishes *between *187 the cases in which seamen's services are not rendered in consequence of a peril of the sea, and in which they are not rendered by reason of some illegal act, or misconduct, or fraud, of the master or owner, interrupting and destroying the voyage. In the latter case, the seamen are entitled to their wages,^d and the rule of the French ordinance is just and reasonable. It declares, that if the seamen be hired for the voyage, they shall, in such case, be paid the entire wages for the voyage, and if they be hired by the month, they shall be paid for the time they served, with the allowance of a reasonable time for their return to the port of departure.^e But if a loss in respect to ship or cargo, arises from the gross negligence of a

^a The *Vanguard*, 6 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 207.

^b *Chandler v. Grieves*, 2 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 606. note. *Abbott on Shipping*, part 4. ch. 2. sec. 1. *Williams v. The Brig Hope*, 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 138.

^c *Robnett v. The Ship Exeter*, 2 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 261. *The Beaver*, 3 *ibid.* 92. *Keane v. The Brig Gloucester*, 2 *Dallas' Rep.* 36. 2 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 403. *Rice v. The Polly and Kitty*, *ibid.* 420. In this last case, the seamen were forced to quit the ship by the cruelty and dangerous threats of the master, and their wages were allowed.

^d *Wells v. Osman*, 2 *Lord Raym.* 1044. *Parry v. The Peggy*, 2 *Bro. Adm. app.* 533.

^e *Ord. des Loyers des Matelots*, art. 3. *Pothier's Louage des Matelots*, n. 203. *Cushing's Translation*, 123. *Roccus, de Nav. et Naulo*, n. 43. *Ingersoll's Translation*, 46. *Hoyt v. Wildfire*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 518.

mariner, the damage may be set off in the admiralty against a claim for wages.^a If a seaman be wrongfully discharged on the voyage, the voyage is then ended with respect to him, and he is entitled to sue for his full wages for the voyage.^b

The general principle of the marine law is, that freight is the mother of wages, and if no freight be earned, no wages are due. This principle protects the owner, by making the right of the mariner to his wages, commensurate with the right of the owner to his freight ; but that the rule may duly apply, the freight must not be lost by the fraud or wrongful act of the master. The policy of the rule applies to cases of loss of freight by a peril of the sea ; and it was truly and distinctly stated by the

*188 Court of K. B. in the time of Charles *II.^c that if the ship perish by tempest, fire, enemies, &c., the mariners lose their wages ; “for if the mariners were to have their wages in such cases, they would not use their endeavours, nor hazard their lives, for the safety of the ship.” If the voyage and the freight be lost, because the ship was seized for debt, or for having contraband or prohibited goods on board, or for any other cause proceeding from misconduct in the master or owner, it would be unreasonable and unjust that the innocent seamen should be deprived of compensation for their services, and the marine law holds them still entitled to their

^a *Abbott on Shipping*, 472. *The New Phoenix*, 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 420.

^b *Sigard v. Roberts*, 3 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 71. In the case of the *Castilia*, 1 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 59, a seaman who had left the ship in the course of the voyage, the master failing to supply him with provisions, was held not to have forfeited his wages. And in the *Elizabeth*, 2 *Dodson's Adm. Rep.* 403, it was held, that though a master be not at liberty, by the general rule, to discharge his crew in a foreign port without their consent, yet that circumstances might vest in him an authority to do so, *upon proper conditions*, as by providing and paying for their return passage, and their wages up to the time of their arrival at home.

^c *Anon.* 1 *Sid. Rep.* 179.

wages.^a The wages are, in such cases, allowed *pro tanto* to the time of the loss of the voyage, and with such additional allowance as shall be deemed reasonable under the circumstances.^b

*Seamen's wages, in trading voyages, are due *189 *pro rata itineris*. This has been so decided in the Scottish courts, and upon principles of controlling equity.^c

If the seaman dies on the voyage, there is no settled English rule on the subject of his wages. In one case, the court intimated, that his representatives might be entitled to a proportion of the wages up to his death, when the hiring was by the month, and there was no special contract in the way;^d and a similar opinion was mentioned by one of the judges of the C. B. in another case.^e In a still later case,^f it was assumed by the

^a *Malyne's Lex Mercatoria*, 105. *Molloy, de Jure Maritimo*, b. 2. ch. 3. sec. 7. *Hoyt v. Wildfire*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 518. *Jacobsen's Sea Laws*, b. 2. ch. 2. The Malta, 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 158.

^b In *Woolf v. The Brig Oder*, 2 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 261, where the voyage was broken up by seizure for debt, wages up to the time were allowed, and one additional month's pay. Wages are not lost if the voyage be broken up by reason of civil process against the vessel, on a claim of ownership. If the claim be unfounded, adequate damages are presumed to be awarded for the unfounded libel, and if well founded, the wages are lost by the default of the shipper. *Van Beuren v. Wilson*, 9 *Cowen*, 158. In *Hoyt v. Wildfire*, where the seamen were hired for a voyage from New-York to the East Indies, and back to New-York, and the vessel was captured and condemned on the outward voyage for having contraband goods on board, wages, according to the rate of the contract, were allowed from the commencement of the voyage until the return of the seamen, with reasonable diligence, to New-York, deducting wages received while in other service, on the circuitous return. The court observed, that the rule in the French law (*Ord. des Loyers des Matelots*, art. 3. *Pothier, Louage des Matelots*, No. 203,) ordained, that if the seamen were hired for the voyage, they should, in such a case, be paid their entire wages for the voyage; and if hired by the month, the wages due for the time they had served, and for the time necessary to enable them to return to the port of departure; and that there was no reason to question the soundness of the rule, or the propriety of following it in that case.

^c *Ross v. Glassford*, and *Morrison v. Hamilton*, cited in 1 *Bell's Com.* 515. But the rule may be varied by agreement. *Appleby v. Dods*, 3 *East's Rep.* 300.

^d *Cutter v. Powell*, 6 *Term. Rep.* 320.

^e *Heath, J.*, in *Beale v. Thompson*, 3 *Bos. & Pull.* 425.

^f *Armstrong v. Smith*, 4 *Bos. & Pull.* 299.

Court of C. B., that the wages of a seaman, who died on the voyage in which wages arose, were due to his representatives; but the case was silent as to the precise time to which they were to be computed. In this country, there have been contradictory decisions on the point. In the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, in Pennsylvania, it was decided, upon the authority of the Laws of Oleron, that the representatives of the seaman dying during the voyage, were entitled to full wages to the end of the voyage.^a On the other hand, it was subsequently decided, in the District Court of the United States for South Carolina,^b and in the District Court in Massachusetts,^c that full wages, by the marine law, meant only full wages up to the death of the mariner;

and in this last case, a very able and elaborate
 *190 review was taken of *all the marine ordinances and authorities applicable to the subject. The court examined critically the provisions in the *consolato del mare*, and in the laws of Oleron, of Wisbuy, and of the Hanse Towns, the ordinances of Charles V. and Lewis XIV., the commentaries of Cleirac, Valin, and Pothier, and all that had been said and decided in England or Massachusetts, in relation to the question. If the two decisions in Pennsylvania outweigh, in point of American authority, the opposite adjudications are best supported in the appeal to those ordinances of European wisdom and policy, in which we discern the deep foundations of maritime jurisprudence.^d

^a Walton v. The Ship Neptune, 1 Peters' Adm. Rep. 142. Sims v. Jackson, *ibid.* 157. note. 1 Wash. Cir. Rep. 414. S. C.

^b Carey v. The Schooner Kitty, Bee's Adm. Rep. 255.

^c Natterstrom v. The Ship Hazard, 2 Hall's L. J. 359.

^d If the seaman be hired *by the voyage*, and die during it, the standard books of maritime law, says Mr. Bell, seem to give the outward wages, if he dies during the outward voyage, and the whole, if he dies during the homeward voyage. But if he be hired *by the month*, it rather seems, that wages will be due only to the time of his death. Bell's Com. vol. i. 514.

As the payment of wages, in general, depends upon the earning of freight, if a ship delivers her outward cargo, and perishes on her return voyage, the outward freight being earned, the seamen's wages on the outward voyage are consequently due.^a By the custom of merchants, seamen's wages are due at every delivering port; and their wages are not affected, without their special agreement, by any stipulation between the owners and the charterer, making the voyages out and home one entire voyage, and the freight to depend on the accomplishment of the entire voyage out and in.^b The owners may waive or modify their claim to freight as they *please, but their acts cannot deprive the *191 seamen, without their consent, of the rights belonging to them by the general principles of the marine law. The doctrine of wages was discussed at the bar, and upon the bench, in the case of the *Two Catharines*,^c with distinguished force and research; and it was held, that where a ship sailed from the United States to Gibraltar, and there landed her cargo, and went in ballast

^a Anon. Holt, Ch. J., 1 *Lord Raym.* 639.

^b Notes of Judge Winchester's decisions, 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 186. note. *Abbott on Shipping*, part 4. ch. 2. sec. 4. *Blanchard v. Bucknam*, 3 *Greenleaf's Rep.* 1. In *Thompson v. Faussat*, 1 *Peters' Civ. Rep.* 182, where the vessel was lost on her homeward voyage, full wages were held due to the seamen up to the arrival at the last port of delivery of the outward cargo; and half wages from that time until her departure from the last port at which the return cargo was taken on board. This rule was elaborately supported by Mr. Justice Story, in the C. C. U. S. for Massachusetts, 1838, in the case of *Pitman v. Hooper*, in opposition to the decision of Judge Hopkinson, in *Bronde v. Haven*, *Gilpin's Rep.* 606. 613, and he considers it to be the settled rule, that when the ship is lost in her homeward voyage, the seamen are to be paid their wages up to the last port of discharge, and for half the time the ship lay there. Half the time passed in port is attributed in practice to the concerns and business of the discharge of the outward voyage, and half the time to employment by the seamen, in preparations or business connected with the homeward voyage; and it is considered to be an equitable and just apportionment, and the wages for that last half or period of time are deemed lost by the loss of the ship on the homeward voyage. The *American Jurist*, for January, 1839, p. 429.

^c 2 *Mason's Rep.* 319.

to Ivica, and after taking in a return cargo, was lost on the voyage back to the United States, the seamen were entitled to wages up to the arrival and stay at Ivica. It made no difference that the vessel was in ballast in the intermediate voyage. The voluntary neglect of the owner will not operate, in such a case, to the injury of the seamen. They are entitled to wages, not only when the owner earns freight, but when, unless for his own act, he might earn it. The wages are due by an arrival at a port of destination, when no cargo is on board, or when the owner chooses to bring the cargo back again, and when the port of destination be not, in point of fact, the port of delivery. Even if the ship perishes on the outward voyage, yet, if part of the outward freight has been paid, the seamen are entitled to wages in proportion to the amount of the freight advanced, for there is an inseparable connexion between freight and wages.^a

Capture by an enemy extinguishes the contract for seamen's wages; and Sir William Scott, in the case of *The Friends*,^b held, that the re-capture of the vessel did not revive the right, or restore him to his connexion with the ship, inasmuch as he was not on board at the re-capture, and did not render any subsequent service. The doctrine of this case was overruled in *Bergstrom v. Mills*;^c

and the American decisions have fully discussed
 *192 the question, and they lay down *a different rule,
 and proceed on the just principle, that the owner recovers his freight, and that is the parent of wages. They, accordingly, allow to the seamen taken prisoners by the captor, and detained, their wages for the whole voyage, if the same be afterwards performed, with a ratable deduction for the expenses of salvage. The

^a Anon. 2 *Show. Rep.* 291. *Brown v. Lull*, 2 *Sumner*, 443.

^b 4 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 143.

^c 3 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 36.

like rule applies to the case of a vessel captured, and afterwards ransomed, and enabled to arrive at her port of destination.^a Nothing can be more equitable than the rule which allows to seamen, suffering in the service, their compensation, when the fund out of which it was to arise is ultimately recovered and enjoyed by the owner.^b And, upon the same principle, if a foreign power seizes the ship, and imprisons the seamen, and they be afterwards released, and re-assume, and complete the voyage, and earn freight, their wages are continued during the interruption of the voyage, in like manner as in a case of capture and re-capture. The Court of K. B. declared the law to this effect in *Beale v. Thompson*,^c and they proceeded on the sound and incontestible principle of the marine law, that the title to wages depended on the ship earning her freight for the voyage, connected with the further fact, that the mariners were not guilty of any breach of duty. If a neutral ship be captured, and even condemned, and the sentence be afterwards reversed, and freight for the voyage allowed in damages, the seamen are entitled to their wages.^d So, in the case of shipwreck, if any proportion of freight be paid for the cargo saved, wages of seamen are to be paid in the same proportion. Whenever freight is earned, wages are due, and must be paid, and *every agreement *193 that goes to separate the validity and equity of the demand for wages, from the fact of freight being earned, is viewed with distrust and jealousy, as being an encroachment on the rights of seamen. The courts

^a *Girard v. Ware*, 1 *Peters' Cir. Rep.* 142.

^b *Hart v. The Ship Little John*, 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 115. *Howland v. The Brig Lavinia*, *ibid.* 123. *Singstrom v. The Schooner Hazard*, 2 *ibid.* 384. *Brooks v. Dorr*, 2 *Mass. Rep.* 39. *Wetmore v. Henshaw*, 12 *Johns. Rep.* 324. *Brown v. Lull*, 2 *Sumner*, 443.

^c 4 *East's Rep.* 546.

^d *Willard v. Dorr*, 3 *Mason*, 161. *Brown v. Lull*, 2 *Sumner*, 443. S. P.

of maritime law extend to them a peculiar protecting favour and guardianship, and treat them as wards of the admiralty; and though they are not incapable of making valid contracts, they are treated in the same manner that courts of equity are accustomed to treat young heirs dealing with their expectancies, wards with their guardians, and *cestui que trusts* with their trustees. They are considered as placed under the influence of men who have naturally acquired a mastery over them. Every deviation from the terms of the common shipping paper, (which stands upon the general doctrines of maritime law,) is rigidly inspected; and if additional burdens or sacrifices are imposed upon the seamen without adequate remuneration, the courts will interfere, and moderate or annul the stipulation.^a It has, accordingly, under the influence of these just and humane considerations, been held, that an additional clause to the shipping articles, by which the seamen engaged *to pay for all medicines, and medical aid, further than the medical chest afforded*, was void, as being grossly inequitable, and contrary to the policy of the act of Congress.^b It has likewise been decided, that a stipulation that the wages of the seamen, earned in the intermediate periods, should depend upon the ultimate successful termination of a long and divided voyage, was inoperative and void.^c

^a The *Minerva*, 1 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 347. The *George Home*, *ibid.* 370. Shipping articles are only conclusive as to the amount of wages and the voyage. On all collateral points the courts of admiralty will consider how far the stipulations in regard to the seamen are reasonable and just. The *Prince Frederick*, 2 *ibid.* 394. *Brown v. Lull*, 2 *Sumner*, 443. S. P. The voyage must be designated with as much particularity and precision as the case admits of, and the articles must not be so loosely drawn, as to leave the seamen exposed to unanticipated and experimental voyages. Vide 1 *Hagg. supra*. The English statute of 6 Wm. IV. c. 19, has made new and more strict regulations relative to shipping articles, for the greater protection of the rights of the seamen.

^b *Harden v. Gordon*, 2 *Mason's Rep.* 541.

^c The *Juliana*, 2 *Dodson's Adm. Rep.* 504. See, also, to the same effect, Judge Winchester's decision in the District Court of Maryland, in 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 187. note. *Mellet v. Stephenson*, in Mass. 1800, cited in *Abbott*

Mariners are bound to contribute out of their wages for embezzlements of the cargo, or injuries produced by the misconduct of any of the crew. But the circumstances must be such as to fix the wrong upon some of the crew ; and then, if the individual be unknown, those of the crew, upon whom the presumption of guilt rests, stand as sureties for each other, and they must contribute ratably to the loss. Some of the cases in the books have established a general contribution from all the crew for such embezzlements, even when some of them were in a situation to repel every presumption of guilt ; but neither public policy, nor principles of justice, extend the contribution or forfeiture of wages for such embezzlements, beyond the parties immediately *in delicto*. This just limitation of the rule was approved of by the English Court of C. B. in *Thompson v. Collins*,^a in their construction of the clause in the usual shipping articles, inserted to enforce this regulation of the marine law. It was also adopted by the Supreme Court of New-York, in *Lewis v. Davis*,^b and afterwards ably and thoroughly vindicated, even against the high authority of Valin, by the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, in the case of *Spurr v. Pearson*.^c The doctrine of that case is so moral and so just, that it may be said to rest on immovable foundations. The substance of it is, that where the embezzlement has arisen from the fault, fraud, connivance, or negligence, of any of the crew,

on Shipping, 490. Amer. edition, 1810. The decision of Lord Stowell, in the *Juliana*, is made with great force and spirit. He took a wide view of the subject, and concluded on the authority of the court of admiralty, of the court of chancery, and of the courts of common law, that where a voyage was divided by various ports of delivery, a proportional claim for wages attached at each of such ports ; and that all attempts to evade or invade that title, by renunciations obtained from the mariners without any consideration, by collateral bonds, or by contracts inserted in the body of the shipping articles, were ineffectual and void.

^a 4 Bos. & Pull. 347.

^b 3 Johns. Rep. 17.

^c 1 Mason's Rep. 104. See, also, *Edwards v. Sherman*, *Gilpin's Rep.* 461.

they are bound to contribute to the reparation
 *195 *of the loss, in proportion to their wages. If the embezzlement be fixed on any individual, he is solely responsible ; and where it was made by the crew, but the particular offender is unknown, and from the circumstances of the case, strong presumptions of guilt apply to the whole crew, all must contribute. Where no reasonable presumption is shown against their innocence, the loss must be borne exclusively by the owner or master. In no case are the innocent part of the crew to contribute for the misdemeanours of the guilty ; and in a case of uncertainty, the burden of the proof of innocence does not rest on the crew, but the guilt of the parties is to be established beyond all reasonable doubt, before the contribution can be demanded.

In case of shipwreck, and there be relics or materials of the ship saved, many of the old ordinances, as well as the new commercial code of France, allow a compensation to the seamen, out of the remains which they had by their exertions, or as salvors, contributed to preserve.^a There were no English decisions on the point, when Lord Tenterden published the third edition of his work ;^b but some of the decisions in this country seem to consider the savings of the wreck as being bound for the arrears of the seamen's wages, and for their expenses home ; and Lord Stowell has, since the Pennsylvania decisions, allowed to the seamen, by whose exertions part of a vessel had been saved, the payment of their wages, as far as the fragments of the materials would form a fund, although there was no freight earned by the owners.^c

^a The *Laws of Oleron*, art. 3, of *Wisbuy*, art. 15, the *Hanseatic Ord.* art. 44, and the *Ord. of Philip II.* tit. *Average*, art. 12, the *Ord. of Rotterdam*, art. 219, and the *French Ord. of the Marine*, liv. 3, tit. 4, *des Loyers des Matelots*, art. 9. *Code de Commerce*, art. 259.

^b *Abbott on Shipping*, part 4. ch. 2. sec. 6.

^c The *Neptune*, 1 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 227. 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 54. 195.

But in such cases where the voyage is broken up by *vis major*, *and no freight earned, no wages, *196 *eo nomine*, are due; and the equitable claim which seamen may have upon the remains of the wreck, is rather a claim for salvage, and seems to be incorrectly denominated in the books a title to wages. Wages, in such case, would be contrary to the great principle in marine law, that freight is the mother of wages, and the safety of the ship the mother of freight.^a If, however, the seamen abandon the wreck of a ship as being a hopeless case, and without the intention of returning to possess and save it, the contract between them and the owners is dissolved, and they lose their lien or privilege for any equitable compensation, whether as wages or salvage. Their claim is extinguished, and though other persons may possess the property which had become derelict, it belongs to the original owner, burdened with their claim for salvage.^b

By the act of Congress,^c one-third of the seamen's wages is due at every port where the ship unloads and delivers her cargo, unless there be an express stipulation to the contrary; and when the voyage is ended, and the cargo or ballast fully discharged, the wages are due, and if not paid within ten days thereafter, admiralty process

2 *ibid.* 426. *Frothingham v. Prince*, 3 *Mass. Rep.* 563. *Lewis v. The Elizabeth and Jane*, 1 *Ware's Rep.* 49. In *Adams v. The Sophia, Gilpin*, 77, and in *Brackett v. The Hercules*, *ibid.* 184, Judge Hopkinson held, that where a portion of the vessel or her cargo was saved by the meritorious exertions of the seamen, a new lien arose thereon for their wages, though the freight be lost.

^a *Dunnett v. Tomhagen*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 154. *The Saratoga*, 2 *Gallison*, 164.

^b *Lewis v. The Elizabeth and Jane*, District Court of Maine, *Ware's Rep.* 41.

^c *Act of Congress*, 20th July, 1790, ch. 29. sec. 6. The English statute law relative to seamen in the merchants' service, has been revised and improved by the statute of 6 Wm. IV. ch. 19, which has greatly bettered the condition, and secured the protection of the rights of seamen. The provisions of the statute are commented upon with learning, candour, and strong approbation in the *Law Magazine*. No. 30. art. 3, an article well worthy of the student's perusal.

may be instituted.^a But there is no fixed period of time by the marine law, within which mariners must proceed to enforce their lien for wages, though the lien may be lost to the seamen and other privileged creditors, by unreasonable delay, and suffering the vessel to pass into the hands of a *bona fide* purchaser ignorant of the claim.^b It does not, like other liens, depend upon possession. Seamen's wages are hardly earned, and liable to many contingencies, by which they may be entirely lost, without any fault on their part. Few claims are more highly favoured and protected by law, and when due, the vessel, owners, and master, are all liable for the payment of them. The seamen need not libel the vessel at the intermediate port where they are discharged. They may disregard bottomry bonds, and pursue their lien
 *197 for *wages afterwards, even against a subsequent *bona fide* purchaser. It follows the ship and its proceeds, into whose hands soever they may come by title or purchase. Their demand for wages takes precedence of bottomry bonds, and is preferred to all other demands, for the same reason that the last bottomry bond

^a The law of England, in ordinary cases, requires the mariner to stay by the ship till the discharge of the cargo, when the other party has done nothing to supersede the existing contract. A spontaneous deviation of importance, will entitle the seamen to their discharge; but by the Danish and Dutch Marine Codes, though the master enlarges or alters the voyage, he may compel the seamen to remain in the service, on a reasonable addition to their wages. This is not the English law. *Jacobson's Sea Laws*, 142. *Institutes of the Laws of Holland, by Vander Linden*, 629. The Cambridge, 2 Hagg. Adm. Rep. 245, 246. The usage in the United States is to discharge the crew before unlading the vessel, and to employ other persons to perform that service. It has now become one of the implied terms of the contract. The voyage is ended when the vessel is safely moored at the wharf, and then the ten days for the payment of the wages begin to run. But if by the terms of the contract or usage of the court, the seamen are bound to remain and assist in discharging the cargo, then the ten days begin to run from the discharge of the cargo. When, in either case, the seamen are discharged, the wages are due. *The Mary, D. C. U. S. Maine District*, August, 1838.

^b *Ware's Rep.* 186. 212.

is preferred to those of a prior date. Their claim is a sacred lien, and as long as a single plank of the ship remains, the sailor is entitled, as against all other persons, to the proceeds, as a security for his wages, for by their labour the common pledge for all the debts is preserved.^a The seamen's lien exists to the extent of the whole compensation due them. There is no difference between the case of a vessel seized abroad and restored in specie or in value : the lien re-attaches to the thing, and to whatever is substituted for it. This is not only a principle of the admiralty, but it is found incorporated into the doctrines of the courts of common law.^b In the French law, the seamen's lien upon the vessel is extinguished after a sale, and a voyage, in the name, and at the risk of the purchaser ; and the preference of the seamen's claim is confined to the wages of the seamen employed in the last voyage.^c

^a *Consulat de la Mer*, ch. 138. 2 *Valin's Com.* 12. *Madonna D'Ibra*, 1 *Dodson's Rep.* 37. *Sydney Cove*, 2 *ibid.* 11. *The Ship Mary*, 1 *Payne's Rep.* 180. *Sheppard v. Taylor*, 5 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 675. *Brown v. Lull*, 2 *Sumner*, 443. 452.

^b *Sheppard v. Taylor*, 5 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 675.

^c *Ord. de la Mar.* tit. *De la Saisie des Navires*, art. 16. *De l'Engagement*, art. 19. *Code de Commerce*, art. 191. 193. The commercial code of Napoleon settles the order and rights of privileged debts, much more fully and precisely than the marine ordinance of Louis XIV.; and this priority in favour of seamen's wages pervades both the maritime ordinances. The venerable code of the *Consolato del Mare*, ch. 138, expressed itself on this subject with the energy of Lord Stowell, when it declared, that mariners must be paid before all mankind, and that *if only a single nail of the ship was left*, they were entitled to it. *Consulat de la Mer*, par *Boucher*, tom. ii. 205. See, also, *Cleirac upon the Judgments of Oleron*, art. 8. n. 31, and *Boulay Paty, Cours de Droit Com.* tom. i. 115. The preference given to seamen for their wages, over all other claims, upon the ship and freight, is the universal law of maritime Europe. The wages of seamen are a lien on the vessel and freight, and *even on the cargo to the amount of the freight due upon it*. The master has his lien on the cargo for his freight. The cargo is hypothecated for the freight, and the freight is hypothecated for the seamen's wages. The lien on the freight is not taken away by the statute of the United States, allowing to seamen process against the vessel. See, *Poland v. The Brig Spartan*, in the District Court of Maine, 1 *Ware*, 134, and the *Paragon*, *ibid.* 330, 331, where the question as to the extent of the lien of seamen for their wages, is learnedly discussed.

Desertion from the ship without just cause, and *animo non revertendi*, or the justifiable discharge of a seaman by the master, for bad conduct, will work a forfeiture of the wages previously earned; and this is a rule of justice, and of policy, which generally pervades the ordinances of the maritime nations. By the English statute law,^a and by the act of Congress,^b desertion is accompanied with a forfeiture of all the wages that are due, and an absence of forty-eight hours without leave, is made conclusive evidence of desertion; and whatever unjustifiable conduct will warrant the act of the master in discharging a seaman during the voyage, will equally deprive the seaman of his wages. But the forfeiture is saved if the seaman repents, makes compensation, or offer of amends, and is restored to his duty.^c Public policy and private justice here move together, and the maritime ordinances unite in this conclusion. The master has power to remit a forfeiture, and the penalty of forfeiture is not applied to slight faults, either of neglect or disobedience. There must be, either an *habitual* neglect, or disobedience, or drunkenness,^d or else a single

^a 11 and 12 William III. c. 7, and 2 George II. c. 36. See, also, *The Jupiter*, 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 221.

^b *Act of Congress*, 20th July, 1790, ch. 29. sec. 2. 5. In *Cloutman v. Tunison*, 1 *Sumner*, 373, Judge Story held, that by the maritime law, the voyage is ended when the ship has arrived at her port of destination, and is safely moored, though her cargo be not delivered, and desertion afterwards does not forfeit the wages at large, but a partial forfeiture may be decreed by way of compensation for breach of duty. So, in another case, Judge Hopkinson held, that if a seaman leaves the vessel after she is moored at the wharf, at the last port of delivery, and *before the discharge of the cargo*, he forfeits a ratable deduction from his wages. To subject the seaman to the forfeiture of his wages, under the act of Congress of 1790, the entry in the log-book, on the day of the absence, is indispensable. *Knagg v. Goldsmith*, *Gilpin*, 207. *Ibid.* 219. *Cloutman v. Tunison*, 1 *Sumner*, 373. *The Rovena*, *Ware's Rep.* 309.

^c The master is bound in such a case to receive back the seaman, as a case fit for condonation, unless his previous misconduct would justify a discharge. *Cloutman v. Tunison*, 1 *Sumner*, 373.

^d *Lady Campbell*, 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 5. *The Malta*, *ibid.* 168.

act of gross dishonesty, or some other act of a heinous and aggravated nature, to justify the discharging a seaman in a foreign port, or the forfeiture of wages; nor will the admiralty courts, except in cases of great atrocity, visit the offences of seamen with the cumulated load of forfeiture of wages and compensation in damages. They stop at the forfeiture of the wages antecedently earned, and in the application of the forfeiture, the advance wages are made a charge on the *forfeited wages, *199 but the hospital money is apportioned ratably on the wages for the whole voyage. In these regulations the moderation of the courts, and the solicitude which the peculiar condition and character of seamen excite, are equally manifest.^a So, if the seaman quits the ship involuntarily, or is driven ashore from necessity, from want of provisions, or by reason of cruel usage and for personal safety, the wages are not forfeited, and he will be entitled to receive them in full to the prosperous termination of the voyage.^b On the other hand, it is the duty of the seamen to abide by the vessel as long as reasonable hope remains, and if they desert the ship under circumstances of danger or distress from perils of the sea, when their presence and exertions might have prevented damage, or restored the ship to safety, they forfeit their wages, and are answerable in damages.^c And even when a seaman might well have been discharged in the course of the voyage, for gross misbehaviour, if the mas-

^a *Whitton v. The Brig Commerce*, 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 160. *Thorne v. White*, *ibid.* 175. *Relf v. The Maria*, *ibid.* 186. *The Ship Mentor*, 4 *Mason's Rep.* 84. 102. *The Malta*, 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 159. *The Susan*, *ibid.* 229. note. *Hutchinson v. Combs*, District Court of Maine, 1 *Ware*, 65.

^b *Jugemens d'Oleron*, art. 13. *Limland v. Stephens*, 3 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 269. *The Favourite*, 2 *Rob.* 232. *Bell's Com.* ch. 4. sec. 1. 4. *Sherwood v. McIntosh*, 1 *Ware*, 109. *Rice v. The Polly and Kitty*, 2 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 420. *Magee v. The Moss*, *Gilpin's Rep.* 219. Refusal to proceed on a voyage not designated by the articles, is not such a desertion as works a forfeiture. 1 *Hagg.* 182. 248. 347.

^c *Sims v. Mariners*, 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 395.

ter refuses to discharge him, and leaves him in imprisonment abroad, he will, in that case, be entitled to his wages until his return to the United States, after deducting from the claim his time of imprisonment.^a

^a *Buck v. Lane*, 12 *Serg. & Rawle*, 266. If a seaman leaves the ship without just cause, the master may enter the desertion in the log-book, under the act of Congress of 1790, which will work a forfeiture of wages antecedently due; or he may have the seaman imprisoned until the vessel is ready to sail, and then the contract continues, and the wages go on. The imprisonment is the punishment. *Brower v. The Maiden*, *Gilpin's Rep.* 294.

In the examination of the maritime law concerning seamen, I have been led to consult, very frequently, the admiralty decisions in the District Court of Pennsylvania, and I feel unwilling to take my leave of this branch of the subject, without expressing my grateful sense of the obligation which the profession, and the country at large, are under, to the venerable author of those decisions. They discover a familiar acquaintance with the maritime ordinances of continental Europe, those abundant fountains of all modern nautical jurisprudence. They have investigated the sound principles which those ordinances contain, in a spirit of free and liberal inquiry; and they have uniformly discussed the rights and claims of mariners, under the influence of a keen sense of justice, a strong feeling of humanity, and an elevated tone of moral sentiment.

LECTURE XLVII.

OF THE CONTRACT OF AFFREIGHTMENT.

(1.) *Of the charter-party.*

A charter-party is a contract of affreightment in writing, by which the owner of a ship lets the whole, or a part of her, to a merchant, for the conveyance of goods, on a particular voyage, in consideration of the payment of freight.

All contracts under seal were anciently called charters, and they used to be divided into two parts, and each party interested took one, and this was the meaning of the *charta-partita*. It was a deed or writing divided, consisting of two parts, like an indenture at common law.^a Lord Mansfield observed, that the charter-party was an old informal instrument, and by the introduction of different clauses at different times, it was inaccurate, and

^a Butler, n. 138. to lib. 3. *Co. Litt.* Pothier's *Charter-Party*, by C. Cushing, n. 1. Valin's *Com.* tom. i. 617. The translation of Pothier's Treatise on Maritime Contracts, by Mr. C. Cushing, and published at Boston, in 1821, is neat and accurate, and the notes which are added to the volume, are highly creditable to the industry and learning of the author. But the work was limited to the treatises on *Charter-Party*, *Average*, and *Hiring of Seamen*. It would contribute greatly to the circulation and cultivation of maritime law in this country, if some other treatises of Pothier, and also, the Commentaries of Valin, could appear in an English dress.

Since the last edition of this work, Mr. L. S. Cushing has published, at Boston, a Translation of Pothier's Treatise on the *Contract of Sale*, and if duly encouraged, as we hope and trust he will be, he promises a translation of the other excellent treatises of Pothier on the various commercial contracts.

sometimes contradictory. But this defect has been supplied, by giving it, as mercantile contracts usually receive, a liberal construction, in furtherance of the real intention and the usage of trade.

*202 *This mercantile lease of a ship describes the parties, the ship, and the voyage, and contains, on the part of the owner, a stipulation as to seaworthiness, and as to the promptitude with which the vessel shall receive the cargo, and perform the voyage; and the exception of such perils of the sea for which the master and ship-owners do not mean to be responsible. On the part of the freighter, it contain a stipulation to load and unload within a given time, with an allowance of so many lay, or running days, for loading and unloading the cargo, and the rate and times of payment of the freight, and rate of demurrage beyond the allotted days.^a

When the goods of several merchants, unconnected with each other, are laden on board, without any particular contract of affreightment with any individual for the entire ship, the vessel is called a *general* ship, because open to all merchants; but when one or more merchants contract for the ship exclusively, it is said to be a *chartered* ship. The ship may be let in whole, or in part, and either for such a quantity of goods by weight, or for so much space in the ship, which is letting the ship by the ton. She may also be hired for a gross sum as freight for the voyage, or for a particular sum by the month, or any other determinate period, or for a certain sum for every ton, cask, or bale of goods put on board; and when the ship is let by the month, the time does not begin to run until the ship breaks ground, unless it be otherwise agreed.^b The merchant who hires a ship, may either lade it with his own goods, or wholly underlet

^a *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 1. sec. 6.

^b *Pothier, Charite-Partie*, No. 4. *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 1. sec. 3.

it, upon his own terms ; and if no certain freight be stipulated, the owner will be entitled to recover, upon a *quantum meruit*, as much freight as is usual under the like circumstances, at the time and place of the shipment.^a

*It is the duty of the owner of the ship, not only to *203 see that she is duly equipped, and in a suitable condition to perform the voyage, but he is bound to keep her in that condition throughout the voyage, unless he be prevented by perils of the sea.^b If, in consequence of a failure in the due equipment of the vessel, the charterer does not use her, he is not bound to pay any freight ; but if he actually employs her, he must pay the freight, though he has his remedy on the charter-party for damages sustained, by reason of the deficiency of the vessel in her equipment.^c The freighter is bound on his part not to detain the ship beyond the stipulated or usual time, to load, or to deliver the cargo, or to sail. The extra days beyond the lay days, (being the days allowed to load and unload the cargo,) are called days of *demurrage* ; and that term is likewise applied to the payment for such delay, and it may become due either by the ship's detention, for the purpose of loading or unloading the cargo, either before, or during, or after the voyage, or in waiting for convoy.^d If the claim for demurrage rests on express contract, it is strictly enforced, as where the running days for delivering the cargo under the bill of lading had expired, even though the consignee was prevented from clearing the vessel of the goods by the default of others.^e

^a *Pothier, Charte-Partie*, No. 8. *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 1. sec. 4. *Hunter v. Fry*, 2 *Barnw. & Ald.* 421.

^b *Putnam v. Wood*, 3 *Mass. Rep.* 481.

^c *Havelock v. Geddes*, 10 *East's Rep.* 555.

^d *Lawes on Charter-Parties*, 130.

^e *Leer v. Yates*, 3 *Taunton*, 387. *Harman v. Gandolph*, 1 *Holt's N. P.* 35. The argument is fairly stated, and this rigorous rule ably vindicated, by Mr. *Holt*, in a note to the case last referred to, and that note was afterwards transferred to his *Treatise on Shipping*, vol. ii. 17. note.

The old and the new French codes of commerce require the charter-party to be in writing, though Valin holds that the contract, if by parol, would be
 *204 equally valid and binding.^a *In the English law, the hiring of ships without writing is undoubtedly valid; but it would be a very loose and dangerous practice, at least in respect to foreign voyages. In the river and coasting trade, there is less formality and less necessity for it; and the contract is, no doubt, frequently without the evidence of deed or writing.^b

If either party be not ready by the time appointed for loading the ship, the other party, if he be the charterer, may seek another ship, or if he be the owner, another cargo. This right arises from the necessity of precision and punctuality in all maritime transactions. By a very short delay, the proper season may be lost, or the object of the voyage defeated. And if the ship be loaded only in part, and she be hired exclusively for the voyage, and to take in a cargo at certain specified rates, the freighter is entitled to the full enjoyment of the ship; for he is answerable to the owner for freight, not only for the cargo actually put on board, but for what the vessel could have taken, had a full cargo been furnished.^c The master has no right to complete the lading with the goods of other persons, without the consent of the charterer; and if he grants that permission, the master must account to him for the freight. He has no right to complain, if the char-

^a *Ord. de la Mar.* liv. 3. tit. *des Charte-Parties*, art. 1, and *Valin's Com. ibid.* *Code de Commerce*, art. 273. The contract for demurrage beyond the lay days is frequently an express covenant in a charter-party, binding the cargo for the performance of the covenant to pay demurrage, as well as of the covenant to pay freight; and the lien is the same in both cases, unless subsequently waived by some explicit act on the part of the owner. See the case of the *Volunteer*, 1 *Sumner's Rep.* 551.

^b *Molloy, de Jure Mar.* b. 2. ch. 4. sec. 3. *Smith v. Shepherd*, cited in *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 4. sec. 1. *Boulay Paty*, tom. ii. 268, 269.

^c *Duffie v. Hayes*, 15 *Johns. Rep.* 327.

terer refuses to grant the permission, or complete the lading, provided he has cargo enough to secure his freight. This was the regulation of the French ordinance, and it has been adopted into the new code.^a

By the contract the owner is bound to see that the ship be seaworthy, which means that she must be tight, staunch, and strong, well furnished, manned, victualled, and, in all *respects, equipped in the *205 usual manner, for the merchant service in such a trade. The ship must be fit and competent for the sort of cargo and the particular service for which she is engaged. If there should be a latent defect in the vessel, unknown to the owner, and undiscoverable upon examination, yet the better opinion is, that the owner must answer for the damage occasioned by the defect. It is an implied warranty in the contract, that the ship be sufficient for the voyage, and the owner, like a common carrier, is an insurer against every thing but the excepted perils.^b To this head of seaworthiness, may be referred the owner's obligation to see that the ship is furnished with all the requisite papers according to the laws of the country to which she belongs, and according to treaties, and the law of nations. Such documents are necessary to secure the vessel from disturbance at home, on the high seas, and in foreign ports.^c If the charter-party

^a *Ord. du Fret*. art. 2. *Pothier, Charte-Partie*, n. 20, 21, 22, 24, 25. *Code de Commerce*, n. 287.

^b *Lyon v. Meils*, 5 *East's Rep.* 428. *Putnam v. Wood*, 3 *Mass. Rep.* 481. *Silva v. Low*, 1 *Johns. Cas.* 134. *Whitall v. The Brig William Henry*, 4 *Miller's Louis. Rep.* 223. *Ord. de la Mar.* liv. 3. tit. 3. *Du Fret*. art. 12. *Pothier, Charte-Partie*, No. 27. *Valin's Com.* h. t. says, (and in this he agrees with the English law,) that the owner is answerable, on his contract, for latent defects, even though the ship had been previously visited by experienced shipwrights, and the defect had escaped detection; though *Pothier (Charte-Partie, n. 30.)* dissents from this opinion of *Valin*, so far as it relates to latent defects unknown to the owner.

^c *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 3. sec. 4. *Baring v. The Royal Exchange Assurance Company*, 5 *East's Rep.* 99. The same *v. Christie*, *ibid.* 398. Ba-

contains any stipulation on the part of the owner to keep the ship in good order during the voyage, the entire expense of the repairs requisite in the course of the voyage, are then to be borne by the owner, and are not, *206 in that case, the *subject of general average or contribution.^a But the owner does not insure the cargo against the perils of the sea. He is answerable for his own fault, or negligence, or those of his agents, and for defects in the ship, or her equipment, and generally, as a common carrier, he is answerable for all losses other than what arise from the excepted cases of the act of God, and public enemies.^b The responsibility of the owner begins where that of the wharfinger ends, and when the goods are delivered to some accredited person on board the ship.^c The cargo must be taken on board with care and skill, and be properly stowed, and the contract by the bill of lading imports that the goods are to be safely stowed under deck, and if they are stowed on deck without the consent of the shipper, or without the sanction of custom, they are at the risk of the master, and he and the owners of the vessel would not be protected from liability for their loss by the exception in the bill of lading of the *dangers of the seas*.^d If the ship had been advertised by the agent of the owner for freight as a general ship, and the notice had stated that she was to sail with convoy, this would amount to an engagement to that effect ; and if she sails without convoy, and be lost,

ring v. Claggett, 3 Bos. & Pull. 201. Lothian v. Henderson, *ibid.* 499. *Ord. de la Mar.* liv. 3. tit. 1. *Charte-Parties*, art. 10. *Valin's Com.* h. t. The ship must be provided with a bill of health, when it is requisite at the port of destination. Levy v. Costerton, 4 *Campb.* 389. S. C. 1 *Starkie*, 212.

^a Jackson v. Charnock, 8 *Term Rep.* 509.

^b See vol. ii. 597.

^c Cobban v. Downe, 5 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 41.

^d The Rebecca, U. S. District Court for Maine, 1831. *Ware's Rep.* 188. Barber v. Brace, 3 *Conn. Rep.* 9. Dorsey v. Smith, 4 *Müller's Louis. Rep.* 211. Shackleford v. Wilcox, 9 *Louis. Rep.* 33.

the owner becomes answerable to the shipper in damages, for the breach of that representation.^a

(2.) *Of the bill of lading.*

In execution of the contract of charter-party, the master of the ship signs a bill of lading, which is an acknowledgment of the receipt of the goods on board, and of the conveyance of them which he assumes. The bill of lading contains the quantity and marks of the merchandise, the names of the *shipper and con- *207signee, the places of departure and discharge, the name of the master, and of the ship, with the price of the freight. The charter-party is the contract for the hire of the ship, and the bill of lading for the conveyance of the cargo; and though it be signed by the master, he does it as agent for the owners, and it is a contract binding upon them.^b By the bill of lading, the master engages as a common carrier to carry and deliver the goods to the consignee, or his order; and, by the common law, owners were responsible for damages to goods on board, to the full extent of the loss. But, in England, by the statute of 53 Geo. III. c. 159, owners, and part owners of ships, are not liable beyond the value of the ship and freight, even though the loss was occasioned by the misconduct of the master, and a part owner. This statute assimilated the common law of England to the maritime law of France, and other commercial countries; and the great principle was, to limit the responsibility of part owners to the amount of their respective capitals embarked in the ship. The value of the ship was to be calculated at the time of the loss, and the freight, in the

^a *Rungt v. Ditchell*, 3 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 64. *Magalhaem v. Busher*, 4 *Campb.* 54.

^b *Beaves' Lex Mercatoria*, 133. 142. *Ferguson v. Cappeau*, 6 *Harr. & Johns.* 394.

statute, means all the freight, whether paid in advance or not.^a

There are commonly three bills of lading; one for the freighter, another for the consignee, factor, or agent abroad, and a third is usually kept by the master for his own use. It is the document and title of the goods sent; and, as such, if it be to order, or assigns, is transferable in the market. The endorsement and delivery of it, transfers the property in the goods from the time of the delivery.^b The *bona fide* holder of the bill of lading, endorsed by the consignee is entitled to the goods, if he purchased the bill for a valuable consideration.

*208 *Where there are several bills of lading, each is a contract in itself as to the holder of it, but the whole make only one contract as to the master and owners. If the several parts of the bill of lading be endorsed to different persons, a competition may arise for the goods; and the rule generally is, that if the equities be equal, the property passes by the bill first endorsed.^c

(3.) *Of the carriage of the goods.*

When the ship is hired, and the cargo laden on board, the duties of the owner, and of his agent, the master, arise in respect to the commencement, progress, and termination of the voyage. Those duties are extremely important to the interests of commerce, and they

^a *Wilson v. Dickson*, 2 *Barnw. & Ald.* 2.

^b See vol. ii. 548—550. This is also the law in France. *Code de Commerce*, art. 281. A *shipping note* of goods at sea does not amount to a bill of lading, and it is not endorsable so as to effect a change of property, and arrest the right of stoppage *in transitu* by the consignor. *Akerman v. Humphrey*, 1 *Carr. & Payne*, 53.

^c *Caldwell v. Ball*, 1 *Term Rep.* 205. 1 *Bell's Com.* 545. When goods are sent by a ship hired by a charter-party, the bills of lading are delivered by the master to the person by whom the ship is chartered. But if they are sent by a *general ship*, employed as a general carrier, each individual who sends goods on board, receives a bill of lading for the same.

have been well and accurately defined in the marine law.^a

*When the voyage is ready, the master is bound *209 to sail as soon as the wind and tide permit ; but he ought not to set out in very tempestuous weather.^b If, by the charter-party, the ship was to sail by a given day, the master must do it, unless prevented by necessity ; and if there be an undertaking to sail with convoy, he is bound to go to the place of rendezvous, and place himself under the protection and control of the convoy, and continue, as far as possible, under that protection, during its course.^c He is bound, likewise, to obtain the requisite sailing instructions for the convoy ;^d but these covenants to sail with the first fair wind, and with convoy, are not conditions

^a The duties of the captain are prescribed minutely in the French statute codes. Every ship must be inspected by the captain, under the forms prescribed, before she sails, and if he has no such official report of the vessel, he becomes responsible for every accident. He must keep a regular journal of events on the voyage ; and the ordinances prescribe very sage regulations in case of the death of any seaman on board, touching his effects. He must be exact in providing the requisite ship's papers before he sails ; such as the bill of sale, register, *role d'équipage*, bill of lading, and charter-party, process verbal, clearance at the customs, and a license to sail. He must be on board when the vessel breaks ground. He is answerable for damages even by *cas fortuit*, when the goods were on deck, unless he had the consent of the owner in writing, or it was a coasting voyage ; and if he sails in conformity to the regulations of the ordinances, he becomes responsible for all damages, and cannot invoke the exception of *force majeure*, when those regulations have not been observed. (*Ord. de la Mar.* art. 10. tit. *Testament*, art. 4. *Ord.* 1720. 1739. 1779. *Code de Com.* art. 224, 225, 226. 228, 229. *Code Civil*, art. 59. 86. 1 *Emerigon*, 374. *Boulay Paty*, tom. ii. 1—35.) The foreign marine ordinances usually make special provision for the proper storage of the cargo. We have seen, in the preceding part of these lectures, that the master was responsible, as a common carrier, for the carriage and safe delivery of the goods ; and in the case of *Sprott v. Brown*, in the Scottish courts, (*Bell's Com.* vol. i. 557. note,) a large mirror was shipped from London to Edinburgh, in a case marked *glass*, and the master had assumed to carry it safe, and it was found broken, on delivery, without any known cause, and the master was held responsible.

^b *Roccus*, note 56. *Ord. of Rotterdam*, art. 128.

^c *Morley v. Bordieu*, *Str. Rep.* 1265. *Lilly v. Ewer*, *Doug. Rep.* 72. *Jefferies v. Legendra*, *Carth. Rep.* 216.

^d *Webb v. Thomson*, 1 *Bos. & Pull.* 5. *Anderson v. Pitcher*, 2 *ibid.* 164. *Victorin v. Clevee*, *Str. Rep.* 1250.

precedent to the recovery of freight, and a breach of them only goes to the question of damages.^a

The master is bound, likewise, to proceed to the port of delivery without delay, and without any unnecessary deviation from the direct and usual course. If he covenants to go to a loading port by a given time, he must do it, or abide the forfeiture;^b and if he be forced by perils out of his regular course, he must regain it with as little delay as possible. Nothing but some just and necessary cause, as to avoid a storm, or pirates, or enemies, or to

procure requisite supplies or repairs, or to relieve
 *210 a ship in distress, will justify a deviation *from
 the regular course of the voyage.^c If he deviates unnecessarily from the usual course, and the cargo be injured by tempests during the deviation, the deviation is a sufficiently proximate cause of the loss to entitle the freighter to recover; though if it could be shown that the same loss not only *might* but *must* have happened if there had not been any deviation, the conclusion might be otherwise.^d Nor has the captain any authority to substitute another voyage in the place of the one agreed upon between his owners and the freighters of the ship. Such a power is altogether beyond the scope of his authority as master.^e In cases of necessity, as where the ship is wrecked, or otherwise disabled, in the course of the voyage, and cannot be repaired, or cannot under the circumstances without too great delay and expense, the master may procure another competent vessel to carry on the

^a *Constable v. Cloberie*, *Palmer's Rep.* 397. *Davidson v. Gwynne*, 12 *East's Rep.* 381.

^b *Shubrick v. Salmond*, 3 *Burr. Rep.* 1637.

^c *Roccus on Ins.* note 52. *Patrick v. Ludlow*, 3 *Johns. Cas.* 10. *Post v. Phoenix Ins. Company*, 10 *Johns. Rep.* 79. *Reade v. Com. Ins. Company*, 3 *ibid.* 352. *Suydam v. Marine Ins. Company*, 2 *ibid.* 138. *Marshall, Ch. J.*, *Mason v. The Ship Blaireau*, 2 *Cranch's Rep.* 257. note.

^d *Davis v. Garrett*, 6 *Bingham*, 716.

^e *Burton v. Sharpe*, 2 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 529.

cargo and save his freight. If other means to forward the cargo can be procured, the master must procure them, or lose his freight; and if he offers to do it, and the freighter will not consent, he will then be entitled to his full freight.^a The Rhodian law^b exempted the master from his contract to carry the goods, if the ship became unnavigable by the perils of the sea. Faber and Vinnius were of opinion, that by the Roman law the master was *not bound*, in such a case, to seek another ship, because the contract related only to the *ship that *211 was disabled.^c The laws of Oleron, and the ordinances of Wisbuy, gave the *power* to the master to hire another vessel, if he chose to do so, and earn freight; but the marine ordinance of Louis XIV declared it to be *the duty* of the master to hire another ship in such a case, if it be in his power.^d The French jurists differ in opinion in respect to the obligation of the master to hire another vessel to carry on the cargo, when his own becomes irreparable. Valin and Pothier contend, that the master is no further bound to procure another vessel, than by losing his freight for the entire voyage if he omits to do it; for, by the contract of affreightment, he only engaged to furnish his own vessel, and when, by the perils of the sea, or by some superior force, for which he is not responsible, he becomes unable to furnish it, all that he is bound to do, by the principles of the contract, is to discharge the freighter from the freight for the residue of the voyage. But Emerigon insists, that they are mistaken in their

^a *Molloy*, b. 2. c. 4. sec. 5. *Griswold v. New-York Insurance Company*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 321. *Bradhurst v. Columbian Insurance Company*, 9 *ibid.* 17. *Schieffelin v. New-York Insurance Company*, *ibid.* 21.

^b *Dig.* 14. 2. 10. 1.

^c *Vinnius, notæ ad Com. Peckii, ad Rem Nauticam*, 294, 295, and *Anthony Faber, Com. ad Pand.*, whom Vinnius cites and follows.

^d *Jugemens d'Oleron*, art. 4. *Laws of Wisbuy*, art. 16. *Ord. de la Mar.* tit. *Du Fret*. art. 11.

construction of the ordinance, and that the master is guilty of a breach of duty, if he refuses to procure another vessel, and take on the cargo, if it be in his power, and that this duty results from the nature of his trust.^a

The new French code has followed the words of the ordinance, and declared, that if the vessel becomes disabled, and the master can have her repaired, the freighter is bound to wait, or pay the whole freight; and that if the vessel cannot be repaired, the master is bound to hire another, and if he cannot hire another, the freight is due only in proportion to the voyage performed. Bou-
 *212 lay Paty, in his commentaries *on the new code, adopts the construction of Emerigon, and holds his reasoning to be conclusive.^b Pardessus is also of the opinion that if the vessel in the course of the voyage becomes unnavigable, the master is bound, if it be in his power, to procure another.^c

The English rule undoubtedly is, that if the ship be disabled from completing the voyage, the ship-owner may still entitle himself to the whole freight, by forwarding the goods by some other means to the place of destination; and he has no right to any freight, if they be not so forwarded, unless it be dispensed with, or there be some new contract upon the subject.^d In this country we have followed the doctrine of Emerigon, and the spirit of the English cases, and hold it to be the duty of the master, from his character of agent of the owner of the cargo, which is cast upon him from the necessity of the case, to act in the port of necessity for the best interest of all concerned; and he has powers and discretion

^a *Valin*, tit. *Du Fret*. art. 11. tom. i. 618. *Pothier*, *Charte-Partie*, n. 68. *Emerigon*, tom. i. 428, 429.

^b *Code de Commerce*, art. 296. *Boulay Paty*, *Cours de Droit Com.* tom. ii. 400—405.

^c *Cours de Droit Com.* tom. iii. n. 644.

^d Lord Ellenborough, 10 *East's Rep.* 393.

adequate to the trust, and requisite for the safe delivery of the cargo at the port of destination. If there be another vessel, in the same or in a contiguous port, which can be had, the duty is clear and imperative upon the master to hire it; but still the master is to exercise a sound discretion adapted to the case. He may transship the cargo, if he has the means, or let it remain. He may bind it for repairs to the ship. He may sell part, or hypothecate the whole. If he hires another vessel for the completion of the voyage, he may charge the cargo with the increased freight, arising from the hire of the new ship; and this power is expressly given him by the old and the new ordinances of France, and it is established by decisions in New-York.^a The master may refuse to hire another vessel, and insist on repairing his own, and whether the freighter be bound to wait for the time to repair, or becomes entitled to his goods without any charge of freight, will depend upon circumstances. *What *213 would be a reasonable time for the merchant to wait for the repairs, cannot be defined, and must be governed by the facts applicable to the place and the time, and to the nature and condition of the cargo. A cargo, of a perishable nature, may be so deteriorated, as not to endure the delay for repairs, or to be too unfit and worthless to be carried on.^b The master is not bound to go to a distance to procure another vessel, and encounter serious impediments in the way of putting the cargo on board another vessel. His duty is only imperative when another vessel can be had in the same or in a contiguous port, or at one within a reasonable distance, and

^a *Mumford v. The Commercial Insurance Company*, 5 *Johns. Rep.* 262. *Searle v. Scovell*, 4 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 218.

^b *Herbert v. Hallet*, 3 *Johns. Cas.* 93. *Clark v. Mass. F. & M. Ins. Co.* 2 *Pick.* 104. *Hunt v. Royal Exchange Assurance Company*, 5 *Maule & Selw.* 47.

there be no great difficulties in the way of a safe reshipment of the cargo.^a

In the course of the voyage, the master is bound to take all possible care of the cargo, and he is responsible for every injury which might have been prevented by human foresight and prudence, and competent naval skill. He is chargeable with the most exact diligence.^b If the ship be captured during the voyage, the master is bound to render his exertions to rescue the property from condemnation, by interposing his neutral claims, and exhibiting all the documents in his power for the protection of the cargo.^c We have already seen, in what cases and to what extent the master may hypothecate or sell the cargo at a port of necessity; and if the ship, relieved at the expense of the goods pledged or sold, should afterwards perish, with the residue of the cargo on board, before arrival at the port of destination, the better opinion is, that the owner is not entitled to payment for the goods sold. The merchant is not placed in a worse
 *214 situation by the sale of the goods *than if they had remained on board the ship. But the foreign authorities are very much at variance on the point, and it remains yet to be settled in the English and American law.^d

^a *Salтус v. Ocean Ins. Co.* 12 *Johns. Rep.* 107. *Tredwell v. Union Ins. Co.* 6 *Cowen's Rep.* 270. See *Infra*, p. 321.

^b *Roccus*, n. 40. 55. *Dale v. Hall*, 1 *Wils. Rep.* 281. *Vinnius, notæ ad Peckium*, 259. 1 *Emerigon*, 373. *Proprietors of the Trent Navigation v. Wood*, 3 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 127.

^c *Cheviott v. Brooks*, 1 *Johns. Rep.* 364.

^d *Emerigon* has collected all the authorities, *pro* and *con*, on this very debatable question. See, *Hall's Emerigon on Maritime Loans*, 92. *Non nostrum tantas componere lites*. In favour of the right of the merchant to be paid, see the *Laws of Wisbuy*, art. 68. *Valin's Com. tit. Du Fret*, art. 14. vol. i. 655. *Cushing's Pothier on Maritime Contracts*, 19. *Charte-Partie*, n. 34, and *Cleirac, Jugemens d'Oleron*, art. 22. n. 2. In opposition to such a claim, *Emerigon* reasons from the provisions and omissions in the *Consolato del Mare*, and the *Ordinances of Oleron* and *Antwerp*, that the merchant is not entitled

(4.) *Of the delivery of the goods at the port of destination.*

On the arrival of the ship at the place of destination, the cargo is to be delivered to the consignee, or to the order of the shipper, on production of the bill of lading and payment of the freight. The English practice is, to send the goods to the wharf, with directions to the wharfinger not to part with them, until the freight and other charges are paid, provided the master be doubtful of the payment; for, by parting with the possession, the master loses his lien upon them for the freight.^a The cargo is bound to the ship as well as the ship to the cargo; but the master cannot detain the goods on board the ship until the freight be paid, for the merchant ought to have an opportunity to examine the condition of them previous to payment.^b The foreign ordinances of Wisbuy, and of Louis XIV, allow the master to detain the goods, while in the lighter or barge, on the passage to the quay, for they are still *in his possession.^c *215 The manner of delivery, and the period at which the responsibility of the owners and master ceases, will much depend upon usage.^d The general rule is, that delivery at the wharf (when there are no special directions to the contrary,) discharges the master.^e But the very reasonable qualification of the rule is, that there must be a delivery at the wharf to some person authorized to receive the goods, or due previous notice must have been

to pay. Pothier also admits, that experienced persons, whom he consulted on the subject, were against his opinion. *Abbott*, in his *Treatise on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 3. sec. 10, is also against the claim of the shipper to be paid for the goods sold.

^a *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 3. sec. 11. *Soldergreen v. Flight*, cited in 6 *East's Rep.* 622.

^b *Abbott, ub. sup.*

^c *Laws of Wisbuy*, art. 57. *Ord. de la Mar.* liv. 3. tit. *Du Fret.* art. 23.

^d *Wardell v. Mourillyan*, 2 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 693.

^e *Hyde v. Trent and Mersey Navigation Company*, 5 *Term. Rep.* 389. *Chickering v. Fowler*, 4 *Pick.* 371. *Cope v. Cordova*, 1 *Rawle*, 90. *Fox v. Blossom*, *New-York Common Pleas*, October, 1823.

given to the consignee of the time and place of delivery ; and the master cannot discharge himself, by leaving them naked and exposed at the wharf. His responsibility will continue until there is actual delivery, or some act which is equivalent, or a substitute for it, unless the owner of the goods, or his agent, had previously assumed the charge of the goods ;^a or at least until the consignee has had notice of the place and time of delivery, and the goods have been duly separated and designated for his use.^b

It is often difficult for the master of a vessel to know to whom he can safely deliver the goods, in case of conflicting claims between consignor and consignee, or consignor and the assignee of the consignee. Prudence would dictate that he deliver the goods to the party upon whose indemnity he can most safely rely. But he ought not to be put to the peril and necessity of indemnity ; and it is desirable that he should know to whom, of right, he can deliver the goods. If the consignee has failed,
 *216 he ought to deliver to the claimant, on *behalf of the consignee ; and if the consignee has assigned the bill of lading, and the rights of the consignor be still interposed and contested, it is safest for the master to deposit the goods with some bailee, until the rights of the claimants are settled, as they can always be, upon a bill of interpleader in chancery, to be filed by the master.^c Having made a consignment, the consignor or seller has not an unlimited power to vary it at pleasure. He may do it only for the purpose of protecting himself against the insolvency of the buyer or consignee.^d

^a *Strong v. Natally*, 4 *Bos. & Pull.* 16. *Ostrander v. Brown*, 15 *Johnson*, 39.

^b *Chickering v. Fowler*, *Cope v. Cordova*, and *Fox v. Blossom*, *supra*.

1 *Valin's Com.* 636. See, vol. ii. 604, 605. S. P.

^c *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 9. sec. 25.

^d *The Constantia*, 6 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 321. 1 *Emerigon des Ass.* 317.

(5.) *Of the responsibility of the ship-owner.*

The causes which will excuse the owners and master for the non-delivery of the cargo, must be events falling within the meaning of one of the expressions, act of God, and public enemies ; or they must arise from some event expressly provided for in the charter-party. It is well settled in the English and in our American law, that carriers by water, (and whether the carriage relates to foreign or inland navigation,) are liable as common carriers, in all the strictness and extent of the common law rule, unless the loss happens by means of one of the excepted perils.^a Perils of the sea denote natural accidents peculiar to that element, which do not happen by the intervention of man, nor are to be prevented by human prudence. A *casus fortuitus* was defined in the civil law to be, *quod damno fatali contingit, cuivis diligentissimo possit contingere*. It is a loss happening in spite of all human effort and sagacity. The only exception to this definition is, the case of a vessel captured and plundered by pirates, and that has been adjudged to be a peril of the *sea.^b A loss by lightning is within the exception *217 of the act of God ; but a loss by fire, proceeding from any other cause, is chargeable upon the ship-owner.^c The moment the goods are transferred from the ship or the lighter to the warehouse, this extraordinary responsibility ends, and the warehouseman is not so responsible.^d

It is often a difficult point to determine, whether the

^a See vol. ii. 598—600.

^b *Pickering v. Barkley, Styles*, 132. *Barton v. Wolliford, Comb.* 56.

^c *Forward v. Pittard*, 1 *Term Rep.* 27. *Hyde v. Trent and Mersey Navigation Company*, 5 *ibid.* 389. In *Hunt v. Morris*, 6 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 676, it was held that the owners of a steamboat destroyed by fire were not liable to the freighters, if proper diligence was used. But the owner is liable to the freighter for damages arising from fire to the ship, occasioned by gross and culpable negligence in the mode of fitting up the ship or otherwise. *Hunter v. the Owners of the Morning Star. Newfoundland Rep.* 270.

^d *Garside v. Trent and Mersey Navigation Company*, 4 *Term Rep.* 581.

disaster happened by a peril of the sea, or unavoidable accident, or by the fault, negligence, or want of skill of the master. If a rock or a sand-bar be generally known, and the ship be not forced upon it by adverse winds or tempests, the loss is to be imputed to the fault of the master. But if the ship be forced upon such rock or shallow by winds or tempests, or if the bar was occasioned by a recent and sudden collection of sand, in a place where ships could before sail with safety, the loss is to be attributed to a peril of the sea, which is the same as the *vis major*, or *casus fortuitus* of the civil law.^a What is an excusable peril, depends a good deal upon usage, and the sense and practice of merchants; and it is a question of fact, to be settled by the circumstances peculiar to the case. The English statute law has exempted ship-owners in some of these hard cases; but, with the exception of a statute in Massachusetts, passed in 1818, and re-enacted in the revised statutes of 1835, limiting the responsibility of owners for the acts of the master and mariners, to the value of the ship and freight, and of a similar statute in Maine,^b I do not know of any such statute exemptions in this country. The owner is bound for the whole amount of the injury done by the master or crew, unless where ordinances or statutes have established a different rule.^c By the

*218 general maritime law of Europe, the *responsibility of owners of vessels for the wrongful acts of masters, is limited to the value of the vessel and freight, and by abandoning them to the creditor they may discharge themselves.^d And it appears very clearly, that by the

^a *Smith v. Shepherd*, cited in *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 4. sec. 1.

^b *Laws of Maine*, vol. i. ch. 14. sec. 8.

^c See vol. ii. 606, and *supra*, p. 207, where the exemptions from responsibility under the English statutes are stated.

^d *Consulat de la Mer*, tom ii. 41. *Emerigon, Contrats a la Grosse*, ch. 4. sec. 11, who refers to the principal foreign authorities on the point. *Boulay*

general maritime law, a lien exists in favour of the merchant, who ships merchandise in a vessel on freight, against the vessel for the non-performance of the contract of affreightment, under the bill of lading, entered into by the master in his quality of master, and that it may be enforced by process *in rem*. The ship itself, in specie, is considered as a security to the merchant who lades goods on board of her, and it makes no difference whether the vessel be in the employment of the owner directly, or be let by a charter-party to a hirer, who was to have the whole control of her. *By custom*, says Cleirac, *the ship is bound to the merchandise and the merchandise to the ship*.^a

By the civil law, the owners were responsible *in solido* for all the obligations of the master, in his character of master, to their full extent, whether arising *ex contractu* or *ex delicto*. But by the maritime law, the owner is not responsible for the wrongful acts of the master beyond his interest in the vessel and freight, and by abandoning them he is discharged, while the ship continues liable in specie, and the shipper has so far a privilege against it over the general creditors.^b

Paty, Cours de Droit Com. tom. i. 263—298. The latter discusses the subject with his usual comprehensive erudition.

^a *Us et Coutumes de la Mer*, 72. *Ibid.* 503. *Navigation des Rivières*, art. 18, 19. *Consulat de la Mer*, tom. ii. p. 80. 90. 104. 455. ch. 58. 63. 72. 259. 289. *Ord. de la Marine*, l. 14. 16. 1 *Valin's Com.* 362. Lord *Tenterden*, in his *Treatise on Shipping*, 170, admits this to be the rule of the maritime law, but denies that the court of admiralty, in England, has jurisdiction to enforce the lien upon the ship *in behalf of the shipper*. That principle of maritime law, therefore, lays dormant, from the want of a court of law or equity to enforce it *in rem*. But in the case of the *Rebecca*, in the admiralty court of the District of Maine, Judge Ware thought himself bound, and on solid grounds, to adopt the principle of the marine law, and he gave a remedy *in rem* against the vessel, in favour of the shipper, for the wrongful acts of the master. *Ware's Rep.* 188. The *Phebe*, *ibid.* 263. S. P.

^b This, says Emerigon, (*Contrats a la Grosse*, ch. 4. sec. 11,) was the nautical law of the middle ages, and of the north of Europe, as well as of the ordinance of the marine, and he refers for the support of his assertions to all the leading text authorities; and it is, no doubt, the settled law of the maritime nations of continental Europe. But this limitation of the owner's responsibility,

(6.) *Of the duties of the shipper.*

We have seen what are the general duties of the master. Those on the part of the charterer are, to use the ship in a lawful manner, and for the purpose for which it was let. Usually, the command of the ship is reserved to the owner, and to the master by him appointed, and the merchant has not the power to detain the ship beyond the stipulated time, or employ her in any other than the stipulated service, and if he does he must answer in damages.^a If the freighter puts on board prohibited or contraband goods, by means whereof the ship is subjected to detention and forfeiture, he must answer to the ship-owner for the consequences of the act.^b And if the merchant declines to lade the ship according to contract, or to furnish a return cargo, as he had engaged to do, he must render in damages due compensation for the loss; and the English law leaves such questions at large

*219 to a jury, without *defining beforehand the rate of compensation, in imitation of some of the ordinances in the maritime codes.

(7.) *Of the payment of freight.*

Freight, in the common acceptance of the term, means the price for the actual transportation of goods by sea

so far as regards the faults of the master, has never been adopted in England or in this country, except by special statute authority, as we have already mentioned, and the common law, like the civil law, holds the owner responsible, without any such limitation. *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 5. Mr. Justice Ware, in the case of the *Rebecca*, above cited, has examined this subject with deep and accurate research, and arrives at the same conclusion with the judges in the Louisiana cases. Porter, J., in *Malpica v. M'Kown*, 1 *Miller's Louis. Rep.* 259. Martin, J., in *Arayo v. Carvell*, *ibid.* 539. The note of the case of the *Rebecca*, in the preceding edition of this volume, was taken from the *Jurist*. The opinion of the learned Judge is now more fully and correctly given in his own volume of reports, and it is, as far as the subject extends, a masterly examination of the maritime jurisprudence of Europe.

^a *Lewin v. East India Company*, *Peake's Rep.* 241.

^b *Smith v. Elder*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 105.

from one place to another; but, in its more extensive sense, it is applied to all rewards or compensation paid for the use of ships.^a The personal obligation to pay freight, rests either on the charter-party, or on the bill of lading, by which the payment of freight is made a condition of delivery; and the general rule is, that the delivery of the goods at the place of destination, according to the charter-party, is necessary to entitle the owner of the vessel to freight. The conveyance and delivery of the cargo is a condition precedent, and must be fulfilled. A partial performance is not sufficient, nor can a partial payment, or ratable freight, be claimed, except in special cases, and those cases are exceptions to the general rule, and called for by the principles of equity.^b

The amount of freight is usually fixed by agreement between the parties, and if there be no agreement, the amount is ascertained by the usage of the trade, and the reason of the case. If the hiring be of the whole ship, or for an entire part of her for the voyage, the merchant must pay the freight, though he does not fully lade the ship. But if he agrees to pay in proportion to the amount of the goods put on board, and does not agree to provide a full cargo, the owner can demand payment only for the cargo actually shipped. If the merchant agrees to furnish a return cargo, and he furnishes none, and lets the ship return in ballast, he must make compensation to the

^a 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 206.

^b If the cargo be tendered to the consignee at the port of discharge, and the government of the place refuse permission to land it, yet the freight is earned. *Morgan v. Insurance Company of North America*, 4 *Dallas' Rep.* 455. Mr. Justice Story, in the case of the *Ship Hooker*, *U. S. C. C. Mass.* May, 1839, laid down the general rule, that freight for the entire voyage could only be earned by a due performance of the voyage, and that the only acknowledged exception, is where there is no default or inability of the carrier ship to perform the voyage, and the ship-owner is ready to forward them, but there is a default on the part of the owner of the cargo, or he waives a further prosecution of the voyage.

amount of the freight; and this is sometimes termed dead freight, in contradistinction to freight due for the actual carriage of goods.^a

*220 *It is supposed to be the doctrine of the case of

Bell v. Puller,^b that the master would be entitled to freight for bringing back the outward cargo, if it could not be disposed of, though the charter-party was silent as to a return cargo. It would stand upon the equity of the claim to dead freight.^c The French law, in such a case, allows freight for bringing back the cargo, because it could not be sold, or was not permitted to be landed.^d

If there be no express agreement in the case, the master is not bound to part with the goods until the freight be paid, for, by the common law, there is a lien on the goods shipped for the freight due thereon, whether it arise under a common bill of lading, or under a charter-party, though the lien may be waived or displaced by any special agreement inconsistent with the lien.^e But if the master refuses to deliver the goods for other cause than the non-payment of freight, he cannot avail himself of the want of a tender. When the regulations of the revenue require the goods to be landed and deposited in a public ware-

^a *Roccus*, note 72, 73, 74, 75. *Edwin v. East India Company*, 2 *Vern. Rep.* 210. *Atkinson v. Richie*, 10 *East's Rep.* 530. *Peters, J.*, in *Giles v. The Brig Cynthia*, 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 207.

^b 2 *Taunt. Rep.* 286.

^c *Laves on Charter-Parties*, 152.

^d *Boulay Paty*, tom. ii. 391. In the case of the Schooner Volunteer and cargo, 1 *Sumner*, 577, Mr. Justice Story, after a skilful criticism of the English cases, was of opinion that the owner would be entitled to hold the cargo by way of lien for the freight in such a case. But the owner cannot rightfully refuse to land the cargo before the freight is paid or secured, for the shipper has a right, after the goods are unlivered, to examine them, and to see whether they are damaged, and the damages, if any, ascertained, and then, after the discharge, the owner has the right to detain the cargo in custody, until payment or security of the freight. *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 3. sec. 11. p. 247, 248. 1 *Valin*, lib. 3. tit. 3. art. 21. p. 665. *Pardessus, Droit Com.* part 3. tit. 4. ch. 2. art. 719. *Case of certain logs of mahogany*, 2 *Sumner*, 601, 602.

^e The Schooner Volunteer and cargo, 1 *Sumner*, 551.

house, the master may enter them in his own name, and preserve the lien. The shipper of goods on freight has a lien on the vessel for the loss of the goods, by reason of the non-performance of the contract entered into by the master in the bill of lading. *The ship is bound to the merchandise and the merchandise to the ship*, according to the language of Cleirac.^a By a common clause in charter-parties, the owner binds the ship, and the charterer binds the cargo, to the performance of all the covenants in the charter-party, though the right of lien for freight does not absolutely depend on any covenant to pay freight. If there be such a covenant it creates a lien or pledge on the cargo, to be enforced by a suit *in rem*, or by detaining the cargo until the freight be paid.^b The English courts of common law will not allow such a lien to be enforced by the Admiralty *in rem*, but the justice and necessity of such a jurisdiction is admitted and not invoked in vain in this country, and the lien may be enforced by process *in rem* against the vessel or the proceeds of the cargo in the district courts.^c The ship-owner's lien for freight is gone when the charterer is constituted owner, and takes exclusive possession for the voyage, *or when the *221 payment of the freight is, by agreement, postponed beyond the time, or at variance with the time and place, for the delivery of the goods. But without a plain intent to the contrary, the ship-owner will not be presumed to have relinquished his lien on the cargo for the freight, notwithstanding he has chartered the vessel to another.^d

^a *Us et Coutumes de la Mer*, p. 72.

^b The Schooner Volunteer and cargo, 1 *Sumner*, 572, 573.

^c *Cleirac, Us et Coutumes de la Mer*, 72. *Boulay Paty*, vol. ii. 297. *Crane v. The Rebecca*, *Ware's Rep.* 188. The Schooner Volunteer and cargo, 1 *Sumner*, 551.

^d *Chandler v. Belden*, 18 *Johus. Rep.* 157. *Clarkson v. Edes*, 4 *Cowen's Rep.* 470. *Ruggles v. Bucknor*, 1 *Paine's Rep.* 358. *Christie v. Lewis*, 2 *Brod. & Bing.* 410. *Pickman v. Wood*, 6 *Pick. Rep.* 248. *Drinkwater v. The Brig Spartan*, *Ware's Rep.* 149. *Fernandee v. Silva*, 1 *Miller's Louis. Rep.* 274.

The general right of the master and owner to retain the goods for the freight is equally perfect, whether the merchant takes the whole vessel by a charter-party, or sends his goods in a general ship. The lien applies whether the hire of the vessel be stipulated in a charter-party, or the freight be stipulated in the bill of lading. The owner is equally the carrier in both cases. But if, instead of letting the use of the ship to freight, the vessel itself be let to hire, and the charterer has the possession and right of control, he is then considered as owner for the voyage, and the general owner, who has parted with the possession, has no lien on the cargo for the hire of the ship.^a When the goods are to be delivered to the consignee on payment of freight, the consignee makes himself responsible by receiving the goods under the usual condition expressed in the bill of lading.^b And if the goods, by the bill of lading, were to be delivered to B., or his assigns, he or they paying freight, and the assignee receives the goods, he is responsible to the master for the freight, under the implied undertaking to pay it.^c So, if the master delivers the goods without payment of the freight, *222 he may sue the consignee to *whom the goods were to be delivered, on payment of freight, upon an implied promise to pay the freight, in consideration of his letting the goods out of his hands before payment.^d It was once held, that if the master parted with the goods to the consignee without securing his freight, he was deprived of all recourse to the consignor; but it is now decided otherwise. If the master cannot recover the freight from the consignee to whom he has delivered the goods

^a *Drinkwater v. The Brig Spartan*, *Ware's Rep.* 149. *Christie v. Lewis*, 2 *Brod. & Bing.* 410. Story, J., in *Kleine v. Catara*, 2 *Gall. Rep.* 68.

^b *Roberts v. Holt*, 2 *Show. Rep.* 432.

^c *Cock v. Taylor*, 2 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 537, afterwards affirmed in *K. B.*, 13 *East*, 399. *Dougall v. Kemble*, 3 *Bing. Rep.* 383. *S. P.*

^d *Mansfield, Ch. J.*, in *Brouncker v. Scott*, 4 *Taunt. Rep.* 1.

without receiving the freight, he still has his remedy over on the charter-party against the shipper, and the condition precedent to the delivery inserted in the bill of lading was intended only for the master's benefit.^a The buyer of the goods from the consignee is not answerable for the freight, for that would prove to be a most inconvenient check to the transactions of business; and the buyer takes independent of the charge of freight, unless that charge forms part of the terms of sale. Nor would he be liable even if he should enter the goods at the custom-house in his own name, while the freight was unpaid.^b

If part of the cargo be sold on the voyage from necessity, the owner, as we have seen, pays the value at the port of delivery, deducting his freight, equally as if the goods had arrived. But if the ship be prohibited an entry by the government of the country, and such prohibition takes place after the commencement of the voyage, and the cargo be brought back, the freight for the outward voyage has been held to have been earned; and the case was distinguished (though, I think, the distinction is not very obvious) from that of a blockade of the port of destination, and decided on the authority of the French ordinance of the marine.^c Nothing can be more just, observes *Valin, than that the outward *223 freight should be allowed, in such a case, since the interruption proceeds from an extraordinary cause, independent of the ordinary maritime perils.^d The case of a

^a *Tapley v. Martens*, 8 *Term Rep.* 451. *Christy v. Rowe*, 1 *Taunt. Rep.* 300. *Shepherd v. De Bernales*, 13 *East*, 565. *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 4. sec. 4. *Barker v. Havens*, 17 *Johnson*, 234. But in this last case the goods were owned by the consignor, and shipped on his account, and had that not been the case, the action would not have been sustained. If there be no charter-party, the shipper was held, by Lord Tenterden, not to be liable in such a case. *Drew v. Bird*, 1 *Moody & Mason*, 156.

^b *Artaza v. Smallpiece*, 1 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 23.

^c *Morgan v. Insurance Company of North America*, 4 *Dallas' Rep.* 455.

^d *Ord. tit. Du Fret. art. 15. Valin, ibid. Code de Commerce, art. 299.*

blockade of, or interdiction of commerce with, the port of discharge, after the commencement of the voyage, is held to be different; for, in that case, the voyage is deemed to be broken up, and the charter-party dissolved; and if the cargo, by reason of that obstacle, be brought back, no freight is due.^a The same principle applies if the voyage be broken up and lost, by capture upon the passage, so as to cause a complete defeasance of the undertaking, notwithstanding there was a subsequent recapture, as in the case of the *Hiram*.^b On the other hand, an embargo detaining the vessel at the port of departure, or in the course of the voyage, does not, of itself, work a dissolution of the contract. It is only a temporary restraint, which suspends, for a time, its performance, and leaves the rights of the parties in relation to each other, untouched.^c If the ship be laden, and be captured before she breaks ground, and afterwards recaptured, but the voyage broken up, the ship-owners are not entitled to any freight, though, by the usage of the trade, the ship was laden at their expense. It is requisite that the ship break ground, to give an inception to freight.^d It is the same thing with a blockade, or hostile investment of the port of departure. Such an obstacle does not discharge the contract of affreightment, because it is merely

*224 a temporary suspension of its performance; and the ship-owner may detain the goods until he can prosecute the voyage with safety, or until the freighter tenders him the full freight. This was the decision in the case of *Palmer v. Lorillard*,^e in which the doctrine

^a *Scott v. Libby*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 336. *Liddard v. Lopes*, 10 *East's Rep.* 526.

^b 3 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 180.

^c *Hadley v. Clarke*, 8 *Term Rep.* 259. *M'Bride v. Marine Insurance Company*, 5 *Johns. Rep.* 308. *Baylies v. Fettyplace*, 7 *Mass. Rep.* 325.

^d *Curling v. Long*, 1 *Bos. & Pull.* 634.

^e 16 *Johns. Rep.* 348.

was extensively examined ; and it was shown, by a reference to the foreign ordinances, and the soundest classical writers on maritime law,^a that the master, in the case of such an invincible obstacle of a temporary nature to the prosecution of the voyage, is entitled to wait for the removal of it, so that he may earn his freight, unless the cargo consists of perishable articles which cannot endure the delay. He stands upon a principle of equity which pervades the maritime law of Europe, if he refuses to surrender the cargo to the shipper without some equitable allowance in the shape of freight, for his intermediate service.

When the goods become greatly deteriorated on the voyage, it has been a very litigated question, whether the consignee was bound to take the goods, and pay the freight, or whether he might not abandon the goods to the master in discharge of the freight. Valin and Pothier entertained opposite opinions upon this question.^b The former insists, that the regulation of the ordinance holding the merchant liable for freight on deteriorated goods, without the right to abandon them in discharge of the freight, is too rigorous to be compatible with equity. He says the cargo is the only proper fund and pledge for the freight, and that *Casaregis*^c was of the same opinion. Pothier, on the other hand, was against the right of the owner to abandon the deteriorated goods in discharge of the *freight; and this is *225 the better opinion, and the one adopted in the case of *Griswold v. The New-York Insurance Company*.^d

^a *Ord. de la Mar.* liv. 3. tit. 3. *Fret.* art. 15, and tit. *Charte-Partie*, art. 3. Valin, h. t. Pothier, *Charte-Partie*, No. 69. 100, 101. *Laws of Oleron*, art. 4. *Consulat*, par Boucher, ch. 80. 82. 84. *Roccus de Nav.* n. 54. *Jacobson's Sea Laws*, by Frick, 295.

^b Valin's *Com.* tom. i. 670. Pothier, *Charte-Partie*, No. 59.

^c *Disc.* 22. n. 46, and *Disc.* 23. n. 86, 87.

^d 3 *Johns. Rep.* 321. Mr. Bell says it is likewise the law in Scotland. 1 *Bell's Com.* 570.

It is in accordance with the ordinances of the marine, and of Rotterdam, and with the new commercial code of France; and the latter puts an end to all further doubt and discussion on the subject in France.^a The ship-owner performs his engagement when he carries and delivers the goods. The right to his freight then becomes absolute, and the carrier is no more an insurer of the soundness of the cargo, as against the perils of the sea, or its own intrinsic decay, than he is of the price in the market to which it is carried. If he has conducted himself with fidelity and vigilance in the course of the voyage, he has no concern with the diminution of the value of the cargo. It may impair the remedy which his lien afforded, but it does not affect his personal demand against the shipper.

If casks contain wine, rum, or other liquids, or sugar, and the contents be washed out, and wasted, and lost, by the perils of the sea, so that the casks arrive empty, no freight is due for them; but the ship-owner would still be entitled to his freight, if the casks were well stowed, and their contents were essentially gone by leakage, or inherent waste, or imperfection of the casks.^b

Should the cargo consist of live stock, as is frequently the case in voyages from this country to the West Indies, and some of the horses or cattle, for instance, should die in the course of the voyage, without any fault or negligence of the master or crew, and there be no express agreement respecting the payment of freight, the general rule is, that the freight is to be paid for all that were put on
 *226 board. But if the agreement *was to pay for the transportation of them, then no freight is due for those that die on the voyage, as the contract is not, in that

^a *Ord. tit. Du Fret. art. 25. Ord. of Rotterdam, art. 155. Code de Com. art. 305. 310. Boulay Paty, tom. ii. 483.*

^b *Molloy, b. 2. c. 4. sec. 14. Frith v. Barker, 2 Johns. Rep. 327.*

case, performed.^a The foreign marine law allows freight paid in advance to be recovered back, if the goods be not carried, nor the voyage performed, by reason of any event not imputable to the shipper.^b The reason is, that the consideration for the payment, which was the carriage of the goods, has failed. But the marine ordinances admit, that the parties may stipulate that the freight so previously advanced shall, at all events, be retained. In *Watson v. Duykinck*,^c the rule of the marine law was recognised, though it was not applied to that case, because the contract there appeared to be, that the freight was paid for receiving the passenger and his goods on board; and, in such a case, the payment is to be retained, though the vessel and cargo be lost on the voyage. The general principle of the marine law was admitted, in the fullest latitude, in *Griggs v. Austin*;^d and whether the freight previously advanced is to be retained or returned, becomes a question of intention in the construction of the contract. The French ordinances require a special agreement to enable the ship-owner to retain the freight paid in advance; and Valin says,^e that many authors on maritime jurisprudence, as Kuricke, Loccenius, and Straccha, will not allow even such a special agreement to be valid.^f *The English law is not so scrupulous, *227 and does not require any such express stipulation, and allows the intention of the parties to retain the previously advanced freight to be more easily inferred.

^a *Dig.* 14. 2. 10. *Molloy*, b. 2. c. 4. sec. 8.

^b *Ord. de la Mar.* tit. *Du Fret.* art. 18. *Roccus, de Nav. et Naulo*, n. 80. *Cleirac, les Us et Coutumes de la Mer*, 42. *Code de Commerce*, art. 302.

^c 3 *Johns. Rep.* 335.

^d 3 *Pick. Rep.* 20.

^e *Com.* tom. i. 661.

^f *Straccha*, in his *Tractatus de Mercatura*, tit. *De Nav.* part 3. n. 24, as referred to by Valin, does not support the reference. He only says, it was a question, whether the advanced freight was to be returned when the goods were not carried, and that a ratable freight, in such case, was equitable.

In *De Silvale v. Kendall*,^a the Court of K. B. adopted a directly opposite principle, and observed, that if the charter-party was silent, the law would require a performance of the voyage before freight was due; but the parties might stipulate, that part of the freight be paid in anticipation, and be made free from subsequent contingency of loss, by reason of loss of the subsequent voyage. If freight be paid in advance, and there be no express stipulation that it shall be returned in the event of freight not being earned, the inference is, that the parties did not intend that the payment of the part in advance should be subject to the risk of the remainder of the voyage; and without some provision of that kind, a new implied contract to that effect could not be raised.

The question, as to the right to a ratable freight, arises in two cases; (1.) when the ship has performed the whole voyage, and has brought only a part of her cargo to the place of destination; (2.) when she has not performed her whole voyage, and the goods have been delivered to the merchant, at a place short of the port of delivery. In the case of a general ship, or one chartered for freight, to be paid according to the quantity of goods, freight is due for what the ship delivers.^b The contract, in such a case, is divisible in its own nature. But if the ship be chartered at a specific sum for the voyage, and she loses part of her cargo by a peril of the sea, and conveys the residue, it has been a question, whether the freight could be apportioned. The weight of authority, in the English books; is against the apportionment of freight in such a case,^c

^a 4 *Maule & Selw.* 37. In *Saunders v. Drew*, 3 *Barnw & Adolph.* 445, the doctrine of the case of *De Silvale v. Kendall*, was admitted, that freight paid in advance, could not be recovered back without an agreement to that effect.

^b *Ritchie v. Atkinson*, 10 *East's Rep.* 295.

^c *Bright v. Cowper*, 1 *Brownlow*, 21, and this case is cited with approbation by *Grose, J.*, in 7 *Term Rep.* 385. *Malynes*, in his *Lex Mercatoria*, 100, is of opinion, that there is no freight due, though he speaks in a loose and questionable manner. But *Abbott*, in his *Treatise on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 7. sec. 9,

and the question has been repeatedly discussed *and determined of late years. It has been held *228 that the contract of affreightment was an entire contract; and unless fully performed by delivery of the whole cargo, no freight was due under the charter-party, in the case where the ship was chartered for a specific sum for the voyage. The delivery of the whole cargo is, in such a case, a condition precedent to the recovery of freight. The stipulated voyage must be actually performed. A partial performance is not sufficient, nor can a partial payment be claimed, except in special cases.^a

The apportionment of freight usually happens, when the ship is forced into a port short of her destination, and cannot finish the voyage. In that case, if the owner of the goods will not allow the master a reasonable time to repair, or to proceed in another ship, the master will be entitled to the whole freight, because the freighter is the cause of the contract not being performed. But if he consents, and the master refuses to go on, he is not entitled to freight, because he has not performed his contract. To entitle himself to freight, the master must proceed, or offer to proceed, in another vessel, or repair his own, and take on the cargo; and if he proceeds, he reassumes his usual risk of losing the freight, by *the loss of the cargo in the subsequent part *229 of the voyage, or of earning freight by its safe arrival and delivery at the port of destination. If, how-

thinks it hard that the owners should lose the whole benefit of the voyage, where the object of it has been in part performed, and no blame is imputable to them. *Holt*, in his *System of Shipping*, Int. 89, says, that a partial freight is due, when the ship has brought part of the goods in safety to the place of destination, for a proportionate benefit has been received.

^a *Post & Russell v. Robertson*, 1 *Johns. Rep.* 24. *The Ship Hooper*, *U. S. C. C. Mass.* May, 1839. See, also, *Clarke v. Gurnell*, 1 *Bulst.* 167. *Cook v. Jennings*, 7 *Term Rep.* 381. *Osgood v. Groning*, 2 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 466, in which the necessity of a precise performance of the covenant to transport and deliver the cargo is required, before an action for the freight can be maintained.

ever, the merchant accepts the goods at the intermediate port, the general rule of the marine law, is, that freight is to be paid according to the proportion of the voyage performed, and the law will imply such a contract. This doctrine pervades the marine ordinances and writers on marine law;^a and it is now equally well settled in the English and American law, that freight, *pro rata itineris*, is due, when the ship, by inevitable necessity, is forced into a port short of her destination, and is unable to prosecute the voyage, and the goods are there voluntarily accepted by the owner. Such acceptance constitutes the basis of the rule for a *pro rata* freight; and it must be a voluntary acceptance, and not one forced upon the owner, by any illegal or violent proceeding. The numerous cases upon which this doctrine is sustained, are all founded upon that of *Luke v. Lyde*, and that case rested upon the decision in the House of Lords, in 1733, in *Lutwidge & How v. Grey*.^b If the outward and homeward voyages be distinct, freight is recoverable for the one, though the other be not performed. But if, by the terms of the contract, they be one voyage, and the ship performs the outward, and fails to perform the homeward voyage, no freight is recoverable.^c

*230 *The rule by which the amount of the ratable

^a *Laws of Oleron*, art. 4. *Ord. of Wisbuy*, art. 16. *Roccus*, n. 81. *Straccha de Navibus*, part 3. n. 24. *Ord. de la Mar.* liv. 3. tit. 3. *Du Fret*, art. 21, 22.

^b *Luke v. Lyde*, 2 *Burr.* 883. *Cooke v. Jennings*, 7 *Term Rep.* 381. *Hunter v. Prinsep*, 10 *East's Rep.* 378. *Liddard v. Lopes*, *ibid.* 526. *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 7. sec. 13. *Robinson v. Marine Insurance Company*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 323. *Hurton v. Union Ins. Company*, cited in *Condy's Marshall on Ins.* 281. 601. *Caze & Richard v. Baltimore Insurance Company*, 7 *Cranch's Rep.* 358. *Armroyd v. Union Insurance Company*, 3 *Binney*, 437. *Welch v. Hicks*, 6 *Cowen's Rep.* 504. *Vance v. Clark*, 1 *Miller's Louis. Rep.* 324. *Tio v. Vance*, 11 *Louis. Rep.* 199. *The Ship Hooper*, *U. S. C. C. Mass.* May, 1839.

^c *Lawes on Charter-Parties*, 149, 150. *Mackrell v. Simond*, 2 *Chitty's Rep.* 666.

freight is to be ascertained, is, to ascertain how much of the voyage had been performed when the disaster happened, which compelled the vessel to seek a port, according to the mode of adjustment pursued in *Luke v. Lyde*; or else to calculate how much of the voyage had been performed, when the goods arrived at the port of necessity, according to the better course pursued in the cases in this country.^a

(S.) *Of loss from collision of ships.*

This has been a difficult subject for discussion and decision, and various opinions have been entertained by the writers on maritime law. The evidence as to the true cause of the collision is of difficult access. The accident usually happens in the darkness of night, or in a storm, and is necessarily accompanied with confusion and agitation. When the fact is clear, that a fault was committed by one party, or that he was in want of due skill or care, and the disaster was the consequence thereof, the party in fault must pay all the damages. There are settled nautical rules, by which, in most cases, the want of skill, or care, or duty, may be ascertained. Thus, the vessel that has the wind free, or is sailing before or with the wind, must get out of the way of the vessel that is close-hauled, or sailing by or against it. The vessel on the starboard tack has a right to keep her wind, and the vessel on the larboard tack is bound to bear up or heave about to avoid danger, or be answerable for the consequences.^b The vessel to windward is to keep away when both vessels are going the same course in a narrow channel, and there is danger of running afoul of

^a *Marine Insurance Company v. Lenox*, cited and approved of in *Robinsons v. Marine Insurance Company*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 323. *Coffin v. Storer*, 5 *Mass. Rep.* 252.

^b *The Woodrop Sims*, 2 *Dod. Adm. Rep.* 83. *The Thames*, 5 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 345. *Jameson v. Drinkald*, 12 *Moore*, 148.

each other.^a But in the case of a steam-vessel,
 *231 *which has greater power, and is more under
 command, she is bound to give way to a vessel
 with sails.^b So, a neglect of due means to check a vessel
 entering a river or harbour where others lie at anchor, is
 a fault which creates responsibility for damages which
 may ensue.^c Where the collision arose by *vis major*, or
 physical causes exclusively, and without any negligence
 or fault in any one, open or concealed, the proprietors of
 the ship or cargo injured must bear their own loss, and it
 is not the subject of apportionment, or contribution, or of
 general average in any form. This was the doctrine of
 the Roman law.^d The greatest difficulty on the subject,
 has arisen in the cases in which the collision proceeded
 evidently from error, neglect, or want of sufficient pre-
 caution, but the neglect, or fault, was either inscrutable,
 or equally imputable to both parties. In this case, of
 blame existing which is undiscoverable, the marine law,
 by a *rusticum judicium*, apportions the loss, as having
 arisen equally by the fault of both parties.^e The rule is

^a *Marsh v. Blythe*, 1 *M'Cord*, 360.

^b *The Shannon*, 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 173. In the case of *Lowry v. The Steamboat Portland*, in the *U. S. D. C. for Mass.* January, 1839, it was certified by experienced navigators, and adjudged by the court, as the rule on the subject, that when two vessels approach each other, both having a free or fair wind, each vessel passes to the right; and that a steamer was considered as always sailing with a fair wind, and is bound to do whatever a sailing vessel going free, or with a fair wind, would be required to do under similar circumstances.

^c *The Neptune* 2d, 1 *Dod. Adm. Rep.* 467.

^d *Dig.* 9. 2. *Consulat de la Mer*, par Boucher, 200—203. *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 8. sec. 12. *Marshall on Insurance*, 493. *Pardessus, Droit Com.* tom. iii. No. 652. *Jameson v. Drinkald*, 12 *Moore*, 148. *The Ligo*, 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 356. *The Woodrop Sims*, 2 *Dod. Rep.* 85. *Bell's Com.* vol. i. 579, 580. 5th edit. In many of the marine codes of continental Europe, the loss in this case is borne equally by the owners of the two vessels, though this is contrary to the English rule. *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 8. sec. 12. *Bell's Com.* vol. i. 581. Story, J., in 2 *Phillips*, 183. 2d edit.

^e *Cleirac, Us et Coutumes de la Mer*, 68. *The Woodrop Sims*, 2 *Dod. Adm. Rep.* 85. If there be fault or want of care on both sides, neither party

universally declared by all the foreign ordinances and jurists; and its equity and expediency apply equally where both parties are to blame, and where the fault cannot be detected. The general rule of the maritime law is, to make the ships contribute equally, without regard to their relative value, and Valin considers this to be the shorter, plainer, and better rule.^a There has been much difference in the codes and authorities in maritime law, whether the cargo, as well as the *ship, was *232 to contribute to the loss. Valin contends, that the contribution is only between the ships, and that the cargoes are totally excluded from the benefit, as well as from the burden of contribution in the case of such a disaster. But in *Le Nere v. Edinburgh and London Shipping Company*, the cargo of the ship that was sunk and lost by the collision, received the benefit of the contribution.^b

can sue the other. *Vanderplank v. Miller*, 1 *Moody & Malkin*, 169. *Vennall v. Garner*, 1 *Crompt. & Meeson*, 21.

^a *Com. tom. ii.* 166. The Marine Ordinance of the city of Rotterdam, in 1721, declares that the damage resulting from collision of ships shall be borne equally, unless, indeed, the collision happened by design, or any remarkable fault, and then the guilty party must bear the whole loss. *Ord. of Rotterdam*, sec. 255, 256. The *Ordinance of Hamburg*, of 1731, tit. 8, is to the same effect, though even still narrower in the exception. The loss, under that ordinance, is assessed as a common average upon both vessels, freights, and cargoes, and to be borne one-half by each vessel. The sentence of a foreign marine court, in a case of collision within its jurisdiction, and in a proceeding *in rem*, is conclusive as to the fact and faultlessness of the collision, and of the apportionment; (2 *Phillips on Ins.* 2d edit. 182,) and where there is no proof of negligence on the part of the master or crew of the damaged ship, the insurer is liable for damages occasioned by collision. *Stevens & Benecke on Average*, by *Phillips*, 363. *Peters v. Warren Ins. Co.* vide *infra*, p. 302.

^b This case was decided in the House of Lords in 1824. See *Bell's Com.* vol. i. 580—583, who has collected and digested the foreign authorities on the subject. By the English statute of 53 Geo. III. c. 159, ship-owners were protected from loss by damage done to other vessels without their fault, beyond their property in the ship, freight, apparel, and furniture. In the case of the *Dundee*, it was held, that *fishing stores* of a Greenland ship were liable to contribute in compensation for damage done to another ship by collision, as *appurtenances* to a ship of that character. *The Dundee*, 1 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 109.

(9.) *Of general average.*

The doctrine of general average grows out of the incidents of a mercantile voyage, and the duties which it creates apply equally to the owner of the ship, and of the cargo. General, gross, or extraordinary average, means a contribution made by all parties concerned, towards a loss sustained by some of the parties in interest, for the benefit of all; and it is called general, or gross average, because it falls upon the gross amount of ship, cargo, and freight.^a

By the Rhodian law, as cited in the Pandects,^b if goods were thrown overboard, in a case of extreme peril, to lighten and save the ship, the loss, being incurred for the common benefit, was to be made good by the contribution of all. The goods must not be swept away
 *233 by the violence of the waves, *for then the loss falls entirely upon the merchant or his insurer, but they must be intentionally sacrificed by the mind and agency of man for the safety of the ship, and the residue of the cargo. The jettison must be made for sufficient cause, and not from groundless timidity. It must be made in a case of extremity, when the ship is in danger of perishing by the fury of a storm, or is labouring upon rocks or shallows, or is closely pursued by pirates or enemies; and then, if the ship, and the residue of the

^a *Particular* average is the same as a partial loss, and is to be borne by the parties immediately interested. *Primage and average*, which are mentioned in bills of lading, mean a small compensation or duty paid to the master, over and above the freight, for his care and trouble as to the goods. It belongs to him of right, and it is not understood to be covered by the policy of insurance. For these charges, as well as for freight, the master has a lien on the cargo. *Park on Ins.* ch. 6. 134. *Best v. Saunders*, 1 *Danson & Lloyd*, 183.

^b *Dig.* 14. 2. 1. This Rhodian law is discussed in the Pandects, by Paulus, Papinian, and other eminent lawyers. It forms the subject of the distinguished commentaries of *Peckius* and *Vinnius*, in the treatise *Ad Rem Nauticam*, and of a treatise of *Bynkershoeck*; and it has received most ample illustrations in the dissertations upon it by numerous other civilians, among whom may be selected *Emerigon* and *Abbott*.

cargo, be saved by means of the sacrifice, nothing can be more reasonable than that the property saved should bear its proportion of the loss. The doctrine of general average is one of those rules of the marine law which is built upon the plainest principles of justice; and it has, accordingly, recommended itself to the notice and adoption of all the commercial nations of the world. The title in the Pandects, *De lege Rhodia de Jactu*, has been the basis of the ordinances of modern Europe, on the subject of general average; and the doctrine of jettison was transplanted into the Roman law from the institutes of the ancient Rhodians. A jettison is only permitted in cases of extreme necessity; and the foreign ordinances^a require, that the officers of the ship, and the supercargo, if on board, should, if practicable, be previously consulted; and if the master, in a case of false alarm, makes a jettison, there is no contribution. The master is responsible for the due exercise of his own judgment in the case of a jettison. He has the authority, and if he shows a necessity of the sacrifice, he will be excused, whether he follows the advice of the crew or not. The crew of a vessel are not authorized to make a jettison of any part of the cargo, even in a case of distress, without the order of the master. This is the general rule, without reference to extreme cases.^b A regular jettison, says Emerigon, is that which takes place with order, and without confusion, and is founded on previous deliberation. Consultation is not indispensable previous to the sacrifice. A case of imminent danger will not permit it. But it must appear that the act occasioning the loss was the effect of judgment and will; and there may be a choice of perils when there is no possibility of safety. There must be a certain

^a *Laws of Oleron*, art. 8, of *Wisbuy*, art. 20, 21. 38. *Consulat de la Mer*, tom. ii. ch. 99. *Code de Commerce*, art. 410.

^b *The Nimrod*, 1 *Ware's Rep.* 14, 15.

loss voluntarily incurred for the common benefit,
 *234 and it *is not necessary that the vessel should be exposed to greater danger than she otherwise would have been. To avoid an absolute shipwreck, it may sometimes be necessary to run the vessel ashore in a place which appears to be the least dangerous, and that will form a case of general average.^a The irregular jettison is valid, for it takes place in the instant of a danger which is imminent and appalling, and when all formality and deliberation would be out of season, or impossible. All acts are precipitate, and commanded by that sense of self-preservation when life is in jeopardy, which is irresistible, and sways every consideration. Such a jettison is a species of shipwreck, and it is called *semi-naufragium*.^b The captain must first begin the jettison with things the least necessary, the most weighty, and of least value, and nothing but the greatest extremity would excuse the master who should commence the jettison with money, and other precious parts of the cargo.^c

Before contribution takes place, it must appear that the goods sacrificed were the price of safety to the
 *235 rest; and if *the ship be lost, notwithstanding the

^a *Sims v. Gurney and Smith*, 4 *Binney*, 513. 1 *Emerigon*, 403. Targa says, that during the sixty years he was a magistrate in the Consulat of the Sea, at Genoa, he met with only four or five cases of a regular jettison, and they were suspicious by reason of their very formalities.

^b *Consulat de la Mer*, ch. 284. *Targa*, ch. 58. *Casaregis, Disc.* 45. n. 28.

^c *Code de Commerce*, art. 411. *Emerigon*, tom. i. 609, has beautifully illustrated, from Juvenal, the growth and progress of an irregular jettison, and that imminent danger and absorbing terror which justify it. At first the skill of pilot fails :

*Nullam prudentia cani
 Rectoris conferret opem.*

Catullus becomes restless with terror as the danger presses, and at last he cries—

*Fundite quæ mea sunt—
 Præcipitare volens pulcherrima.*—Juvenal, *sat.* 12.

jettison, there will be no ground for contribution.^a All damage arising immediately from jettison, or other act of necessity, is to be a matter of general average, and, therefore, if, in cutting away a mast, the cargo, by that means, be injured, or if, in throwing over any part of the cargo, other parts of the cargo be injured, the damage goes into general average, because it is to be considered as part of the price of safety to the residue of the property.^b So, if a ship be injured by a peril of the sea, and be obliged to go into port to refit, the wages and provisions of the crew, during the detention, constitute the subject of general average, according to the decisions in New-York and Massachusetts.^c Those decisions are supported by the rule as laid down in Beawes,^d and they are in coincidence with the law and practice of Holland and France.^e Lord Tenterden, in his treatise on shipping,^f observed, that the English law books furnished no decision on this point, and he thought it susceptible of a reasonable doubt, though his opinion was evidently against the justice and policy of the charge for contribution. Since he wrote, the question has been decided in the K. B. according to

^a *Pothier*, tit. *Avaries*, n. 113. No contribution, if at the time of sacrificing the cargo, there was no possibility of saving it. *Crockett v. Dodge*, 3 *Fairfield*, 190. No loss or expense is considered and applied as general average, unless it was intended to save the remaining property, and unless it accomplished the object. *Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Company*, *U. S. C. C. Mass.* May, 1839. *Law Reporter*, for July, 1839.

^b *Maggrath v. Church*, 1 *Caines' Rep.* 196.

^c *Walden v. Le Roy*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 263. *Padelford v. Boardman*, 4 *Mass. Rep.* 548. In Pennsylvania, it is decided that the wages and provisions of the crew during an *embargo*, go into a general average, and, as the Ch. J. observed, the criterion of general average is, when the expenses were "necessarily and unavoidably incurred for the general safety of the ship and cargo." *Ins. Company of N. America v. Jones & Clark*, 2 *Binney*, 547. The case of a vessel forced into port by *sea perils and damage to refit*, would doubtless be considered as equally within the principle. See *infra*, p. 302.

^d *Lex Mercatoria*, vol. i. 161.

^e *Ricard, négoce d'Amsterdam*, 280. *Emerigon, Traité des Ass.* tom. i. 624.

^f *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 8. sec. 8.

his opinion, and in a case in which he sustained and enforced a contrary opinion in his character of counsel.^a The result of the decisions in *Plummer v. Wildman*, and *Power v. Whitmore*,^b is, that where the general safety requires a ship to go into port to refit, by reason of some peril, the wages and provisions of the crew during
 *236 the *detention are not the subject of general average; but the other necessary expenses of going into port, and of preparing for the refitting the ship, by unloading, warehousing, and reloading the cargo, are general average.^c The costs of the repairs, so far as they accrue to the ship alone as a benefit, and would have been necessary in that port, on account of the ship alone, are not average. Yet, if the expense of the repairs would not have been incurred but for the benefit of the cargo, and might have been deferred with safety to the ship, to a less costly port, such extra expense is general average.

It has likewise been held, that the wages and provisions of the crew, during a capture and detention for adjudication, are a proper subject for general average;^d while,

^a *Power v. Whitmore*, 4 *Maule & Selw.* 141.

^b 3 *Maule & Selw.* 482. 4 *ibid.* 141. S. P. In *De Vaux v. Salvador*, 4 *Adol. & Ellis*, 420, Lord Denman, in that case, relied upon the nisi prius case of *Fletcher v. Pole*, before Lord Mansfield, in 1769, and cited by *Park on Ins.* vol. i. 70; and also in *Robertson v. Ewer*, 1 *Term*, 131. He seemed to admit that the expenses of wages and provisions, in such cases, might go into contribution as between owners and freighters, though not as against underwriters.

^c *Beaves, L. M.* 161. *Abbott on Shipping*, 280. 1st edit. Bedford Com. Ins. Company *v. Parker*, 2 *Pick.* 8, and *Thornton v. U. S. Ins. Company*, 3 *Fairfield*, 150, support the position, that the necessary expenses of unloading, and reloading the cargo, when the vessel is forced into a port to refit, are to be brought into general average, for all persons concerned are interested in the measures requisite to complete the voyage. The case of *Walden v. Le Roy*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 263, assumes, that those expenses, in such a case, go into general average; and there seems to be no doubt from the cases, that where the wages and provisions of the crew are to be borne by general contribution, those other expenses are equally a part of it.

^d *Ricard, négoce d'Amsterdam*, 279. *Boulay Paty*, tom. iv. 444. *Leavenworth v. Delafield*, 1 *Caines' Rep.* 574. *Kingston v. Girard*, 4 *Dallas' Rep.* 274.

in the case of a vessel detained by an embargo, they are not so subject, and are chargeable exclusively upon the freight.^a The French ordinance of the marine, Pothier, and Ricard, all agree, that wages and provisions are not a subject for contribution in the case of an embargo; and yet it has been held, on the other hand, by the Court of Errors in Pennsylvania, in 1807, that *they were, in such a case, the subject of general *237 average.^b In respect to the wages and provisions of the crew, while the vessel was detained at an intermediate port, by fear of enemies, and waiting for convoy, they were allowed to form the subject of general average, by the courts in Holland, amidst conflicting opinions, and after very protracted and exhausting litigation.^c We cannot but lament the uncertainty and confusion which the contradictory rules on this subject have created. There is no principle of maritime law that has been followed by more variations in practice than this perplexed doctrine of general average; and the rules of contribution in different countries, and before different tribunals, are so dis-

^a *Robertson v. Ewer*, 1 *Term Rep.* 127. *Penny v. New-York Insurance Company*, 3 *Caines' Rep.* 155. *M'Bride v. Marine Insurance Company*, 7 *Johns. Rep.* 431. *Harrod v. Lewis*, 3 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 311.

^b *Insurance Company of North America v. Jones*, 2 *Binney's Rep.* 547.

^c *Bynk. Quæst. J. Priv.* lib. 4. ch. 25. Bynkershoeck, in one of the adjudged cases which he cites, complains that the existing usages had extended contribution to every kind of danger, and frequently comprehended wages and provisions of the crew as proper objects of it, and that the practice might be abused to the destruction of the merchant. His history of the vexatious litigation in these cases is quite curious. In one of them, the Maritime Court at Amsterdam, in November, 1697, and again, in November, 1698, adjudged, that the wages and provisions were a proper subject for contribution. The decisions were affirmed, on appeal, in July, 1700, and reversed on a further appeal, in July, 1710. On a still further appeal to the Supreme Senate, of which Bynkershoeck was a member, after great discussion, and much division in opinion, the original decisions of the Amsterdam maritime judges were restored, in March, 1713. *Magens*, in his *Essay on Insurance*, vol. i. 66—69, shows the uncertainty and difficulty abroad, as well as in England, of settling the proper items for a general average, and particularly as to the wages and provisions of the crew.

cordant, and many of the distinctions are so subtle, and so artificial, that it becomes extremely difficult to reduce them to the shape of a connected and orderly system. The French jurists complain, that their ancient nautical legislation left the question of contribution very much at

large, and subject to arbitrary discretion, and they
 *238 commend very highly the regulations *of the ordinance and of the code as just and equitable, and marked with certainty and precision.^a

If part of the cargo be voluntarily delivered up to a pirate, or an enemy, by way of ransom or contribution, and to induce them to spare the vessel and residue of the goods, the property saved must contribute to the loss, as being the price of safety to the rest. The expense, also, of unlading the goods, to repair damages to the ship, or to lighten her when grounded, must be sustained by general contribution; for all the parties concerned are interested in the measures requisite for the prosecution of the voyage. If the masts, cables, and other equipments of the vessel be cut away, to save her in a case of extremity, their value must be made good by contribution.^b It was attempted, in the case of *Covington v. Roberts*,^c to extend the application of the general rule to the case of the loss of a mast, in carrying an unusual press of sail to escape from an enemy, and to make that the subject of general average; but the court considered that to be no more than a common searisk. All casual and

^a *Ord. de la Mar.* tit. *Avaries*, art 7. *Code*, art. 400, 401. *Boulay Paty*, tom. iv. 466.

^b *Ord. de la Mar.* tit. *Avaries*, art. 6. *Valin's Com.* tom. ii. 165. 1 *Emerigon*, 620, 621. *Hennen v. Monro*, 16 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 449.

^c 5 *Bos. & Pull.* 378. *Shiff v. Louisiana State Ins. Company*, 18 *Martin*, 629. to S. P. Where a vessel was stranded near her port of destination, and for the purpose of relieving her, the cargo was put into lighters and forwarded to the port, and during the passage in the lighters, part of the cargo was injured; such a loss to the cargo was held to be a proper subject of general average. *Lewis v. Williams*, 1 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 430.

inevitable damage and loss, as distinguished from that which is purposely incurred, is the subject of particular and not of general average.^a

*If the ship be voluntarily stranded, to escape *239 danger from tempests, or the chase of an enemy, the damages resulting from that act are to be borne as general average, if the ship be afterwards recovered, and perform her voyage.^b But if the ship be wholly lost or destroyed, by the act of running her ashore, it has been a question much discussed, and different opinions entertained, whether the cargo saved was bound to contribute to bear the loss of the ship. In *Bradhurst v. The Columbian Insurance Company*,^c the ship, in a case of extremity, was voluntarily run ashore, and lost, but the cargo was saved; and it was held, that no contribution was to be levied on the cargo for the loss of the ship. The marine

^a *Emerigon*, tom. i. 622, states an interesting case to illustrate the general doctrine. A French vessel, being pursued by two cruisers of the enemy, the master, as soon as it was dark, hoisted a boat into the sea, furnished with a mast and sail, and a lantern at the mast head, and then changed his course, and sailed during the night without any light on board his ship. In the morning no enemy was in sight; and the value of the boat thus voluntarily abandoned for the common safety, was made good by general contribution.

^b In a case of voluntary stranding, if it be done to save the cargo, the damage to the ship and cargo is the subject of general average; but if it was resorted to for to save the lives or liberty of the crew, it is particular average. This distinction, Mr. Benecke says, is conformable to the practice of all countries. *Benecke on the Principles of Indemnity*, 220, 221. The principle is, that if a vessel be run ashore voluntarily to save life, and is lost, and would unavoidably have been lost without the act, it is not a case for contribution or general average, for nothing was saved, and no property sacrificed to save property. *Benecke*, p. 219. *Stevens & Benecke, by Phillips on Average*, 84. *Meech v. Robinson*, 4 *Wharton*, 360. But when a vessel is stranded, and part of the cargo taken on shore and conveyed to the place of destination, by land, and the vessel is afterwards recovered, and other parts of the cargo reshipped and carried to the port of destination, the owners of the cargo landed and conveyed by land, are bound to contribute to the extra charges and expenses incurred by the master, *after the landing of such cargo*, as general average. The rule of equity, reciprocity, and equality, requires it. *Bevan v. Bank of United States*, 4 *Wharton's Rep.* 301. See, also, *Benecke*, p. 306, 307, to the same point.

^c 9 *Johns. Rep.* 9. *Eppes v. Tucker*, 4 *Call.* 346. *Scudder v. Bradford*, 14 *Pick.* 13. S. P.

ordinances, and writers on maritime law were consulted, and the conclusion drawn from them was, that the cargo never contributed for the ship, if she was lost by means of the act of running her ashore. But in two subsequent cases, where the ship was lost under like circumstances, it was decided, on a like review of the European law, that the loss was to be repaired by general average.^a The question, therefore, in which the foreign and domestic authorities so materially vary, remains yet to be definitively settled.^b

A temporary safety is all that is requisite to
 *240 entitle the *owners of the property sacrificed to contribution; and if the ship survives the disaster, and be afterwards lost by another, still the goods saved in the second disaster, must be contributory to the original loss, for without that loss they would have been totally destroyed.^c Goods shipped on deck contribute if saved, but if lost by jettison, they are not entitled to the benefit of general average; for they, by their situation, increase the difficulty of the navigation, and are peculiarly exposed to peril.^d

^a *Caze v. Reilly*, 3 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 298. *Gray v. Wain*, 2 *Serg. & Rawle*, 229. In *Scudder v. Bradford*, 14 *Pick.* 13, where the masts were cut away, but the vessel afterwards, notwithstanding that sacrifice, went ashore and was lost, it was held that the cargo saved was not liable to a general average, for the sacrifice was unavailing.

^b This question was finally settled in the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the *Columbian Ins. Company v. Ashby*, 13 *Peters' Rep.* 331. The court reviewed the principal authorities, foreign and domestic, and decided, that in the case of a voluntary stranding of the ship for the common safety, and to save the crew and cargo from impending peril, followed by a total loss of the ship, but with a saving of the cargo, a clear case of general average existed, in which the insurers of the cargo were held liable to contribute upon that principle to the loss of the ship and freight.

^c *Vinnius, in Peckium ad legem Rhodiam*, 246. 250. *Boulay Paty*, tom. iv. 443.

^d *Consulat de la Mer*, ch. 183. *Ord. de la Mar.* 3. 8. 13. *Emerigon*, ch. 12. sec. 42. *Smith v. Wright*, 1 *Caines' Rep.* 43. *Lenox v. U. I. Company*, 3 *Johns. Cas.* 178. *Boulay Paty*, tom. iv. 566. *Code de Commerce*, art. 421.

It becomes an important inquiry on this subject, what goods are to contribute, and in what proportions, to a loss voluntarily incurred for the common safety. The general doctrine is, that all the merchandise, of whatever kind or weight, or to whomsoever belonging, contributes. Goods of the government are liable to contribute, equally with those of other shippers. The contribution is made, not on account of encumbrance to the ship, but of safety obtained, and, therefore, bullion and jewels put on board as merchandise, contribute according to their full value. By the Rhodian law,^a it was deemed just that all should contribute to whom the jettison had been an advantage, and the amount was to be apportioned according to the value of the goods. It extended to the effects and clothes of every person, and even to the ring on the finger, but not to the provisions on board, nor to the persons of freemen, whose lives were of too much dignity and worth to be susceptible of valuation. The modern marine codes do not generally go to the extent of the Rhodian law, and they vary greatly on the subject. By the English law, the wearing apparel, jewels, and other things belonging to the persons of passengers or crew, and taken on board for private use, and not as *merchandise for *241 transportation, and the provisions and stores for the crew, do not contribute in a case of general average.^b The common rule, according to Magens,^c is, that what articles pay freight must contribute, and what goods pay no freight pay no average; and that articles contribute

Dodge v. Bartol, 5 *Greenleaf*, 286. The Brig Thaddeus, 4 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 582. *Abbott on Shipping*, 344. Wolcott v. Eagle Ins. Company, 4 *Pick.* 429. But if they be laden on deck, according to the custom of a particular trade, they are entitled to contribution from the ship-owner for a loss by jettison. Gould v. Oliver, 4 *Bingham*, N. C. 134. *contra*. Dodge v. Bartol, *ub. sup.*

^a *Dig.* 14. 2. 2.

^b *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 8. sec. 14.

^c *Magens on Insurance*, vol. i. 62, 63.

according to their value, and not according to weight. By the French ordinance of the marine, as well as by the new commercial code, provisions and the clothes of the ship's company do not contribute ; but usage goes further, and does not subject to the charge of general average either clothes, jewels, rings, or baggage of the passengers, for they are considered as accessory to the person. Emerigon, who has, according to his usual manner, collected and exhausted all the learning appertaining to the subject, inclines to think with Pothier, that by strict law and by equity, the clothes and jewels of passengers ought to contribute. But Boulay Paty, in his commentaries on the new code, and in which he draws most liberally on the resources of Emerigon, thinks they ought to be exempted, and that the existing French usage is proper.^a

Instruments of defence and provisions do not contribute, because they are necessary to all ; and yet if they are sacrificed for the common safety, they are to be paid for by contribution ; nor do the wages of seamen contribute to the general average, except in the single instance of the ransom of the ship. They are exempted lest the apprehension of personal loss should restrain them from making the requisite sacrifice, and the

*242 hardships and perils they endure well entitle *them to an exemption from further distress.^b If part of the cargo be sold for the necessities of the ship, it is in the nature of a compulsive loan for the benefit of all concerned, and bears a resemblance to the case of jettison ;

^a *Ord. de la Mar. tit. Du Fret. art. 11. Code de Commerce, art. 419. Pothier, tit. Des Avaries, n. 125. 1 Emerigon, 645. Boulay Paty, tom. iv. 561, 562. In Brown v. Stapleton, 4 Bingham, 119, 12 B. Moore, 334. S. C., the general rule was declared to be, that provisions for the crew on board a ship are not merces put on board for the purposes of commerce, and do not contribute to a general average, even when the cargo of the ship consists only of passengers.*

^b *1 Emerigon, 642,*

and if the ship be afterwards lost, the goods saved must contribute towards the loss of the goods sold, equally as if they had been thrown overboard to lighten the vessel. In such a case, a portion of the cargo, according to Lord Stowell, is abraded for the general benefit.^a

Without entering minutely into the doctrine of adjusting and settling a general average,^b it will be sufficient to observe, that, as a general rule, the goods sacrificed, as well as the goods saved, if the vessel arrives at the port of destination, are to be valued at the clear net price they would have yielded, after deducting freight, at the port of discharge; and this rule is founded on a plain principle of equity.^c The person whose loss has procured the safe arrival of the ship and cargo, should be placed on equal ground with those persons whose goods had safely arrived, and that can only be by considering his goods to have also arrived. The owners of the ship contribute according to her value at the end of the voyage, and according to the net amount of the freight and earnings. The value of the vessel lost is estimated according to her value at the port of *243 departure, making a reasonable allowance for wear or tear on the voyage up to the time of the disaster; and the practice in this country, at least it is the practice

^a *Hall's Emerigon on Maritime Loans*, 94. *The Gratitude*, 3 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 264.

^b Mr. Benecke has discussed at large, and very ably, the complicated and difficult subject of general average, and the adjustment of it; and to him I must refer for a more minute detail of the learning and principles applicable to the case. *Principles of Indemnity*, ch. 5. 7.

^c *Tudor v. Macomber*, 14 *Pick.* 34. *The Consolato del Mare*, and the usage of divers countries, made a distinction as to the rule of valuation, and they took the value at the place of departure, if the jettison took place before the middle of the voyage, and the value at the place of discharge, if afterwards. But the ordinance of the marine did not make any such distinction. 1 *Emerigon*, 654. If the vessel returns to the port of departure, or to some neighbouring port, the price of replacing the goods sacrificed, or the cost price, including charges, is the rule for settling the general average. *Tudor v. Macomber*, 14 *Pick.* 34.

in Boston,^a to ascertain the contributory value of the freight by deducting one-third of the gross amount. As to losses of the equipment of the ship, such as masts, cables, and sails, it is usual to deduct one-third from the price of the new articles; for, being new, they will be of greater value than the articles lost.^b The subject of the adjustment of a general average has been very much discussed in some of the modern cases. In *Leavenworth v. Delafield*,^c which was the case of a vessel captured and carried in for adjudication, and where the wages and provisions of the crew went into general average, a rule of adjustment somewhat peculiar to the case was adopted; for no disaster had happened to injure the vessel or cargo. In *Bell v. Smith*,^d the vessel had been so deteriorated by the perils of the sea, as to render a sale of her abroad necessary; and the general average was calculated on the price she sold for, and not on four-fifths of her original value, as in the preceding case of capture. In adjusting the difficult subject of contribution to a general average, one rule has been to take the value of the ship and cargo at the port of necessity, or place where the expense was incurred; and if there be no price of ship and cargo at such a place to be well and satisfactorily ascertained, the parties concerned may be forced to recur to the value at the port and time of departure on the voyage.^e The doctrine of adjustment underwent a very full discussion in *Strong v. *244 The New-York Firemen's *Insurance Company*,^f and

^a 3 *Mason's Rep.* 439.

^b *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 8. sec. 14, 15. *Strong v. Fire Ins. Company*, 11 *Johns. Rep.* 323. *Simonds v. White*, 2 *Barnw. & Cress.* 805. *Gray v. Waln*, 2 *Serg. & Rawle*, 229. 257, 258.

^c 1 *Caines' Rep.* 574.

^d 2 *Johns. Rep.* 98.

^e As a general rule, the valuation of the cargo in the bill of lading is conclusive between the owner of the ship and the owner of the cargo, in the adjustment of a general average in the home port. *Tudor v. Macomber*, 14 *Pick.* 34.

^f 11 *Johns. Rep.* 323. *Lewis v. Williams*, 1 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 430. *Depan v. Ocean Ins. Company*, 5 *Cowen*, 63. S. P.

it was there declared to be the duty of the master, in cases proper for a general average, to cause an adjustment to be made upon his arrival at the port of destination, and that he had a lien upon the cargo to enforce the payment of the contribution. This was shown to be the maritime law of Europe. When the general average was thus fairly settled in the foreign port, according to the usage and law of the port, it was binding and conclusive as to the items, as well as the apportionment thereof, upon the various interests, though settled differently from what it would have been in the home port. The very same principle was largely examined and recognised in *Simonds v. White*.^a If, however, it was not a proper case for a general average, and was a partial loss only, then these cases do not apply, and a foreign adjustment, founded in mistake, and assuming a case for general average, when none existed, is not binding.^b With respect to the payment of the average, each individual is undoubtedly entitled to sue for the amount of his share when adjusted; but the English practice usually is, in the case of a general ship, where there are many consignees, for the master, before he delivers the goods, to take a bond from the different merchants for payment of their portions of the average when the same shall be adjusted.^c

^a 2 *Barnw. & Cress.* 805. *Dalglish v. Davidson*, 5 *Dowl. & Ry.* 6. *Loring v. Neptune Ins. Company*, 20 *Pick.* 411. *Thornton v. United States Ins. Company*, 3 *Fairfield*, 153.

^b *Lenox v. United Ins. Company*, 3 *Johns. Cas.* 178. *Power v. Whitmore*, 4 *Maule & Selw.* 141.

^c *Abbott on Shipping*, part 3. ch. 8. sec. 17. The captain may make the giving of the average bond a condition of the delivery, and it is held to be a reasonable condition in support of a right founded on commercial usage. *Cole v. Bartlett*, 4 *Miller's Louis. Rep.* 130. The absolute owner of goods is liable to pay a general average; but if a mere consignee, who is not owner, receives them, and the bill of lading saying "he paying freight and demurrage," and is silent as to general average, the consignee is not bound to pay it, though he would have been if it had been mentioned. He is liable to pay freight by reason of the condition on which he receives the goods, and which he agrees to by receiving the goods. *Scaife v. Tobias*, 3 *Barnw. & Adolph.* 523.

(9.) *Of salvage.*

Salvage is the compensation allowed to persons by whose assistance a ship or its cargo has been saved in whole or in part from impending danger, or recovered from actual loss, in cases of shipwreck, derelict, or recapture; and it often forms a material ingredient in the discussions and adjustment which take place when a voyage has been disastrous.^a The equitable doctrine of salvage came from the Roman law;^b and it was adopted by the admiralty jurisdictions in the different countries of Europe; and whether it be a civil or war salvage, it is equally founded on the principle of rewarding individual, spontaneous, and meritorious services, rendered in the protection of the lives and property of others on the sea, or wrecked on the coast of the sea.^c It is chargeable upon the owners, who receive benefit, and who would have sustained the loss if it had not been prevented by the exertions of the salvors. The allowance of salvage depends frequently on positive statute regulations fixing the rate, and the foreign ordinances contain precise enactments on this head, though salvage is said to be a question of the *jus gentium*, and not the creature of local institutions, like a mariner's contract.^d The regulation of salvage, by the statute law of the United States, is confined to cases of recapture. In the case of shipwrecks, or derelicts at sea, and rescue, and most other cases, the law has not

^a *Salvage*, in policies of insurance, says Mr. Phillips, has a meaning somewhat different, and it applies to that part of the cargo which survives the peril, and is saved, and is to be charged or credited as the case may be, on the adjustment of total losses.

^b *Dig.* 3. 5.

^c The *Calypso*, 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 217, 218. Ware, J., in the *Bee*, *Ware's Rep.* 336. The Schooner *Emulous*, 1 *Sumner*, 207. In the case of a ship stranded on a sand-bank, in the *St. Lawrence*, *infra corpus comitatus*, the suit for salvage was held to be of common law, and not of admiralty jurisdiction. *Stuart's Lower Canada Rep.* 21.

^d 1 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 278.

fixed any certain rate of salvage, and it is left to the discretion of the Court of Admiralty, under all the circumstances. The amount to be allowed varies according to the labour and peril incurred by the salvors, the merit of their conduct, the value of the ship and cargo, and the degree of danger from which they were rescued.^a The courts are liberal in the allowance of salvage in meritorious cases, as a reward for the service, and as an incentive to effort; and the allowance fluctuates between one-half, one-third, and one-fourth of the gross or net proceeds of the property saved, but one-third has been the most usual rate.^b In a case of derelict, Sir William Scott observed, that in no instance, except where the crown alone was concerned, and where no claim had been given for a private owner, had more *than one-half of the net proceeds of the *246 property been decreed by way of salvage; and in that case he directed the salvage to be apportioned among the crews of the two vessels which were the salvors, according to the numbers of the crews.^c The same

^a The Aquila, 1 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 32. The Two Friends, *ibid.* 235. The Sarah, cited in a note to *ibid.* 263. The William Bedford, 3 *Rob.* 355. Marshall, Ch. J., 2 *Cranch's Rep.* 267. Bond v. The Brig Cora, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 80. The Schooner Emulous, 1 *Sumner*, 207. The Elizabeth & Jane, 1 *Ware's Rep.* 35.

^b If the owner has voluntarily and fairly entered into a contract for a fixed or a reasonable compensation, the service rendered in a maritime case of distress is still a salvage service; but the contract is not held binding upon the owner, unless it appears that no advantage was taken, and that the rate of compensation was reasonable. The Schooner Emulous, 1 *Sumner*, 207.

^c L'Esperance, 1 *Dod. Rep.* 46. But in a case of extraordinary salvage merit, in bringing in a derelict, the court have not only allowed a moiety for salvage, but they have charged the costs upon the other moiety. The Frances Mary, 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 89. The Reliance, *ibid.* 90. note. In the Charlotta, *ibid.* 361, the court gave the original salvors the salvage of two-fifths of the whole value. It was a case of derelict, and of great merit. In cases of derelict, the rule limiting the salvage to a moiety seems to be the fixed rule in the English admiralty and in our own. The Fortuna, 4 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 193, and L'Esperance, 1 *Dod. Rep.* 46. The Blendonhall, *ibid.* 414. 421. The Elliotta, 2 *ibid.* 75. Rowe v. The Brig ———, 1 *Mason's Rep.* 372. The Henry Ewbank, *Am. Jurist*, No. 23. 67. 1 *Sumner*, 401. S. C. Property is derelict, in the maritime sense of the word, when it is abandoned without hope of recovery, or without an intention of returning. *Ware's Rep.* 43.

observations were made by the court in *Mason v. The Ship Blaireau*,^a and no instance was found in which salvors were allowed beyond a moiety of the value. The court, in that case, reduced the allowance made in the court below to the salvors, from three-fifths of the net proceeds of the ship and cargo, to two-fifths thereof. In general, neither the master, nor a passenger, seaman, or pilot, is entitled to compensation in the way of salvage, for the ordinary assistance he may have afforded a vessel in distress, as it is no more than a duty; for a salvor is a person who, without any particular relation to the ship in distress, proffers useful service, and renders it without any pre-existing contract making the service a duty.^b But a passenger, or an officer acting as such, for extraordinary exertions beyond the line of his duty, has been deemed entitled to a liberal compensation as salvage.^c So, also, in a case of extraordinary peril, it is admitted, that great exertions and personal hazard may exalt a

^a 2 *Cranch's Rep.* 268.

^b The *Neptune*, 1 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 236. *Hobart v. Drogan*, 10 *Peters*, 108. 122.

^c *Newman v. Walters*, 3 *Bos. & Pull.* 612. *Bond v. The Brig Cora*, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 80. *Case v. Le Tigre*, 3 *ibid.* 567. *The Branstons*, 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 3. note. The general rule is, that a salvage remuneration is given only to the persons *actually* occupied in the salvage service. *The Vine*, *ibid.* 1. But where the service has been performed at some risk to the property of the *owners*, a portion of the remuneration has been allotted to them. In cases of civil salvage, the courts of admiralty do not recognise the rule of proportion, but award an equitable remuneration. Though the master and crew are in strict language the only salvors, yet the *owners* of the salvor or saving ship are also allowed salvage, and one-third has been established as the suitable proportion under ordinary circumstances. *The Blaireau*, 2 *Cranch's Rep.* 240. *The Brig Harmony*, 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 34. note. *The Cora*, 2 *ibid.* 361. 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 80. *The Ship Henry Ewbank*, 1 *Sumner*, 400. *The Salacia*, 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 262. Underwriters may be entitled as owners to salvage, after an accepted abandonment. *The Ship Henry Ewbank*, *supra*. The act of New-York of Feb. 19th, 1819, ch. 18. sec. 19, (and which act was not repealed by the New-York Revised Statutes of 1830,) authorizes the board of wardens of the port of New-York to allow to branch and deputy pilots a reasonable reward for extra services for the preservation of vessels in distress. Vide *supra*, p. 176. note.

pilotage service into something of a salvage service.^a And if the ship has been abandoned, so as to discharge a seaman from his contract, yet if he subsequently contributes to the preservation of the vessel, he will be entitled to salvage.^b As the *duty of the sea- *247 men ceases by capture, any exertion subsequently and successfully made to recover and rescue the captured ship, will entitle them to recompense.^c The case will then be withdrawn from the operation of the general, if not universal principle, that so long as the person, be he a seaman, pilot, or other person, is acting within the line of his duty in the given case, he has no valid claim for a salvage remuneration.

The subject of salvage was largely discussed in our courts in a case of recapture.^d The District Court of New-York allowed as salvage one-half of the value of the ship. The Circuit Court reversed the decree, and denied all salvage. The Supreme Court of the United States corrected both decrees, and allowed one-sixth part of the net value, after deducting the charges. The court, in that case, admitted the rule to be, that a neutral vessel, captured by a belligerent, was entitled to be discharged without paying salvage, on the ground that no beneficial service was thereby rendered, as the neutral, acting properly, would, of course, be discharged by the courts of the sovereign of the captor; and they admitted, like-

^a Sir William Scott, in the *Joseph Harvey*, 1 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 257. Phil. edit.

^b *Mason v. Ship Blaireau*, 2 *Cranch's Rep.* 240. *Hobart v. Drohan*, 10 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 103. In this last case it was decided that seamen and pilots may, in extraordinary cases beyond the appropriate line of duty, perform salvage service, and be entitled to compensation as salvors. But pilots or engineers of steamboats do not come within the exception, though the rules of the marine law relative to disasters at sea, apply generally to navigation by steamboats. *Mesner v. Suffolk Bank*, *U. S. D. C. Mass.* 1838.

^c *The Two Friends*, 1 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 271. *The Beaver*, 3 *ibid.* 292.

^d *Talbot v. Seaman*, 1 *Cranch's Rep.* 1.

wise, the exception to the rule, when belligerent captors and courts were notorious for their unprincipled rapacity. This rule, and the exception, have been frequently declared in the English admiralty.^a The rule of British jurisprudence in respect to recaptured property, and salvage thereon, is to give the benefit of the rule applicable to recaptured property of British subjects to allies, until it appears that they act upon a less liberal principle, and then the allies are treated according to their own measure of justice.^b The same rule has been
*248 *adopted by statute in this country,^c and is founded on the immovable basis of reciprocal justice.

Though the contract of seamen be not dissolved by shipwreck, and it be their duty to remain and labour to preserve the wreck and fragments of the ship and cargo, yet they may be entitled to recompense, by way of salvage, for their peculiar services. The wages recovered in the case of shipwreck, are in the nature of salvage, and form a lien on the property saved. The character of seamen creates no incapacity to assume that of salvors; and were it otherwise, it would be mischievous to the interests of commerce, inconsistent with natural equity, and would be tempting the unfortunate mariner to obtain by plunder and embezzlement in a common calamity, what he ought to possess upon principles of justice. The allowance of salvage in such cases is and ought to be liberal; not less, in any case, than the wages would have amounted to; and even an additional recompense should be made in cases of extraordinary danger and distinguished gallantry, where the service was much enhanced,

^a The War Onskan, 2 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 299. The Carlotta, 5 *ibid.* 54.

^b The Santa Cruz, 1 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 42.

^c *Act of Congress*, March 3d, 1800, ch. 14. sec. 3.

by the preservation of life, and the great value of the property at stake.^a

(10.) *Of the dissolution of the contract of affreightment.*

The contract of affreightment may be dissolved without execution, not only by the act of the parties, but in many cases by the act of the law.

If the voyage becomes unlawful, or impossible to be performed, or if it be broken up, either before or after it has actually commenced, by war or interdiction of commerce with the place of destination, the contract is dissolved.^b There is *no difference in principle *249 between a complete interdiction of commerce which prevents the entry of the vessel, or a partial one in relation to the merchandise on board, which prevents it being landed. The contract of affreightment in respect to the goods is dissolved, for the shipper cannot demand the delivery of the goods if the landing of them would expose the vessel to seizure.^c And if the voyage be broken up by capture on the passage, so as to cause a complete defeasance of the undertaking, the contract is dissolved, notwithstanding a subsequent recapture.^d So, if there be a blockade of the port of destination, by means of which a delivery of the cargo becomes impossible, and

^a The Two Catherines, 2 *Mason's Rep.* 319. The Court of Admiralty has no power of remunerating the mere preservation of life; but if it be connected with the preservation of property, it forms a high ingredient of merit in the allowance of salvage. 1 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 83.

^b Liddard v. Lopes, 10 *East's Rep.* 526.

^c Patron v. Silva, 1 *Miller's Louis. Rep.* 277.

^d The Hiram, 3 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 189. Capture does not of itself *ipso facto* dissolve the contract of affreightment. It suspends it during the prize proceedings, and it reattaches upon a recapture, which confers a title to salvage only, and restores and does not extinguish the rights of neutrals. This is the general rule, and it is well sustained by Mr. Justice Story, in the case of the Ship Hooper, in the *U. S. C. C. Mass.* May Term, 1839, on the ordinary principles of commercial law, in opposition to some of the admiralty decisions of Lord Stowell, which proceed upon rather peculiar and enlarged discretion in the administration of international law and policy in prize cases.

the vessel returns to the port of departure, the voyage is defeated and the contract dissolved.^a

But a temporary impediment of the voyage does not work a dissolution of the charter-party, and an embargo has been held to be such a temporary restraint, even though it be indefinite as to time.^b The same construction is given to the legal operation of a hostile blockade, or investment of the port of departure, upon the contract. It merely suspends the performance of it, and the voyage must be broken up, or the completion of it become unlawful, before the contract will be dissolved.^c If the cargo be not of a perishable nature, and can endure the delay, then the general principle applies, that nothing but occurrences which prevent absolutely the execution of the contract will discharge it. The parties must wait until those which merely retard its execution are removed. The commercial code of France^d

*250 declares, that, if before the *vessel sails on her voyage, an interdiction of commerce with the country to which she is bound takes place, the charter-party is dissolved, though it would be otherwise if a superior force hinders, for a time, the departure of the ship, or if she were detained by superior force during the voyage.

In parting with the subject of this, and of the two preceding lectures, I readily acknowledge the free use that has been made of Lord Tenterden's excellent treatise on maritime law. It has been the basis of the compilation, and it was impossible to have found any other model so perfect, or to have made any material improvement upon it. It is equally distinguished for practical good

^a *Scott v. Libby*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 336. *The Tuleta*, 6 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 177.

^b *Hadley v. Clarke*, 8 *Term Rep.* 259. *McBride v. Marine Ins. Company*, 5 *Johns. Rep.* 308. *Baylies v. Fettyplace*, 7 *Mass. Rep.* 325.

^c *Palmer v. Lorillard*, 16 *Johns. Rep.* 348.

^d *Code de Commerce*, art. 276, 277.

sense, and for extensive and accurate learning, remarkably compressed, and appropriately applied. Another work from which I have derived much assistance, is Mr. Holt's view of the English navigation laws, and of maritime contracts. He has followed in the track of Lord Tenterden, and with great credit to himself. His work is wholly free from the encumbrance of foreign learning on the same subject. This omission gives the appearance of a dry practical character to the work, but the reading of it becomes quite interesting by reason of the clearness of its analysis, the precision of its principles, the perspicuity of the style, and the manly good sense of the author. The introductory part is particularly excellent, for it contains a very condensed, yet comprehensive, and perfectly accurate view of all the principles in the work, entirely disembarassed from adjudged cases.

No one can observe, at first, without surprise, how extensively and closely subsequent writers follow in the footsteps of those who preceded them; but when we come to study the same topics, handled so often by master spirits, we perceive that this must necessarily be the case, in ethics and in law, where discoveries are not to be made, as in the physical sciences. The entire region of ethical and municipal jurisprudence has been amply explored, and with more than a

*Denham or a Parry's success.^a Panætius was *251 the original author of the substance of Cicero's *Offices*, as Cicero himself acknowledges; and that consummate work, in its turn, became the foundation of all

^a In the immense collection which was published at Amsterdam in 1669, of the various works of Straccha, Santerna, and others, on nautical and maritime subjects, we have laborious essays, replete with obsolete learning, on different branches of commercial law, of no less than twenty Italian civilians, whose works are now totally forgotten, and even their very names have become obscured by the oblivion of time. Subsequent civilians may have erected stately tomes from the matter which their ruins have furnished.

that Grotius, Puffendorf, Cumberland, and a thousand other writers, have laid down as the deductions of right reason, concerning the moral duties of mankind. No person would think of compiling a code of ethics without at least visiting the shades of Tusculum, and still less would he think of erecting a temple of jurisprudence, without adorning it with materials drawn from the splendid monuments of Justinian, or the castellated remains of feudal grandeur. The literature of the present day, "rich with the spoils of time," instructs by the aid of the accumulated wisdom of ages.

LECTURE XLVIII.

OF THE LAW OF MARINE INSURANCE.

MARINE insurance is a contract whereby one party, for a stipulated premium, undertakes to indemnify the other against certain perils, or searisks, to which his ship, freight, and cargo, or some of them, may be exposed, during a certain voyage, or a fixed period of time.

In the consideration of a title in the law of such extensive concern, and upon which so many learned volumes have been exhausted, it has been found difficult to bring the subject within manageable limits, and suitably restricted for the object of these lectures. It has been my endeavour to state the leading principles of the contract, and to dwell upon such parts only as are best adapted for elementary instruction.

The subject will be considered under the following arrangement : (I.) Of the formation and subject matter of the contract. (II.) Of the voyage in relation to the policy. (III.) Of the rights and duties of the insured in case of loss.

I. *Of the formation and subject matter of the contract.*

(1.) *Of the parties.*

All persons, whether aliens or natives, may be insured, with the exception of alien enemies, for it is a contract

authorized by the general law and usage of
*254 nations.^a It was *for a long time an unsettled
question in the English law, whether the insurance
of enemy's property was lawful. In the year 1741, a bill
was brought into Parliament to prohibit insurances on the
property of the subjects of France, then at war with Great
Britain; and the propriety of such a restriction was much
discussed, and the bill was dropped. But in 1748, such
a bill passed into a law.^b It prohibited, under a penalty,
the assurance on ships or merchandises belonging to
France; and the contracts for such policies were declared
void. The statute of 33 Geo. III. c. 27, was to the same
effect, though much more severe in its penalties. Those
statutes were temporary, and applied only to the then
existing war; and they left the question still undecided
as to the legality of such insurances independent of
statute.

Lord Hardwicke, in the year 1749, declared,^c that
there had been no determination that such insurances
were unlawful, and that it might be going too far to say,
that all trading with enemies was unlawful, and that there
had been several insurances of that sort during the war
of 1741. But in *Brandon v. Nesbit*,^d the Court of K. B.
gave a fatal wound to the opinion, that the insurance of
enemy's property was lawful, though that opinion had
received considerable currency under the sanction of the
great name and influence of Lord Mansfield. It was
certainly without any just foundation, either in the English
law, or in the established policy and principles of the law
of nations. That case was a suit on a policy of insurance,
brought in the name of an English agent, for his principal,

^a Pothier terms it a contract *du Droit des Gens*.

^b Stat. 21 Geo. II. ch. 4.

^c *Henkle v. The Royal Exchange Assurance Company*, 1 *Vesey's Rep.* 317.

^d 6 *Term Rep.* 23.

who was an alien enemy ; and it was adjudged, that no action could be maintained either by, or in favour of an alien enemy. The case of *Bristow v. Towers*^a *was still more directly on the point, and the *255 legality and expediency of insurances of enemy's property were discussed very much at large, and with great ability and learning. The decision of the court was put upon the strict ground, that the insurance of enemy's property was illegal, and no action could be sustained on such a policy. A distinction was afterwards taken in *Bell v. Gilson*,^b where it was held, that the insurance of goods purchased in an enemy's country during war, by a British agent, and shipped for British subjects, was a lawful insurance. But every distinction of that kind was subsequently abandoned ;^c and in the case of insurances on French property previous to war, they were held not to cover a loss by British capture after the war was renewed, even though the action was not brought until after the restoration of peace. It was declared, that an insurance of enemy's property, as well as all commercial intercourse with the enemy, was, at common law, unlawful, and that an insurance, though effected before the war, made no difference, as a foreigner might otherwise insure previous to the war, against all the evils incident to the war. Insurances of enemy's property had been indulged, but never were legal. The judicial language at last was,^d that such insurances were not only illegal and void, but repugnant to every principle of public policy. The former opinion in favour of the expediency of such insurances, had

^a 6 *Term Rep.* 35.

^b 1 *Bos. & Pull.* 345.

^c *Furtado v. Rodgers*, 3 *Bos. & Pull.* 191. *Gamba v. Le Mesurier*, 4 *East's Rep.* 407. *Brandon v. Curling*, *ibid.* 410.

^d *Lord Ellenborough, Kellner v. Le Mesurier*, 4 *East's Rep.* 396. *Lord Erskine, Ex parte Lee*, 13 *Vesey's Rep.* 64.

never yet produced one single judicial determination in favour of their legality.

All the continental ordinances and jurists concur in the illegality of such insurances.^a Bynkershoeck, *256 in a chapter *devoted to the consideration of this question, concludes that the reason of war absolutely requires the prohibition of insurance of enemy's property; because, by assuming such risks, we promote the maritime commerce of the enemy. Valin considered that insuring enemy's property, and trading with the enemy, was substantially the same thing; and he truly observed, that when the English, in the war of 1756, insured French ships and cargoes, which were captured and condemned as prize of war, and paid for by English underwriters, the nation only took with one hand what it restored with the other.^b

The doctrine of the European law, on this subject, was extensively discussed and explicitly recognised in New-York, in the case of *Griswold v. Waddington*;^c and as that doctrine is founded on the same principle of general policy which interdicts all commerce and trading with the enemy, in time of war, it may be considered as the established law of this country.

With respect to persons who may be insurers, the rule of the common law prevails with us, and any individuals, or companies, or partnerships, may lawfully become insurers; and we have no incorporated companies, like those of the *Royal Exchange Assurance*, and the *London*

^a The ordinances of Barcelona, as early as 1484, declared such insurances void. *Consulat de la Mer*, par Boucher, tom. ii. 717. See, also, *Le Guidon*, ch. 2. sec. 5, in *Cleirac, Us et Coutumes de la Mer*, 197. edit. 1671. *Ord. of Stockholm*, of 1756. 2 *Magens*, 257. *Ord. of the States General of the Netherlands*, in 1622, 1657, 1665, and 1689, cited in *Bynk. Q. J. Pub. lib. 1. ch. 21. Emerigon, des Ass. tom. i. 128.*

^b *Valin's Com.* tom. ii. 32. See vol. i. lec. 4, how far a foreign domicile communicates to a citizen the disabilities of an alien enemy.

^c 16 *Johns. Rep.* 438.

Assurance companies, with the monopoly or exclusive right of making insurance as a company or partnership on a joint capital. Each part owner may insure for himself, and may act his pleasure as to the insurance of his individual proportion of interest. During the colonial government of this country, as well as for the first fifteen or twenty years after the peace of 1783, the business of insurance was almost entirely carried on by *private individuals, each taking singly for him- *257 self, and not *in solido*, a risk to the amount of his subscription.^a But incorporated companies began to multiply and supplant private underwriters, and the business of insurance in the United States is now carried on almost exclusively by incorporated companies. Individuals, and unincorporated partnership companies, are still at liberty to carry on the business of insurance to any extent they please, and the success of any such competition with the incorporated companies would depend upon the ability to command confidence, and the judgment and skill with which the business was conducted.^b

^a As early as 1725, Francis Rawle, of Philadelphia, proposed the establishment, under legislative sanction, of a marine insurance office. This he did in a small volume, printed by Dr. Franklin, and the first book he ever printed. See App. to Mr. Wharton's Memoir of the late William Rawle, Esq.

^b Marine insurance was formerly a lawful business in New-York, equally open to all the world; but in 1829, the legislature, by statute, (*Laws of New-York*, sess. 52. ch. 336,) prohibited marine insurance, or lending on respondentia or bottomry, effected within the state, to all persons and companies residing in any foreign country, acting by any agent here. Persons and associations in other states effecting such insurances in New-York, were taxed ten per cent. on their premiums. The same check and prohibition applies to insurances in New-York against fire. *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 714. The statute law of Pennsylvania also prohibits all kinds of insurance by foreign corporations or companies within the state. *Purdon's Dig.* 545. The law in Massachusetts is more liberal, and it allows incorporated insurance companies in other states and in foreign countries to insure by their agents, upon compliance with certain conditions intended to guard against abuse. *Act of 1816*, and *Revised Statutes of 1835*. Every incorporated insurance company in Massachusetts may insure vessels, freight, money, goods, and effects, and against captivity of persons, and on the life of any person at sea, and on money lent upon bottomry and respondentia,

(2.) *Of the terms and subject of the policy.*

If the ship be specified in the policy, it becomes part of the contract, and no other ship can be substituted without necessity; but the cargo may be shifted from one ship to another, if it be done from necessity, and the insurer of it will still be liable.^a An insurance on the body of a ship sweeps in, by the comprehensiveness of the expression, whatever is appurtenant to the ship. This is the doctrine taught in all the continental writers on insurance, as well as in the English law.^b An insurance on a ship means *prima facie* the legal interest in the vessel, and not the mere equitable interest, and if the policy be intended to cover the equitable interest

*258 only, that *interest ought to be disclosed to the insurer.^c An insurance will be valid without naming the ship, as upon goods on board *any ship or ships*; and it becomes sometimes a nice question as to the application of the loss, when there are two or more policies of that loose description on different parcels of goods.^d So, it will be valid if made on account of A., or of whom it may concern.^e In England, the statute of 25 Geo. III. c. 44, prohibits insurances in blank, as to the name of the insured; and the name of the party in interest, or some agent in his behalf, must be inserted, and the policy cannot be applied to any property which does not belong to

and against fire: on dwelling houses and other buildings, and on merchandise or other property within the United States. *Statutes*, 1817, 1819. *Revised Statutes*, 1835, part 1. tit. 13. ch. 37. sec. 2.

^a The owner may change the master of the vessel insured in his discretion, without prejudice to the insurance, provided it be done in good faith, and a substitute of competent skill be provided. *Platt, J., Walden v. Firemen's Ins. Company*, 12 *Johnson*, 138.

^b *Emerigon*, tom. i. 423. *Boulay Paty*, tom. iii. 379. *Plantamour v. Staples*, 1 *Term Rep.* 611. note.

^c *Ohl v. Eagle Ins. Company*, 4 *Mason's Rep.* 390.

^d *Emerigon*, tom. i. 173. *Kewley v. Ryan*, 2 *H. Blacks.* 343. *Henchman v. Offley*, *ibid.* 345. note.

^e *Boulay Paty*, tom. iii. 528. 531, tom. iv. 28.

the party named, or in which he is not interested; but the suit on the policy may be brought in the name of the principal or agent.^a The interest of the real owner may be averred and shown; but if one partner insures in his own name only, the policy will cover his undivided interest in the partnership, and no more.^b If the policy has the words, *and whomsoever it may concern*, then it will cover the whole partnership interest;^c and Valin and Boulay Paty think it covers the whole if the policy be generally on his goods.^d On such a policy an action may be maintained by any one of the owners whose interest was intended to be insured by it. It will cover a person who has but a special interest, as by lien or otherwise.^e Those general words, *whom it may concern*, will only apply to the person having an interest in the subject insured, and who was in the contemplation of the contract.^f But a policy may be applied to cover the interest intended to be insured, though the owner of it was not known to the parties, provided the terms of the policy will permit it.^g

The form of the policy in England and the United States, contains the words *lost or not lost*; and if the subject insured be lost, or has arrived in safety when the contract is made, it is still valid, if made in ignorance of the event, and the insurer must pay the loss or not pay it as the *case may be. This is laid down by *259 the foreign jurists as a general principle of insu-

^a Cox v. Parry, 1 Term Rep. 464.

^b Valin's Com. tom. ii. 34. 1 Emerigon, 293, 294. Graves & Barnewell v. Boston Marine Ins. Company, 2 Cranch's Rep. 419. Dumas v. Jones, 4 Mass. Rep. 647. Turner v. Burrows, 5 Wendell's Rep. 541.

^c Lawrence v. Sebor, 2 Caines' Rep. 203.

^d Valin, tom. ii. 34. Boulay Paty, tom. iii. 386.

^e The Pacific Ins. Company v. Catlett, 1 Wendell's Rep. 561. S. C. 4 ibid. 75.

^f Newson v. Douglass, 7 Johnson & Harris' Rep. 417. Bauduy v. Union Ins. Company, 2 Wash. Cir. Rep. 391. De Bolle v. Pennsylvania Ins. Company, 4 Wharton, 63.

^g Buck v. Chest. Ins. Company, 1 Peters' S. C. Rep. 151.

rance, without reference to those words, which are said to be peculiar to the English policies, and that without them the policy would be void if the subject was lost when the insurance was made.^a There is no English adjudication to that effect, and the point may well be doubted, inasmuch as all the continental authorities hold such insurances to be valid, if made in ignorance of the existing loss.^b

A policy on a voyage from abroad may be good, though it omits to name the ship, or master, or port of discharge, or consignee, or to specify and designate the nature or species of the cargo, for all these may be unknown to the insured when he applies for the insurance.^c The policy, in such a case, will be good to the amount insured, if effects be laden in any ship, to any port, and to any consignee. The text writers, however, require cargo of the same form and species, and the policy will not cover the same thing under a new modification, if the essential character of the article has changed ; as a policy on a cargo of wheat will not cover a cargo of flour.^d A policy on cargo or goods generally will not cover goods stowed on deck, nor live stock, unless there be some local mercantile usage to give extension to the terms.^e And a

^a 5 *Burr. Rep.* 2803, 2804. *Park on Insurance*, 31.

^b *Rota Genue Decisio*, 42. n. 8. *Roccus, de Ass.* n. 51. *Emerigon*, tom. ii. 121. *Ruggles v. Gen. Int. Ins. Company*, 4 *Mason's Rep.* 74. *Kohne v. Ins. Company of North America*, 1 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 93. In *Hammond v. Allen*, 2 *Sumner*, 397, Mr. Justice Story thinks that the policy would be binding, though the ship was lost at the time, and though the policy had not the words *lost or not lost*, if the parties acted in mutual ignorance of that event.

^c *Le Guidon*, ch. 12. art. 2. *Ord. de la Mar. tit. des Assurances*, art. 4. *Code de Commerce*, art. 337. *Poulay Paty, Cours de Droit Com.* tom. iii. 411, 412.

^d *Boulay Paty*, tom. iii. 388, 389. See, *infra*, p. 310.

^e *Lenox v. United Ins. Company*, 3 *Johns. Cas.* 178. *Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Company*, 2 *Gill & Johnson*, 136. *Wolcott v. Eagle Ins. Company*, 4 *Pick.* 429. *Smith v. Miss. Mar. and Fire Ins. Company*, 11 *Louisiana Rep.* 142.

policy may be on bills of exchange if they truly exist.^a If bottomry or respondentia interest be insured by the lender, it has been required to be insured *eo nomine*, and not under the general description of *goods*.^b But this rule was originally adopted on the ground of mercantile usage; and where the usage was shown to be different, such an interest was allowed *to be co- *260 vered by a policy on goods.^c If any of the terms used in a policy have by the known usage of trade, and the practice as between the insurers and the insured, acquired an appropriate sense, they are to be construed according to that sense. All mercantile contracts, if dubious or made with reference to usage, may be explained by parol evidence of the usage.^d But the rule is checked by this limitation, that the usage to be admissible must be consistent with the principles of law, and not go to defeat the essential provisions of the contract.^e If part

^a Palmer *v.* Pratt, 2 *Bing.* 185.

^b Glover *v.* Black, 3 *Burr.* 1394. Robertson *v.* Union Ins. Company, 2 *Johns. Cas.* 250. Kenny *v.* Clarkson, 1 *Johns. Rep.* 385.

^c Gregory *v.* Christie, 1 *Condy's Marshall on Insurance*, 118.

^d Coit *v.* Com. Ins. Company, 7 *Johns. Rep.* 385. Allegre *v.* Maryland Ins. Company, 6 *Harr. & Johns.* 408. Robertson *v.* Clarke, 1 *Bing.* 445. Renner *v.* Bank of Columbia, 9 *Wheat.* 591. Columbia Ins. Company *v.* Catlett, 12 *ibid.* 383.

^e Palmer *v.* Blackburne, 3 *Bing.* 61. Bryant *v.* Com. Ins. Company, 6 *Pick.* 131. Rankin *v.* American Ins. Company, 1 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 619. No particular usage or custom can be admitted to alter or impair a clear and express written contract of the parties. The evidence of usage can only be admitted, when the intention of the parties is indeterminate, and the language of the contract may admit of various senses. Schooner Reeside, 2 *Sumner's Rep.* 567. Mr. Justice Story, in that case and in *Donnell v. Columb. Ins. Company*, 2 *Sumner*, 377, thought that usages among merchants ought to be very sparingly adopted as rules of law, as they are often founded in mere mistake, and in a want of comprehensive views of the full bearing of principles. In *Wallace v. Bradshaw*, 6 *Dana's Ken. Rep.* 385, it was held that a commission merchant, receiving goods on general consignment from a distant owner, and making advances therefor, might, for his own interest and safety, be authorized, by the usage of the place, in certain circumstances, at his discretion, and for the benefit of himself and the consignor, to ship the goods to a more advantageous market, or one deemed so, especially if a sale at the place would not indemnify him for

of the policy should be written and part printed, and there should arise a reasonable doubt upon the meaning of the contract, the greater effect is to be attributed to the written words, for they are the immediate language selected by the parties, and the printed words contain the *formula* adapted to that and all other cases upon similar subjects.^a

The ancient laws of insurance required the insured to bear the risk himself, of one-tenth of his interest in the voyage. This was to stimulate him, by a sense of his own interest, to watch more vigilantly for the preservation of the cargo. The Dutch ordinances of Antwerp, Middleburg, and Amsterdam, and the *Le Guidon*, had such provisions.^b But these provisions have been omitted in all the modern codes, as being odious and useless, and the merchant can have his interest insured to the entire extent of it.

Policies are generally effected through the agency of brokers; and the insurance broker keeps running accounts with both parties, and becomes the mutual agent of both the underwriter and the insured. His receipt of the premium places him in the relation of debtor to the one party, and creditor to the other. The general rule is, that the broker is the debtor of the underwriter for the premiums, and the underwriter the debtor of the assured for the loss. The receipt of the premium in the policy, is conclusive evidence of payment, and binds the insurer, unless there be fraud on the part of the insured.^c If the agent effects an insurance for his principal without his knowledge or authority, and the principal afterwards

his advances; and that if such was the known custom of the place (*New-Orleans*;) it would be reasonable to sustain the authority.

^a Lord Ellenborough, 4 *East*, 136. *Coster v. Phoenix Ins. Company, C. C. Penn.* April, 1807.

^b 2 *Magens*, 26. 68. *Le Guidon*, ch. 2. art. 11.

^c *Dalzell v. Mair*, 1 *Campb. Rep.* 532. *Foy v. Bell*, 3 *Taunt. Rep.* 493.

adopts the act, the insurer is bound, and cannot
 *object to the want of authority.^a But if A. in- *261
 sures the property of B. without authority, (and
 the master of a vessel, merely as master or a part owner,
 as such, has no such authority,) and without any adop-
 tion of the act by B., the contract is not binding.^b A
 merchant who has effects of his foreign correspondent
 in hand, or who is in the habit of insuring for him, is
 bound to comply with an order to insure, and the order
 may be implied in some cases from the previous course
 of dealing between the parties. If the agent neglects or
 imperfectly executes the order, he is answerable, as if he
 himself was the insurer, and is entitled to the premium.^c

If the subject matter of the policy be assigned, the
 policy may also be assigned, so as to give a right of action
 to the assignee. But if there be no statute provision, (as
 there is in Pennsylvania,^d) the assignee must sue in the
 name of the assignor, who will not be permitted to defeat
 or prejudice the right of action of the assignee. The de-
 claration, in such a suit, may contain the averment that
 the plaintiff sues as mere trustee, and that the whole
 interest is in others.^e

^a *Bridge v. Niagara Ins. Co. of New-York*, 1 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 247.

^b *Bell v. Humphreys*, 2 *Starkie*, 345. *French v. Backhouse*, 5 *Burr.* 2727.
Foster v. United States Ins. Company, 11 *Pick.* 85.

^c *Buller, J.*, in *Wallace v. Tellfair*, 2 *Term Rep.* 188. note, and in *Smith v. Lascalles*, 2 *Term Rep.* 188. *De Taslett v. Crousillat*, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 132. *Morris v. Summerl*, *ibid.* 203. A commission merchant is not bound to insure for the benefit of his principal, goods consigned to him for sale, without some express or implied directions to that effect; though he has such an interest in the goods, that he may insure them to their full value in his own name. *Brisban v. Boyd*, 4 *Paige*, 17.

^d 1 *Binney's Rep.* 429.

^e 2 *Condy's Marshall on Insurance*, 800. 803. 805. 1 *Phillips on Insurance*, 11. *Carter v. Union Ins. Company*, 1 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 463. *Wakefield v. Martin*, 3 *Mass. Rep.* 558. *Bell v. Smith*, 5 *Barnw. & Cress. Rep.* 188. *Ashhurst, J.*, in *Delancey v. Stoddart*, 1 *Term Rep.* 26. *Craig v. The United States Ins. Company*, 1 *Peters' Cir. Rep.* 410. A clause in a policy that it shall

(3.) *Of insurable interests.*

The assured must have a lawful interest subsisting at the time of the loss in the subject insured to entitle him to recover upon his policy. That interest may be absolute or contingent, legal or equitable. It may exist in him not only as absolute owner, but also in the character of mortgagor or mortgagee, borrower or lender, consignee, factor, or agent, and may arise from profits, freight, or commissions, or other lawful business. The subject will be better illustrated by considering it with its qualifications under the following heads, viz: 1. *Illicit trade.* 2. *Contraband of war.* 3. *Seamen's wages.* 4. *Freight, profits, and commissions.* 5. *Open and valued policies.* 6. *Wager policies.* I shall treat of each of them in their order.

1. *Of illicit trade.*

The proper subject of insurance, is lawful property engaged in a lawful trade. We have seen that the property of enemies, and a trade carried on with enemies, do not come within this definition. So, an insurance on a voyage undertaken in violation of a blockade, or of an embargo, or of the provisions of a treaty, is illegal, whether the policy be on the ship, freight, or goods, embarked in the illegal traffic.^a Any illegality in the com-

be void if assigned without the consent, in writing, of the insurer, is taken strictly, and means an effectual transfer or pledge of the particular policy. In Massachusetts, it has been decided, that if there be an absolute transfer of the subject insured, the contract of insurance is avoided, for the assured cannot sue, as he has not suffered any loss, and the assignee cannot sue, for he is no party to the contract. But if the assignment be in the nature of a mortgage, or in trust, the insured may nevertheless sue and recover to the extent of his residuary interest. *Carroll v. The Boston Marine Ins. Company*, 8 *Mass. Rep.* 515. *Lazarus v. Commonwealth Ins. Company*, 5 *Pick.* 76.

^a The *Hurtig v. Hane*, 3 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 324. *Delmada v. Motteux*, K. B., 25 *George III. Park on Insurance*, 311. Sir W. Scott, in the *Eenrom*, 2 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 6. *Hughes on the Law of Insurance*, 70.

mencement of an entire voyage, will render the whole illegal, and destroy the policy intended for its protection.^a

It is a clear, settled, and universal principle, that an insurance on property, intended to be imported or exported, contrary to the law of the place where the policy is made, or sought to be enforced, is void. No court, consistently with its duty, can lend its aid to carry into execution a contract which involves a violation of the laws the court is bound to administer.^b

*It has been a question of great discussion, *263. whether a trade prohibited by one country, might be made the subject of lawful insurance, to be protected and enforced in the courts of another in which the prohibition does not exist. This question involves principles in politics and morals of momentous importance, and yet the jurists of England and France have differed widely in opinion upon it. Valin and Emerigon consider the insurance of goods, employed in a foreign smuggling or contraband trade, to be valid, provided the insurer was duly informed, when he entered into the contract, of the nature of the trade. The French Admiralty of Marseilles, in 1758, sustained and enforced a contract of insurance in favour of a French merchant who attempted to export silks from Spain, contrary to the law of that country, and whose vessel was, in consequence thereof, seized, and the cargo confiscated. Emerigon justified the decision in France, under the broad terms of the

^a Wilson v. Marryatt, 8 Term Rep. 31. Bird v. Appleton, *ibid.* 562.

^b Johnston v. Sutton, Doug. Rep. 254. Parkin v. Dick, 11 East's Rep. 502. The United States v. The Paul Sherman, 1 Peters' Rep. 98. 1 Phillips on Insurance, 35. 1 Emerigon, 210. ch. 8. sec. 5. And see his opinion in a note to 2 Valin, 130, in which he refers to *Straccha de Assecur.* Glossa, 5. n. 2, 3, where we have the establishment of the above doctrine, that the insurance of prohibited goods is null and void, founded on the sound principle, that *in mercibus illicitis non sit commercium*. The same principle is in *Roccus de Assecur.* n. 21, and he copied it almost verbatim, from *Santerna de Assecur. et Spons. Merc.* part 4. n. 17.

policy, which assumes the *aversio periculi*, and by the usage of the commercial nations, who permit their subjects to carry on, at their own risk, a smuggling trade, contrary to the revenue laws of other countries.^a Valin concurs in opinion with Emerigon;^b but their conclusions were met and opposed by the manly sense, and stern moral principles of Pothier, who denied that it was permitted to Frenchmen to carry on, in a foreign country, a contraband trade prohibited by the laws of the foreign country.^c They who engage in foreign commerce are bound by the law of nature and nations, to act in obedience to the laws of the country in which they transact

business. Every sovereign possesses a rightful
 *264 and supreme jurisdiction within his *own territory.

He has a right to regulate the commerce of his subjects in his discretion; and so far as foreigners interfere with that commerce within his dominion, they are equally bound with natives to obey the laws which regulate it. If Frenchmen, trading in Spain, were not bound by the Spanish laws, the subjects of Spain are bound by them, and it is immoral for foreigners to seduce Spaniards into an illicit trade. In every view, according to Pothier, the commerce was illicit, and contrary to good faith, and the insurance of it was equally inadmissible, and created no valid obligation.

Emerigon, who was enlightened, as he admits, in the whole course of his work, by the luminous mind of Pothier, as the latter was by Valin, bows to the irresistible energy of the principles of Pothier, and concedes, that the insurance of a foreign smuggling, or contraband trade, is rather tolerated than justified, and allowed only

^a 1 *Emerigon*, 210—215. 2 *Valin*, 128. note.

^b *Com. de Assur.* tom. ii. 127.

^c *Traité des Ass.* n. 58.

because other nations have indulged in the same vicious practice.^a

*In England, the law of insurance is the same *265 as it is in France. A policy, unlawful by the law of the land where it is made, is void every where; but an insurance upon a smuggling voyage, prohibited only by the law of the foreign country where the ship has traded, or intends to trade, is good and valid, on the principle, which has been adopted from a motive of policy or comity, that one country does not take notice of the revenue laws of another, nor hold itself bound to repudiate commercial transactions which violate them. If the underwriter, therefore, with full knowledge that he was covering a foreign smuggling trade, makes the insurance, it is held to be a fair contract between the parties, and he is bound by it.^b The decisions of Lord Mansfield on this subject, must be considered as laying down an exceedingly lax morality, particularly in the case of *Planche v. Fletcher*, where an insurance upon a voyage in which it was intended to defraud the revenue of a foreign state, was held not to be illegal, though fictitious papers were fabricated for the purpose of facilitating the fraud. Lord Hardwicke had advanced similar doctrine in *Boucher v. Lawson*,^c when he declared, that the unlawfulness, by the Portuguese laws, for exporting gold from Portugal, made

^a It is admitted that such an insurance is not binding, if the underwriter was not informed of the prohibited trade. He must know that he was insuring a contraband or smuggling trade. *Roccus de Ass.* n. 21, says, that such an insurance is not binding *ignorante assecuratore*; and *Santerna, de Assecurat*, part 4. n. 17, whom Roccus cites, uses the same words. Roccus copied from him; and yet those qualifying expressions, and which are so material to the question, do not appear in Mr. Ingersoll's translation of Roccus. I mention this without the least intended disparagement of that very useful translation, the general accuracy of which is undoubted.

^b *Planche v. Fletcher*, *Doug. Rep.* 238. *Lever v. Fletcher*, *Hil. Vac.* 1780, cited *Park on Insurance*, 313. 6th edition.

^c *Cases temp. Hard.* 183.

no difference in the action at London, for in England it was a lawful trade. The statute of 19 Geo. II. c. 37, was made even with a view to favour the smuggling of bullion from the Spanish and Portuguese colonies. Lord Kenyon, in the case of *Waymell v. Reed*,^a seemed to have felt the pressure of the unsound and immoral principle involved in the doctrine of the English courts, for he purposely waived the inquiry whether or not it be immoral for a native of one country to enter into a contract with the subject of another, to assist the latter in de-
 *266 frauding the revenue *laws of his country. The

English writers on insurance have not concurred entirely in opinion on the question; for while Miller, in his essay on *The Elements of Insurance*, approves of the English rule, and Mr. Justice Park admits it without any complaint, there are other writers, equally intelligent, who most pointedly condemn the doctrine.^b

In this country, we have followed the English rule, as declared by Lord Mansfield, to the full extent; and the underwriter is liable for losses in consequence of violations of the trade laws of foreign states, provided he was apprized of the intention on the part of the insured, to violate such laws, either by the terms of the policy, or the standing regulations of the place to which the vessel is insured, or the known usages of the trade. But it is well understood and settled, that the underwriter is not liable for any loss arising from foreign illicit trade, unless he underwrote with full knowledge that such a trade was the object of the voyage. An insurance to a port does not include the risk of going into the port in violation of law, unless the peril of illicit entry at the port be also within the provision or contemplation of the policy. All the

^a 5 Term Rep. 599.

^b *Miller on Insurance*, 23. *Park on Insurance*, 313. *Condy's Marshall on Insurance*, vol. i. 60. *Chitty on Commercial Law*, vol. i. 82. 84.

authorities, foreign and domestic, recognise this doctrine. If the trade be known by the underwriter to be illicit, and he makes no exception of the risk of illicit trade, it will be presumed he intended to assume it. The implication would be very fair and just, and would supply the place of more direct proof.^a It is certainly matter of surprise and regret, that in such countries as France, England, and the United States, distinguished for a correct and enlightened administration of justice, smuggling voyages, made on purpose to elude the laws, and seduce the subjects of foreign states, should be countenanced, *and even encouraged, by the courts of justice. *267 The principle does no credit to the commercial jurisprudence of the age.^b

(2.) *Of contraband of war.*

The insurance by a neutral, of goods usually denominated contraband of war, is a valid contract, for it is not deemed unlawful for a neutral to be engaged in a contraband trade. It is a commercial adventure which no neutral nation is bound to prohibit, and which only exposes the persons engaged in it to the penalty of confiscation. But, on the other hand, all articles contraband

^a *Valin*, tom. ii. 127. *Planche v. Fletcher*, *Doug. Rep.* 251. *Roccus, de Ass.* not. 21. *Gardiner v. Smith*, 1 *Johns. Cas.* 141. *Richardson v. Maine Ins. Company*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 102. *Parker v. Jones*, 13 *ibid.* 173. *Andrews v. Essex Fire and Marine Ins. Company*, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 18. 20. *Archibald v. M. Ins. Company*, 3 *Pick. Rep.* 70. It has been usual in American policies for the assured to warrant "free from damage or loss in consequence of seizure or detention of the property for, or on account of, any illicit or prohibited trade." But notwithstanding the warranty, the insurer is liable for loss by seizure and confiscation for an illicit traffic *barratrously* carried on by the master and crew at a foreign port, without the knowledge or privity of the owner. *Suckley v. Delafield*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 222. *Dunham & Co. v. American Ins. Company*, 2 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 422.

^b In the case of *La Jeune Eugenie*, 2 *Mason's Rep.* 459, 460, a case that pleads the cause of humanity with admirable eloquence, the rule supporting smuggling voyages is admitted, but pretty plainly condemned.

of war are subject to seizure *in transitu*, by the belligerent cruisers, and so far it is a case of imperfect right.^a Mr. Phillips, in his *Treatise of the Law of Insurance*, intimates, that the trading in articles contraband of war is illegal by the law of nations, which forms part of the municipal law of every state; and that the property cannot, therefore, be the lawful subject of insurance, even in a neutral state.^b But though it may be difficult to answer this reasoning, it is certain, that the established doctrine is not so rigorous. Vattel^c admits, that it is not an act in itself unlawful or hostile, for a neutral to carry on a contraband trade; and if the neutral right to carry, and the belligerent right to seize and confiscate, clash with, and reciprocally injure each other, it is a collision of rights

which happens every day in war, and flows from
 *268 the effect of an inevitable *necessity. The Chief

Justice of Massachusetts, in *Richardson v. Maine Insurance Company*,^d examined this subject with very accurate discrimination, and he considered, that illicit voyages might be ranked in several classes: (1.) When the sovereign of the country to which the ship belonged, interdicted trade with a foreign country or port; and in that case, the voyage, for the purpose of trade, would be illicit, and all insurances thereon void. (2.) Where the trade in question is prohibited by the trade laws of a foreign state; and in that case, the voyage, in such a trade, may be the subject of insurance in any state in which the trade is not prohibited, for the municipal laws of one jurisdiction have no force in another. (3.) When

^a See vol. i. 142, and the authorities there cited; and in addition thereto, see, *Seton & Co. v. Low*, 1 *Johns. Cas.* 1. *Barker v. Blakes*, 9 *East's Rep.* 233. *Pond v. Smith*, 4 *Conn. Rep.* 297. *Juhel v. Rhinelander*, 2 *Johns. Cas.* 120, and affirmed on error, *ibid.* 487.

^b *Phillips on Insurance*, vol. i. 101. 429. 2d edit.

^c B. 3. c. 7. sec. 111.

^d 6 *Mass. Rep.* 102.

neutrals transport to belligerents goods contraband of war. The law of nations does not go to the extent of rendering the neutral shipper of goods contraband of war an offender against his own sovereign. While the neutral is engaged in such a trade, he is withdrawn from the protection of his sovereign, and his goods are liable to seizure and condemnation by the powers at war. To this penalty the neutral must submit, for the capture was lawful. The neutral may lawfully transport contraband goods, subject to the qualification of being rightfully liable to seizure by a belligerent power; but he is never punished by his own sovereign for his contraband shipments. In like manner, the neutral may lawfully carry enemy's property, and the belligerent may lawfully interrupt him and seize it. An insurance, then, by neutrals, in a neutral country, is valid, whether it relates to an interloping trade in a foreign port, illicit *lege loci*, or to a trade in transporting contraband goods, which is illicit *jure belli*. But to render the insurance in either case valid, the nature of the trade; and of the goods, should be disclosed to him, or there should be just ground, *from the circumstances of the trade, or otherwise, *269 to presume that he was duly informed of the facts.^a

(3.) *Of seamen's wages.*

The commercial ordinances have generally prohibited the insurance of seamen's wages, and the expediency of the prohibition arises from the consideration, that if the title to wages did not depend upon the earning of freight by the performance of the voyage, seamen would want

^a Parsons, Ch. J., 6 *Mass. Rep.* 114, 115. In New-York, the underwriter is presumed to assume the risk of contraband of war, without a previous disclosure of the nature of the cargo; and on the ground of that presumption the contraband cargo need not be disclosed. *Seton v. Low*, 1 *Johns. Cas.* 1. *Juhel v. Rhineland*, 2 *ibid.* 120. 487.

one great stimulus to exertion in times of difficulty and disaster. Though there be no statute ordinance on the subject in the English law, yet it is every where assumed, as a settled principle in the marine law of England, that seamen's wages are not insurable.^a But the goods that seamen purchase abroad with their wages, do not fall within the reason, nor do wages already earned and due; and yet if a seaman, at an intermediate port, by a refusal to proceed, coerces the master to have his wages already earned insured, such a policy has been held void in the French courts.^b

(4.) *Of freight, profits, and commissions.*

In France and Spain, freight not earned, cannot be insured, and for the same reason, that seamen's wages are not insurable. Several of the commercial tribunals wished, however, to adopt the practice of the English, and give a greater extension to the liberty of insurance.

To this it was answered, that risk was of the essence of the contract, and that there *could be no real loss of that which is a nonentity, and had no certain existence, as future contingent freight and profits.^c By leaving the freight to be earned uncovered, the master has stronger inducements to be vigilant in the preservation of the ship and cargo. This is the reason assigned by Cleirac; but Emerigon says, the true ground of the prohibition is, the uncertainty of the existence of any future freight.^d In England, and the United States,

^a 1 *Magens on Insurance*, 18. Lord Mansfield, in 3 *Burr. Rep.* 1912. Webster v. De Tastet, 7 *Term Rep.* 157. Lord Stowell, in 1 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 239.

^b *Emerigon*, tom. i. 236.

^c *Boulay Paty*, tom. iii. 482, 483.

^d *Ord. de la Mar. Du Fret.* art. 15. *Code de Commerce*, art. 347. *Cleirac, sur le Guidon*, ch. 15. art. 1. 1 *Emerigon*, 224. *Ord. of Bilbao*, ch. 22. But freight already earned and due may be insured, for it has then ceased to be uncertain. *Pardessus, Cours de Droit Com.* tom. iii. n. 764, 765.

future, or expected and contingent, and even dead freight is held to be an insurable interest. It is sufficient that the insured has an interest in the subject matter from which the freight is to arise. It is necessary, however, that the ship should have actually begun to earn freight, in order to entitle the insurer to recover, for, until then, the risk on the freight does not commence. An inchoate right to freight is an insurable interest. The risk generally begins from the time the goods, or part of them, are put on board; and if the ship has been let to freight under a charter-party of affreightment, the right to freight commences, and is at risk, so soon as the ship breaks ground; and if the charterer omits to put on board the expected cargo, and the ship performs the voyage in ballast, the right to freight is perfect. But when the freight arises from the transportation of the goods, it commences when the goods are put on board, and the policy attaches to the extent of the goods on board, or ready to be shipped.^a

*Profits are, equally with freight, a proper sub- *271
ject of insurance. The right to insure expected or contingent profits, is settled in England, and has received

^a *Tonge v. Watts*, *Str. Rep.* 1251. *Thompson v. Taylor*, 6 *Term Rep.* 478. *Forbes v. Aspinall*, 13 *East's Rep.* 323. *Davidson v. Willasey*, 1 *Maule & Selw.* 313. *Riley v. Hartford Ins. Company*, 2 *Conn. Rep.* 368. *Livingston v. Columbian Ins. Company*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 49. *Davy v. Hallett*, 3 *Caines' Rep.* 16. Mr. *Benecke*, in his *Treatise on the Principles of Indemnity*, 57, says, that the practice of insuring ship and freight separately, is attended with many difficulties, and that the best, if not the only way to obviate them, and to put the owner, under all circumstances, in the same situation in which he would have been in case of a safe arrival, would be, *to insure the ship and freight jointly, as one indivisible risk, in the same policy.* In *Adams v. Pennsylvania Ins. Company*, 1 *Rawle*, 97, in the case of a valued policy on freight, there was specie on board belonging to the owner of the ship, and the ship was lost before any cargo was purchased, or contracted for, or procured; and it was held, that there was no claim upon the insurer, for there was only a reasonable expectation of profit upon a cargo expected to be procured and shipped. The contingency of expected freight was too remote.

repeated and elaborate confirmation.^a They are likewise, in this country, held to be an insurable interest.^b The consignee of goods consigned to him for sale, has an insurable interest therein to their full value, and he may insure them in his own name.^c Insurances on freights, profits, and commissions, are required, by the course and interests of trade, and have been found to be greatly conducive to its prosperity. But the doctrine that pervades the cases is, that the insured must have a real interest in the subject matter from which the profits are expected. There must be a substantial basis for the hope or expectation of profits, in order to prevent the policy from being considered a wager. Commissions are a species of profit expected to arise from the sale of property consigned to an agent or supercargo, and they are an insurable interest in England, and other countries, where insurance on profits are legal.^d

In France, assurances on profits are unlawful, and contrary to the code, as they were also to the ordinances of the marine, *and for the same reason
 *272 that insurances on freight are not allowed. The subject insured must have a physical existence, and be a substance capable of being exposed to the hazards of the sea. And yet there seems to be no more objection to the insurance of a thing having only a potential existence, than to the sale of it; and it is admitted, that the sale of the proceeds of a future vintage, or of the next

^a *Grant v. Parkinson*, cited in *Park on Insurance*, 354. 6th edition. *Le Cras v. Hughes*, *ibid.* 358. *Craufurd v. Hunter*, 8 *Term Rep.* 13. *Barclay v. Cousins*, 2 *East's Rep.* 544. *Henrickson v. Margetson*, *ibid.* 549. note. Profits must be insured *qua* profits. 3 *Neville & Manning*, 819.

^b *Loomis v. Shaw*, 2 *Johns. Cas.* 36. *Tom v. Smith*, 3 *Caines' Rep.* 245. *Abbot v. Sebor*, 3 *Johns. Cas.* 39. *Fosdick v. Norwich Marine Ins. Company*, 3 *Day's Rep.* 108.

^c *De Forest v. Fulton Ins. Company*, 1 *Hall's Rep.* 84. *Brisban v. Boyd*, 4 *Paige*, 17.

^d *Benecke on Indemnity*, 35.

cast of the net by a fisherman, is a good and valid sale. The hope or expectation of profit, in these cases, is, says Pothier,^a a moral entity susceptible of value, and of being sold. But in Italy, Portugal, and the Hanse Towns, they are held lawful; and Santerna, and after him, Straccha, and then Roccus, all show, that the profits of goods may lawfully be estimated in an insurance on goods.^b The English cases have required the insured to show, in an insurance on profits, that some profit would have been produced upon the adventure, if the peril to the property from which the profits were to arise had not intervened.^c I should apprehend that was the proper course, though the cases in this country have not explicitly declared, that the party must show affirmatively that the goods, if they had arrived safe, would have come to a profitable market, or that the state of the foreign market was such as to have afforded, as in *Grant v. Parkinson*, a very strong expectation of profits. Such an expectation seems to have been assumed in the American cases.

(5.) *Of open and valued policies.*

An *open* policy is one in which the amount of interest is not fixed by the policy, but is left to be ascertained by the insured, in case a loss should happen. A *valued* policy is where a value has been set on the ship or goods insured, *and inserted in the policy in the *273 nature of liquidated damages.

If a policy on profits be an open one, there must be proof given of the amount of the profits that would probably have been made, if the loss had not happened; there would not otherwise be any guide to the jury, in

^a *Traité du Con. de Vente*, n. 5, 6.

^b *Roccus*, n. 31. 96. *Santerna, de Ass. and Spons. Merc. Tract.* part 3. n. 40, 41. *Straccha, de Ass. Gloss.* 6. n. 1. *Ord. of Hamburg*, 2 *Magens*, 213. *Benecke*, 35.

^c *Hodgson v. Glover*, 6 *East's Rep.* 316.

the computation of the loss. In *Mumford v. Hallett*,^a it was supposed that every policy on profits must, of necessity, be a valued one, because without the valuation it would be extremely difficult to ascertain the amount to be recovered. A loss on the profits must be regulated by the loss of the property from which the profits were to arise.^b Where the ship and cargo were lost on the voyage, the whole amount of the valued profits was held recoverable, without showing that there would have been any ultimate profit if the loss had not happened.^c

The value in the policy is, or ought to be, the real value of the ship, or the prime cost of the goods, including the incidental expenses of them previous to the shipment, and the premium of insurance.^d It means the amount of the insurable interest; and if the insured has some interest at risk, and there be no fraud, the valuation on the policy is conclusive between the parties; for they have, by agreement, settled the value, and not left it open to future inquiry and dispute as between themselves.^e If the valuation should, however, be grossly enormous, as in the case put by Lord Mansfield, where cargo was valued at 2,000%, and the insured had only the value of a cable on board, there is no doubt it would raise a strong presumption of fraud; and either the valuation or the policy would be set aside. A valuation, fraudulent in fact, as respects the insurer, or so excessive as to raise a necessary presumption of fraud, entirely vacates the policy, and discharges the insurer; and the English, American, and French law of insurance contain the same general doctrine on the subject.^f

^a 1 *Johns. Rep.* 433.

^b *Abbott v. Sebor*, 3 *Johns. Cas.* 39.

^c *Patapsco Ins. Company v. Coulter*, 3 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 222.

^d *Pothier, des Ass.* n. 43.

^e *Shaw v. Felton*, 2 *East's Rep.* 109.

^f Lord Mansfield, in *Lewis v. Rucker*, 2 *Burr. Rep.* 1171. *Shaw v. Felton*, 2 *East's Rep.* 109. *Feise v. Aguilar*, 3 *Taunt. Rep.* 506. *Haigh v. De la*

There are cases which suggest that the valuation is applicable only to cases of total loss, and does not apply to average losses.^a But the better opinion is, that in settling all losses, total or partial, the valuation of the property in the policy, is to be considered as correct in the adjustment of the loss and the true measure of indemnity, and the adjustment is to be the same as if the goods had actually cost, or the ship and freight were actually worth, the sum at which they were valued.^b Mr. Benecke concludes, from a consideration of the cases, that the opinion, that in a case of a partial loss the valuation ought to be disregarded, *is as destitute of authority, as *275 it is void of justice and sound reason.^c

Cour, 3 *Campb. Rep.* 319. *Forbes v. Aspinall*, 13 *East's Rep.* 323. *Aubert v. Jacobs*, *Wightwick's Rep.* 118. *Wolcott v. Eagle Ins. Company*, 4 *Pick. Rep.* 429. *Marine Ins. Company v. Hodgson*, 6 *Cranch's Rep.* 206. *Condy's Marshall*, 290, 291. 1 *Phillips on Insurance*, 305—313. 1st edit. *Valin's Com.* tom. ii. 147. *Pothier, des Ass.* n. 151. 159. *Boulay Paty*, tom. iii. 397, 398. *M. Delvincourt*, in his *Institutes de Droit Com.* tom. ii. 345, 346, contends, that though the valuation be made without fraud, if there be palpable evidence of mistake in the valuation, the policy may be opened; and Valin, Pothier, and Emerigon, are of that opinion. But Boulay Paty thinks that the excess in the valuation, by mistake, is not sufficient to open the policy; and there must be proof of actual fraud going to the destruction of the contract. *Cours de Droit Com.* tom. iii. 401. The *Ordinance of the Marine*, h. t. art. 8, and the *Code de Commerce*, art. 336, make fraud the basis of opening the valuation. *Le Guidon*, ch. 2. art. 13, and *Valin, Com.* tom. ii. 52, consider an over valuation of a moiety, or one-third, or even of one-fourth, to be evidence of fraud; but other text writers justly conclude that every case will depend upon its own circumstances, without being governed by any such rule. Mr. Benecke has referred to the various and discordant provisions of the principal commercial nations of Europe, concerning valuations, and they are generally held to be conclusive, unless shown to be fraudulent. *Benecke on Indemnity*, 151, 152.

^a Lord Mansfield, in *Le Cras v. Hughes*, cited in 2 *East's Rep.* 113. *Sewall, J.*, 7 *Mass. Rep.* 370. *Allegre v. Insurance Company*, 6 *Harr. & Johns.* 408.

^b The New-York Board of Underwriters, May 20, 1837, resolved, that in cases of a technical total loss of a vessel, the only basis of ascertaining her value, shall be her valuation in the policy, and if not so valued, her actual value at the time of the inception of the risk at the port of which she belonged.

^c *Goldsmith v. Gillies*, 4 *Taunt. Rep.* 803. *Tunno v. Edward*, 12 *East's Rep.* 488. *Forbes v. Aspinall*, 13 *East's Rep.* 323. *Phillips on Insurance*, vol. ii. 206—217. 1st edit. *Benecke on Indemnity*, 152, 153. 157.

A valuation does not preclude the inquiry, whether the whole interest valued has been at risk. If the valuation of freight of a whole cargo be made, the underwriter will not be liable beyond the extent of the freight of the goods put on board.^a This doctrine applies equally to an insurance upon cargo; and the insured, on a valued policy on cargo, will not recover beyond the interest he had at risk. There must be a total loss of the whole subject matter of insurance to which the valuation applied, whether the insurance was on goods, or upon freight. The valuation fixes the price of the whole subject at risk, but it does not admit, that the property on which the valuation was made was on board the vessel.^b If, therefore, certain articles be comprised in a valuation, and part are safely landed before the ship is lost, the valuation must be opened, and the claim of the insured reduced in the proportion which the articles actually lost bore to the valuation of the whole at the commencement of the risk.^c

(6.) *Of wager policies.*

A mere hope or expectation, without some interest in the subject matter, is a wager policy, and all such marine policies are, by statute, in England, declared void.^d But the English courts have refined greatly, in considering what is an interest sufficient to sustain a policy, and to place it out of the reach of the prohibition. If a person be directly liable to loss in the happening of any

^a *Forbes v. Aspinall*, 13 *East's Rep.* 323.

^b *Parker, Ch. J., Haven v. Gray*, 12 *Mass. Rep.* 71. *Wolcott v. Eagle Ins. Company*, 4 *Pick. Rep.* 429. *Brooke v. Louis. Ins. Company*, 4 *Martin, N. S.* 640. 681. If much less property was shipped than was expected to be on board, the assured, though it be a valued policy, can recover only in case of loss, a proportion *pro rata*. *Alsop v. The Comm. Ins. Company*, 1 *Sumner*, 451.

^c *Benecke on Indemnity*, 146.

^d 19 *Geo. II. c.* 37.

particular event, as if he be an insurer, or *be answerable as owner for the negligence of the master, he has an insurable interest.^a A creditor, to whom property is assigned as collateral security, has an insurable interest to the amount of his debt.^b In the case of *Lucena v. Craufurd*,^c the distinction between a reasonable expectation of gain in the shape of freight, commissions, or profits, founded on some interest in the subject matter which was to produce them, and a mere shadowy hope or expectation, was fully, and very ably investigated, in the Court of Common Pleas, and in the House of Lords, and great talents were displayed and exhausted upon that litigated point. The decision was, that commissions to become due to public agents, and all reasonable expectations of profits, were insurable interests. The interest need not be a property in the subject insured. It is sufficient if a loss of the subject would bring upon the insured a pecuniary loss, or intercept a profit. Interest does not necessarily imply a right to, or property in, the subject insured. It may consist in having some relation to, or concern in, the subject of the insurance, and which relation or concern may be so affected by the peril as to produce damage. Where a person is so circumstanced, he is interested in the safety of the thing, for he receives a benefit from its existence, and a prejudice from its destruction, and that interest is, in the view of the English law, a lawful subject of insurance.^d

It was admitted by the judges of the Court of K. B., in *Craufurd v. Hunter*,^e that, at common law, prior to the

^a Walker *v.* Maitland, 5 *Barnw. & Ald.* 171.

^b Wells *v.* Philadelphia Ins. Company, 9 *Serg. & Rawle*, 103.

^c 3 *Bos. & Pull.* 75. 5 *ibid.* 269.

^d Lawrence, J., in 5 *Bos. & Pull.* 302, 303, 304. *Hughes on Insurance*, 30. An equitable, as well as a legal interest, and an interest held under an executory contract, are valid subjects of insurance. *Columbian Insurance Company v. Lawrence*, 2 *Peters' Sup. C. Rep.* 25.

^e 8 *Term Rep.* 13.

statute of Geo. II, wager policies were not illegal; and the courts have been very much embarrassed in their endeavours to draw the line of distinction between wagers that were and were not admissible in courts of *277 justice. The law has been *thought to descend from its dignity when it lends its aid to recover the fruits of an idle and frivolous wager. In *Good v. Elliot*,^a Mr. J. Buller made a vigorous, but unsuccessful stand, against suits upon wagers in any case; and nothing could have been more impertinent than the wager in that case, which was, whether one third person had purchased a wagon of another. Many of the cases stated by Mr. J. Buller, were of a nature to draw into discussion, and unnecessarily affect the character or feelings of third persons; and to sustain suits upon such wanton wagers, would be a disgrace to any administration of justice. The case of *Jones v. Randall*,^b went quite far enough, when it sustained an action upon a wager whether a decree in Chancery would be reversed on appeal to the House of Lords. If wagers are to be allowed in any case, as valid ground for a suit, the betting on the return of a ship, in the shape of a policy without interest, is as harmless as any that could be devised. In *Egerton v. Fuzelman*,^c it was ruled in the English courts, that a wager on a battle between two dogs was illegal, and not the ground of action.

In New-York, the courts had formerly assumed it to be a clear and settled principle of the common law, that a policy in which the insured had no interest, and which was, in fact, nothing more than a wager or bet between the parties to the contract, whether such a voyage would be performed, or such a ship arrive safe, was a valid con-

^a 3 Term Rep. 693.

^b Cowp. Rep. 37.

^c 1 Carr. & Payne, 613.

tract.^a It was only required that the wager should concern an innocent transaction, and not be contrary to good morals or sound policy.^b *But now, by *278 statute,^c all wagers, bets, or stakes made to depend upon any lot, chance, casualty, or unknown, or contingent event whatever, are declared to be unlawful, with the exception of contracts on bottomry or respondentia, and all insurances made in good faith for the security or indemnity of the party insured. The statute has effectually destroyed wager policies; for they are not within the exception. In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court expressed a strong opinion against the validity of a wager policy, and the doctrine there is, that all gaming is unlawful according to the general policy and laws of the commonwealth. In Pennsylvania, every species of gambling policy is reprobated, and they follow the principles, while they do not acknowledge the authority, of the English statute in the reign of George II.^d Wager policies, without any real interest to support them, are condemned also by positive ordinances in France, and in most of the commercial nations of Europe.^e

^a *Juhel v. Church*, 2 *Johns. Cas.* 333. *Abbot v. Sebor*, 3 *ibid.* 39. *Clen-deney v. Church*, 3 *Caines' Rep.* 141. *Buchanan v. Ocean Ins. Company*, 6 *Cowen's Rep.* 318.

^b *Bunn v. Riker*, 4 *Johns. Rep.* 426. *Mount & Wardell v. Waites*, 7 *ibid.* 434. *Campbell v. Richardson*, 10 *ibid.* 406.

^c *New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 662. sec. 8, 9, 10.

^d *Amory v. Gilman*, 2 *Mass. Rep.* 1. *Babcock v. Thompson*, 3 *Pick. Rep.* 446. *Pritchett v. Insurance Co. of North America*, 3 *Yeates' Rep.* 464. *Craig v. Murgatroyd*, 4 *ibid.* 163. *Adams v. Pennsylvania Ins. Company*, 1 *Rawle*, 107. In Vermont, it is held, that no suit will lie to recover property won of another by a bet or wager. *Collamer v. Day*, 2 *Vermont Rep.* 144. Wager contracts or bets on elections are void. *Lloyd v. Leisenring*, 7 *Watts*, 294.

^e *Ord. de la Mar.* liv. 3. tit. 6. *Des Ass.* art. 22. 1 *Emerigon*, 264. In Scotland, the rule of the civil law relative to *Sponsiones ludicræ* was early adopted as common law, and no wager or gaming contract will support an action. 1 *Bell's Com.* 300. *Code de Commerce*, art. 357. *Ord. of Genoa*, of *Middleburg*, of *Rotterdam*, of *Amsterdam*, of *Hamburg*, and *Stockholm*, collected in 2 *Magens*, 65. 68, 83. 132. 229. 257. *Roccus, de Assedur.* n. 88.

(4.) *Of reassurance and double insurance.*

After an insurance has been made, the insurer may have the entire sum he hath insured, *reassured* to him by some *other insurer. The object of this is indemnity against his own act; and if he gives a less premium for the reassurance, all his gain is the difference between what he receives as a premium for the original insurance, and what he gives for the indemnity against his own policy. If he gives as much for reassurance, he gains nothing by the transaction; and if he gives a higher premium, as insurers will sometimes do to cover a dangerous risk, he becomes a loser by his original insurance. These reassurances are prohibited in England, except in special cases, by the statute of 19 Geo. II. ch. 37; but they are allowed with us.^a The contract of reassurance is totally distinct from, and unconnected with, the primitive insurance; and the reassured is obliged to prove the loading and value of the goods, and the existence and extent of the loss, in the same manner as if he were the original insured.^b He need not abandon to the reinsurer, as soon as the first insured has abandoned to him, for he has no connexion with the first insurance. If he proves the original claim against him to be valid, when he resorts over to the reinsurer, he makes out a case for indemnity.^c

These reassurances are allowed by the French ordi-

The latter refers to a decision of the Rota of Genoa, in which the principle is declared, *si non adest risicum, assecuratio non valet; nam non adest materia in qua forma posset fundari. Decisiones Rotæ Genuæ*, 55. n. 9.

^a *Hastie v. De Peyster*, 3 *Caines' Rep.* 190. *Merry v. Prince*, 2 *Mass. Rep.* 176.

^b *Pothier*, h. t. n. 153. *Emerigon*, tom. i. 247. 250.

^c *Hastie v. De Peyster*, *ub. sup.* When the loss has happened, and been duly ascertained, the reassurer must pay to the first insurer the amount of the loss within the policy, notwithstanding the first insurer has become insolvent, and can pay only in part. He must pay the entire sum reassured, and has no concern with any arrangement between the first insurer and his creditors. 1 *Marshall on Insurance*, 143. *Emerigon*, tom. i. p. 243.

nances,^a and the first insurer can reassure to the same amount; but the better opinion is, that he cannot insure the premium due him for the first insurance. Valin, Pothier, M. Estrangin the commentator upon Pothier, and Boulay Paty, are all opposed to Emerigon on this point, and they certainly bear down his opinion.^b

The insured may likewise cause to be insured the solvency *of the first insurer; but this will not *280 often be the case, for it lessens greatly the profits of the voyage, by multiplying the charges upon it; and Marshall says it has never happened in England, for a double insurance answers better the end proposed.^c The second insurer does not become strictly a surety for the first insurer. It is a totally distinct contract, without any participation in the other, and he is not bound to render any service to the first one. It is a conditional obligation of a special kind.^d Valin and Pothier contend, that the second insurer of the solvency of the first one, becomes a surety for the first, and is entitled to oppose to the claim the *exception of discussion*, which is to require, that the first insurer should, at his expense, be first prosecuted to judgment and execution; but Emerigon and Boulay Paty are not of that opinion, though they admit, that the first insurer must be put legally in default after a legal demand.^e

A *double insurance* is where the insured makes two insurances on the same risk, and the same interest. But

^a *Ord. de la Mar. des Assurances*, art. 20. *Code de Commerce*, art. 342.

^b Valin, h. t. Pothier, h. t. n. 35. 1 Emerigon, 249. 3 Boulay Paty, 432.

^c *Condry's Marshall*, p. 145.

^d *Santerna, de Ass.* part 3. n. 55, 56, 57, 58. *Straccha, de Ass.* introduc. n. 43, 49, who cites and adopts the opinion of Santerna; and both of them refer back to the civil law, and to the doctors who had commented upon it; and they, in their turn, are quoted and followed by *Emerigon*, tom. i. 253.

^e *Pothier, Traité des Ass.* No. 33. Valin, tom. ii. 66. *Le Guidon*, ch. 2. art. 20. 1 *Emerigon*, 259. *Boulay Paty*, tom. iii. 440. 442.

the law will not allow him to receive a double satisfaction in case of loss, though he may sue on both policies. The underwriters on the different policies are bound to contribute ratably towards the loss.^a They pay according to the rate of their subscriptions, without regard to the order of time in which the policies were made; *281 and if the insured recovers *his whole loss from one set of underwriters, they will be entitled to their action against the other insurers, on the same interest and risk, for a ratable proportion of the loss.^b The doctrine of contribution applies very equitably to such a case. It was so declared by the Circuit Court of the United States at Philadelphia, in *Thurston v. Koch*;^c and though in most countries of Europe, the first policy in the order of time is to be exhausted before the second operates, yet the rule requiring the insurers in each policy to bear a ratable share of the loss, was declared, in that case, to be founded in equity, and in sound principles of commercial policy. The French rule is, that if there exist several contracts of insurance on the same interest and risk, and the first policy covers the whole value of the subject, it bears the whole loss, and the subsequent insurers are discharged on returning all but half per cent. premium. But if it does not cover the entire value, the subsequent policies, in case of loss, are bound only to make up the part uncovered.^d The ancient rule in England was according to the French ordinance,^e and it has

^a *Rogers v. Davis, and Davis v. Gilbert*, decided at N. P. by Lord Mansfield, *Park on Insurance*, 374, 375. 6th edition. *Lucan v. Jefferson Ins. Company*, 6 *Cowen's Rep.* 635.

^b *Newby v. Reed*, 1 *Blacks. Rep.* 416. *Millaudon v. Western Marine and Fire Ins. Company*, *Louis. Rep.* by *Curry*, vol. ix. p. 27.

^c 4 *Dallas' Rep.* 348. App. p. 32.

^d *Code de Commerce*, art. 359.

^e *Malynes' Lex Mercatoria*, 112. *The African Company v. Bull*, 1 *Show. Rep.* 132. *Gilbert's Rep.* 232.

been deemed more simple and convenient. Merchants frequently prefer it, and it is perfectly consonant to a strict construction of the contract with the first underwriter.

Policies have sometimes a clause introduced into them to prevent the rule of contribution, and to make the insurers responsible according to the order of date of their respective policies. Where two policies were dated upon the same day, it was held, that prior in date was intended to be equivalent to prior in time, and that the policy first in time, in point of fact, was to bear the loss.^a

*As a general rule of construction, and independent of usage, the first policy, under such a clause as that to which I have referred, would have to bear the whole loss, whether partial or total, to the extent of the policy.^b But the usage of the companies in New-York is understood to be, that partial losses are to be apportioned between the policies without regard to dates, provided the cargo on board was large enough to have attached both policies to it. This is the French rule. In France, if there be goods on board to the amount of both

^a *Brown v. Hartford Ins. Company*, 3 *Day's Rep.* 58. The same point was afterwards so ruled in *Potter v. Marine Ins. Company*, 2 *Mason's Rep.* 475. The clause against contribution runs thus: "It is further agreed that if the assured shall have made any other assurance upon the premises, prior in date to this policy, the assurers shall be answerable only for so much as the amount of such prior insurance may be deficient." The *American clause*, as it has been denominated, is stated in the case of the *American Ins. Company v. Griswold*, 14 *Wendell*, 399, to be, that "in case of any subsequent insurance, the insurer shall, nevertheless, be answerable for the full extent of the sum subscribed by him, without right to claim contribution from subsequent assurers." The one form is adapted to the first policy, and the other form to the last policy. This clause was held, in the above case, to bar the claim for contribution from subsequent assurers upon the same cargo, although there was aliment for all the policies at the time of subscription.

^b *Columbian Ins. Company v. Lynch*, 11 *Johns. Rep.* 233. *Rogers v. Davis, Park on Insurance*, 374.

policies, and a partial loss ensues, the insurers contribute ratably in proportion to their subscriptions.^a

(5.) *Of representation and warranty.*

1. *Of representation.*

All the writers who have treated of the contract of insurance, agree, that it is eminently a contract of good faith, which is peculiarly enjoined upon the insured, as he possesses an entire knowledge of all those circumstances which combine to form the contract, and is bound to communicate the facts and objects which are to determine the will of the insurer. It is, accordingly, an established principle, that a misrepresentation to the underwriter, or concealment of a fact material to the risk, will avoid the policy. It will avoid it though the loss arose from a cause unconnected with the misrepresentation, or even though the misrepresentation or concealment happened through

mistake, neglect, or accident, without any fraudulent intention.^b Lord Mansfield laid down, *with great strength and clearness, the general principles which governed this branch of the subject, and they have been implicitly adopted in all succeeding cases. The special facts upon which the contingent chance was to be computed, usually lie in the knowledge of the insured only, and the underwriter trusts to his representation, and proceeds upon the confidence that he does not withhold any facts material to the estimate of the risk. The suppression of any such facts, whether by design, or mistake, or negligence, equally renders the policy void, for the risk

^a *Ord. de la Mar. des Ass.* art. 25. 2 Valin, 73, 74. *Code de Commerce*, n. 360. *Pothier*, h. t. n. 77.

^b *Carter v. Boehm*, 3 Burr. Rep. 1905. *Pawson v. Watson*, Cowp. Rep. 785. *Fitzherbert v. Mather*, 1 Term Rep. 12. *Ratcliffe v. Shoolbred*, *Park on Insurance*, 249. 6th edition. *Mac Dowall v. Fraser*, Doug. Rep. 260. *Shirley v. Wilkinson*, *ibid.* 293. n. *Bridges v. Hunter*, 1 Maule & Selw. 15.

run becomes different from the one assumed in the policy. The law requires *uberrima fides* in the formation of the contract, and yet either party may be innocently silent, as to grounds open to both, for the exercise of their judgment. The underwriter need not be told general topics of speculation and intelligence. He is bound to know every cause which may occasion natural or political perils. Men argue differently from natural phenomena and political appearances, and when the means of information and judging are open to both parties, each acts from his own skill and judgment. The question in those cases always is, whether there was, under all the circumstances, a fair representation or a concealment; if the misrepresentation or concealment was designed, whether it was fraudulent, and, if not designed, whether it varied materially the object of the policy, and changed the risk understood to be run. If the misrepresentation was by fraudulent design, it avoids the policy, without staying to inquire into its materiality; and, if by mistake or oversight, it does not affect the policy, unless it was material, and not true in substance.^a

*If the information be stated as mere opinion, or *284 expectation, and, perhaps, as mere belief, it does not amount to a representation, or affect the policy, provided it was given in good faith; for the underwriter, in such a case, takes the risk upon himself.^b

^a *Marshall*, in his *Law of Insurance*, 479, questions, very strongly, the propriety of the decision in *Carter v. Boehm*, from which I have chiefly drawn the above principles. But whatever may be the opinion as to the application in that case of the doctrines stated, there is no question as to their solidity independent of the case, and they were confirmed by Lord Ellenborough, in *4 East's Rep.* 596, and recently by the Supreme Court of the United States, in *McLanahan v. The Universal Ins. Company*, *1 Peters' Rep.* 170. See, also, *Flinn v. Tobin*, *1 Moody & Malkin*, 367. S. P.

^b Lord Mansfield, *Cowp. Rep.* 788. *Barber v. Fletcher*, *Doug. Rep.* 305. *Hubbard v. Glover*, *3 Campb. Rep.* 312. *Bowden v. Vaughan*, *10 East's Rep.* 415. *Rice v. New-England Marine Ins. Company*, *4 Pick. Rep.* 439. *Allegre v. Maryland Ins. Company*, *2 Gill. & Johnson*, 136.

A representation to the first underwriter, in favour of the risk, extends to all subsequent underwriters, and on the ground that they subscribed upon their confidence in his judgment and knowledge of the risk, and are, therefore, entitled to avail themselves of all the conditions upon which he subscribed.^a This rule has not been favourably received by later judges, and it is strictly confined to representations made to the first underwriter, and not to intermediate ones.^b Nor does it extend to a subsequent underwriter on a different policy, though on the same vessel, and against the same risks.^c

The knowledge or information material for the insurer to know, and necessary to be communicated to him, when the contract is made, is a question, not of science, or one which rests upon the opinion of mercantile men, but a question of fact for a jury, and they are to judge of the materiality of the information under a consideration of all the circumstances *that belong
*285 to the case.^d This point was fully considered, and with a review of the English and American authorities, in the case of the *New-York Firemen's Insurance Company v. Walden*;^e and that doctrine has since received the unqualified sanction of the Supreme Court of the United States.^f The books abound with cases relative to the very litigated question as to what are, and what are not, necessary disclosures, and it is not consistent with my purpose to do more than bring into notice the leading principles which govern this very practical branch of the law of insurance.

^a *Barber v. Fletcher, supra. Stackpole v. Simon, Park on Insurance*, 582. 6th edit.

^b *Brine v. Featherstone*, 4 *Taunt. Rep.* 369. *Lord Ellenborough, Forrester v. Pigou*, 1 *Maule & Selw.* 9. *Bell v. Carstairs*, 3 *Campb. Rep.* 543.

^c *Elting v. Scott*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 157.

^d *Durell v. Bederley*, 1 *Holt's N. P. Rep.* 283.

^e 12 *Johns. Rep.* 513.

^f *M'Lanahan v. Universal Ins. Company*, 1 *Peters' Rep.* 170.

It is the duty of the insured to communicate every species of intelligence which he possesses, which may affect the mind of the insurer either as to the point whether he will insure at all, or as to the rate of premium. The decisions, in some of the old cases, contain strict doctrines on the subject of concealment, which have never been shaken;^a and the modern cases are equally sound and exact in their requisitions.^b But the insured is not bound to communicate loose rumours, nor any facts which the underwriter may be presumed to know equally with himself. General news stated in the newspapers and open to all need not be stated, unless there be something known to the assured, and applying peculiarly to his case, or unless he has particular information not in possession of the public, and then the withholding of it is material.^c The underwriters are presumed to have the ordinary marine intelligence appearing in the gazettes, or when they are fairly put upon inquiry.^d

The insured is not bound to disclose all by-gone calamities, or produce his portfolio of letters; and he need only disclose the material facts known to him at the date of the last intelligence.^e The underwriter is

^a *Dacosta v. Scandrett*, 2 *P. Wm.* 170. *Seaman v. Fonereau*, *Str.* 1183.

^b *Lynch v. Hamilton*, 3 *Taunt. Rep.* 37. *Beckwaite v. Walgrove*, cited *ibid.* *Richards v. Murdock*, 1 *Lloyd & Welsby*, 132. 10 *Barnw. & Cress.* 527. S. C. In this last case, orders to an agent to wait thirty days after the receipt of the order, before he insures, to give every chance for the arrival of the vessel, were deemed material, and the fact of the delay ought to have been disclosed to the insurer. In the subsequent case of *Richards v. Campbell*, in 1832, the agent was held responsible for his great ignorance in not knowing the necessity of the disclosure, and in not making it.

^c *Lynch v. Dunsford*, 14 *East's Rep.* 494. *Moses v. Delaware Ins. Company*, *Wharton's Dig.* 310. pl. 18.

^d *Greene v. Merchants' Ins. Company*, 10 *Pick. Rep.* 402. *Alsop v. Commercial Ins. Company*, reported in 2 *Phillips on Insurance*, 85. 1st edit.

^e *Freeland v. Glover*, 6 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 14. 7 *East's Rep.* 457. S. C. *Kemble v. Bowne*, 1 *Caines' Rep.* 75. *Vallance v. Dewar*, 1 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 503.

bound to know the nature *and general course of the trade and of the voyage, and he assumes that kind of knowledge at his peril.^a The general rule is, that all facts material to the risk, and known to the one party and not to the other, must be disclosed when the policy is to be effected; and they must be fully and fairly disclosed.^b But if the subject on which disclosures would otherwise be requisite, be covered by a warranty, either express or implied, in that case it need not become a matter of representation.^c It is likewise sufficient in the case of a representation, that it be equitably and substantially complied with;^d and in furtherance of that perfect good faith which is so strongly called for in the formation of this contract, it is adjudged, that if the party, after having given instructions for effecting a policy, receives intelligence material to the risk, he must forthwith, or with due and reasonable diligence, communicate it, or countermand his instructions.^e If, however, the insured acts with good faith, the validity of the policy will not be affected by the fraudulent misconduct of the master, in withholding from his owner information of the loss, until after the policy was underwritten.^f

^a *Planche v. Fletcher*, *Doug. Rep.* 251. *Calbraith v. Gracie*, 1 *Cond'y's Marshall*, 388. a. note. *Delonguemere v. N. Y. Firemen's Ins. Company*, 10 *Johns. Rep.* 120. *Kingston v. Knibbs*, 1 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 508. note. *Vallance v. Dewar*, *ibid.* 503. *Stewart v. Bell*, 5 *Barnw. & Ald.* 238. *Seton v. Low*, 1 *Johns. Cas.* 1.

^b *Ely v. Hallet*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 57. *Kohne v. Ins. Company N. America*, 6 *Binney's Rep.* 219. *Hoyt v. Gilman*, 8 *Mass. Rep.* 336.

^c *Shoolbred v. Nutt*, *Park on Ins.* 300. 6th edit. *Haywood v. Rodgers*, 4 *East's Rep.* 590. *Walden v. N. Y. Firemen's Ins. Company*, 12 *Johns. Rep.* 128. *De Wolf v. N. Y. Firemen's Ins. Company*, 20 *ibid.* 214. *S. C.* 2 *Cowen's Rep.* 56.

^d *Pawson v. Watson*, *Cowp. Rep.* 785. *De Hahn v. Hartley*, 1 *Term Rep.* 343. *Suckley v. Delafield*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 222.

^e *Emerigon*, tom. ii. 148. *Valin's Com.* tom. ii. 95. *Grieve v. Young*, *Miller on Insurance*, 65. *Watson v. Delafield*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 224. 2 *Johns. Rep.* 526. *S. C.* *M'Lanahan v. Universal Ins. Company*, 1 *Peters' Rep.* 170.

^f *Gen. Int. Ins. Company v. Ruggles*, 12 *Wheat. Rep.* 408. *S. C.* 4 *Mason's*

The French ordinance of the marine had no positive provisions on this subject, and yet the same principles which prevailed in the English law were recognised as sound principles applicable to the government of the contract.^a In the new code,^b it is provided, that any concealment or misrepresentation on the part of the insured, which would diminish the opinion of the risk, or change the subject matter of it, annuls the insurance. It is held to be void even when the concealment or misrepresentation would have had no influence on the loss. Nor is it deemed necessary, under the French law, to prove fraud in fact; and the concealment or misrepresentation is equally fatal, whether it proceeds from design, forgetfulness, or negligence.^c The severe dispositions of the code are much commended by the French lawyers, as an improvement upon their ancient jurisprudence, and a great protection to the insurer against impositions of which he was often the victim.

2. *Of warranty.*

There is, in every policy, an implied warranty that

Rep. 74. The decision in *Gladstone v. King*, 1 *Maule & Selw.* 35, was, that if the master conceals a loss or other material fact from the owner, in the letter to him, and the owner upon the receipt of the letter, and in ignorance of the fact, effects an insurance, the policy is void so far as respects the previous loss; for that the captain was bound, as agent of the owner, to communicate to him the loss, and what was known to the agent, was impliedly known to the principal. The decision in *Ruggles v. Gen. Int. Ins. Company*, overruled the English doctrine, and held that the omission of the master to communicate the loss, though fraudulently done, did not affect the policy, for the knowledge of the agent was the knowledge of the principal *only so far as the agency extended*, and he was not the agent of the owner as to insuring.

^a *Emerigon*, tom. i. 69.

^b *Code de Commerce*, art. 348.

^c *Pardessus*, tom. iii. 330. *Boulay Paty*, tom. iii. 510. The latter writer cites several decisions from the *Journal de Jurisprudence Commerciale et Maritime de Marseilles*, made within the ten preceding years, by which contracts of insurance were declared void on this very ground of misrepresentation and concealment; and they do great credit to the exemplary justice of the French tribunals. *Ibid.* 514—527.

the ship is seaworthy when the policy attaches. This means, as we have already seen, that the vessel is competent to resist the ordinary attacks of wind and weather, and is competently equipped and manned for the voyage, with a sufficient crew, and with sufficient means to sustain them, and with a captain of general good character and nautical skill.^a It is also an implied condition that the goods, tackle of the ship, &c., shall be properly stowed,^b and that there should be a pilot on board of competent skill.^c This warranty of seaworthiness *288 relates to the commencement *of the risk, and the warranty is not broken if she becomes unseaworthy afterwards.^d But it is the duty of the assured to keep the vessel seaworthy during the voyage, if it be in his power to do so, and if from the neglect or want of

^a *Law v. Hollingworth*, 7 *Term Rep.* 160. *Wilkie v. Geddes*, 3 *Dow's Rep.* 57. *Silva v. Low*, 1 *Johns. Cas.* 184. *Brown v. Girard*, 4 *Yeates' Rep.* 115. *Walden v. Firemen's Ins. Company*, 12 *Johnson*, 128. In the nisi prius case of *Clifford v. Hunter*, 3 *Carr. & Payne*, 16, Lord Tenterden ruled, that a ship was not seaworthy for a voyage from India to England, with no other person on board except the master, capable by his skill in navigation, of taking the command of the ship, in the case of the death or sickness of the master, and that the mate must have that nautical skill. This is a new doctrine, and it may be questioned. Lord Tenterden admitted it to be a question, not of law but of fact, for a jury. The warranty would seem to imply no more than that the assured must have a sound and well equipped vessel in reference to the voyage, and have on board a competent person as master, and a competent person as mate, and a competent crew as seamen. In the American coasting and West India trade, Lord Tenterden's rule would be oppressive, and is contradicted by usage, and is not the law in respect to any such trade. *Treadwell v. Union Ins. Company*, 6 *Cowen*, 270. In the case of *Gillespie v. Forsyth*, tried before Mr. Justice Bowen and a special jury in the K. B. at Quebec, October, 1839, the doctrine of Lord Tenterden was discarded, in reference, at least, to voyages between the West Indies and Quebec, and it was shown to be contrary to usage. *Law Reporter*, for January, 1840.

^b *Roccus*, note 22. *Brooks v. Oriental Ins. Company*, 7 *Pick.* 259.

^c Vide, *supra*, p. 175.

^d *Peters v. Phoenix Ins. Company*, 3 *Serg. & Rawle*, 25. *Holdsworth v. Weir*, 1 *Manning & Ryland*, 673. *American Ins. Company v. Ogden*, 20 *Wendell*, 287. The want of seaworthiness in a vessel when the voyage commences, is a good defence, though she arrived in safety at the port of destination. *Prescott v. U. Ins. Company*, 1 *Wharton*, 399.

faith of the owner or his agents, the vessel becomes unseaworthy by damage or loss in her hull or equipments during the voyage, the owner must repair the damage or supply the loss, at the port of refuge, refreshment, or trade. The underwriter will be discharged from liability for any loss, the consequence of such want of faith or diligence. Unseaworthiness arising after the commencement of the voyage, and produced by a peril insured against, does not, of itself, discharge the insurer. It imposes upon the assured the duty of using reasonable diligence to repair it, and a negligence in that respect may discharge the insurer from any loss arising from the want of such due diligence.^a If a vessel be insured in the latter part of a long seavoyage, the standard of seaworthiness is more liberal and more relaxed, and it will be sufficient if the vessel be competent to be safely navigated home.^b There are numerous cases in England, and in this country, on the question of seaworthiness, and they have generally been questions depending upon matters of fact, and lead to inquiries too minute for general elementary instruction.^c A breach of the implied warranty of seaworthiness, in the course of the voyage, has no retrospective operation, and does not destroy a just claim to damages for losses occurring prior to the breach of this implied condition.^d The standard of seaworthiness has been gradually raised within the last thirty years, from a more perfect knowledge of ship-building, a more enlarged

^a *Paddock v. Franklin Ins. Company*, 11 *Pick.* 227. *Hollingworth v. Brod-rick*, 7 *Adolph. & Ellis*, 40. *American Ins. Company v. Ogden*, 20 *Wendell*, 287. 294.

^b *Hucks v. Thornton*, 1 *Holt's N. Y. Rep.* 30. *Paddock v. Franklin Ins. Company*, 11 *Pick.* 227.

^c The cases are well collected in *Phillips on Insurance*, vol. i. 308—329. 2d edit.

^d *Annen v. Woodman*, 3 *Taunt. Rep.* 299. *Sewall, J.*, in *Taylor v. Lowell*, 3 *Mass. Rep.* 347. *Paddock v. Franklin Ins. Company*, 11 *Pick.* 227.

experience of maritime risks, and an increased skill in navigation.

In many ports certain equipments would now be deemed essential, which, at an earlier period, were not customary on the same voyages. Seaworthiness is to be measured by the standard in the ports of the country to which the vessel belongs, rather than by that in the ports or country where the insurance was made.^a

Every warranty is part of the contract, and is either express or implied. If it be an express warranty, it must appear upon the face of the policy. It differs from a representation in this respect, that it is the nature of a condition precedent, and requires a strict and literal performance. Whether the thing warranted be material or not, and whether the loss happened by reason of a breach of the warranty, or did not, is immaterial.^b A breach of it avoids the contract *ab initio*. Every condition prece-

dent requires a strict performance to entitle a
 *289 party to his right of action. But seaworthiness *in
 port may be one thing, and seaworthiness for a
 whole voyage quite another, and a ship may be seaworthy
 in harbour when under repair, though she would not be
 so in that condition at sea.^c It relates to the purposes in
 contemplation, whether in port or for the voyage, and
 seaworthiness is of course subject to be modified by cir-
 cumstances. A vessel may be seaworthy while lying in
 port for the purposes to which she is to be there applied,
 when she would not be for the voyage, and she may be
 seaworthy for one voyage and not for another. It is suf-

^a *Tidmarsh v. Washington Fire and Marine Ins. Company*, 4 *Mason*, 439.

^b *De Hahn v. Hartley*, 1 *Term Rep.* 343. *Goicoechea v. Louisiana State Ins. Company*, 6 *Martin*, N. S. 51.

^c *Annen v. Woodman*, 3 *Taunt. Rep.* 299. *Bond v. Nutt*, *Cowp. Rep.* 601. *Pawson v. Watson*, *ibid.* 785. *De Hahn v. Hartley*, 1 *Term Rep.* 343. *Worsley v. Wood*, 6 *ibid.* 710. *Forbes v. Wilson*, 1 *Park on Insurance*, 344. *Fowler v. Aetna Fire Ins. Company*, 6 *Cowen's Rep.* 673.

ficient if she be seaworthy for the voyage when she sails.^a The general rule is that the vessel must be seaworthy at the commencement of the risk, whatever that risk may be, in order to make the policy attach and charge the insurer.^b It was held, in the case of *Weir v. Aberdeen*,^c that though a ship be unseaworthy at the commencement of the risk, yet if the defect be cured before a loss, a subsequent loss is recoverable under the policy. The argument of Lord Tenterden in favour of this doctrine is very weighty, but a doubt seems to have been thrown over its solidity by the Supreme Court of the United States.^d

There has been much discussion respecting the doctrine of seaworthiness, in its application to the successive stages of the voyage subsequent to its commencement. The owner is bound to keep the vessel in a competent state of repair and equipment during the voyage, as far as it may be in his power. If this be not the case, and a loss afterwards happens, which could not by any means be either increased or affected by a prior breach of the implied warranty of seaworthiness when the policy attached, as, for instance, if the master should omit to take a pilot at an intermediate port, when he ought and might have done it, and the vessel be two years afterwards lost by capture, or if he sailed without sufficient anchors, and the vessel be afterwards struck with lightning, would the insurer be discharged? The better opinion would seem to be that he would not be discharged.^e A clause is frequently inserted in policies that if a vessel upon a regular

^a *Taylor v. Lowell*, 3 *Mass. Rep.* 331. *Merchants' Ins. Company v. Clapp*, 11 *Pick.* 56.

^b *Paddock v. Franklin Ins. Company*, 11 *Pick.* 227.

^c 2 *Barnw. & Ald.* 320.

^d *M'Lanahan v. The Universal Ins. Company*, 1 *Peters' Rep.* 170.

^e *Shaw*, Ch. J., *Paddock v. Franklin Ins. Company*, 11 *Pick.* 227. *Weir v. Aberdeen*, 2 *Barnw. & Ald.* 320. *M'Millan v. Union Ins. Company of Charleston*, S. C. 1838. *American Ins. Company v. Ogden*, 15 *Wendell*, 532.

survey be declared unseaworthy, by reason of her being unsound or rotten, the insurers shall be discharged. This clause is intended to save the underwriters from the vexatious and difficult investigation of the latent defects of a ship to which the disaster was to be attributed. It is sufficient if the survey be made within a reasonable time after the termination of the voyage, and if the survey states that the vessel was condemned solely on account of rottenness existing at the time of the survey, it is a conclusive bar to the assured.^a

The most usual express warranties are, that the ship was safe at such a time, or would sail by such a day, or would sail with convoy, or a warranty against illicit and contraband trade, or that the property insured is neutral. During the long maritime wars that grew out of the French revolution, and while we continued in our neutral position, the warranty of neutrality attracted great attention, and became a very fruitful topic of discussion in the courts of justice. It was understood and settled, that it was not sufficient, under this warranty, that the ship and cargo be in fact neutral. They must be neutral to the purpose of being protected, and, therefore, the ship must have the requisite *insignia* of neutrality by being duly documented as a neutral vessel, and by being unaccompanied with documents that go to falsify the warranty. She must also have been conducted, throughout the voyage, according to the duties which particular treatises, and the general rules of neutrality, enjoin, so as to be entitled to protection, by the law of nations, in the courts of the belligerent powers. To construe the engagement to be less *than that, would be to render it, in a great degree, idle and nugatory. On such a

^a *Steinmetz v. United States Ins. Company*, 2 *Serg. & Rawle*, 296. *Brandegee v. National Ins. Company*, 20 *Johns. Rep.* 328. *Griswold v. National Ins. Company*, 3 *Cowen's Rep.* 96. *Rogers v. Niagara Ins. Company*, 2 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 86.

warranty the insurer lays out of view the risk of loss, by reason of the want of due proof of neutrality, and of a strictly neutral conduct. The insured having in his own hands the means to maintain his averment, he is bound to do it whenever and wherever the neutrality of the property, or its privileges as such, are called in question.^a The warranty imposes upon the insured the exact observance of all those duties which belong to a neutral vessel; and by the violation, or by the omission, of any clear and certain neutral duty, the vessel forfeits her neutrality, and the warranty is broken. The neutral is bound to submit to visitation and search, and resistance thereto would be a breach of the warranty.^b

Many interesting questions arise in the course of a maritime war, upon the warranty of neutrality, but which attract no attention while they remain dormant in a season of general peace. One of those questions held a prominent place some years ago in the jurisprudence of this country, and led to very vexed discussions, and contradictory results. The controversy to which I allude was concerning the legal effect, in a suit upon the policy, of a sentence of condemnation in the admiralty courts of the belligerent powers, of property warranted neutral, but captured, libelled, and condemned as enemy's property.^c The general result of those discussions has been already stated, and they will probably not be revived until some maritime war shall hereafter arise, to stimulate cupidity, and disturb the commerce of the ocean.

^a *Blagge v. New-York Ins. Company*, 1 *Caines' Rep.* 549. *Baring v. Royal Exchange Ins. Company*, 5 *East's Rep.* 99. *Carrere v. Union Ins. Company*, *Condy's Marshall*, 406. *a. note.* *Calbraith v. Gracie*, *ibid.* *Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Pratt*, 2 *Binn. Rep.* 303. *Wilcocks v. Union Ins. Company*, *ibid.* 574. *Coolidge v. N. Y. Firemen's Ins. Company*, 14 *Johns. Rep.* 303. The register is the only requisite document in time of peace in evidence of the national character of the vessel. *Catlett v. Pacific Ins. Company*, 1 *Payne*, 594.

^b See, vol. i. 153.

^c See, vol. ii. 120, 121.

(6.) *Of the perils within the policy.*

The general rule is, that the insurer charges himself with all the maritime perils that the thing insured can meet with on the voyage: *præstare tenetur quodcunque damnum obveniens in mari*. It was an ancient opinion stated by Santerna, that the insurer was not responsible for very unusual and extraordinary perils not specially stated. But such a principle is now utterly exploded, and the policy sweeps within its inclosure every peril incident to the voyage, however strange or unexpected, unless there be a special exception.^a The perils enumerated in the common policy are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace every species of risk to which ships and goods are exposed from the perils of the sea, and all other causes incident to maritime adventure. The enumerated list may be enlarged or abridged at the pleasure of the parties.

A person may protect himself by insurance against all losses except such as may be repugnant to public policy or positive prohibition, or occasioned by his own misconduct or fraud. Against the latter it is not to be presumed any insurance could be effected, nor would the courts tolerate such a vicious principle; for this would, as Pothier says, be a contract which would invite *ad delinquendum*.^b

1. *Of the acts of the government of parties.*

An insurance against loss by reason of the acts of one's own government, as an arrest, or embargo, is valid. There is no distinction on this point between a foreign and domestic embargo; and if the embargo intervenes after the commencement of the risk, it suspends, but

^a *Santerna de Ass.* part 3. n. 72. *Ord. de la Mar.* tit. *Ass.* art. 20. *Code*, art. 350. *Boulay Paty*, tom. iv. 9.

^b *Goix v. Knox*, 1 *Johns. Cas.* 337. *Simeon v. Bazett*, 2 *Maule & Selw.* 94. *Pothier, Traité de Ass.* No. 65.

does not dissolve, the contract *of insurance, and the insured may abandon and claim a total loss.^a The same principle is incorporated into the new French commercial code, and it pervades universally the law of insurance.^b A distinction has, however, been taken between that case and a claim arising between subjects of different states, and it has been held, that a foreigner could not claim against a British underwriter, founded on the act of his own state, any more than if the claim was created by his own act, and on the principle that he was to be deemed a party to the public authoritative acts of his own government.^c But Lord Ellenborough afterwards threw a doubt over the doctrine, and explained away the force of it, by raising refined distinctions. He said, the exclusion of risk occasioned by the act of the assured's own government, was only an implied exclusion from the reason and fitness of the thing, and might be rebutted by circumstances.^d The distinctions were afterwards pointedly disclaimed, and the whole doctrine exploded, on a writ of error, in the Exchequer Chamber;^e and it was there established, that it was no objection to the right of recovery by the insured, that the loss happened by the act of the government of his country, though he and the insurer were subjects of different states. The latter rule has, likewise, after a clear and accurate review of the cases, been adopted as just and solid by the Supreme Court of New-York; and it was declared, that a subject was not to be deemed a party to the legislative, and much less to the judicial

^a Page *v.* Thompson, cited in *Park on Insurance*, 109. n. 6th edit. Odlin *v.* Pennsylvania Ins. Company, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 312. Delano *v.* Bedford Ins. Company, 10 *Mass. Rep.* 347. M'Bride *v.* Marine Ins. Company, 5 *Johns. Rep.* 299.

^b *Code de Commerce*, art. 369. 1 *Emerigon*, 541. *Pothier*, h. t. No. 59.

^c Conway *v.* Gray, 10 *East's Rep.* 536. Mennett *v.* Bonham, 15 *East's Rep.* 477. Flindt *v.* Scott, *ibid.* 525.

^d Simeon *v.* Bazett, 2 *Maule & Selw.* 94.

^e Bazett *v.* Meyer, 5 *Taunt. Rep.* 824.

acts of his own country, so as thereby to deprive
 *293 him of remedy on *a policy by a foreign insurance
 office, by reason of any acts or judgments of his
 own country. The contrary doctrine was founded on
 a fanciful and unreasonable theory.^a

2. *Of interdiction of commerce.*

An interdiction of commerce with the port of destination, or a denial of entry by the power at the port, or by a blockade, has been held not to be a loss within the policy, by decisions in England and in this country. The loss must be occasioned by a peril, acting upon the subject insured immediately, and not circuitously, and a just fear of capture is not sufficient.^b But there are other cases, which have declared that an interdiction of commerce with the port of destination by means of a blockade, or the possession of the port by an enemy, was a peril within the policy. It is considered a loss by restraint of princes which could not be resisted, and operates as effectually as if the vessel was actually seized. It would be unreasonable to require the insured to rush into danger with the moral certainty of loss.^c There is no doubt about the

^a Francis v. Ocean Ins. Company, 6 Cowen's Rep. 404. S. C. 2 Wendell's Rep. 64.

^b Hadkinson v. Robinson, 3 Bos. & Pull. 338. Lubback v. Rowcroft, 5 Esp. N. P. Rep. 50. Parkin v. Tunno, 11 East's Rep. 22. Richardson v. Maine Ins. Company, 6 Mass. Rep. 102. King v. Delaware Ins. Company, 2 Wash. Cir. Rep. 300. Smith v. Universal Ins. Company, 6 Wheaton's Rep. 176. Story, J., in Andrews v. Essex Ins. Company, 3 Mason, 6.

^c 1 Emerigon, 507—512. Symonds v. Union Ins. Company, 4 Dallas' Rep. 417. Schmidt v. Union Ins. Company, 1 Johns. Rep. 249. Craig v. Union Ins. Company, 6 ibid. 226. Barker v. Blakes, 9 East's Rep. 283. Olivera v. Union Ins. Company, 3 Wheaton's Rep. 183. Saltus v. Union Ins. Company, 15 Johns. Rep. 523. Thompson v. Read, 12 Serg. & Rawle, 440. Simonds v. Union Ins. Company, 1 Wash. Cir. Rep. 382. Vigers v. Ocean Ins. Company, 12 Louisiana Rep. 362. If the loss be occasioned by the illegal act of a foreign government, it is a loss within the perils of the policy, even though the master refused to submit to the illegal order, provided his actual conduct was

general principle, that if the voyage be relinquished merely through fear of capture, the loss is not covered by the policy. The apprehension of capture, or of any other peril *in transitu* is no ground of abandonment. But a just fear of one of the perils insured against, has been deemed equivalent to the presence of *vis major*, when that applied directly and effectually, as in the case of a blockading squadron, so as to break up the voyage. The danger was imminent, and might be said to be present and palpable, as well as apparently remediless and morally certain. If therefore the danger be so great as to amount to almost a certainty *of cap- *294 ture, it becomes a restraint in contemplation of the policy, and this is the doctrine which is best supported by authority.

A warranty against illicit trade was introduced into some of our American policies in 1788. It was intended to apply only to seizures for breaches of the laws of trade, and the commercial regulations of ports. It does not extend to seizures for offences against the law of nations, nor to acts of lawless violence, though committed under a pretext of some municipal regulation; nor to arbitrary seizures under the pretence of illicit trade, when in truth no such thing existed. It only applies to protect the insurers against illicit trade actually carried on or attempted.^a

3. *Of risks excluded by the usual memorandum.*

To prevent disputes respecting partial losses, arising from the perishable quality of the goods insured, or from trivial subjects of difference, it has been a general practice

bona fide in furtherance of the voyage. *Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Company, C. U. S. Mass.*, August, 1838.

^a *Fauvel v. Phoenix Ins. Company, 4 Serg. & Rawle, 29. Cuculu v. Orleans Ins. Company, 18 Martin's Louis. Rep. 11.*

to introduce into policies a stipulation, by way of memorandum, that upon certain enumerated articles, the insurer should not be liable for any partial loss whatever, and upon others for none, under a given rate per cent. This clause was first introduced into the English policies about the year 1749. Before that time the insurer was liable for every injury, however small, that happened to the thing insured. In France, if there be no such express stipulation, the ordinance of the marine, and the new code, provide that the insurer

*295 *shall not be liable, if the partial loss does not exceed one per cent. of the value of the article damaged.^a

The memorandum clause alluded to, usually declares that the enumerated articles, and any other articles that are perishable in their own nature, shall be free from average under a given rate, *unless general, or the ship be stranded*. In consequence of this exception, all small partial losses, however inconsiderable, are to be borne by a general average, provided they were incurred in a case proper for such an average; and in *Cantillon v. London Assurance Company*,^b it was held, that the exception amounted to a *condition*, and that if the ship was stranded, the insured was let in to prove his whole partial loss. But in *Wilson v. Smith*,^c that decision was overruled, and it was held that those words did not make a condition, but only an *exception*; and that in the case of stranding, and in all cases proper for a general average, and in those cases only, the memorandum did not apply. Afterwards, in *Mason v. Skurray*,^d Lord Mansfield held

^a 3 Burr. Rep. 1551. Ord. de la Mar. tit. Assurances, art. 47. Code de Commerce, art. 408.

^b Cited 3 Burr. Rep. 1553.

^c 3 Burr. Rep. 1550.

^d Park on Insurance, 160.

the same doctrine; and in *Cocking v. Fraser*,^a the principle was carried still further, and received its due expansion, and was clearly and precisely defined. It was settled by a strong determination of the court of K. B., that though a total loss may exist, in certain cases, when the voyage is defeated, yet in case of perishable articles within the memorandum, the insurer is secure against all damage to them, whether great or small, whether it defeats the voyage, or only diminishes the price of the goods, unless the article be completely and actually destroyed, so as no longer physically to exist. Considering the difficulty of ascertaining how much of the loss arose by the perils of the sea, and how much by *the perisha- *296 ble nature of the commodity, and the impositions to which insurers would be liable in consequence of that difficulty, the rule of construction, as settled in that case, is very salutary, by reason of its simplicity and certainty.

But this decision was shaken, and the original doctrine of Lord Ch. J. Ryder, in *Cantillon v. London Assurance Company*, revived, by the decision of the K. B. in *Burnet v. Kensington*,^b which declared, that if the ship be stranded, it destroyed the exception, and let in the general words of the policy. It was also shaken by the observations of Lord Alvanley, in *Dyson v. Rowcroft*,^c and of Lord Ellenborough, in *Cologan v. London Assurance Company*.^d In our American courts, the doctrine of the case of *Cocking v. Fraser* is the received law. It was explicitly and pointedly recognised as a sound decision by the Supreme Court of New-York, in *Maggrath v. Church*,^e and it has

^a *Park on Insurance*, 151. In some of our American policies the exception in these words, *or the ship be stranded*, is omitted.

^b 7 *Term Rep.* 210.

^c 3 *Bos. & Pull.* 474.

^d 5 *Maule & Selw.* 447.

^e 1 *Caines' Rep.* 196.

received a similar sanction in subsequent cases, in that and in other courts;^a and the weight of authority is in favour of the doctrine, that in order to charge the insurer, the memorandum articles must be specifically and physically destroyed, and must not exist in specie. It has been frequently a vexed point in the discussions, whether the insurer was holden, if the memorandum articles physically existed, though they were absolutely of no value. The *dicta* of some of the judges, in the cases referred to, are in favour of the doctrine, that an extinguishment of the memorandum articles *in value*, was equivalent to an extinguishment *in specie*; and there is much plausible reasoning in favour of that explanation of the rule.

*297 *Lord Ellenborough, in *Cologan v. London Assurance Company*, expressed himself strongly on the point, and declared that it could not be less a total loss because the commodity subsisted in specie, if it subsisted only in the form of a nuisance. There was a total loss of the thing, if, by any of the perils insured against, it was rendered of no use whatever, although it might not be entirely annihilated.^b

If there be a total loss of the voyage by reason of shipwreck, or any other casualty, and there be no other means to forward the cargo, there is no distinction between the memorandum articles and the rest of the

^a Neilson *v.* Columbia Ins. Company, 3 *Caines' Rep.* 103. Saltus *v.* Ocean Ins. Company, 14 *Johns. Rep.* 133. Marcardier *v.* Chesapeake Ins. Company, 3 *Cranch's Rep.* 39. Morean *v.* United States Ins. Company, 1 *Wheat. Rep.* 219.

^b 5 *Maule & Selw.* 447. Parry *v.* Aberdeen, 9 *Barnw. & Cress.* 411. Mr. Benecke says, that the prevalent opinion now is, that if the memorandum articles are, by sea damage, rendered of *no value*, there is a total loss, though they exist in specie. And yet he puts, and leaves unanswered the question, whether, if a cargo of fish, valued at 100 pounds, be entirely rotten, and can be sold for one shilling, for manure, is that deemed of any value? *Benecke on Indemnity*, 379. He might have answered in the negative, for the cargo was of no value as fish, or in contemplation of the contract.

cargo. The total loss applies equally to the whole.^a When part of the articles in the memorandum are totally destroyed by the perils insured against, and the residue remain partially damaged, it has been a very unsettled question, whether the insured was entitled to recover for the part so totally lost. The case of *Davy v. Milford*,^b is a strong determination in favour of the *re- *298 covery. It was said, that there was no case, nor no reason to maintain, that where the least particle of the thing insured subsisted in specie, though the greater part was actually destroyed, the insured should be precluded from recovering the value of that which was totally lost. The language of some of the judges, afterwards, in *Cologan v. London Assurance Company*,^c was to the same effect. But, in opposition to that doctrine, we have the case of *Hedburgh v. Pearson*,^d in which the hogsheads of sugar covered by the memorandum were saved, but the greater part of the loaves in each hogshead were washed out and destroyed by a peril of the sea, and yet it was held to be only an average loss, and the insurer wholly discharged. So, in *Guerlain v. Col. Insurance Company*,^e part of the memorandum articles (and which were distinct kinds of provisions, and specifically enumerated in the policy) were lost by shipwreck, and the insured was not allowed to recover, on the ground that the insurance was upon so much cargo

^a *Manning v. Newnham*, *Condy's Marshall*, 586. *Cologan v. London Assurance Company*, 5 *Maule & Selw.* 447. *Morean v. United States Ins. Company*, 1 *Wheat. Rep.* 219. *Magrath v. Church*, 1 *Caines' Rep.* 214, and, see, *Phillips on Insurance*, vol. ii. 467—510. 2d edition, where all the cases are collected and stated. The French code, art. 409, exempts the insurer, under the clause, *free from average*, for all partial losses, *except in cases which authorize an abandonment*; and, in such cases, the insured has the option between the abandonment and the claim for average loss.

^b 15 *East's Rep.* 559.

^c 5 *Maule & Selw.* 447.

^d 7 *Taunt. Rep.* 154.

^e 7 *Johns. Rep.* 527.

as an integral subject, and the insurer was not liable for any particular item, though it was totally lost. The court referred to several decisions in the French tribunals, as reported by Emerigon,^a and to the doctrine of that writer, by which it appears, that in France, under the clause free of average, the insurer is not holden, though part of the subject insured be totally destroyed. The principle is, that the parties have a right to make their own contracts, and if the contract be lawful, it becomes a law to the court, and it would introduce uncertainty and confusion to undertake to modify the contract (as they do in Italy, under this very clause^b) upon assumed principles of equity. The cases of *Biays v.*

The Chesapeake Insurance Company, Morean v. The
 *299 **United States Insurance Company, and of Hum-*
phreys v. The Union Insurance Company,^c have established the same rule, that the underwriter pays nothing if the loss of the memorandum articles be partial, and not total; and it is partial only when part of the cargo arrives in safety, however deteriorated in value, though another part of the cargo had been wholly destroyed by disasters on the voyage. This may now be considered as the settled law of this country on the subject.^d

The French law requires, that goods, subject by their nature to particular detriment or diminution, be specified

^a 1 *Emerigon*, 662—670.

^b *Targa*, ch. 52. not. 18. *Casaregis*, *Disc.* 47. n. 10.

^c 7 *Cranch*, 415. 1 *Wheat. Rep.* 219. 227. note. 3 *Mason*, 429.

^d *Wadsworth v. Pacific Ins. Company*, 4 *Wendell*, 33. In that case it was decided, that the underwriter was not answerable for a partial loss on memorandum articles, except for general average, unless there be a *total loss of the whole* of the particular species, whether the particular article be shipped in bulk, or in separate boxes or packages. So, in *Brooke v. Louisiana Ins. Company*, 17 *Martin*, 530, where the insurance was of a cargo of mules as memorandum articles, it was held, that there must be a physical total loss of the whole number insured, to authorize a recovery. See, 16 *Martin*, 640. 681, discussions on the same case.

in the policy ; otherwise, the insurer is not liable for the losses which may happen to those articles, unless the insured was ignorant of the nature of the cargo at the time the contract was made.^a This is a valuable rule, calculated to guard against dispute and imposition.

4. *Of the usual perils covered by the policy.*

It will not be necessary, nor will this course of instruction permit me to do more, than take notice of a few of the prominent perils which accompany the voyage, and surround it with danger. The general and sweeping clause in the policy which follows the list of enumerated perils, “ and of all other perils, losses, and misfortunes to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the goods, ship, &c.” cover other cases of marine damage of the like kind with those specially enumerated, and occasioned by similar causes.^b

The ignorance or inattention of the master or mariners, is not one of the perils of the sea.^c Those words apply to all *those natural perils and operations of *300 the elements which occur without the intervention of human agency, and which the prudence of man could not foresee, nor his strength resist. *Quod fato contingit, et cuivis patrifamilias, quamvis diligentissimo possit contingere.* The imprudence, or want of skill in the master, may have been unforeseen, but it is not a fortuitous event.^d

^a *Ord. de la Mar.* tit. *Des Ass.* art. 31. *Code de Commerce*, art. 355.

^b *Cullen v. Butler*, 5 *Maule & Selw.* 461.

^c *Pothier*, h. t. No. 64. *Gregson v. Gilbert*, *Park on Insurance*, 83. *Lodowick v. Ohio Ins. Company*, 5 *Hammond*, 435.

^d In *Straccha*, *Glossa*. 22, *casus fortuitus* is defined to be *accidens, quod per custodiam, curam et diligentiam mentis humanæ evitari non potest.* *Santerna*, de *Ass.* part 3. n. 65, adds, *ubi diligentissimus præcavisset, et providisset non dicitur propriè casus fortuitus.* In *Andrews v. Essex Marine Ins. Company*, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 26, and in the case of *Cammann v. N. Y. National Ins. Company*, tried in the Superior Court in New-York, in December, 1834, it was held to be an unsettled question, whether a loss proceeding from the *negligence* of the captain, would affect the policy as fully as fraud, and the

The insurer undertakes only to indemnify against extraordinary perils of the sea, and not against those ordinary ones to which every ship must inevitably be exposed; but it is often difficult to discriminate between damage occasioned by the ordinary service of the voyage, and which falls upon the owner, and by a peril of the sea for which the insurer is responsible. Damages resulting from the ordinary employment of the ship, or the inherent infirmity of the article, as the loss of an anchor by the friction of the rocks, or the wear and tear of the equipment of the ship, or her destruction by worms, or the diminution of liquids by the ordinary leakage to which they are naturally subject, or hemp taking fire in a state of effervescence, may be mentioned as instances of losses which are not within the policy, because they are not losses attributable to a *cas fortuit*.^a It has even been a

proper rule was suggested by Oakley, J., to be, that the neglect of the captain to use those precautions against damage, which a prudent man would have used *under like circumstances*, would be a case of *gross* negligence within the meaning of the law. In the case of *Bolton v. American Ins. Company*, tried in the Superior Court of New-York, before Ch. J. Jones, (November, 1835,) it was held, that the underwriters were liable for a loss arising, not from negligence merely, but from *gross* negligence by the master. But it is very difficult to draw the line of distinction between the cases where gross negligence ends and ordinary negligence begins, or to distinguish between pure accident, and accident from negligence. The Courts seem to be approximating in effect to the French meaning of barratry, for they hold, that in a case not amounting to barratry within the meaning of the English law, if the proximate cause of the loss be a peril enumerated, the insurer is liable, though the remote cause of that loss was the negligence of the master or crew. *Shore v. Bentall*, 7 *Barnw. & Cress.* 798. note. *Busk v. Royal Exchange Ass. Company*, 2 *Barnw. & Ald.* 73. *Bishop v. Pentland*, 7 *Barnw. & Cress.* 219. *Patapsco Ins. Company v. Coulter*, 3 *Peters' S. C. Rep.* 222. See, also, *infra*, p. 306. note 3, and 2 *Sumner's Rep.* 200.

^a *Valin*, tom. ii. 81. *Pothier, des Ass.* No. 66. 1 *Emerigon*, 390. *Rhol v. Parr*, 1 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 444. *Martin v. Salem Marine Ins. Company*, 2 *Mass. Rep.* 420. *Boyd v. Dubois*, 3 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 133. Mr. *Phillips*, in his *Treatise on Insurance*, vol. i. 639, very properly adds, that if the injury to the ship, by worms, arose from the loss, by a sea peril, of the protection of the copper sheathing, the insurer may reasonably be charged. But if the loss of the sheathing might have been repaired, before the vessel became exposed to the action of the worms, it was an act of negligence in the master, which would exonerate the underwriter. *Hazard v. N. E. Marine Ins. Company*, 1 *Sumner*, 218. The

vexed question, whether damage done to a ship by rats, was among the casualties comprehended under perils of the sea, and the authorities are much divided on the question. The better opinion would, however, seem to be, that the insurer *is not liable for this sort *301 of damage, because it arises from the negligence of the common carrier, and it may be prevented by due care, and is within the control of human prudence and sagacity.^a

When a missing vessel shall be presumed to have perished by a peril of the sea, depends upon circumstances, and there is no precise time fixed by the English law.^b In the French law, a vessel not heard from is presumed to be lost after the expiration of one year in ordinary voyages, and of two years in long ones.^c The ordinances of foreign states have been very arbitrary on this point. Thus, by the ordinance of Hamburg, a ship was presumed to be lost, if bound to any place in Europe, and not heard from in three months, and by the *Recopilacion des Loyes de Indias*, in Spain, if a vessel which goes to the Indies is

insurer is liable for all accidents arising from any *extraordinary* circumstances or cause, and not from the inherent weakness or ordinary wear and tear of the vessel. *Potter v. Suffolk Ins. Company*, 2 *Sumner*, 197. *Fletcher v. Inglis*, 2 *Barnw. & Ald.* 315.

^a *Dale v. Hall*, 1 *Wils. Rep.* 231. *Hunter v. Potts*, 4 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 203. *Aymar v. Astor*, 6 *Cowen's Rep.* 266. *Roccus, de Ass.* n. 49. *Cleirac, sur le Guidon*, ch. 5. art. 8, and *Emerigon*, tom. i. 377, 378, who cites the *Dig.* 19. 2. 13. 6, and Casaregis, Straccha, Santerna, Kuricke, and Targa, may all be considered as maintaining the principle, that the owner, and not the insurer, is holden for an injury by rats; and the only case that I have met with directly to the contrary, is *Garrigues v. Cox*, 1 *Binn. Rep.* 592. The opinion of *Santerna, De Ass.* part 4. n. 31, 32, is not consistent with his own principles; for, while he admits that an injury by rats cannot properly come under the name of *casus fortuitus; magis est improvisus poveniens ex alterius culpa, quam fortuitus*, he still concludes it to be a peril generally and absolutely assumed, when not controlled by usage.

^b *Green v. Brown*, *Str. Rep.* 1199. *Brown v. Neilson*, 1 *Caines' Rep.* 525. *Gordon v. Bowne*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 150. *Houstman v. Thornton*, 1 *Holt's N. P. Rep.* 242.

^c *Code de Commerce*, art. 375.

not heard from within a year and a half.^a In the case of missing vessels, the loss is presumed to have happened immediately after the date of the last news; so that if an insurance be for three months, and the vessel not being heard from, a further insurance is made for a year,
 *302 and the vessel *is never heard from, in that case the first insurer pays the loss.^b

What degree of peril changes it from an ordinary to an extraordinary character, so as to bring it within the stipulation of indemnity, is frequently a perplexing question, to be determined by the circumstances of the particular case. And to prevent uncertainty and dispute, it is a settled rule, that the peril, whatever it may be, upon which the policy attaches, must be the proximate, and not the remote cause of the loss. *Causa proxima non remota spectatur.*^c If a ship be driven ashore by the wind,

^a 1 *Magens*, 89, 90. *Institutes of the Civil Law of Spain*, b. 2. tit. 17. ch. 1.

^b *Boulay Paty*, tom. iv. 246.

^c *Walker v. Maitland*, 5 *Barnw. & Ald.* 171. It is upon the principle mentioned in the text, that the insurer on goods is not liable when they are sold by the captain of a ship, to defray the expense of repairs, rendered necessary by a tempest. *Powell v. Gudgeon*, 5 *Maule & Selw.* 431. *Sarguy v. Hobson*, 4 *Bingham*, 131. Damages to another vessel by collision, in which the vessel insured, according to the admiralty rule, in a case of mutual error, was bound to bear half the damage, were held by the K. B. not chargeable upon the insurer, for the *proximate* injury is what the insurer has to sustain, and not what the ship has to pay for damages to another, by an accident remote and incidental. *De Vaux v. Salvador*, 4 *Adolph. & Ellis*, 420. This decision was examined and questioned by Mr. Justice Story, in the case of *Peters v. Warren Ins. Co.* in the C. C. U. S. for Massachusetts, in October, 1839, 2 *Phillips on Insurance*, 2d edit. 181—190. In that case the Ship Paragon came in collision in the river Elbe with the galliot Franc Anna, and sunk her; no fault on either side. The marine court at Hamburg apportioned one-half of the loss upon the Paragon, which the master was compelled to pay, and for which the underwriters were held liable, on the ground that the damages apportioned on the Paragon, were a direct and proximate effect of the collision. The great point in discussion was not the principle that *causa proxima non remota spectatur*, but its application. Lord Bacon (*Maxims of the Law*, regula 1,) gives this sound reason for the maxim, that “it were infinite for the law to consider the causes of causes, and their impulsions one of another; therefore, it contenteth itself with the immediate cause.” The French codes and jurists, in a case of mere accident by collision, without the fault of either party, and where the

and in that situation be captured by an enemy, the loss is to be imputed to the capture, and not to the stranding.^a When a partial loss is followed by a total loss, the former may be considered as merged in the latter. The courts are not to be seeking about for odds and ends of previous partial losses, when there is an overwhelming cause of loss which swallows up the whole subject matter.^b So, on the other hand, if the first loss be distinct and total, and be followed by abandonment, the rights of the parties are fixed, and the courts are not to cast their eyes forward to see what further perils awaited the property.^c

By the rule and practice in the United States, the wages and provisions of the crew during the necessary detention of the vessel for repairs requisite in the course of the voyage, by reason of perils insured against, are considered as included in the perils of the sea, and made chargeable upon *the insurer;^d and we *303 have already seen^e how far wages and provisions

damages are apportioned, declare that the insurers bear the part of the damages which belong to the vessel insured by them. Emerigon, Valin, Pothier, Boulay Paty, and Estrangin, the commentator on Pothier, all concur in this rule, and it appears to me that the decision of Mr. Justice Story was well sustained by just reasoning and sound authority.

^a Green v. Elmslie, *Peake's N. P. Rep.* 212. In *De Hahn v. Cobbett*, 2 *Bingham*, 205, a ship was stranded, and in that condition captured, and the *proxima causa* was held, in that case, to be the shipwreck and not the capture, as the former was a total loss.

^b Livie v. Jansen, 12 *East's Rep.* 648.

^c Schieffelin v. N. Y. Ins. Company, 9 *Johns. Rep.* 27.

^d Walden v. Le Roy, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 263. *Barker v. Phenix Ins. Company*, 8 *Johns. Rep.* 307. *Padelford v. Boardman*, 4 *Mass. Rep.* 548. *Clark v. U. S. Fire and Marine Ins. Company*, 7 *Mass. Rep.* 365. In *Guzzam v. Cincinnati Ins. Company*, 6 *Ohio Rep.* 73, it was held, that in a policy on time, the insurer was not liable for the wages of the crew, while the vessel is stranded within the time. The wages were considered to be the ordinary expense. *Webb v. Protec. Ins. Company*, *Ibid.* 456. S. P. But in the case of *Potter v. The Ocean Ins. Company*, *C. C. U. S. Mass.* October, 1837, Judge Story held, that it made no difference in the application of the principle, that the wages and provisions of the crew, while the vessel went into port to repair, constituted a general average, when the insurance was on time.

^e *Supra*, p. 236.

constitute an item of general average in the cases of capture, embargo, or detention. But I cannot undertake to specify more particularly the various kinds of losses which are deemed to be covered by the general stipulation to indemnify against perils of the sea. Many subtle distinctions have been raised and discussed in the books on this point, and several of them have been stated or referred to by Mr. Phillips.^a

The enumerated perils of the sea, *pirates, rovers, thieves*, include the wrongful and violent acts of individuals, whether in the open character of felons, or in the character of a mob, or as a mutinous crew, or as plunderers of shipwrecked goods on shore.^b The theft that is insured against by name, means that which is accompanied by violence, (*latrocinium*,) and not simple theft: *furtum non est casus fortuitus*.^c But the stipulation of indemnity

^a *Phillips' Treatise on Insurance*, vol. i. 635—647.

^b *Nesbit v. Lushington*, 4 *Term Rep.* 783. *Brown v. Smith*, 1 *Dow's Rep.* 349. *Bondrett v. Hentigg*, 1 *Holt's N. P. Rep.* 149. *Pirates, rovers, thieves*, are perils expressly mentioned in the policy; but in the early history of insurance, it was quite a vexed question, whether they were included among the general perils of the sea; and Santerna, and after him Straccha, have noticed the discussions, and compiled learning, on the point. It was conceded, that piracy was a *casus fortuitus* of the sea, but not theft. *Santerna, De Ass. and Spons.* part 3. n. 61—65. *Straccha, Glossa.* 22. *passim*.

^c *Boulay Paty*, tom. iv. 35. *Roccus*, not. 42. *Emerigon*, tom. i. ch. 12. sec. 29. These cases refer to simple theft committed on board the vessel, and which the law presumes might have been prevented by due vigilance in the master. It is now held, that the clause in the modern policies against loss by *thieves*, applies to the acts of thieves who stole from the ship while she lay at the wharf, but who had no connexion with the ship, though the master and ship-owners might also be liable as common carriers. It seems to be intimated, that the clause might even apply to simple theft by persons belonging to the ship. The *Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Storrow*, 5 *Paige*, 293. This decision overrules all the old authorities and text books, for they all apply the term *furtum* or simple theft, as well as *latrocinium* or robbery, to *assailants* from without the ship, and exclude from the policy simple theft, as not being properly a casualty. All the English text writers follow the same rule, as *Malynes*, (*Lex Mer.* c. 25,) *Molloy*, (*de Jur. Mar.* b. 2. c. 7. sec. 7,) *Beawes*, (*Lex Mer.* 313,) *Weskett*, (*on Ins.* tit. *Theft*,) *Park*, (p. 30, 31,) *Millar*, (p. 145, 146,) and *Marshall*, (*by Condry*, vol. i. 243.) *Park*, in his 6th edition, says, that the English law is silent on the subject. The decision by Chancellor Walworth may be reasona-

against *takings at sea, arrests, restraints and detainments of all kings, princes, and people*, refers only to the acts of government for government purposes, whether right or wrong. An arrest in the domestic port, after the voyage commenced, justifies an abandonment; but if made before the risk commenced, the contract ^{*is} ^{*304} discharged.^a An arrest by the admiralty process, at the instance of an individual, on a private claim, is not a case within the policy, and it is to be presumed the Court of Admiralty would indemnify the owner or insured in the award of costs and charges against the unjust prosecutor.^b It is a very ancient rule, that the insurer does not run the risk of obstructions occasioned by the debts or misconduct of the assured.^c Under the insurance against fire, it is held, that if the ship be burnt under justifiable circumstances, to prevent capture, or from an apprehension of a contagious disease, the insurer is liable.^d If sails and rigging, put on shore while the vessel is repairing at a foreign port, be burnt, they are covered by the policy.^e It has likewise been held, after a very learned discussion, that the insurer is answerable for a loss by fire occasioned by the negligence of the master and mariners.^f This decision is subsequent to that of

ble, and it is according to the popular acceptance of the word *thieves*, but it is against all the text authorities, foreign and domestic. It is also in contravention of the principle that thefts are not casualties, and it may be a matter of questionable policy whether the owners and masters of ships ought to be indemnified against thefts of goods under their own care, and occasioned by their own lack of vigilance. This decision was followed in *Bryan v. The American Ins. Co.* in the Superior Court of New-York, in April, 1840, where it was held, that an insurance against *thieves*, and barratry of the master and crew, covered a loss by simple theft on the voyage, unaccompanied with force.

^a *Boulay Paty*, tom. iv. 238.

^b *Nesbit v. Lushington*, *supra*. *Ord. of Hamburg*, 2 *Magens*, 218.

^c *Le Guidon*, ch. 2. sec. 7.

^d *Pothier*, h. t. n. 53. *Targa*, ch. 56. *Emerigon*, tom. i. 434. 2 *Valin*, 75. *Gordon v. Rimmington*, 1 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 123.

^e *Pelly v. Royal Exchange Assurance Company*, 1 *Burr. Rep.* 341.

^f *Busk v. Royal Exchange Assurance Company*, 2 *Barnw. & Ald.* 73. See,

Grim v. Phoenix Insurance Company,^a in which it was held, after a discussion equally searching and elaborate, that a loss by fire arising from carelessness, was not covered by the insurance. The French law coincides with the English decision.^b Every species of *capture*, whether lawful or unlawful, and whether by friends or enemies, is also a loss within the policy. *Barratry* is a peril specially insured against, and Lord Mansfield thought it very strange, that the underwriter should *305 undertake *to indemnify against the misconduct of the master, who is the agent of the insured, and subject to his control.^c It means fraudulent conduct on the part of the master, in his character of master, or of the mariners, to the injury of the owner, and without his consent, and it includes every breach of trust committed with dishonest views. *Barratry* is used by the French writers in its larger sense, as comprehending negligence, as well as wilful misconduct;^d therefore, no illustration can be safely drawn from the French authorities, when

also, *Walker v. Maitland*, 5 *ibid.* 171, and *Bishop v. Pentland*, 7 *Barnw. & Cress.* 219. S. P. See, also, *infra*, p. 306. It may here be added, that loss of goods by spontaneous ignition, is not covered by the policy. *Boyd v. Dubois*, 3 *Campb.* 133.

^a 13 *Johns. Rep.* 451.

^b *Boulay Paty*, tom. iv. 23. The rule appears to be settled by the weight of authority in the United States, that in a marine policy in which fire is expressly insured against, the insurer is answerable for a loss by fire, occasioned by the negligence of the master or crew. *Patapsco Ins. Co. v. Coulter*, 3 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 222. *Columbia Ins. Co. v. Lawrence*, 10 *ibid.* 517. *Waters v. Merchants' Ins. Company*, 11 *ibid.* 213.

^c We are told by *Roccus, De Ass.* n. 39, that *barratry* is expressly excepted in the policies at Naples. So, by the ordinance of Philip II, for Antwerp, and by the usage at Rotterdam and Cadiz, *barratry* in the captain or mariners was not insurable. On the other hand, at Hamburg, and Genoa, and Bilboa, it might be insured against. *Emerigon, Des Ass.* tom. i. 366, 367. *Ord. de Bilboa*, ch. 22. n. 19. In the *Institutes of the Civil Law of Spain*, by *Asso & Manuel*, b. 2. tit. 17. ch. 1, it is laid down that the insurer is not liable for damages arising from the fault of the captain or pilot. In some of our American policies, the risk from *barratry* is qualified: it is, "Barratry of the master, (unless the assured be owner of the vessel,) and mariners."

^d *Pardessus, Cours de Droit Com.* tom. iii. n. 772.

the term is used as in the English and American law, in a more limited sense, and applicable only to the wilful misconduct of the master or mariners. To trade with an enemy without leave of the owner, though it be intended for his benefit, or for a neutral to resist search, though his motive be to serve the owner, or for a letter of marque to cruise, and take a prize, though done for the benefit of the owner, if the ship be lost by reason of the acts, are all of them acts of barratry. So, sailing out of port in violation of an embargo, or without paying the port duties, or to go out of the regular course upon a smuggling expedition, or to be engaged in smuggling against the consent of the owner, are all of them acts of barratry, equally with more palpable and direct acts of violence and fraud, for they are wilful breaches of duty by the master, in his character of master, to the injury of the owner.^a It makes no difference in the reason of the thing,

*whether the injury the owner suffers be owing to *306
an act of the master, induced by motives of advantage to himself, or of malice to the owner, or a disregard to those laws which it was the master's duty to obey, and which the owner relied upon him to observe. It is, in either case, equally barratry. If the ship be barratrously taken out of her course, that act takes the whole

^a *Stamma v. Brown*, *Str. Rep.* 1173. *Knight v. Cambridge*, as cited by Lord Mansfield, in *Cowp. Rep.* 153, and by Lord Ellenborough, in 8 *East's Rep.* 135, 136. *Vallejo v. Wheeler*, *Cowp. Rep.* 143. *Robertson v. Ewer*, 1 *Term Rep.* 127. *Havelock v. Hancill*, 3 *Term Rep.* 277. *Moss v. Byrom*, 6 *Term Rep.* 379. *Phyn v. Royal Exchange Assurance Company*, 7 *Term Rep.* 505. *Earl v. Rowcroft*, 8 *East's Rep.* 126. *Hood v. Nesbit*, 2 *Dallas' Rep.* 137. *Kendrick v. Delafield*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 67. *Brown v. Union Ins. Company*, 5 *Day's Rep.* 1. *Cook v. Commercial Ins. Company*, 11 *Johns. Rep.* 40. *Grim v. Phoenix Ins. Company*, 13 *Johns. Rep.* 451. *Wilcocks v. Union Ins. Company*, 2 *Binn. Rep.* 574. *Millaudon v. New-Orleans Ins. Company*, 11 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 602. The insurer is answerable for a loss from barratry of the master, in attempting to smuggle, though the policy contains a warranty by the assured against illicit or prohibited trade. *Suckley v. Delafield*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 222. *Amer. Ins. Co. v. Dunham*, 15 *Wendell*, 1.

property from the possession of the insured, and produces a total loss.^a But it is requisite that the loss resulting from the barratry must actually happen during the continuance of the voyage; and if the ship be not seized for a smuggling act until she has been moored twenty hours in safety at the port of destination, the insurer is discharged.^b

We have seen that it is a vexed question, rendered the more perplexing by well balanced decisions, and in direct opposition to each other, whether a loss by fire proceeding from negligence, be covered by a policy insuring against fire. It has been made a question, also, whether a loss by any other peril in the policy, operating immediately and proximately upon the property, be chargeable upon the insurer, when the remote cause of that loss was the negligence or misconduct of the master and mariners, not amounting to barratry. Among a number of cases that bear upon the question, the case of *Cleveland v. Union Insurance Company*,^c may be selected as a strong decision in favour of the insured; and the more recent case of *Walker v. Maitland*,^d as one equally
 *307 strong against *him, on that very point. The doctrine in the last decision seems to be gaining ground as the prevalent and better opinion.^e

^a *Dixon v. Reid*, 5 *Barnw. & Ald.* 597.

^b *Lockyer v. Offley*, 1 *Term Rep.* 252.

^c 8 *Mass. Rep.* 308.

^d 5 *Barnw. & Ald.* 171.

^e The authority of the case of *Cleveland v. Union Ins. Company* is much weakened by the circumstances attending it, as stated by Mr. Justice Story, in *Williams v. The Suffolk Ins. Company*, *C. C. U. S. Mass.*, August, 1838. It has received, however, a confirmation by the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio, after a full and learned discussion, in *Fulton v. The Lancaster O. Ins. Company*, 7 *Ohio Rep.* part 2. p. 1. 25. It was there decided, that a river insurance policy, without any clause against barratry, did not cover a loss by a peril within the policy, the remote cause of which was the negligence of the master or crew. The court went upon the authority of former decisions in Ohio and earlier English cases, and upon the principle that it was just and politic to hold the in-

II. *Of the voyage in relation to the policy.*

(1.) *When the policy attaches and terminates.*

The commencement and end of the risk, depend upon the words of the policy. The insurer may take, and modify, what risk he pleases. The policy may be on a voyage *out*, or on a voyage *in*, or on the whole complex voyage *out and in*; or it may be *for part* of the route, or for a limited *time*, or from *port to port*, in an intermediate stage of the voyage.^a If insurance on a ship be *from* such a place, the risk does not commence until the vessel breaks ground. If *at and from*, it then includes all the time the ship is in port after the policy is subscribed, if the ship be at home; and if abroad, it commences, according to a decision in Pennsylvania, only from the time she has been safely moored twenty-four hours after her arrival.^b But if a ship be expected to arrive at a

surer discharged, when the more remote cause of the loss was negligence of the master or mariners, notwithstanding the immediate cause of the loss was a peril insured against. But I apprehend that the rule, that *causa proxima non remota spectatur*, has now become a controlling and a settled rule, not only in the English but in the general American insurance law. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, afterwards, in *Delano v. The Bedford Ins. Company*, 10 *Mass. Rep.* 354, recognised the general rule, that the immediate and direct, not the remote or contingent, cause of the loss was to be regarded in maintaining the right of the assured to recover; and in the Supreme Court of the United States, the doctrine has been repeatedly declared, in conformity with the English rule as laid down in the later cases. *Patapsco Ins. Company v. Coulter*, 3 *Peters' Rep.* 222. *Columb. Ins. Company v. Lawrence*, 10 *ibid.* 517. *Waters v. M. L. Ins. Company*, 11 *ibid.* 213. Vide *supra*, p. 300. n. Independent of all authority the Ohio rule would appear to be the most just, and the other the most practicable, convenient, and certain.

^a A policy *on time* insures no specific voyage, but covers any voyage within the prescribed time, and the loss and damage the ship may sustain, by the perils insured against, within the limited period. *Bradlie v. The Maryland Ins. Company*, 12 *Peters*, 378.

^b *Garrigues v. Coxe*, 1 *Binn. Rep.* 592. In *Pittagrew v. Pringle* 3 *Barnw. & Adolph.* 514, the general principle was admitted to be, that if a ship *quits her moorings* and removes, though only to a short distance, being perfectly ready to proceed on her voyage, it is a *sailing on the voyage*, though she be detained by some subsequent occurrence. It is otherwise if she be not in a condition for the voyage, when she quits her moorings and hoists sail. In *Treadwell v. Union Ins. Company*, 6 *Coven's Rep.* 270, the court said, that a policy *at and from North Carolina to New-York*, did not attach, at least as to

foreign port, and be insured *at and from that place*, or *from her arrival* there, other cases say, the risk *308 attaches from her *first arrival.^a The risk is

seaworthiness, until the vessel had passed the *boundary line of the state*, though the voyage had commenced when the vessel sailed with the cargo from Perquimions' river, at or near the town of Hertford, in that state. That was giving too narrow a construction to the words *at and from*; for though it has been justly held, that the warranty of seaworthiness has not the same extended application *in as out* of port, while the vessel is dismantled, and undergoing necessary repairs, (*Smith v. Surridge*, 4 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 25,) yet, to every reasonable extent, such a policy covers the risk of the vessel while within port, or within the line of the state.

But a policy on a vessel *at and from her port of lading*, means one indicated port or place only, and going to another within seven miles, after she had *begun* to take in her cargo, is a deviation. *Brown v. Tayleur*, 4 *Adolph. & Ellis*, 241.

^a *Motteaux v. London Assurance Company*, 1 *Atk. Rep.* 543. *Condy's Marshall*, 261. 2 *Caines' Cases in Error*, 172. In *Parmeter v. Cousins*, 2 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 235, the ship was insured *at and from* St. Michael to England, and the ship arriving there in distress, was blown out to sea and destroyed, after lying at anchor above twenty-four hours, and Lord Ellenborough ruled, that the insurer was not liable, because the vessel had not once been *at* the place in good safety, and the policy on the homeward voyage had not attached. It is surprising, that the construction of the policy *at and from* should still remain to be settled. The words ought long since to have been defined and fixed with mathematical precision. Lord Hardwicke says, the policy attaches from the *first arrival*. Ch. J. Tilghman says, it attaches as soon as the vessel *has been safely moored twenty-four hours*. Lord Ellenborough requires the vessel to be at the place in good safety, whether the loss takes place within, or not until above twenty-four hours after she has arrived and anchored. Mr. Justice Porter, in *Zacharie v. Orleans Ins. Company*, 5 *Martin N. S.* 637, required the same anchorage for twenty-four hours in *good safety*. In *Williamson v. Innes*, 8 *Bingham*, 79. note, it was held, that on a homeward policy on freight *at and from* A. it attaches when the ship was in a condition to begin to take in her cargo. There are excepted cases in which the risk in a policy *at and from* will not attach until the time of sailing, as where the ship is not finished, or is undergoing repairs, or where there is a particular usage to that effect. The general rule is that in policies *at and from* a given place, the risk attaches while the vessel is at the place. *Palmer v. Marshall*, 8 *Bing.* 79, and in *Taylor v. Lowell*, 3 *Mass. Rep.* 331, and which was confirmed in *Merchants' Ins. Company v. Clapp*, 11 *Pick.* 56, it was held, that in an insurance on cargo and freight *at and from* a foreign port, the policy attaches though the vessel, while in port with the cargo on board, may need repairs to enable her to undertake the voyage. There is much nicety and difficulty in settling precisely when the policy attaches so as to charge the insurer, or when the voyage insured is, under the circumstances, to be considered as discontinued or abandoned. The case of *Tasker v. Cunningham*, 1 *Bligh.* 87, which floated through several courts in Scotland, and was finally disposed of in the British House of Lords, is a sample of much subtlety in discrimination.

usually made to continue until the vessel has been anchored for twenty-four hours in safety, and no longer; and the rule has been applied, though the loss proceeded from a cause, or death wound, existing before the ship's arrival.^a But the risk continues during quarantine, though after the twenty-four hours.^b

If the policy be to a country generally, as to *Jamaica*, the risk ends at the first port made for the purpose of unloading, after the vessel has been moored there in safety for twenty-four hours.^c But in France, where insurances are generally to the *French West India Islands*, the ship continues until the cargo is discharged at the last place of *destination.^d If the policy contains a *309 liberty to *touch, stay, and trade*, or to *touch and stay*, or if there be a known usage of trade, the risk will be prolonged according to that usage, or the terms of the policy, and intermediate voyages may be covered by the insurance.^e

The risk upon the cargo is subject to much modification by the agreement of the parties, but it usually commences from the loading thereof aboard the ship. By the French law, the policy covers the goods while on the passage in lighters from the wharf to the ship, in the harbour where she is anchored, though not if the goods

^a *Lockyer v. Offley*, 1 *Term Rep.* 252. *Meretony v. Dunlope*, cited in *ibid.* 260. *Howell v. The Protection Ins. Company*, 7 *Ohio Rep.* 284. In *Peters v. Phoenix Ins. Company*, 3 *Serg. & Rawle*, 25, the court overruled this case of *Meretony v. Dunlope*, and held, that where a vessel received her death wound during the voyage, or suffered damage above fifty per cent., she might be abandoned, though she had been moored twenty-four hours in safety in the port of destination, and that it was of no moment at what time the loss was ascertained, if it occurred during the voyage.

^b *Waples v. Eames*, *Str. Rep.* 1243.

^c *Leigh v. Mather*, 1 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 412.

^d 2 *Emerigon*, 72.

^e *Salvador v. Hopkins*, 3 *Burr. Rep.* 1707. *Gregory v. Christie*, cited in *Condy's Marshall*, 273. *Farquharson v. Hunter*, *Park on Insurance*, 67.

are to ascend or descend a river to the ship.^a The risk continues while the cargo is actually on board the ship, and no longer; though if the cargo be temporarily landed from necessity, during the voyage, they are still protected by the policy.^b If the policy, as is usual, covers the risk upon the goods *until safely landed*, then the risk continues during their passage to the shore, and until all the goods are landed.^c Policies of insurance are construed according to the usages of trade; and therefore if it be the ordinary course of the trade for the owner to employ a common public lighter to remove the goods from the ship to the shore, the policy covers them; though if he was to employ his own lighter, or to take the goods under his own charge, the insurer would be discharged.^d

*310 *There are usually distinct policies on the outward and on the homeward voyage, and if the ship perishes in the harbour abroad, after having discharged part of her outward, and received part of her homeward cargo, there may arise questions as between the different policies on the cargo. It is stated in the French law, that the policy on the outward cargo does not end but by the total, or almost total, discharge of the outward cargo; and I should presume the risk on the homeward cargo attaches as fast as it is received on board, and that the case may happen in which there was alimant sufficient to sustain both policies concurrently in point of time. If the policy be on the voyage out and home, on cargo to such a value, or on a trading voyage, the policy

^a *Boulay Paty*, tom. iii. 419. *Code de Commerce*, art. 328.

^b *Boulay Paty*, tom. iii. 427.

^c *Tiernay v. Etherington*, cited in 1 *Burr. Rep.* 348. *Gardiner v. Smith*, 1 *Johns. Cas.* 141.

^d *Rucker v. London Assurance Company*, cited 2 *Bos. & Pull.* 432. *in notis.* *Hurry v. Royal Exchange Assurance Company*, *ibid.* 430. *Matthie v. Potts*, 3 *ibid.* 23. *Strong v. Nataly*, 4 *ibid.* 16. *Coggeshall v. American Ins. Company*, 3 *Wendell*, 283. See *supra*, p. 260, as to usage.

will attach on every successive cargo, taken on board in the course of the voyage, and the amount of property on board to the sum mentioned, remains covered, if on board, without regard to the fact that part of the original cargo was landed at an intermediate port, and the cargo on board at the time of the loss was the proceeds of the outward cargo. The policy attaches on goods taken in exchange, or substituted, in the course of a trading voyage, as often as the goods may be changed.^a But if the policy be on goods outward, and upon their *proceeds* home, and the same goods are brought back in the same vessel, without having been changed or landed at the port of destination, they are not covered by the policy on the homeward voyage. The policy had reference to a change of cargo at the port of destination, and meant a substituted *cargo for the one carried out, and not *311 the cargo itself. The homeward cargo, procured by money or credit advanced on the outward cargo, may, and has been deemed, by a reasonable construction, as the proceeds of the outward cargo;^b but it would be too extravagant a departure from the terms of a written contract, to make the issues and profits of a cargo stand in this case for the original cargo.^c

In insurances on freight, the risk usually begins from the time the goods are sent on board, and not before.^d But if the ship, sailing under a contract, be lost on her way to the port of lading, or at the port of lading to which she had arrived in ballast, before any goods are put on board, or when part of the cargo is on board, and

^a Mansfield, Ch. J., in *Grant v. Paxton*, 1 *Taunton*, 474. *Columbia Ins. Company v. Catlett*, 12 *Wheat.* 383. *Coggeshall v. American Ins. Company*, 3 *Wendell*, 283.

^b *Haven v. Gray*, 12 *Mass. Rep.* 71. *Whitney v. The American Ins. Company*, 3 *Cowen*, 210.

^c *Dow v. Hope Ins. Company*, 1 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 166.

^d *Tonge v. Watts*, *Str. Rep.* 1251.

preparations making to receive passengers, the insurer on freight and passage money is liable; because an inchoate right to freight, which is an insurable interest, had commenced, and there was an inception of the risk, which attaches on the whole freight for the voyage.^a

If the policy be an open one, the recovery is limited to the actual amount of freight which would have been earned; and it is necessary to prove that goods were on board from which freight was to arise, or that there was some contract, under which the ship-owner would have been entitled to freight, if the peril had not occurred. In a valued policy, if the insured has done something towards earning the freight, and there was nothing
 *312 to prevent earning it but the occurrence *of the peril, his interest in the whole freight has commenced and been put at risk, and the weight of authority is, that he is entitled to recover the amount of the valuation, though only part of the cargo be on board.^b In the case of *De Longuemere v. Fire Insurance Company*,^c the court did not question the decision in *Forbes v. Aspinall*,^d where a valued policy on freight was opened, and a recovery allowed only as to the portion of the cargo on board when the peril occurred; and they rather concurred in it, on the ground that the residue of the cargo, which was to be the aliment for the freight, was not in that case ready to be shipped, and the vessel was, in fact, a mere seeking ship, and for aught that

^a *Thompson v. Taylor*, 6 *Term Rep.* 478. *Mackenzie v. Shedden*, 2 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 431. *Horncastle v. Stuart*, 7 *East's Rep.* 400. *Truscott v. Christie*, 2 *Brod. & Bing.* 320. *Riley v. Hartford Ins. Company*, 2 *Conn. Rep.* 373. *Hart v. Delaware Ins. Company*, *Condy's Marshall*, 281. note.

^b *Montgomery v. Eggington*, 3 *Term Rep.* 362. *Davidson v. Willasey*, 1 *Maule & Selw.* 313. *Livingston v. Columbian Ins. Company*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 49. *De Longuemere v. Phoenix Ins. Company*, 10 *Johns. Rep.* 127. *Same v. Fire Ins. Company*, *ibid.* 201.

^c 10 *Johns. Rep.* 201.

^d 13 *East's Rep.* 323.

appeared, the residue of the cargo might never have been obtained.

(2.) *Of deviation.*

The policy relates only to the voyage described in it, and to the route proper for the voyage insured; and if the vessel departs voluntarily, and without necessity, from the usual course of the voyage, the insurer is discharged, for it is a variation of the risk, and the substitution of a new voyage. The meaning of the contract of insurance for the voyage is, that the voyage shall be performed with all safe, convenient, and practicable expedition, and in the regular and customary track. In the case of an unjustifiable deviation, the insurer is discharged; not indeed from loss occurring previous to the deviation, but from all subsequent losses. These are elementary principles in the law of insurance, and pervade the institutions of every country on the subject.^a

*The shortness of the time, or of the distance of *313 a deviation, makes no difference as to its effect on the contract; if voluntary and without necessity, it is the substitution of another risk, and determines the contract.^b So strictly has this doctrine been maintained, that where a vessel having liberty in sailing down the Frith of Forth to touch at Leith, she touched at another port in its stead equally in her way, it was held to be a fatal deviation, though neither risk nor premium would have been increased, if it had been permitted.^c

The great cause of litigation in the courts, on this subject of deviation, is as to the facts and circumstances

^a *Roccus de Ass.* n. 20. 52. *Emerigon*, tom. ii. 28. 59, 60. 9 *Mass. Rep.* 447. *Condy's Marshall*, 184, 185. 1 *Phillips on Insurance*, 181. 1st edit.

^b *Fox v. Black*, and *Townson v. Guyon*, cited in *Beaves*, vol. i. 306. 9 *Mass. Rep.* 449. *Martin v. Delaware Ins. Company*, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 254.

^c *Elliott v. Wilson*, 7 *Bro. P. C.* 459.

which will be sufficient to justify it, on the ground of usage or necessity, or of the true construction of the policy; and these are mostly questions of law for the determination of the court.

Stopping, or going out of the way to relieve a vessel in distress, or to save lives, or goods, may perhaps, under certain circumstances, not be considered as a deviation which discharges the insurer. Mr. Justice Lawrence intimates, in one case,^a that it might be justifiable; but Judge Peters observed, that such deviations were justified to the heart on principles of humanity, but not to the law. If, however, the object of the deviation was to save life, Judge Washington afterwards observed, that he would not be the first judge to exclude such a case from the exceptions to the general rule, though he could not extend the exception to the case of saving property.^b

The Chief Justice observed, in the case of *Mason* *314 *v. *Ship Blaireau*,^c that the Supreme Court of the United States had great doubts whether stopping to relieve a vessel in distress, was an unjustifiable deviation in regard to the policy.

The courts are exceedingly strict in requiring a prompt and steady adherence to the performance of the precise voyage insured; and considering the particular state of facts upon which calculations of the value of risks are made, and the uncertainty and danger of abuse that relaxations of the doctrine would introduce, the severity of the rule is founded in sound policy.^d

^a 6 *East's Rep.* 54.

^b 1 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 40. 64. 2 *ibid.* 378. *Bond v. The Brig Cora*, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 80. This distinction was sustained by Mr. Justice Story, in the case of *Foster v. Gardner*, *Am. Jurist*, No. 21, and in the case of *The Henry Ewbank*, 1 *Sumner*, 400; and he agreed that any stoppage on the high seas, except for the purpose of saving life, would be a deviation, and discharge the underwriter. *The Schooner Boston and Cargo*, 1 *Sumner*, 328. S. P.

^c 2 *Cranch's Rep.* 257. note.

^d If a steamboat be lost in an attempt to take a vessel in tow, and there be no

If there be liberty granted by the policy to *touch*, or to *touch and stay*, at an intermediate port on the passage, the better opinion now is, that the insured may trade there, when consistent with the object, and the furtherance of the adventure, by breaking bulk, or by discharging and taking in cargo, provided it produces no unnecessary delay, nor enhances nor varies the risk.^a And if there be several ports of discharge mentioned in the policy, and the insured goes to more than one, he must go to them in the order in which they are named in the policy, or if they be not specifically named, he must generally go to them in the geographical order in which they occur, though there may be cases in which he need not follow the geographical order.^b This liberty to touch, stay, and trade, is always construed to be subordinate to the voyage insured, and to the usual course of that voyage, and for purposes connected with it. It does not extend to ports and places opposite to, or wide of, the usual course, or wholly unconnected with the voyage insured. This principle is as old as the law of insu-

clause in the policy allowing it, and no acquiescence of the insurers in such a usage, they are not liable. *Hermann v. Western Marine and Fire Ins. Company*, 13 *Louis. Rep.* 516.

^a *Raine v. Bell*, 9 *East's Rep.* 195. *Cormack v. Gladstone*, 11 *ibid.* 347. *Laroche v. Oswin*, 12 *ibid.* 131. *Urquhart v. Barnard*, 1 *Taunt. Rep.* 450. *Kane v. Columbian Ins. Company*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 264. *Hughes v. Union Ins. Company*, 3 *Wheaton's Rep.* 159. *Thorndike v. Boardman*, 4 *Pickering's Rep.* 471. *Chase v. Eagle Insurance Company*, 5 *ibid.* 51. This liberal construction is also given to the liberty to *touch, and make port freely*, contained in the French policies, and if new goods be taken in at such stopping port, the policy on cargo attaches on them as a substitute for the others. If the policy be on cargo to such an amount, and the ship discharges part of her cargo at the stopping port, but reserves sufficient on board as aliment for the policy, and pursues the voyage, the policy attaches on the *residuum* of the cargo. *Emerigon*, tom. ii. c. 13. sec. 8. *Boulay Paty, Cours de Droit Com.* tom. iv. 140—147.

^b *Beatson v. Haworth*, 6 *Term Rep.* 531. *Marsden v. Reid*, 3 *East's Rep.* 572. *Clason v. Simmonds*, cited in 6 *Term Rep.* 533. *Kane v. Col. Ins. Company*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 264. *Metcalf v. Parry*, 4 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 123. *Houston v. New-England Ins. Company*, 5 *Pickering's Rep.* 89.

rance, and has accompanied it in every stage of its progress.^a

The law requires the voyage, so far as concerns the underwriter, to be performed with reasonable diligence, and every unnecessary delay, in or out of port, or in commencing the voyage insured against, will amount to a deviation.^b Deviation is always understood to be an after thought, arising subsequent to the commencement of the voyage, and produced by the perception of some new interest, or the influence of some strong temptation. A premeditated intention to deviate, amounts to nothing, unless it be actually carried into execution; and this rule is adopted in England and in the courts of the United States.^c If the ship quits, from necessity, the course described in the policy, she must pursue such new voyage of necessity, in the direct course, and in the shortest
 *316 time, or it will amount to a deviation. This *was the doctrine as declared by Lord Mansfield in the case of *Lavabie v. Wilson*,^d and that case is reported at large in *Emerigon*,^e with a liberal and exalted eulogy (pronounced in the midst of war between the two countries) on the wisdom and probity of the English administration of justice: *tanta vis probitatis est, ut eam in hoste etiam*

^a *Straccha*, Gloss. 14. *Casaregis*, Disc. 67. n. 23, and Disc. 134. *Valin*, tom. ii. 78, 79. *Emerigon*, tom. ii. ch. 13. sec. 6 and 8. *passim*. *Clason v. Simmonds*, 6 *Term Rep.* 533. note. *Gardiner v. Senhouse*, 3 *Taunt. Rep.* 16. *Langhorn v. Allnutt*, 4 *ibid.* 511. *Hammond v. Reid*, 4 *Barnw. & Ald.* 72. *Lolly v. Whitmore*, 5 *ibid.* 45. *Bottomley v. Bovill*, 5 *Barnw. & Cress.* 210. *Rankin v. Reave*, *Park on Insurance*, 7th edit. 445. *Rucker v. Allnutt*, 15 *East's Rep.* 278.

^b *Jarratt v. Ward*, 1 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 263. *Smith v. Surridge*, 4 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 25. *Oliver v. Maryland Ins. Company*, 7 *Cranch's Rep.* 487. 9 *Mass. Rep.* 447. *Earl v. Shaw*, 1 *Johns. Cas.* 317. *Mount v. Larkins*, 8 *Bingham*, 103. *Fremen v. Taylor*, *ibid.* 124. *Grant v. King*, 4 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 175. *Seamans v. Loring*, 1 *Mason*, 127.

^c *Foster v. Wilmer*, *Str. Rep.* 1249. Lord Mansfield, in *Doug. Rep.* 18. 365. 3 *Cranch's Rep.* 357. 7 *Mass. Rep.* 352.

^d *Doug. Rep.* 284.

^e *Traité des Ass.* tom. ii. 62.

diligamus. All permissions given by the policy out of the ordinary course and incidents of the voyage, are to be construed strictly. If the vessel have liberty to carry letters of marque, she may deviate for the purpose of defence, but not for the purpose of capture.^a In *Haven v. Holland*,^b a pretty enlarged discretion, and one carried to the very verge of the law, was confided to the captain as to the best mode of defence, and it was held, that the letter of marque might chase and capture hostile vessels in sight, in the course of the voyage, without its being a deviation; and if he captures the vessel, the master may make the victory effectual, and man out the prize, and the delay for those purposes is not a deviation. If liberty be given her to *chase and capture*, that will not enable her to convoy her prize into port,^c though she may do it if she be not thereby led out of the way;^d and to cruise for six weeks, means six consecutive weeks, and not at different times.^e

The object of the deviation must be considered, in order to determine its effect upon the policy. It must be commensurate only with the necessity that produces it, and that necessity will justify a deviation on account of a peril not insured against.^f And when the deviation is governed by that *necessity, as a deviation *317 from stress of weather, or to procure necessary repairs, or to join convoy, or to avoid capture or detention, it works no injury to the policy.^g

^a *Parr v. Anderson*, 6 *East's Rep.* 202.

^b 2 *Mason's Rep.* 230.

^c *Lawrence v. Sidebotham*, 6 *East's Rep.* 45.

^d *Ward v. Wood*, 13 *Mass. Rep.* 539.

^e *Syers v. Bridge*, *Doug. Rep.* 509.

^f *Scott v. Thompson*, 4 *Bos. & Pull.* 181. *Robinsons v. Marine Ins. Company*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 89.

^g *Condy's Marshall*, 203. b. to 213. *Phillips on Insurance*, vol. i. 2d edit. p. 480—576. The latter work has collected and digested all the English and American cases on this very diffusive head of deviation, and to which I must refer for a more particular knowledge of the distinctions and exceptions with which the books abound.

There has been considerable discussion in the books relative to the identity of the voyage described in the policy, and the voyage actually begun. If the vessel sails on a different voyage, the policy never attaches ; but if she be lost before she comes to the dividing point, between the course of the voyage in the policy, and the course of the new voyage, the change of the voyage often becomes a contested question as to the intention of the party. If the ship really sailed on another voyage, the policy never attached, though the vessel be lost before she came to the dividing point ; but if the *termini* of the voyage described in the policy be the same as those upon which the vessel sailed, it is the same voyage, and a mere intention, afterwards formed, to deviate, is of no consequence, if the vessel be lost before she came to the dividing point. The distinction between an alteration of the voyage, and a mere deviation in the course of it, is very reasonable and solid. The one is adopted previous to the commencement of the risk, and shows that the party had receded from his agreement, but the other takes place after the risk has commenced, and relates only to the execution of the original plan.^a It has, however, been held, in one case, after much discussion,^b and suggested in another, in opposition to the established *rule, that the identity of the voyage does not always consist in the identity of the *termini*;^c and that though the *terminus ad quem* be dropped, and another substituted in the course of the voyage, it may be still the same voyage ; and if the vessel be lost before

^a Wooldridge v. Boydell, *Doug. Rep.* 16. Kewley v. Ryan, 2 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 343. Middlewood v. Blakes, 7 *Term Rep.* 162. Silva v. Low, 1 *Johns. Cas.* 184. Henshaw v. Marine Ins. Company, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 273. Marine Ins. Company v. Tucker, 5 *Cranch's Rep.* 357. Boulay Paty, tom. iv. 56, 57.

^b Lawrence v. Ocean Ins. Company, 11 *Johns. Rep.* 241. S. C. 14 *ibid.* 46.

^c Johnson, J., in 3 *Cranch's Rep.* 385.

she comes to the dividing point between the course to the original, and to the substituted port of destination, it is an intention to deviate, and nothing more.^a

III. *Of the rights and duties of the insured in cases of loss.*

(1.) *Of abandonment.*

A total loss within the meaning of the policy, may arise either by the total destruction of the thing insured, or, if it specifically remains, by such damage to it as renders it of little or no value. A loss is said to be total if the voyage be entirely lost or defeated, or not worth pursuing, and the projected adventure frustrated. It is a constructive total loss if the thing insured, though existing in fact, is lost for any beneficial purpose to the owner. In such cases, the insured may abandon all his interest in the subject insured, and all his hopes of recovery, to the insurer, and call upon him to pay as for a total loss. The object of the provision is to enable the insured to be promptly reinstated in his capital, and be thereby enabled to engage in some new mercantile adventure. Long interruption to a voyage, and uncertain hopes of recovery, would often be ruinous to the business of the merchant; and, therefore, if the object of the voyage be lost, or not worth pursuing, by reason of a peril insured against, or if the cargo be so damaged as to be of little or no value, or *where the salvage is very high, and *319 further expense be necessary, and the insurer will not engage to bear it, or if what is saved be of less value than the freight, or where the damage exceeds one-half

^a The foreign jurists distinguish between the *voyage insured*, and the *voyage of the ship*. *Independenter se habet assicuratio a viaggio navis*. If a ship sails on a voyage from Saint Malo to Toulon, and is insured from Saint Malo to Cadiz, the latter is the voyage insured, but the former is the voyage of the ship, and the voyage insured is known by its two extremes, or the *terminus a quo*, and the *terminus ad quem*. *Casaregis, Disc. 67. n. 5. 31. Boulay Paty, tom. iii. 416, 417.*

the value of the goods insured, or where the property is captured, or arrested, or even detained by an indefinite embargo; in these and other cases of a like nature, the insured may disentangle himself, and abandon the subject to the underwriter, and call upon him to pay a total loss. In such cases, the insurer stands in the place of the insured, and takes the subject to himself with all the chances of recovery and indemnity. A valid abandonment has a retrospective effect, and does of itself, and without any deed of cession, and prior to the actual payment of the loss, transfer the right of property to the insurer to the extent of the insurance; and if after an abandonment, duly made and accepted, the ship should be recovered, and proceed and make a prosperous voyage, the insurer, as owner, would reap the profits.^a

These considerations have introduced the right of abandonment into the insurance law of every country, and yet the text writers have generally condemned the privilege as inconsistent with just notions concerning the nature of the contract of insurance, which is a contract of indemnity. But it has now become an ingredient so interwoven with the whole system of insurance, that it cannot be abolished, though the late English cases, says

^a *Guidon*, c. 7. sec. 1. *Goss v. Withers*, 2 *Burr. Rep.* 683. *Hamilton v. Mendes*, *ibid.* 1198. *Mills v. Fletcher*, *Doug. Rep.* 231. *Manning v. Newnham*, *Park on Insurance*, 221. *Cazalet v. St. Barbe*, 1 *Term Rep.* 187. *Queen v. Union Ins. Company*, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 331. The abandonment carries with it to the insurer, not only the title to the subject insured, but its proceeds if recovered, and any compensation awarded by way of indemnity. The benefit of the *spes recuperandi* passes, and all that may be collateral or incidental to the ownership. *Bleauwpot v. Da Costa*, 1 *Eden*, 130. *Randall v. Cochran*, 1 *Ves. sen.* 98. *Comegys v. Vasse*, 1 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 193. *Atlantic Ins. Company v. Storrow*, 1 *Edw. Ch. Rep.* 621. *Rogers v. Hosack's Executors*, 18 *Wendell*, 319. *Matthews, J.*, in *Mellon v. Bucks*, 5 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* N. S. 371. Mr. Benecke justly observes, that the principles in some of the above cases, before Lord Mansfield, were too generally expressed to serve as a basis of the law of abandonment, and that it was from actual decisions, and not from such general observations, that the law must be collected. *Benecke on Indemnity*, 348.

Mr. Benecke, show a stronger inclination in the courts to restrict than to enlarge the right. The laws of Hamburg distinguish themselves from all others, *by restricting the right of abandonment to the *320 only case of a missing ship.^a

As soon as the insured is informed of the loss, he ought (after being allowed a reasonable time to inspect the cargo, and for no other purpose,) to determine promptly whether he will or will not abandon, and he cannot lie by and speculate on events. If he elects to abandon, he must do it in a reasonable time, and give notice promptly to the insurer of his determination; otherwise he will be deemed to have waived his right to abandon, and will be entitled to recover only for a partial loss, unless the loss be, in fact, absolutely total.^b If the thing insured exists *in specie*, and the insured wishes to go for a total loss, an abandonment is indispensable.^c The same principle which requires the insured who abandons, to do it in a reasonable time, also requires the insurer who rejects an abandonment, to act promptly.^d The object of the abandonment is to turn that

^a *Ord. of Hamburg*, tit. 11. The Insurance Companies of Philadelphia, in 1807, agreed that their policies should provide against abandonment in cases of capture or detention, until sixty days after advice received of the act, unless the property be sooner condemned; and in cases of embargo, until after four calendar months; and against any abandonment on account of seizure or detention in port, under French decrees, or on account of the port of detention being blockaded.

^b *Mitchell v. Edie*, 1 *Term Rep.* 608. The reasonable time for giving notice of abandonment depends upon circumstances, and five days delay after intelligence received has been held too late. *Hunt v. Royal Exchange Assurance Company*, 5 *Maule & Selw.* 47.

^c *Mitchell v. Edie*, 1 *Term Rep.* 608. *Martin v. Crockatt*, 14 *East's Rep.* 465. *Hunt v. Royal Exchange Assurance Company*, 5 *Maule & Selw.* 47.

^d *Hudson v. Harrison*, 3 *Brod. & Bing.* 97. The insurer may take possession of a vessel stranded and abandoned to him, and repair her, provided he does it diligently or in a reasonable time, and if he has not accepted the abandonment, and the repairs amount to less than half the value, he may restore the vessel. *Peele v. Suffolk Ins. Company*, 7 *Pick. Rep.* 254.

into a total loss, which otherwise would not be one ; and it is unnecessary, and would be idle, to abandon in the

*321 case of an entire destruction of the subject.^a *It is only necessary when the loss is constructively total. The right of abandonment does not depend upon the certainty, but upon the high probability of a total loss, either of the property, or voyage, or both. The insured is to act, not upon certainties, but upon probabilities ; and if the facts present a case of extreme hazard, and of probable expense, exceeding half the value of the ship, the insured may abandon, though it should happen that she was afterwards recovered at a less expense.^b Though the subject may physically exist, yet there may be a technical total loss to the owner, if the thing be taken from

^a Mullett *v* Shedden, 13 *East's Rep.* 304. Green *v*. Royal Exchange Assurance Company, 6 *Taunt. Rep.* 68. Cambridge *v*. Anderton, 2 *Barnw. & Cress.* 697. *Casaregis*, *Disc.* 3. n. 23. *Disc.* 70. n. 5. 33. Roux *v*. Salvador, 3 *Bingham's N. C. Rep.* 266. In this last case, in the Exchequer Chamber, Lord Abinger gave a learned historical review of the law of abandonment, and the decision of the court was, that if the goods insured are damaged by sea perils during the course of the voyage, and at an intermediate port of necessity, became perishable, and could not be reshipped, the assured might recover as for a total loss without abandonment, even though the perishable articles (hides) did exist in specie, for they could not be reshipped with safety, and they were deemed totally lost as a shipment for the voyage. An abandonment in a policy on freight held to be unnecessary when the ship is hopelessly stranded, for then there is nothing to abandon. Idle *v*. Royal Exchange Assurance Company, 8 *Taunt. Rep.* 755. Mount *v*. Harrison, 4 *Bingham*, 388.

^b Fontaine *v*. Phoenix Ins. Company, 11 *Johns. Rep.* 293. Robertson *v*. Caruthers, 2 *Starkie's Rep.* 571. Bradlie *v*. The Maryland Ins. Company, 12 *Peters' Rep.* 378. 398. Though the vessel be disabled on the voyage, and it becomes reasonable, under the circumstances of the case, that the master should procure another vessel to send on the cargo, and though he may not be able to do it at the port of distress, or at a contiguous port, yet it has been held not to be a proper case for abandonment of the cargo, inasmuch as the cargo in the given case was light, and might without great expense have been transported to another port for shipment. Bryant *v*. Commonwealth Ins. Company, 6 *Pick. Rep.* 131. Each case will be governed on a reasonable view of its special circumstances. If the master must send the cargo not to a contiguous port, but to distant places for reshipment, and the transportation be difficult and hazardous, the master is not bound to attempt to reship the cargo. Treadwell *v*. Union Ins. Company, 6 *Cowen's Rep.* 270. Vide *supra*, p. 213.

his free use and possession. Such are the common cases of total losses by embargoes, by captures, and by restraints, and detainments of princes. The right to abandon exists when the ship, for all the useful purposes of the voyage, is gone from the control of the owner; as in the cases of submersion, or shipwreck, or capture, and it is uncertain, or the time unreasonably distant, when it will be restored in a state to resume the voyage; or when the risk and expense of restoring the vessel, are disproportioned to the expected benefit and objects of the voyage. All these general doctrines concerning abandonment have been entirely incorporated into our American law, and they exist to all essential purposes in the French jurisprudence.^a

*The case of *Peele v. Merchants' Insurance Com-* *322
pany,^b contains a very elaborate review of the whole law of abandonment, and the conclusion is, that the right of abandonment is to be judged of by all the circumstances of each particular case existing at the time of abandonment, and that there was no general rule that the injury to the ship by the perils insured against must in all cases exceed one-half her value, to justify an abandonment. The law, as declared in the great cases before Lord Mansfield, of *Goss v. Withers*, *Hamilton v. Mendes*, and *Mills v. Fletcher*, has been acted upon for half a century,

^a *Emerigon*, tom. ii. 194—197. *Pothier, des Ass.* n. 131. 138. *Gardiner v. Smith*, 1 *Johns. Cas.* 141. *Abbott v. Broome*, 1 *Caines' Rep.* 292. *U. Ins. Company v. Robinson*, 2 *Caines' Rep.* 280. *Lee v. Boardman*, 3 *Mass. Rep.* 238. *Marine Ins. Company v. Tucker*, 3 *Cranch's Rep.* 357. *Chesapeake Ins. Company v. Stark*, 6 *ibid.* 268. *Peele v. Merchants' Ins. Company*, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 27. Submersion is not *per se* a total loss of a vessel. It will depend upon circumstances whether it be or be not total. *Sewall v. United States Ins. Company*, 11 *Pick. Rep.* 90. When the insurance is on the *ship*, it is a total loss, if at the time of abandonment the ship was absolutely lost to the owner, as by capture or detention; or she was in such a state, that the expense of making her available would exceed half her value.

^b 3 *Mason's Rep.* 27. See, also, *Bradlie v. The Maryland Ins. Company*, 12 *Peters' Rep.* 378. S. P.

and their doctrine has never been shaken; and the case of *M'IVER v. Henderson*^a left the law on the subject of abandonment exactly where those cases had placed it.^b

The French ordinance of the marine confined abandonment to the five cases of capture, shipwreck, stranding, arrest of princes, and an entire loss of the subject insured.^c But the new commercial code has modified and enlarged the privilege of abandonment. It applies to the cases of capture, shipwreck, stranding with partial wreck, disability of the vessel occasioned by perils of the sea, arrest of a foreign power, or arrest on the part of the government of the insured after the commencement of the voyage, and a loss or damage of the property insured, if amounting to at least three-fourths of its value.^d The English and American law of abandonment applies not only to those cases, but to every case where the perils covered by the policy have occasioned a loss, either of
 * 323 the subject, or of the voyage. It is understood, that mere *stranding of the ship is not, of itself, to be deemed a total loss; yet it may be attended with circumstances that will justify an abandonment, even though the hull of the ship should not be materially damaged; as if she be stranded where there are no means of adequate relief, and the expense of the removal would exceed the value of the ship.^e The foreign writers distinguish innavigability from shipwreck, and there has

^a 4 *Maule & Selw.* 576.

^b In the case of the *American Ins. Company v. Ogden*, 20 *Wendell*, 287, it was held, that if the ground for abandonment, in the case, either of a technical or actual total loss, was the result of *culpable negligence*, or want of *due diligence*, on the part of the owner or his agent, the insurer was not liable. And if there has been a want of *ordinary prudence* in the owner in furnishing funds or credit to the master, to enable him to make the necessary repairs, and the master was thereby deprived of the means to obtain funds or credit, an abandonment cannot be made as for a constructive or technical total loss.

^c *Ord de la Mar.* art. 46.

^d *Code de Commerce*, art. 369.

^e *Bosley v. Chesapeake Ins. Company*, 3 *Gill & Johns*. 450.

been some difficulty as to the true definition of shipwreck.^a But the right to abandon does not turn upon any definition, and the cases on the subject *324 have been governed by their own peculiar circumstances, connected with the property at the time, and with reference to the general principles and analogies of law.^b

^a There are two kinds of shipwreck: (1.) When the vessel sinks, or is dashed to pieces. (2.) When she is stranded, which is, when she grounds, and fills with water. The latter may terminate in shipwreck, or may not, and it depends on circumstances whether it will or will not justify an abandonment. The shades of difference between *shipwreck* of the two kinds, and *wreck* absolute and partial, and *stranding* with and without wreck, are minutely stated by the French civilians. See *Boulay Paty*, tom. iv. 12—14. 230, 231, and *Ord. de la Mar.* h. t. art. 46, which distinguishes between shipwreck, wreck, and stranding. In *Bishop v. Pentland*, 7 *Barnw. & Cress.* 219, 1 *Manning & Ryland*, 49, *stranding* was held to be when a ship, by accident, is on the ground or strand, and is injured thereby. A stranding in the sense of a policy is, when a ship takes ground, not in the ordinary course of navigation, but by accident, or the force of wind, or the sea, and remains stationary for some time. The vessel must ground from an accident happening out of the ordinary and usual course of navigation. She must be on the strand under extraordinary circumstances, or from extraneous causes. *Wells v. Hopwood*, 3 *Barnw. & Adolph.* 20. *Kingsford v. Marshall*, 8 *Bingham*, 458. But the cases make a stranding to depend so much upon special circumstances, and they make so many distinctions, that it is difficult to give any precise definition or rule uniformly applicable to the subject. *McDougle v. Royal Exchange Assurance Company*, 4 *Campb.* 283. 4 *Maule & Selw.* 503. *Rayner v. Goodmand*, 5 *Barnw. & Ald.* 225. *Burnett v. Kensington*, 1 *Esp. N. P. Rep.* 417. *Carruthers v. Sydebotham*, 4 *Maule & Selw.* 77. *Barrow v. Bell*, 4 *Barnw. & Cress.* 736, are cases to show the perplexities and nice refinements on this point. Innavigability, in the sense of insurance law, is when the vessel, by a peril of the sea, ceases to be navigable by irremediable misfortune: *in eum Statum, qui providentia humana reparari non potest*. The ship is relatively innavigable, when it will require almost as much time and expense to repair her, as to build a new one. This is the doctrine of Targa and Emerigon, and of the judicial decisions which the latter reports. *Targa*, ch. 54. p. 239, and ch. 60. p. 256. *Emerigon*, tom. i. 591—593. Innavigability, when duly established, constitutes a total loss, and a right to abandon. When it is established by an official survey and report, (*procès verbaux*,) it creates a *presumptio juris* of innavigability, by a peril of the sea, against the insurer, and which he may contradict; but without such a survey, which is required by the French ordinances, the presumption is *juris et de jure* against the insured, that the innavigability proceeded from inherent defects. *Emerigon*, tom. i. 577.

^b *Wood v. L. and K. Ins. Company*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 479. *Peele v. Merchants' Ins. Company*, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 42, 43, 44.

The English rule is, that an abandonment, though rightfully made, is not absolute, but is liable to be controlled by subsequent events; and that if the loss has ceased to be total before action, the abandonment becomes inoperative. The rule was suggested, but left undecided, in *Hamilton v. Mendes*, but it was explicitly declared and settled in subsequent cases.^a The English rule does not rest, however, without some distrust as to its solidity. It was much doubted in the House of Lords, by Lord Eldon, in *Smith v. Robertson*;^b every question as to the principle was expressly waived, and it has since been very much shaken.^c But in these United States a different rule prevails, and it is well settled in American jurisprudence, that an abandonment once rightfully made, is binding and conclusive between the parties, and the rights flowing from it become vested rights, and are not to be divested by subsequent events.^d The right to abandon is to be tested by the actual facts
 *325 at the time of the abandonment, *and not upon the state of the information received.^e The opinion

^a *Bainbridge v. Neilson*, 10 *East's Rep.* 329. *Patterson v. Ritchie*, 4 *Maule & Selw.* 394.

^b 2 *Dow's Rep.* 474.

^c *Holdsworth v. Wise*, 7 *Barnw. & Cress.* 794. It was there held, that if a ship has been once necessarily abandoned, the owners may recover for a total loss, though she is afterwards recovered and brought into port. This was coming to the true and sound doctrine on the subject. See, also, *Naylor v. Taylor*, 9 *ibid.* 718.

^d *Bradlie v. Maryland Ins. Company*, 12 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 378. In *Peele v. Suff. Ins. Company*, 7 *Pick. Rep.* 254, it was held, that if a vessel be stranded and abandoned to the underwriters, and they take and repair her at a cost of less than fifty per cent. of her value, they may in a reasonable time return her to the owners, without their consent and exonerate themselves. A contrary doctrine was held in *Peele v. Merchants' Ins. Company*, 2 *Mason, supra*, and the French law is clearly otherwise in a case proper for abandonment and duly made. *Emerigon, Traité des Ass.* tom. ii. 195. *Pothier, Traité des Ass.* n. 138. *Pardessus, Cours de Droit Com.* tom. iii. 406.

^e *Church v. Bedient*, 1 *Caines' Cases in Error*, 21. *Depau v. Ocean Ins. Company*, 5 *Cowen's Rep.* 63. *Dutilh v. Gatiliff*, 4 *Dallas' Rep.* 446. *Marshall v. Delaware Ins. Company*, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 54. 4 *Cranch*, 202.

of Lord Mansfield, in *Hamilton v. Mendes*, was very destitute of precision on this point, and the American rule is founded on principles of equity, and public convenience. The opposite doctrine, said a great authority,^a appeared to trench very much upon the true principles of abandonment, and not to be supported by very exact or cogent analogies. The Court of Session in Scotland, even went so far as to consider the right to abandon to depend merely upon the information at the time, and that if the right be exercised *bona fide* upon the state of facts received, the transaction was closed and definitive, and was not to be opened or disturbed by any subsequent event, or any event of which the intelligence subsequently arrived.^b

*There is a material difference between an in- *326
surance on ship, and on cargo, and some confusion
is introduced by blending the cases; but the essential
principles of abandonment, with some variation, apply
equally to each. A total loss of cargo may be effected
not merely by its destruction, but, in very special cases,

Rhineland v. Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, 4 *Cranch's Rep.* 29. *Lee v. Boardman*, 3 *Mass. Rep.* 238. *Wood v. L. & K. Ins. Company*, 6 *ibid.* 479. *Adams v. Delaware Ins. Company*, 3 *Binn. Rep.* 287. *Peele v. Merchants' Ins. Company*, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 27. *Maryland and Ph. Ins. Co. v. Bathurst*, 5 *Gill & Johns.* 159. *Bradlie v. Maryland Ins. Company*, 12 *Peters*, 378.

^a Story, J., 3 *Mason's Rep.* 37.

^b *Smith v. Robertson*, 2 *Dow's Rep.* 474. In the opinion in *Peele v. Merchants' Ins. Company*, it was observed by the court, in reference to the definitive nature of an abandonment, when once duly made, that it was "no slight recommendation of the American doctrine, that it stands approved by the cautious learning of *Valin*, the moral perspicacity of *Pothier*, and the practical and sagacious judgment of *Emerigon*." But an observation of *Valin*, in the place referred to, makes me doubt whether he merited the eulogy, in respect to that point; for he says, that though there should be *information of a loss justifying an abandonment*, yet, if the ship should be repaired by the care, and at the expense of the insurer, he thinks the insurer would have a right to compel the insured to receive back the vessel and cargo, notwithstanding the abandonment, and put up with the payment of a partial loss. *Valin's Com.* tom. ii. 144, or lib. 3. tit. 6. art. 60. That opinion of *Valin*, I take to be heresy in American law, and it is pointedly condemned by *Emerigon*, tom. ii. 195.

by a permanent incapacity of the ship to perform the voyage, as when it produces a destruction of the contemplated adventure. A loss of the voyage for the season, or a case of retardation only, unless the cargo be of a perishable nature, does not amount to a total loss of the cargo.^a It is only in particular cases that the loss of the voyage will be a ground of abandonment of the cargo. The goods are not so necessarily connected with the ship, that if the ship be lost, there must, of course, be a loss of voyage with respect to the goods. In *Gernon v. Royal Exchange Assurance*,^b the ship was forced back by stress of weather, and the cargo found to be so damaged as not to be in a state to send on, and an abandonment was held good. There must be an actual total loss, or one in the highest degree probable, to justify an abandonment of the cargo.^c In *Hudson v. Harrison*,^d it was admitted to be extremely difficult to deduce any general rule from the circumstances under which the insured has a right to abandon the cargo. It is a very entangled branch of the law of insurance. If the ship has been lost, and the cargo materially damaged, the cases and text writers vary as to the right of the insured to abandon, or whether he must send on the goods when half is saved, or a third, or a quarter.^e The doctrine of the old cases, that the insured may abandon when the voyage

*327 is *lost, is narrowed. Every such loss will not

^a *Anderson v. Wallis*, 2 *Maule & Selw.* 240. *Everth v. Smith*, *ibid.* 278. Mere retardation of the voyage by a peril insured against, unless it produces a total incapacity of the ship to perform the voyage, does not constitute a technical total loss of the ship. *Bradlie v. The Maryland Ins. Company*, 12 *Peters' Rep.* 378.

^b 6 *Taunt. Rep.* 383.

^c *Anderson v. Wallis*, 2 *Maule & Selw.* 240. *Hunt v. Royal Exchange Ass. Company*, 5 *ibid.* 47. *Wilson v. Royal Exchange Ass. Company*, 2 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 624.

^d 3 *Brod. & Bing.* 97.

^e See, *supra*, p. 212, 213. 321. note, when it is or is not the duty of the master to send on the cargo by another vessel.

justify it. A retardation is not sufficient. If the profits be reduced one-half, it was said the owner was not bound to prosecute the voyage, but every case seems to rest upon its own circumstances.

When a case proper for abandonment exists, and it be duly made,^a the underwriter cannot intercept the exercise of the right, and destroy its effect, by an offer to pay the amount of the repairs. In a case proper for abandonment, the insured may stand upon his rights, uncontrolled by the underwriter, for the option to abandon rests with him, and not with the other party. If by his acts and interference he shows that he intends to act as *owner*, and elects to repair, he loses his right to abandon, or it is a waiver of it if made.^b He may elect to repair the damage at the expense of the insurer, even if it amounts to the whole value of the ship;^c and, on the other hand, he is not obliged, against his consent, to take the remnants and surplusses of a lost voyage, and claim under the policy the average or expenses incurred by the calamity. This is the more recent, and, I think, the more solid doctrine on the subject, and it is enforced with great strength in the case of *Peele v. Merchants' Insurance Company*,^d which has so fully investigated and explained all the prominent points under this interesting title in the law of insurance.

In *Pole v. Fitzgerald*,^e decided in the Exchequer Chamber, in the middle of the last century, on error from the K. B., it was held, after great discussion and consideration, that on an insurance of a ship for a voyage, it

^a To render an abandonment effectual, it is held that the cause of the loss of the ship must be stated in the letter of abandonment, for the benefit of the insurer. *Hazard v. N. E. Marine Ins. Company*, 1 *Sumner*, 218.

^b *Dickey v. N. Y. Ins. Company*, 4 *Cowen*, 222. S. C. 3 *Wendell*, 658. *Columb. Ins. Company v. Ashby*, 1 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 139.

^c *Story, J.*, in *Humpheys v. Union Ins. Company*, 3 *Mason*, 436.

^d 3 *Mason*, 27.

^e *Willes' Rep.* 641.

was not sufficient that the voyage be lost, if the ship was safe. It was declared, that the insurance was of the ship, and not of the voyage, and the decision was affirmed in the House of Lords, notwithstanding Lord Mansfield made a very strong argument against it in his character of counsel.^a After Lord Mansfield came into the

*328 Court of K. B., he introduced and established *the doctrine which he had maintained as counsel, that on the insurance of a ship for a specified voyage, a loss of either the ship, or the voyage, was the same thing, and justified an abandonment. This, according to Lord Eldon,^b was an act of the King's Bench, reversing a judgment of the Exchequer Chamber, and the House of Lords. The case of *Fitzgerald v. Pole*, after having slept unnoticed and disregarded for half a century, was mentioned with respect, first in the Supreme Court of New-York,^c and then in *Hadkinson v. Robinson*,^d and more recently by Lord Ellenborough,^e who intimated, that the loss of the voyage had nothing to do with the loss of the ship, and that it was well to resort to the good sense of the judgment in *Pole v. Fitzgerald*, to purify the mind of those generalities. It is settled, that a loss of the voyage as to the cargo is not a loss of the voyage as to the ship, for a policy on a ship is an insurance of the ship for the voyage, and not an insurance on the ship and the voyage.^f And, under this qualification, I apprehend, the doctrine of the case of *Manning v. Newnham* to be the established doctrine, that if the ship be prevented by a peril within the policy from proceeding on her voyage, and be irreparably

^a 5 Bro. P. C. 137—142.

^b 1 Dow's Rep. 359. 2 *ibid.* 477.

^c 1 Johns. Cas. 309.

^d 3 Bos. & Pull. 388.

^e 2 Maule & Selw. 293.

^f *Alexander v. Baltimore Ins. Company*, 4 Cranch's Rep. 370. See, also, 1 Mason's Rep. 343.

injured, and the voyage be thereby lost, it is a total loss of ship, freight, and cargo, provided no other ship can be procured to carry on the cargo.^a It must be admitted, however, that the extreme variety, and apparent conflict of many of the cases on this subject of abandonment, are enough to justify the complaint of Lord Eldon, that there is as much uncertainty on this, as on any other branch of the law.

*It is understood to be a fixed rule, that if the ship be so injured by perils as to require repairs to the extent of more than half her value at the time of the loss, the insured may abandon; for if ship or cargo be damaged so as to diminish their value above half, they are said to be constructively lost. The rule came from the French law, and is to be found in the treatise of *Le Guidon*,^b where it is applied to the case of goods; and in respect to both ship and cargo, the rule has been incorporated into the American jurisprudence.^c There has been considerable discussion in the text books, as to the right to abandon, when a part only of the property insured is damaged above a moiety, or lost, and this will depend upon the manner in which it is insured. If the insurance be upon different kinds of goods indiscriminately, or as one entire parcel, it is then an insurance upon an integral

^a *Condy's Marshall*, 585, 586.

^b Ch. 7. art. 1. 9.

^c *Valin's Com.* tom. ii. 101. *Pothier, des Ass.* n. 121. *Code de Commerce*, art. 369. *Gardiner v. Smith*, 1 *Johns. Cas.* 141. *Dickey v. N. Y. Ins. Company*, 4 *Coven's Rep.* 222. *Marcardia v. Chesapeake Ins. Company*, 9 *Cranch's Rep.* 39. *Ludlow v. Columbian Ins. Company*, 1 *Johns. Rep.* 335. *Peters v. Phoenix Ins. Company*, 3 *Serg. & Rawle*, 25. *Wood v. L. and K. Ins. Company*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 479. *Story, J.*, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 69. The loss must exceed one-half of the goods insured, or the gross amount paid for them. *Budd v. Union Ins. Company*, 4 *M'Cord's Rep.* 1. In *Hall v. Ocean Ins. Company*, 21 *Pick.* 472, it was held, that in making the estimate to ascertain whether the loss was technically total, or to the amount of fifty per cent. on the sum insured, including the premium, items which should be carried to the amount of general average, are not to be included.

subject, and an abandonment of part only cannot be made. But if the articles be separately specified and valued, it has been considered so far in the nature of a distinct insurance on each parcel, that the insured was allowed to recover as for a total loss of the damaged parcel, when damaged above a moiety in value. Mr. Phillips has suggested a doubt whether this distinction be well founded. The rule was taken from the French treatises, and unless the different sorts of cargo be so distinctly separated and considered in the policy, as to make it analogous to *330 distinct insurances on distinct parcels, there *can not be a separate abandonment of a part of the cargo insured.^a

The meaning of the words in the rule, "one-half of the value," has been held to be, the half of the general market value of the vessel at the time of the disaster, and not her value for any particular voyage or purpose.^b The expense of the repairs at the port of necessity, including the expense of getting the ship afloat, if stranded, is the true test for determining the amount of the injury, and such sum is to be taken as will fully reinstate the vessel, and, in general, with the same kind of materials of which she was composed at the time of the disaster. It has also been considered, that the three objects of insurance, vessel, cargo, and freight, stand on the same ground as to

^a *Guerlain v. Columbian Ins. Company*, 7 *Johns. Rep.* 527. *Deidericks v. Com. Ins. Company*, 10 *ibid.* 234. *Condy's Marshall*, 600. 2 *Phillips on Insurance*, 370. *Valin*, tom. ii. 108. *Pothier*, h. t. No. 121. 131, 132. *Emerigon*, tom. ii. 214. *Le Guidon*, ch. 7. sec. 8, 9. In *Seton v. Delaware Ins. Company*, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 175, it was held, that a partial loss of an entire cargo, by sea damage, if amounting to more than half, might, under circumstances, be converted into a technical total loss; but not if a *distinct part of the cargo* be destroyed, and the voyage be not thereby broken up.

^b As the true basis of the valuation, is the value of the ship at the time of the disaster, if after the damage is or might be repaired, the ship is not or would not be worth at the place of repairs double the cost of repairs, it is a technical total loss. *Bradlie v. The Maryland Ins. Company*, 12 *Peters*, 378.

a total loss by a deterioration to more than one-half of the value.^a

In ascertaining the value of the ship, and the quantum of expense or injury, difficulties have arisen, and they were fully discussed, and very clearly explained, in *Peele v. Merchants' Insurance Company*.^b The valuation in the policy is conclusive in case of a total loss, but in some respects, it is inapplicable for the purpose of ascertaining the quantum of injury in case of a partial loss of goods. The rule in that case is, to ascertain the amount of injury by the difference between the gross proceeds of the sound and damaged goods.^c *This is also *331 the true rule as to the ship, though there is greater difficulty in the application. The value of the ship at the time and place of the accident, is the true basis of calculation.^d And with respect to the arbitrary and fluctuating rule as to the allowance of one-third new for old, there is no doubt of its application in cases of partial loss ; but such a deduction is not allowed, and does not apply

^a *Center v. American Ins. Company*, 7 *Cowen's Rep.* 564. 4 *Wendell*, 45. S. C. *Sewall v. United States Ins. Company*, 11 *Pick.* 90.

^b 3 *Mason's Rep.* 70—78.

^c *Johnson v. Sheddon*, 2 *East's Rep.* 581.

^d *Patapsco Ins. Company v. Southgate*, 5 *Peters' U.S. Rep.* 604. The valuation in the policy, at the home port, or in the general market of other ports, constitutes no ingredient in ascertaining whether the injury by the disaster is more than one-half of the vessel or not. *Bradlie v. The Maryland Ins. Company*, 12 *Peters*, 378. This decision, pronounced by Mr. Justice Story, was in conformity with the doctrine declared by him in the case of *Peele v. The Merchants' Ins. Company*, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 27, but a different rule has been adopted in Massachusetts and New-York, in avowed contradiction to the decision in the federal court. It is held, in the courts in those states, that the value of the vessel, as agreed upon by the parties and inserted in the policy, is to be taken as the true value, in determining whether the repairs could exceed half her value, in reference to the question of abandonment ; and that it governs, as well when the assured claims for a technical total loss, as when he claims for a loss by a total destruction of the ship ; and further, that in determining the same question, the deduction of one-third new for old was to be made from the estimated amount of the repairs. *Deblois v. The Ocean Ins. Company*, 16 *Pick. Rep.* 312. *American Ins. Company v. Ogden*, 20 *Wendell*, 297. 297—300.

to cases of total loss.^a The reason of this allowance to the underwriter, of one-third of the expense of the reparations, is on account of the better condition in which the ship is put by them, than she was when insured; and, therefore, neither the reason of the rule, nor the rule itself, applies to the case of a ship suffering a partial loss on her first voyage, when she is new, and cannot be made better by repairs.^b The half value which authorizes an abandonment, is half the sum which the ship, if repaired, would be worth, without any such deduction.^c

Upon a valid abandonment, the master becomes the agent of the insurer, and the insured is not bound by his subsequent acts unless he adopts them. It is the same thing with the consignee of the cargo. It is the duty of the master, resulting from his situation, to act with good faith, and care, and diligence, for the protection
 *332 and recovery of the property, for the benefit of whom it may eventually concern. The master of an insured ship injured by the perils of the sea, and not competent to complete the voyage, may sell her in a case of necessity, as when the ship is in a place in which she cannot be repaired; or the expense of repairing her would be extravagant, and exceed her value; or he had no moneys in his possession, and was not able to raise any.^d In cases of capture he is bound, if a neutral, to remain and assert his claim until condemnation, or the

^a *Peele v. The Merchants' Ins. Company*, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 28. 73—77.

^b In *Pirie v. Steele*, 8 *Carr. & Payne*, 200. It was a matter of dispute when a vessel may be said to be on her first voyage. Lord Abinger thought the best method was to make the deduction of one-third new for old depend upon the age of the ship, to be specified in the policy.

^c *Dupuy v. U. Ins. Company*, 3 *Johns. Cas.* 182. *Contra*, *Smith v. Bell*, 2 *Caines' Cases in Error*, 153. *Coolidge v. Gloucester Ins. Company*, 15 *Mass. Rep.* 341. *Peele v. Marine Ins. Company*, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 76, 77. The extent of loss, in the case of a ship, says Boulay Paty, is estimated by a comparison of the value in the policy, with the value at the place of loss, and not with the amount of the expense requisite to repair. *Cours de Droit Com.* tom. iv. 252.

^d *Somers v. Sugrue*, 4 *Carr. & Payne*, 276.

recovery be hopeless.^a His wages, and those of the crew, are a charge on the owner, and ultimately, in case of recovery, to be borne as a general average by all parties in interest; and if the abandonment be accepted, the underwriter becomes owner for the voyage, and in that character liable for the seamen's wages, and entitled to the freight subsequently earned.^b If the master purchases in the vessel, or ransoms her, the insurer will be entitled to the benefit of the purchase or composition; and, on the other hand, if the insured affirms the purchase of the master, it will be, at the option of the insurer, a waiver of the abandonment. The insurer can accept of the repurchase of the master, as his constructive agent, and affirm the act, or he may leave it to fall upon the master.^c

*It has been a very controverted question, *333 whether an abandonment of the ship transferred the freight in whole or in part. It was finally settled in the jurisprudence of New-York and of Massachusetts, and adopted as the true rule in the Circuit Court of the United States for Massachusetts, that on an accepted

^a *Marshall v. Union Ins. Company*, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 452. The duty of the mariners is the same. *The Saratoga*, 2 *Gallis. Rep.* 164. *Brown v. Lull*, 2 *Sumner*, 443.

^b *Hammond v. Essex Fire and Marine Ins. Company*, 4 *Mason's Rep.* 196. It has been made a question whether the underwriter, after an accepted abandonment, is bound, in his new character of owner, to go on and complete the voyage. In *Case v. Davidson*, 5 *Maule & Selw.* 89, *Holroyd, J.*, was of opinion that he was under no such obligation to the freighter, whose rights as owner of the goods were personal, lying in contract with the ship-owner, *and not running with the ship*. There is a suggestion of Mr. Justice Putnam, to the same effect, in *Coolidge v. Gloucester Marine Ins. Company*, 15 *Mass. Rep.* 343. The underwriter cannot claim salvage property unless there has been an abandonment of the property made and accepted. *The Ship Henry Ewbank*, 1 *Sumner*, 400.

^c *Saidler & Craig v. Church*, cited in 2 *Caines' Rep.* 286. *United Ins. Company v. Robinson*, *ibid.* 280. *Jumel v. Marine Ins. Company*, 7 *Johns. Rep.* 412. *Willard v. Dorr*, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 161. *Boulay Paty*, tom. iv. 309, 310.

abandonment of the ship, the freight earned previous to the disaster was to be retained by the owner, or his representative, the insurer on the freight, and apportioned *pro rata itineris*; and that the freight subsequently to be earned went to the insurer on the ship.^a In the case of *Armroyd v. Union Insurance Company*,^b the question was raised, but left undecided, whether the entire or only a *pro rata* freight, in such a case, went, on abandonment, to the insurer of the ship. This litigious question has now been settled in England; and in *Case v. Davidson*,^c where *ship and freight were separately insured, and each subject abandoned as for a total loss, it was adjudged that the abandonment of the ship transferred the freight as incident to the ship, and that an abandonment was equivalent to a sale of the ship to the abandonee.^d The French jurisprudence on this

^a *United Ins. Company v. Lenox*, 1 *Johns. Cas.* 377. 2 *ibid.* 443. *Davy v. Hallet*, 3 *Caines' Rep.* 20. *Marine Ins. Co. v. United Ins. Company*, 9 *Johns. Rep.* 186. *Coolidge v. Gloucester Marine Ins. Company*, 15 *Mass. Rep.* 341. *Hammond v. Essex Fire and Marine Ins. Company*, 4 *Mason's Rep.* 196. So, in the case of a mortgage of a ship whilst at sea, and possession taken under it, the accruing freight passes to the mortgagee, as incident to the ship. *Dean v. M'Ghie*, 12 *B. Moore*, 185.

^b 3 *Binney's Rep.* 437.

^c 5 *Maule & Selw.* 79. S. C. affirmed on error, 2 *Brod. & Bing.* 379. In this case the court did not make any distinction between the freight earned as a *pro rata* freight, antecedent to the abandonment, and that earned afterwards, but the entire freight was held to pass with the transfer of the ship. There would seem, therefore, to be a variance on this point between the English and the American cases. I was misled in the first edition of this work, by the marginal note of the decision, in which it is stated in the report of the case by *Maule & Selwin*, and repeated in the report of the case on error by *Broderip & Bingham*, that an abandonment of the ship to the insurer on the ship, carried the freight "earned subsequently to the abandonment as incident to the ship;" and in the statement of the case it is also said that the underwriter on the ship who recovered, claimed "a proportion of the money received by the defendants for freight." But on a closer inspection of the case, it appears that the underwriter claimed and recovered the entire freight, and that no distinction was made between the freight arising prior and subsequent to the loss, or prior and subsequent to the abandonment.

^d Mr. *Benecke*, *Principles of Indemnity*, 403, after giving an interesting history of the progress of the question, concludes that the insurer on the freight,

subject has been equally embarrassing and unsettled. The ordinance of 1681 had no textual regulation relative to freight, in cases of abandonment. It was left to the decisions of the tribunals, and they denied to the insurer on the ship any freight for the goods saved. Valin exposed the error,^a and maintained that freight on abandonment, whether paid in advance or not, ought to go to the insurer. In 1778, it was settled at Marseilles, under the sanction of Emerigon, that freight was an accessory to the ship; and in abandoning the ship, the freight acquired during the voyage went with it.^b The ordinance of 1779 followed that doctrine, and declared that acquired freight already earned on the voyage, was insurable, and did not go with the ship on abandonment, but that the future freight to be earned on the goods saved, would go to the insurer, if there was no stipulation to the contrary in the policy, saving the wages of seamen and bottomry *liens. The new code^c declared that *335 the freight of goods saved, though paid in advance, went, upon abandonment, to the insurer on the ship. The construction given to the code by the Royal Court at Rennes, in 1822, in the case of *Blaize v. Company of General Assurance at Paris*, was, that the future freight did not go to the insurer on the ship, but only the freight on the goods saved and already earned at the time of the loss.^d

in case of an abandonment of that also, will still have a personal claim on the owner for the freight subsequently earned, and which, but for the abandonment, would have belonged to him. Though the decision of Lenox and United Insurance Company, in New-York, (1 *Johnson's Cases*, 377. 2 *ibid.* 443,) had been in print for eighteen or twenty years, it seems to have been entirely unknown to the English Courts, and to Mr. Benecke, in 1824, though he has, in the course of his work, ransacked the local laws and ordinances of most of the petty as well as great commercial states and cities in Europe.

^a *Com.* liv. 3. tit. 6. *Des Assurances*, art. 15.

^b *Emerigon*, tom. ii. 217—227.

^c *Code de Commerce*, art. 386.

^d *Boulay Paty*, tom. iv. 397—417.

(2.) *Of the adjustment of partial losses.*

In an open policy the general rule is, that the actual or market value of the subject insured, is to be estimated at the time of the commencement of the risk. The object of inquiry is, the true value of the subject put at risk, and for which an indemnity was stipulated.^a

There are two kinds of indemnity that may lawfully be obtained under a contract of insurance. The first is, to pay what the goods would have sold for if they had reached the place of destination; and the value there consists of the prime cost and expenses of the outfit, the freight and expenses at the port of delivery, and the profit or loss arising from the state of the market. This species of indemnity puts the insured in the same situation as if no loss had happened. The other kind of indemnity is, to pay only the first cost of the goods, and the expenses incurred; and this places the insured in the situation he was before he undertook the adventure.^b It annuls the speculation, and excludes the consideration of any eventual profit or loss. The first kind of insurance is, in the opinion of Mr. Benecke,^c more conformable to the nature of mercantile transactions, and affords, in every case, an exact indemnity; but the second kind of

*336 insurance of goods is the one in practice in England and other commercial countries.^d

^a A *partial loss* is frequently termed a *particular average* in distinction from a *general average*, and Mr. Benecke says, that it denotes, in general, every kind of expense or damage, short of a total loss, and which is to be borne by the proprietor of the particular concern; and he says it is expressive, and ought to be retained. *Stevens & Benecke on Average*, by *Phillips*, 341.

^b See *supra*, p. 274. n. b.

^c *Treatise on the Principles of Indemnity in Marine Insurance*, ch. 1.

^d The underwriters, in cases of partial loss, have nothing to do with remote or contingent losses. They have nothing to do with bottomry bonds given to raise money for repairs, though they must bear their share of the extra expenses of raising the money, as part of the partial loss. They are not bound to supply funds in a foreign port for repairs. They are simply bound to pay the partial loss. *Bradlie v. The Maryland Ins. Company*, 12 *Peters*, 378.

The actual or market value at the port of departure, may frequently be different from the invoice price, or prime cost, and when that happens, or can be ascertained, it is to be preferred.^a In *Guhn v. Broome*,^b the invoice price was adopted as the most stable and certain evidence of the actual value; but in *Le Roy v. United Insurance Company*,^c the invoice price was understood to be equivalent to the prime cost, and that was commonly the market value of the subject at the commencement of the risk. The court, in that case, did not profess to lay down any general rule, but they, nevertheless, adopted the prime cost as being a plain and simple, and, generally speaking, the best rule by which to test the value of the subject. The English Court of King's Bench, in *Usher v. Noble*,^d pursued, in effect, the same rule, by estimating a loss on goods in an open policy, at the invoice price at the loading port, and taking with that the premium of insurance, and commission, as the basis of the calculation.^e

If goods arrive damaged at the place of destination, the way to ascertain the quantity of damage, either in open or valued policies, is to compare the market price, or gross amount of the damaged goods, with the market price or gross amount at which the same goods would have sold if sound.^f But this mode of adjustment affords no perfect indemnity *to the insured, for he *337 has to pay freight for the goods as if they were

^a *Snell v. Delaware Ins. Company*, 4 *Dallas' Rep.* 430. *Carson v. Marine Ins. Company*, 2 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 468.

^b 1 *Johns. Cas.* 120.

^c 7 *Johns. Rep.* 343.

^d 12 *Ecst's Rep.* 639.

^e This is admitted in the French law to afford all the indemnity that was stipulated by the policy. *Boulay Paty*, tom iv. 41, 42. The premium of insurance is considered as part of the value of the goods.

^f *Lewis v. Rucker*, 2 *Burr. Rep.* 1167. *Johnson v. Sheddon*, 2 *East's Rep.* 581. *Usher v. Noble*, 12 *ibid.* 639. *Benecke on Indemnity*, 426.

sound, and which freight he cannot recover of the insurer. Various expedients have been suggested to remedy the inconvenience, and the true one is to insure the sum to be paid for the freight and charges at the port of delivery.^a

We have seen, in a former lecture,^b than an adjustment of a general average at a foreign port is conclusive; and it is equally so between the parties to the policy, and between the parties in interest in the adventure.^c It is the rule in all foreign countries for the underwriter to be bound by foreign adjustment of general average, unless there be a stipulation to the contrary in the policy, as is the case in those of the insurance companies at Paris.^d There is a material difference between the adjustment of a partial loss, and of a general average, since the former is adjusted according to the value at the time and place of departure of the vessel, and the latter according to the value at the foreign port.^e And, as in cases of partial loss, it is to be adjusted upon a comparison of the gross proceeds of the sound and damaged goods, the underwriter has nothing to do either with the state of the market, or with the loss on landing expenses, freight, and duty, accruing in consequence of the deterioration; for no premium is paid for those items, and all other modes of adjusting particular average, except that founded on the principle of the gross proceeds, are erroneous.^f In set-

^a *Benecke on Indemnity*, 17—26.

^b *Ante*. lec. 47. p. 244.

^c Though the foreign adjustment be conclusive as between the parties to it, yet the party to whom the contribution has been made, is not restricted, in his claim under the policy, to the sum apportioned as his share of the loss, when it falls short of a complete indemnity. *Thornton v. United States Ins. Company*, 3 *Fairfield*, 154.

^d *Molloy*, b. 2. ch. 6. sec. 16. 7 *Mass. Rep.* 370. 5 *Cowen's Rep.* 63. *Benecke on Indemnity*, 331.

^e 1 *Emerigon*, 659. *Ord. de la Mar. tit. Du Jet.* art. 6.

^f *Benecke on Indemnity*, 426, 427. In the adjustment of loss on a policy on profits, it is not necessary to show what the profits would have been if the loss had not happened. It is sufficient to show interest in the cargo and the loss

ting losses under the memorandum in the policy, which declares articles free of average under say five per cent., if a partial loss to an article be found, on survey and sale, to have been five per cent., the insurer pays the damages and *the expenses*. If under five *per cent., *338 he pays nothing, and the insured *bears the expenses*. The expenses are like costs of suit, and fall upon the losing party. The expenses are not taken to make up the five per cent.^a

thereof. The loss of the cargo carries with it the loss of the profits, either in whole or in part, as the case may be. If the cargo be totally lost the loss on the policy on profits is total. If partial on cargo it is partial on profits and to the same extent. The *salvage* on what is saved of the cargo, is credited to the insurer on profits as well as to the insurer on cargo. They stand on the same footing precisely. *Henrickson v. Margetson*, 2 *East's Rep.* 549. note. *Barclay v. Cousins*, 2 *East's Rep.* 544. *Patapsco Ins. Company v. Coulter*, 3 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 222. In some of the New-York policies, this principle is specially recognised by the introduction of the clause in policies on profits, that *the policy is subject to the same average and benefit of salvage as cargo*.

^a *Benecke on Indemnity*, 436. Mr. Benecke, in ch. 9, has gone into particular calculations on the subject of the adjustment of particular average, on every kind of expense or damage short of a total loss, and applied his principles to almost all the variety of cases that can arise, and to his lucid explanations I must refer the student for a more practical knowledge of the subject. The five per cent. is to be computed upon the valuation in the policy, after deducting the premium. Several or distinct losses happening to the ship at different times, are not to be added to make up the five per cent. *Brooks v. Oriental Ins. Company*, 7 *Pick.* 259. Distinct successive losses to the ship cannot be added together to make up the five per cent., though it may be otherwise as to the cargo. In the one case, many trifling losses may fall within the common wear and tear of the ship borne by the owner; but in the other, the entire damage cannot be ascertained until the cargo is unladed. *Ibid.* See, also, *Stevens on Average*, 214. *Benecke*, 473. But in the case of *Donnell v. Columb. Ins. Company*, 2 *Sumner's Rep.* 366, a different view was taken of the subject under the memorandum in the policy, and after a thorough examination of the English and the French law of insurance, it was held, that if there be successive losses on the ship or cargo, each less than five per cent., but amounting in the aggregate to more than five per cent., they were not within the exception, and were to be borne by the insurer. The exception of all losses not amounting to five per cent., means all losses during the voyage, and the exception applies to all losses, *ejusdem generis*, below five per cent., and not amounting in the aggregate to five per cent. Mr. Justice Story drew the conclusion that there was no distinction in the insurance law of Europe, between the aggregate averages of the whole voyage, and an average loss at a particular period.

If extraordinary expense, and extra freight, be incurred in carrying on the cargo in another vessel, when the first one becomes disabled by a peril of the sea, the French rule is, to charge the same upon the insurer of the cargo.^a This question is left undecided in the English law, but in this country we have followed the French rule.^b With respect to leakage, the rule, in cases free from special stipulation, is, that the insurer is not liable for waste occasioned by ordinary leakage, and only for leakage beyond the ordinary waste, and produced by some extraordinary accident. The practice is, to ascertain, in each particular case, what amount of leakage is to be attributed to ordinary causes, or the fault of the insured, or bad stowage, and what to the perils of the sea; and, in pursuing this inquiry, the season of the year, the nature of the articles, the description of the vessel,
 *339 *the length of the voyage, and the stowage, are all to be considered.^c

An adjustment of a loss cannot be set aside or opened except on the ground of fraud, or mistake of facts not known. It is only *prima facie* evidence of the claim, and the party must have a full disclosure of the circumstances of the case before he will be concluded by it. In the language of Lord Ellenborough, they must all be blazoned to him as they really existed.^d And in making the adjustment, in the case of a partial loss, the rule is to apply the old materials towards the payment of the new, by deducting the value of them from the gross amount of the

^a *Emerigon*, tom. i. 429—433. *Code de Commerce*, No. 391, 393.

^b *Mumford v. Commercial Ins. Company*, 5 *Johns. Rep.* 262. *Searle v. Scovell*, 4 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 218. *Dodge v. Marine Ins. Company*, 17 *Mass. Rep.* 471.

^c *Phillips on Insurance*, vol. i. 246, 247. *Miller on Insurance*, 132. 2 *Valin*, 14. 80. 83. *Emerigon*, vol. i. 391.

^d *Dow v. Smith*, 1 *Caines' Rep.* 32. *Shepherd v. Chewter*, 1 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 274. *Steel v. Lacy*, 3 *Taunt. Rep.* 286.

expenses for the repairs, and to allow the deduction of the one-third new for old upon the balance.^a In England, if the injury be sustained, and the repairs made, when the vessel is new, and on her first voyage, no deduction of new for old is made; because the vessel being new, it is not supposed that she is put in better condition by the repairs.^b But in this country that distinction has not been adopted, and the deduction of one-third new for old is made, whether the vessel be new or old.^c

The insurer is liable for all the labour and expense attendant upon an accident which forces the vessel into port to be repaired;^d and in consequence of the general permission in the policy for the insured *340 to labour for the recovery of the property, the insurer may be rendered liable for the expenses incurred in the attempt to recover the lost property, in addition to the payment of a total loss.^e It has been a question much

^a *Burnes v. Nat. Ins. Company*, 1 *Cowen*, 265. *Savage*, Ch. J., in *Dickey v. New-York Ins. Company*, 4 *ibid.* 245. *Brooks v. Oriental Ins. Company*, 7 *Pick.* 259. *Eager v. Atlas Ins. Company*, 14 *ibid.* 141. See *supra*, p. 331. The rule applies equally to steam-vessels insured on our interior waters. *Wallace v. Ohio Ins. Company*, 4 *Ohio Rep.* 284. In *Potter v. The Ocean Ins. Company*, *C. C. U. S. Mass.*, October, 1837, it was held, that in case, of repairs to the ship, by the perils insured against, the deduction of one-third new for old was applicable only to the labour and materials employed in the repairs, and to the new articles purchased in lieu of those lost or destroyed.

^b *Fenwick v. Robinson*, 1 *Danson & Lloyd*, 8. 3 *Carr. & Payne*, 323.

^c *Dunham v. Com. Ins. Company*, 11 *Johns. Rep.* 315. *Sewall v. U. S. Ins. Company*, 11 *Pick.* 90. Temporary repairs in the course of the voyage are held to be particular average, but other repairs abroad, from strict necessity, to enable the vessel to return, and which become useless afterwards, are general average. *Brooks v. Oriental Ins. Company*, 7 *ibid.* 259.

^d *Shiff v. Miss. Ins. Company*, 1 *Miller's Louis. Rep.* 304.

^e 1 *Caines' Rep.* 284. 450. 7 *Johns. Rep.* 62. 424. 433. 4 *Taunt. Rep.* 367. Emerigon has taken notice of this stipulation in the English policies, by means of which the insurer may become chargeable beyond the amount of his subscription; and there is the same stipulation, by which they may be so charged, in the policies, at Antwerp, Rouen, Nantes, and Bordeaux; and there is the same clause in the *formula* given by Loccenius. In the form used at Marseilles there is no such clause, and without such clause, and as a general rule, the insurer is not chargeable beyond his subscription. But with such a special clause, Valin

contested in the French tribunals, whether the insurer can, in cases distinct from the above stipulation, be held chargeable at the same time, and cumulatively, with the amount of an average, and also with the amount of a subsequent total loss, in the same voyage. This is said to be contrary to all principle, and the elements of the contract; and it was decided in the Court of Cassation, in 1823, after great litigation, that the insurer was not holden beyond the amount of his subscription, and for which he received a premium, notwithstanding the prior partial and the subsequent total loss.^a

(3.) *Of the return of premium.*

The premium paid by the insured is in consideration of the risk which the insurer assumes; and if the
 *341 contract of *insurance be void *ab initio*, or the risk has not been commenced, the insured is entitled to a return of premium. If the insurance be made without any interest whatsoever in the thing insured, and this proceeds through mistake, misinformation, or any other innocent cause, the premium is to be returned. So, if the insurance be made with short interest, or for more than the real interest, there is to be a ratable return of premium. If the risk has not been run, whether it be owing to the fault, pleasure, or will of the insured, or to any other cause, the premium must be returned, for the

and Emerigon both agree, that the expense must be borne by the insurer, though it go beyond the effects recovered. This, however, is denied by Boulay Paty, who insists that the sum subscribed limits all claim upon the insurer. 1 *Emerigon*, 484. 2 *ibid.* 202—213. *Valin's Com.* tom. ii. 99. *Boulay Paty*, tom. iv. 312, 313. In some of our American policies, the stipulation is that the assured may labour and travel, for, in, and about the safeguard and recovery of the property, *to the charges whereof the insurers will contribute, according to the rate and quantity of the sum insured.*

^a *Kermet v. La Compagnie Royal d'Assurance*, reported in the *Journal de Cassation*, 1823, and quoted at large in *Boulay Paty*, tom. iv. 519—532, and see, also, *ibid.* 272—276.

consideration for which it was given fails.^a If the vessel never sailed on the voyage insured, or the policy became void by a failure of the warranty, and without fraud, the policy never attached; but if the risk has once commenced, though the voyage be immediately thereafter abandoned, there is to be no return or apportionment of premium. And if the premium is to be returned, it is the usage in every country, where it is not otherwise expressly stipulated in the policy, for the insurer to retain one-half per cent. by way of indemnity for his trouble and concern in the transaction.^b

The insurer retains the premium in all cases of actual fraud on the part of the insured, or his agent.^c So, if the trade be in any respect illegal, the premium cannot be reclaimed.^d If the voyage be divisible, there may be an apportionment of the premium; and if the risk as to the one part of the voyage has not commenced, the premium may *be proportionably retained. But *342 the premium cannot be divided and apportioned, unless the risks were divisible and distinct in the policy. If the voyage and the premium be entire, there can be no apportionment. It is requisite that the voyage, by the usage of trade, or the agreement of the parties, be divisible into distinct risks; and, in that case, if no risk has been run as to one part, there may be an apportionment of premium.^e

^a *Tyrie v. Fletcher*, *Cowp. Rep.* 666. *Loraine v. Thomlinson*, *Doug. Rep.* 585. 8 *Term Rep.* 156. *arg.* *Holmes v. Union Ins. Company*, 2 *Johns. Cas.* 329. *Taylor v. Sumner*, 4 *Mass. Rep.* 56.

^b *Emerigon*, tom. ii. 154. 2 *Phillips on Insurance*, 526. *Code de Commerce*, art. 349. *Hendricks v. Com. Ins. Company*, 8 *Johns. Rep.* 1.

^c *Tyler v. Hern*, *Park on Insurance*, 235. *Chapman v. Fraser*, *Marshall on Insurance*, 652.

^d *March v. Abel*, 3 *Bos. & Pull.* 35. *Van Dyck v. Hewitt*, 1 *East's Rep.* 96.

^e *Stevenson v. Snow*, 3 *Burr. Rep.* 1237. *Long v. Allen*, *Marshall on Insurance*, 660. *Donath v. Ins. Company of North America*, 4 *Dallas' Rep.* 463. *Ogden v. Firemen's Ins. Company*, 12 *Johns. Rep.* 114. 2 *Phillips on Insurance*, 538.

The French code provides for the apportionment of premium, in the case of an insurance on goods, when part of the voyage has not been performed.^a M. Le Baron Locré, in his commentary upon this article, vindicates it by very ingenious reasoning, which M. Boulay Paty^b thinks, however, does not remove the difficulty; and he contends, that such a provision is contrary to a principle of the contract, that when the risk has once commenced, the right to the entire premium is acquired.

IV. *Of the writers on insurance law.*

I have now finished a survey of the leading doctrines of marine insurance, which is by far the most extensive and complex title in the commercial code. There is no branch of the law that has been more thoroughly investigated, and more successfully cultivated in modern times, not only in England, but upon the European continent. Maritime law in general, partakes more of the character of international law than any other branch of jurisprudence; and I trust I need not apologize for the free use which has been made, for the purpose of illustration, not of English authorities only, *but of the writings of other foreign lawyers, and the decisions of foreign tribunals, relative to the various heads of the law-merchant. I am justified, not only by the example of the most eminent of the English lawyers and judges, but by the consideration, that the law-merchant is part of the European law of nations, and grounded upon principles of universal equity. It pervades every where the institutions of that vast combination of Christian nations, which constitutes one community for commercial purposes and social intercourse; and the interchange of principles, and spirit, and literature, which that intercourse produces,

^a *Code de Commerce*, art. 356.

^b *Cours de Droit Commercial Maritime*, tom. iv. 98, 99.

is now working wonderful improvements in the moral and political condition of the human race.

The general principles of insurance law rest on solid foundations of justice, and are recommended by their public utility; and yet it is a remarkable fact, that none of the nations of antiquity, though some of them were very commercial, and one of them a great maritime power, appear to have used, or even to have been acquainted, with this invaluable contract.^a It was equally a stranger to the early maritime codes compiled on the revival of arts, learning, and commerce, at the conclusion of the middle ages. The *Consolato del Mare*, the laws of Oleron, and the laws of the Hanseatic association, were all silent upon the subject of the contract of insurance. The first allusion to it is said to have been made in the latter part of the fourteenth century, and where we should not, at that early age, have first expected to find it: in the laws of Wisbuy, compiled in the Teutonic language, on the bleak shores of an island in the middle of the Baltic sea.^b It is so necessary a contract, that

^a Bynkershoeck and Emerigon both agree, that the contract of insurance was not to be found in the Roman law, though some traces of it have been supposed to be perceived in the Roman history. *Bynk. Quæst. J. Pub. lib. 1. c. 21. Emerigon des Ass. pref.*

^b The allusion to marine insurance, in art. 66 of the *Laws of Wisbuy*, is so obscure or equivocal, that the most celebrated jurists have differed in opinion, as to the origin of the contract. *Cleirac*, in his commentary on that article of the *Laws of Wisbuy*, applies it directly to insurances; and he had studied that compilation thoroughly, for he translated it into French, from the old German, or *Tudesque* language, in which the code had been preserved to his day. In the collection of *Sea Laws*, published at London under Queen Anne, the article, as translated, applies to marine insurance. Emerigon, also, in the preface to his treatise, gives that construction to the article, and he and *Cleirac* are great authorities on the point. On the other hand, Emerigon admits that *Stypmannus*, *Gibalinus*, *Ansaldus*, and *Casaregis*, would not allow that the use of insurances was introduced into commerce until towards the fifteenth century; and *Valin* intimates, that the contract of insurance came from the Italians, and passed from them to the Spaniards, Dutch, and other commercial nations. *Malynes*, as early as 1622, traced the practice of insurance from *Claudius Cæsar* to the inhabitants of Oleron, and then to Antwerp and London. *Cleirac's*

Valin concludes, *maritime commerce cannot well be sustained without it, for no prudent ship-owner would be willing to risk his own fortune, and that of others, on an unprotected adventure at sea. The business of uncovered navigation or trade, would be spiritless or presumptuous. The contract of insurance protects, enlarges, and stimulates maritime commerce; and under its patronage, and with the stable security which it affords, commerce is conducted with immense means, and unparalleled enterprise over every sea, and to the shores of every country, civilized and barbarous. Insurers are societies of capitalists, who are called by their business to study, with profound sagacity, and with exactness of calculation, the geography and navigation of the globe, the laws of the elements, the ordinances of trade, the principles of international law, and the customs, products, character, and institutions of every

*345 *country, where tide waters roll, or to which winds can waft the flag of their nation.^a

les Us et Coutumes de la Mer, 155. *Malynes' Lex Mercatoria*, part 1. 105. *Emerigon, Traité des Ass.* pref. *Valin's Com.* tom. ii. 27. Bynkershoeck said, he had no evidence that the contract of insurance was in use in Holland in the fifteenth century, though he found it to have been in established use by the middle of the following century. *Quæst. J. Priv.* lib. 4. ch. 1. *Don Antonio de Capmany* in his *History of the Commerce of Barcelona*, as referred to in *Mc Cullock's Dictionary of Commerce*, art. *Insurance*, gives an ordinance relative to insurance, issued by the magistrates of that city in 1435. If this be the fact, Barcelona must be regarded as the birth place of the law of marine insurance.

^a The French lawyers have described the contract of insurance in strong and eloquent language. *C'est une espece de jeu*, said Emerigon, truly and gravely; *qui exige beaucoup de prudence de la part de ceux qui s'y adonnent. Il faut faire l'analyse des hazards, et posséder la science du calcul des probabilités; prévoir les ecueils de la mer, et ceux de la mauvaise foi; ne pas perdre de vue les cas insolites et extraordinaires; combiner le tout, le comparer avec le taux des primes, et juger quel sera le resultat de l'ensemble.* But the French counsellors of state, Messrs. Corvetto, Bégouen, and Maret, in their report to the legislative body, on the 8th September, 1807, declared, that *Ce beau contrat est le noble produit du génie de l'homme, et le premier garant du commerce maritime. Il a consulté les saisons; il a porté ses regards sur la mer; il a interrogé ce terrible élément; il en a jugé l'incon-*

Many of the states and great commercial cities of Europe, in the early periods of modern history, made and published ordinances relating to insurance, and most of them have been collected in *Magen's Essay on Insurance*, published in 1755. The most important of these compilations, were the ordinances of Barcelona, Bilboa, Florence, Genoa, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Königsberg, as well as royal ordinances of the kings of France, Spain, and Portugal. They are authentic memorials of the prosperity of commerce, and evidence of the early usages in respect to a contract governed by general principles of policy and justice. We may also refer to the decisions of the Rota of Genoa, (of which so much use is made by Roccus,) to show how early and extensively insurance questions became a source of litigation and topic of discussion in the courts of *justice.^a But without dwelling *346 upon these historical views, my object at the close of this lecture is, merely to direct the attention of the student to the character and value of the most distinguished works, which have elevated and adorned this branch of the law.

The earliest work extant on insurance, is the celebrated French treatise entitled *Le Guidon*. It was digested and prepared some centuries ago, by a person whose name is unknown, for the use of the merchants of Rouen.

stance; il en a presenti les orages; il a épié la politique; il a reconnu les portes et les côtes des deux mondes; il a tout soumis à des calculs savans, à des theories approximatives, et il a dit au commerçant habile; au navigateur intrepide: certes il y a des desastres sur lesquels l'humanité ne peut que gemir; mais quant à votre fortune allez, froncessez les mers, déployez votre activité et votre industrie: Je me charge de vos risques.

^a Those decisions, under the title of *Decisiones Rotæ Genuæ de Mercatura*, are contained in the voluminous compilation, which includes the works of Santerna and of Straccha, and was published at Amsterdam in 1669. They amount to two hundred and fifteen decisions, and many of them relate to insurance questions, and they settled principles which govern at this day.

It was published by Cleirac in 1671, in his collection entitled *Les Us et Coutumes de la Mer*; but it was a production of a much earlier date, and it contains decisive evidence that the law of insurance had become, in the sixteenth century, a regular science. Emerigon viewed it as containing the true principles of nautical jurisprudence, and valuable for its wisdom and for the great number of principles and decisions which it contained; and when Cleirac gave to the world his revised and corrected edition of the *Le Guidon*, he regretted that he was not able to rescue from oblivion the name of an author who had conferred signal honour on his country, by the merit and solidity of his production, though it wanted the taste and elegance of later ages.^a

The treatise of Roccus on insurance, has been universally regarded as a text book of great authority. He was an eminent civilian and judge at Naples, and published his work in 1655; and Mr. Ingersoll, the American translator, perceives an analogy between the treatises of Roccus and Littleton's tenures. That analogy does truly exist in the sound logic, admirable precision, and
 *347 vast power of compression, *which are displayed throughout his works. He made free use of the treatises of Santerna and Straccha on insurance law, and gave authority to those very creditable productions of the latter part of the sixteenth century.^b Bynkershoeck has

^a Cleirac's pref. to *Le Guidon*.

^b The treatise of *Santerna*, a Portuguese lawyer, *De Assecurationibus et Sponsonibus Mercatorum*, and the larger and later work of *Straccha*, of Ancona, *De Assecurationibus*, equally abound in references throughout the body of their works, to the civil law and the early civilians. The latter is essentially the groundwork of the treatises of Roccus, and yet both Straccha and Santerna are rudely termed, by Bynkershoeck, semi-barbarous writers, though they were familiar not only with the Roman law, but with the Roman classics. Emerigon and Valin make free use of the works of these authors, as they do also of the commercial discourses of Casaregis, who is, without contradiction, as Valin says, (*Com. sur. Ord.* pref.) the best of all the writers whom he had

devoted the fourth book of his *Quæstiones Juris Privati* to the contract of insurance. It constitutes a large treatise, which discusses, with his usual freedom of thought and expression, almost every important branch of the law of that contract. His work, which occasionally refers to the Roman law, is almost entirely grounded on Dutch edicts, and judicial decisions in the courts of Holland. It is essentially a collection of reports of cases adjudged in the Dutch courts, and I do not perceive that he ever refers to the decisions of the Rota of Genoa, or to the writings of Santerna, Straccha, or Roccus, which were before his eyes. Such reserve, or proud disdain of foreign illustration and aid, detracts greatly from the scientific character and liberal temper of the work. But we proceed to the mention of authors, by whose learned labours the utility of all preceding treatises on insurance was superseded, and their fame and lustre eclipsed.

*Valin's copious commentary upon that part of *348 the ordinance of Louis XIV, which relates to insurance, is deserving of great attention, and it has uniformly and every where received the tribute of the highest respect, for the good sense, sound learning, and weight of character, which are attached to his luminous reflections. Pothier's essay on insurance is a concise, perspicuous, accurate, and admirable elementary digest of the principles of insurance, and it contains the fundamental doctrines and universal law of the contract. But the treatise of Emerigon very far surpasses all preceding works, in the extent, value, and practical application of his principles. It is the most didactic, learned, and finished production extant on the subject. He professedly

enumerated, and he had already mentioned Cleirac, Straccha, Stypmannus, Loccenius, Kuricke, Peckius, Vinnius, and Weysten. Casaregis has also received the highest and warmest eulogy from the learned and eloquent author of the article No. 15, in the *North American Review*, vol. vii. 323.

carried his researches into the antiquities of the maritime law, and illustrated the ordinances by what he terms the jurisprudence of the tribunals; and he discussed all incidental questions, so as to bring within the compass of his work a great portion of international and commercial law, connected with the doctrines of insurance. In the language of Lord Tenterden, no subject in Emerigon is discussed without being exhausted, and the eulogy is as just as it is splendid. Emerigon was a practical man, who united exact knowledge of the details of business with manly sense and consummate erudition. He was a practising lawyer at Marseilles, for perhaps forty years, and the purity of his private life corresponded with the excellence of his public character. Valin acknowledges that he owed some of the best parts of his work to the genius and industry of that eminent civilian, who gratuitously pressed upon him, with a cordiality and disinterestedness almost without example, a rich collection of materials, consisting of decisions and authorities, suitable to illustrate and adorn the jurisprudence of the commentary. It would be difficult to peruse the testimony which Valin has so frankly borne to the moral as well as literary and professional accomplishments of Emerigon, without being sensibly touched with the generosity of the friendship of those illustrious men.

*349 *Since the renovation of the marine ordinance of Louis XIV, in the shape of the commercial code of France of 1807, there has arisen a host of commentators, such as the Baron Locré, Pardessus, Laporte, Delvincourt, Toullier, and Boulay Paty, of various and unequal merit. Toullier, though already quite voluminous, has not as yet touched on the commercial code. On the law of insurance, I would select and recommend Boulay Paty, as the latest and best writer. He has explained and illustrated every part of the code, but devoted nearly half of his voluminous work to the single head

of insurance, and he has treated the subject very much in the style of Emerigon. He has trodden in his footsteps, adopted his copious learning, applied his principles with just discrimination, and given us a complete treatise on every branch of insurance, according to the order, and under the correction of the new code.

The first notice of the contract of insurance that appears in the English reports, is a case cited in Coke's Reports,^a and decided in the 31st of Elizabeth; and the commercial spirit of that age gave birth to the statute of 43d Elizabeth, passed to give facility to the contract. But the law of insurance received very little study and cultivation for ages afterwards; and Mr. Park informs us that there were not forty cases upon matters of insurance prior to the year 1756, and even those cases were generally loose *nisi prius* notes, containing very little information or claim to authority. From that time forward, the decisions of the English courts on insurance assumed new spirit and vigour, and they deserve to be studied with the utmost application. When Sir William Blackstone published the second volume of his Commentaries, Lord Mansfield had presided in the Court of King's Bench for nearly ten years, and in that short space of time the learning relating to marine insurance had been so rapidly and so extensively cultivated, that he concluded that if the principles *settled *350 were well and judiciously collected, they would form a very complete title in the code of commercial jurisprudence. Mr. Park (now a judge of the Court of King's Bench) took the suggestion, and published his *System of the Law of Marine Insurances* in 1786, and he had the advantage of the labours of the whole period of Lord Mansfield's judicial life; and the decisions are collected and digested with great copiousness, erudition,

^a 6 Coke's Rep. 47. b.

and accuracy. He extracted all that was valuable from the compilations of Malynes, Molloy, Magens, Beawes, and Weskett; and he had the good sense and liberality to enrich his work with the materials of those vast and venerable repositories of commercial learning, the *Le Guidon*, the foreign ordinances, and the writings of Roccus, Bynkershoeck, Valin, Pothier, and Emerigon.

About the time that Park published his treatise, the *Elements of the Law relating to Insurances*, by Mr. Miller, a Scotch advocate, appeared at Edinburgh. He evidently compiled his work without any knowledge of the contemporary publication of Mr. Park; and though the English cases are not so extensively cited and examined by him, he supplied the deficiency by a digest of cases in Scotland; and he appears to have been equally familiar with the continental civilians, and to have discussed the principles of insurance with uncommon judgment and freedom of inquiry. Since the publication of Miller's treatise, no work appeared in Scotland on the subject of insurance, until Mr. Bell took a concise view of that, as well as of other maritime contracts, in his very valuable *Commentaries*; and he states, that since the period of 1787, the mercantile law of Scotland has been making rapid strides towards maturity.

The treatise of Park had passed through five editions, when Mr. Marshall published, in 1802, his *Treatise on the Law of Insurance*. It contains a free and liberal discussion of principles, and it is more didactic and elementary in its instruction than the work of his predecessor,
 *351 but it abounds *with citations of the same cases at Westminster, and a reference to the same learned authors in France and Italy. Mr. Park is entitled to the superior and lasting merit of being the artist who first reduced the English law of insurance to the beauty and order of a regular science, and shed upon it the rays of foreign genius and learning. The American edition

of Marshall, by Mr. Condry, is greatly to be preferred to any other edition; and even that improved work is now in a considerable degree superseded by Mr. Phillips' *Treatise on the Law of Insurance*, the first volume of which was published at Boston in 1823, and the second in 1834, and a new and improved edition of the entire work in two volumes in 1840. This author has very diligently collected and ingrafted into his work, not only the English cases, but the substance of all the American cases and decisions on insurance, which had been accumulating for a great number of years. In that view it is an original work of much labour, discrimination, and judgment, and of indispensable utility to the profession in this country.^a

The treatise of Mr. Benecke, on *the Principles of Indemnity in Marine Insurance*, may be considered as an original work of superior merit, written by a business man, on the most useful and practical part of the law of insurance. It contains great research, clear analysis, strong reasoning, and an accurate application of principles, and was intended for the use of the merchant and ship-owner, as well as of the practising lawyer. The work was the result of much study, research, and experience; and the public expectation of its value, from the well known character and ability of *the *352 author, had been highly raised, a long time before the publication.^b

^a In 1828 a new *Treatise on the Law relating to Insurance*, by David Hughes, Esq., of the inner temple, was published at London. It goes over the same ground already fully and sufficiently occupied by his two eminent predecessors, Park and Marshall; and with very scanty reference to any foreign authorities, it cites all the modern English cases. It is a plain, methodical, and correct treatise, and must be valuable to an English lawyer, *so far as it has incorporated into the work the substance of the recent decisions not to be found in the former works*. Beyond that information, the treatise is entirely superfluous.

^b The treatise of Mr. Benecke was published in 1824, and yet in Jacobsen's work on the *Laws of the Sea*, published at Altona, in 1814, he speaks of this treatise, by its title, as being in preparation by a master hand.

LECTURE XLIX.

OF MARITIME LOANS.

THE contracts of *bottomry* and *respondentia* are maritime loans of a very high and privileged nature, and they are always upheld by the Admiralty with a strong hand, when entered into *bona fide*, and without any suspicion of fraud. The principle on which they are founded and supported is of great antiquity, and penetrates so deeply into it, that Emerigon says its origin cannot be traced. It was borrowed by the Romans from the laws of the ancient Rhodians, and it is deeply radicated in the general maritime law of Europe, from which it has been transplanted into the law of this country. The object of hypothecation bonds is to procure the necessary supplies for ships which happen to be in distress in foreign ports, where the master and owners are without credit, and in cases in which, if assistance could not be procured by means of such instruments, the vessels and their cargoes must be left to perish. The authority of the master to hypothecate the ship and freight, and even the cargo, in a case of necessity, is indisputable.^a The vital principle of a bottomry bond is, that it be taken in a case of unprovided necessity, where the owner has no resources or credit for obtaining necessary supplies.^b If the lender

^a The Gratitude, 3 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 240. 267. The Hero, 2 *Dods. Rep.* 139. Case of the Duke of Bedford, 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 294. Vide *supra*, p. 173. Sea stores, particularly for the subsistence of passengers, are objects of a bottomry bond. 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 301.

^b Vide *supra*, p. 171. The degree of necessity that will justify the master in

knew that the owner had an empowered consignee or agent in the port, willing to supply his wants, the taking the bond is a fraud; but if fairly taken under an
 *354 ignorance of the fact, the *courts of admiralty are disposed to uphold such bonds, as necessary for the support of commerce in its extremities of distress.^a And if the lender of money on a bottomry or respondentia bond, be willing to stake the money upon the safe arrival of the ship or cargo, and to take upon himself, like an insurer, the risk of sea perils, it is lawful, reasonable, and just, that he should be authorized to demand and receive an extraordinary interest to be agreed on, and which the lender shall deem commensurate to the hazard he runs.^b

A bottomry bond is a loan of money upon the ship, or ship and accruing freight, at an extraordinary interest, upon maritime risks, to be borne by the lender, for a specific voyage, or for a definite period. It is in the nature of a mortgage, by which the ship-owner, or the master on his behalf, pledges the ship as a security for the money borrowed, and it covers the freight of the

taking up money on bottomry for repairs, and that will justify the creditor in lending it, is examined with great learning and judgment in the case of the *Ship Fortitude*, *C. C. U. S. Mass.*, August, 1838. See the *Law Reporter*, vol. i. No. 5.

^a The *Nelson*, 1 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 169. Lord Stowell, in the case of the *Gratitudine*, 3 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 271, 272.

^b For the historical learning on the subject of maritime loans, see *Dig.* 22. 2. *De nautico fenore*. *Code*, 4. 33. *Ibid.* *Bynk. Q. J. Priv. lib.* 3. c. 16. p. 506. 509. *Emerigon*, h. t. ch. 1. sec. 1, has collected all that the Roman law has said on the subject. The speeches of Demosthenes against Zenothemis, Apaturius, Phormio, Lacritus, and Dionysodorus, relate to the *fenus nauticum* of the Roman law, or the bottomry contract of the modern commercial nations. See, in the *American Jurist*, No. 6. p. 248, an account of maritime loans in ancient Athens, taken from the treatise on the *Public Economy of Athens*, by the learned Augustus Boeckh, Greek Lecturer and Professor at the University of Berlin. The goods were generally, and sometimes the vessel was pledged for the security of the loan with maritime interest. See, also, Lord Stowell, in the case of the *Gratitudine*, 3 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 267. The *Alexander*, 1 *Dodson's Adm. Rep.* 273. The *Augusta*, *ibid.* 283. The *Hero*, 2 *ibid.* 139.

voyage or during the limited time. A *respondentia bond* is a loan upon the pledge of the cargo, though an hypothecation of both ship and cargo may be made in one instrument; and, generally, it is only a personal obligation on the borrower, and is not a specific lien on the goods, unless there be an express stipulation to that effect in the bond; and it amounts, at most, to an equitable lien on the salvage, in case of loss.^a The condition of the loan is *the safe arrival of the subject hypothe- *355 cated, and the entire principle as well as interest is at the risk of the lender during the voyage. The money is loaned to the borrower, upon condition that if the subject pledged be lost, by a peril of the sea, the lender shall not be repaid, except to the extent of what remains; and if the subject arrives safe, or if it shall not have been injured, except by its own defect, or the fault of the master or mariners, the borrower must return the sum borrowed, together with the maritime interest agreed on, and for the repayment, the person of the borrower is bound, as well as the property pledged. This is the definition of the contract given by Pothier;^b and it was taken from the Roman laws, and has been adopted by Emerigon, and he says the definition is given in nearly the same terms by all the maritime jurists.^c

Money may also be lawfully loaned at any rate of interest, upon the mere hazard of a specific voyage, to be mentioned in the contract, without any security either

^a 2 *Blacks. Com.* 459. *Busk v. Fearon*, 4 *East's Rep.* 319. According to *Emerigon*, vol. ii. 476. 561, the respondentia lender has a *lien* on the cargo of the borrower on board; and if the loan be for the outward and homeward voyage, the lien affects the return cargo, being the proceeds of the outward cargo. But this is not the English law. *Respondentia* loans have been disused in England since the statute of 19 Geo. II. c. 37.

^b *Contrat à la grosse*, n. 1.

^c *Emerigon, Traité des Contrats à la grosse*, ch. 1. sec. 2. 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 53. 57. Story, J., in the case of the Brig *Draco*, 2 *Sumner*, 186. S. P.

upon the ship or cargo. But this last species of maritime loan, depending upon the event of the voyage, has a tendency to introduce wagering and usurious contracts, and it has been restrained in England, by the statute of 19 Geo. II. c. 37, as to East India voyages. If the borrower has no effects on board, or, having some, he borrows much beyond their value, it will afford a strong ground to suspect fraud, and that the voyage will have an unfortunate end.^a Such loans were entirely suppressed in France, by the marine ordinance of 1681. They were considered to be wagers, in the form of bottomry contracts; and it was declared that, in case of loss,

the borrower upon goods should not be discharged
*356 without proving *that he had goods on board at
the time of the loss, on his own account, to the amount of the sum lent.^b The same prohibition was continued in the commercial code, and the loan on bottomry, or at respondentia, is valid to the extent only of the value of the subject matter on which the loan is effected.^c Sergeant Marshall says,^d that there is no common law decision that sanctions such a loan, and he considers it to be a gambling contract. The weight of authority is, however, in favour of the validity of these maritime loans where nothing is hypothecated.^e The lender runs the risk of the voyage, and receives extraordinary interest by way of compensation. The contract is not usurious, for the principal loaned is put at risk.^f

^a *Casaregis*, dis. 62. n. 7. *Guidon*, ch. 19. sec. 10.

^b *Ord. de la Mar.* tit. *Des contrats à grosse aventure*, art. 14. *Ibid.* art. 3.

^c *Code de Commerce*, art. 317.

^d *Condry's Marshall*, vol. ii. 745.

^e 2 *Blacks. Com.* 459. *Molloy*, b. 2. ch. 10. sec. 13.

^f *Soome v. Gleen*, 1 *Sid. Rep.* 87. *The New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 662, declare void all wager contracts, except contracts on bottomry or respondentia. See *supra*, lec. 48. It is essential that the principal and interest should both be put at risk, if the interest reserved be more than legal interest, in order to constitute a bottomry contract. *Jennings v. Insurance Company of Pennsylvania*, 4 *Binney's Rep.* 244.

The general rule is, that the power of the master to take up money upon bottomry or respondentia, exists only after the voyage has commenced, and is to be exercised in some foreign port where the owner does not reside, for in such cases only is the hypothecation presumed to be necessary.^a But it is not indispensable to the validity of an hypothecation bond, that the ship or cargo should be in a foreign port. The law does not look to the mere locality of the transaction, but to the difficulty of communication between the master and his owners. If forced into a port of the same country in which the owner resides, the master may hypothecate the ship and cargo, in a case of extreme necessity, and when he had no opportunity or means, or it was extremely difficult, to communicate with the owners. Occasions may arise in which the different *ports of the same *357 country may be as much separated and cut off from all communication with each other, as if they were situated in distant parts of the globe.^b

There is great analogy between the contracts of bottomry and insurance. They are frequently governed by the same principles, though each of them has a character peculiar to itself. They contribute in different proportions to the facility and security of maritime commerce; but the immense capitals now engaged in every branch of commerce, and the extension of marine insurance, has very essentially abridged the practice of such loans. The master cannot hypothecate for a pre-existing debt, and the necessity of the loan must be shown to have existed at the time it was made,^c and that the master had no other

^a *Condy's Marshall*, vol. ii. 741. b. c. *Reade v. Commercial Ins. Company*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 360. 1 *Emerigon*, tom. ii. 424. 436. *Code de Commerce*, art. 321. *Lister v. Baxter*, *Str. Rep.* 695.

^b *La Ysabel*, 1 *Dodson's Rep.* 273. See, also, the *Rhadamanthe*, 1 *Dodson's Adm. Rep.* 201.

^c The *Brig Hunter*, *Ware's Rep.* 249. Dr. Lushington, in the case of the *Ship Vibelia*, in the English Admiralty, in December, 1838, held, that where the

means of raising the money at marine interest ; and when that fact is established, the misapplication of it by the master, without the knowledge and assent of the lender, will not affect its validity.^a The marine interest depends entirely upon the risk, and therefore if the proposed voyage be abandoned before the risk has attached, the contract is turned into a simple and absolute loan at ordinary legal interest. So, if the borrower had not goods on board the ship to the value of the sum borrowed, the contract, in case of loss, is reduced in proportion to the diminished value, and the borrower is bound at all events to return the surplus of the sum borrowed with the ordinary interest. The maritime interest is in a ratio to the maritime risk, or value of the goods shipped.^b After the voyage has commenced, and the loan has been for a moment at hazard, though the vessel be shortly forced back, by the perils of the sea, into the port of departure, and the voyage broken up, the lender

*358 is entitled to *his principal, with the marine interest, for the whole had been put at hazard.^c

The same principle of necessity, which upholds a bottomry bond, entitles a bond of a later date, fairly given at a foreign port, under a pressure of necessity, to priority of payment over one of a former date ; notwithstanding this is contrary to the usual rule in other cases of secu-

general character of the transaction was clearly that of bottomry, the whole was to be presumed to be of the same character, unless expressly disproved ; and that it was competent for a foreign merchant, without any express agreement at all for a bottomry bond, to make advances on the security of the ship as a lien given by the law of his own country, and that it was not necessary to have a bottomry bond, or any agreement for one, till the ship was about to sail. *The Law Reporter*, for September, 1839.

^a *The Jane*, 1 *Dodson's Rep.* 461. *Emerigon*, tom. ii. 434. *Hurry v. The Ship John*, 1 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 293. *Vide supra*, p. 163 and 171. n. d.

^b *Emerigon, Traité des Contrats à la grosse*, ch. 6. sec. 1. *Franklin Ins. Company v. Lord*, 4 *Mason's Rep.* 248.

^c *Boulay Paty, Cours de Droit Com.* tom. iii. 74—76. 167—169.

rity.^a The equity of it consists in this, that the last loan furnished the means of preserving the ship, and without it the former lenders would entirely have lost their security, and therefore it supersedes a prior mortgage as well as any other prior lien.^b The bottomry bond is also to be paid before any prior insurance,^c and it supersedes a previous mortgage of the ship.^d The bottomry bond cannot be made to cover advances made upon the personal security of the borrower, and not upon the exclusive security of the ship; but taking bills of exchange at the same time, by way of collateral security, does not exclude the bottomry bond, nor diminish its solidity.^e

The perils which the lender on bottomry runs, are usually specified in the bond; and, according to the forms in common use, they are essentially the same as those against which the underwriter, in a policy of insurance, undertakes to indemnify. By the French law, the lender can insure the money lent, for he runs the risk of it. He can insure the principal, though not his maritime interest.^f The respondentia bonds in Philadelphia, are said to be peculiar. The lender is entitled to the benefits of salvage, and is liable for general *and *359 particular average. They extend to perils by fire, enemies, men of war, or any other casualties.^g There is not, in respect to the contract, any constructive total

^a The Rhadamanthe, 1 *Dodson's Rep.* 204. The Betsey, *ibid.* 289. The Jerusalem, 2 *Gallison's Rep.* 350. *Code de Commerce*, art. 323.

^b The Sloop Mary, 1 *Paine's Rep.* 671.

^c *Boulay Paty*, tom. iii. 228. 232.

^d The Duke of Bedford, 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 294.

^e The Augusta, 1 *Dodson's Rep.* 283. The Jane, *ibid.* 461. The Hunter, *Ware's Rep.* 249.

^f *Guidon*, ch. 18. sec. 2. note, by *Cleirac*. *Roccus, De Navibus*, n. 51. *Valin*, tom. ii. 12. *Appleton v. Crowninshield*, 3 *Mass. Rep.* 443. *Code de Commerce*, art. 347.

^g *Insurance Company of Pennsylvania v. Duval*, 8 *Serg. & Rawle*, 138.. By the *Code de Commerce*, art. 330, the lender, on bottomry, and at respondentia, is also chargeable for general and for particular average.

loss. Nothing but an utter annihilation of the subject hypothecated, will discharge the borrower on bottomry.^a The property saved, whatever it may be in amount, continues subject to the hypothecation. The lender can look only to what is saved; and if that be not equal to the value of the loan, the lender must bear the loss of the residue, and he cannot recover the deficiency of the borrower. By the general marine law, the lender on bottomry is entitled to be paid out of the effects saved, so far as those effects go, if the voyage be disastrous.^b

The position laid down by Lord Mansfield, and afterwards by Lord Kenyon,^c that the lender on bottomry or *respondentia* was not liable to contribute, in case of a general average, has been much and justly questioned in the elementary works.^d It is contrary to the maritime law of France, and of other parts of Europe, and *360 in Louisiana we have a decision *against it.^e The new French law, contrary to the ordinance of 1681, charges the lender with simple average, on partial losses, unless there be a positive stipulation to the contrary; but such a stipulation, to exempt him from gross or general average, would be void, and contrary to natural equity.^f The reasoning of Emerigon is conclusive in

^a Thompson *v.* Royal Exchange Assurance Company, 1 *Maule & Selw.* 30.

^b Parker, J., and Sewall, J., in *Appleton v. Crowninshield*, 3 *Mass. Rep.* 443. Wilmer *v.* Smilax, 2 *Peters' Adm. Rep.* 295. note. *Valin's Com.* tom. ii. 12. *Code de Commerce*, art. 327. *Magen on Insurance*, vol. ii. 52. 56. 196—198. 430. *Emerigon*, tom. ii. 544. 547.

^c Joyce *v.* Williamson, and Walpole *v.* Ewer, *Park on Insurance*, 6th edit. 563. 565. In the former case, Lord Mansfield declared it to be a clear point, that by the law of England there was neither average nor salvage upon a bottomry bond. This must be understood with the exception in the statute of 19 Geo. II. c. 37, which on East India risks allows the benefit of salvage to the lender on bottomry or at *respondentia*.

^d See *Condy's Marshall*, vol. ii. 760, 761. 1 *Phillips on Insurance*, 735—737. 2d edit.

^e Chandler *v.* Garnier, 18 *Martin*, 599.

^f *Ord. de la Mar.* h. t. art. 16. *Code*, art. 330. *Emerigon, Traité des Contrats à la grosse*, ch. 7. sec. 1.

favour of the right of making the lender chargeable with his equitable proportion of an average contribution. If he owes the preservation of his money lent, to the sacrifice made by others for the preservation of the ship and cargo, why should he not contribute towards a jettison, ransom, or composition, made for the common safety? If no such sacrifice had been made, he would have lost his entire loan, by the rapacity of pirates, or the violence of the storm.

If the ship or cargo be lost, not by the perils of the sea, but by the default of the borrower or master, the hypothecation bond is forfeited, and must be paid. If the ship be lost on the voyage, and the cargo forwarded by another ship, in that case the borrowers must pay the debt, for such is the spirit of the contract.^a The lender, who is, in effect, an insurer, does not, as in ordinary cases of insurance, assume the risk of barratry, or loss by the fraud or misconduct of the borrower or his agents.^b And the doctrine of seaworthiness, deviation, and the necessity of diligence and correct conduct on the part of the borrower, are equally applicable to this contract, as to that of insurance. The lender is not to bear losses proceeding from the want of seaworthiness, or from unjustifiable deviation, or from the fault of the borrower, or the inherent infirmity of the cargo. Nor does he run the risk of the goods shipped on board another ship without necessity.^c

^a *Ins. Company of Penn. v. Duval*, 10 *Serg. & Rawle*, 138.

^b *Roccus, De Navibus*, n. 51. *Wessel v. Wildy, Skinner*, 152. *Ord. de la Mar.* tit. *Contrats à la grosse*, art. 12. *Emerigon*, tom. ii. 509—512. *Code de Commerce*, art. 326.

^c *Condy's Marshall*, vol. ii. 753—753. *Boulay Paty*, tom. iii. 158—164. 171—176. *Ibid.* 192. So, if the vessel be sold or transferred after the risk has commenced, or the voyage be in any manner broken up by the borrower, the maritime risk terminates, and the bond becomes presently payable, in like manner as a policy of insurance becomes in a like case *functus officii* as to future risks. *The Brig Draco*, 2 *Sumner*, 193, 194.

These maritime loans may be safely effected in a fair and proper case, as we have already seen, at the port of destination, as well as at any other foreign port.^a So, the consignee of the cargo, and even the agent of the owner of the ship, under special circumstances, may take a bottomry bond, by way of security for advances made by him.^b The owner himself may also execute a bottomry bond abroad, and it will be enforced in our American Admiralty Courts, which have undoubted jurisdiction over such contracts, though executed on land and under seal.^c

It has been made a question, whether a loan on bottomry or respondentia be good, if the ship or goods be already at sea when it is effected, inasmuch as the motives to the loan are supposed to have ceased after the ship's departure. Valin is in favour of the validity of the loan, and he considers that the presumption is, either that the money has been usefully employed in the things put at risk, or in paying what was due on that account; and this reasoning is deemed solid by Marshall, notwithstanding it stands opposed to the high authority of Emerigon.^d It has, likewise, been recently sanctioned by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, who have adjudged that it is not necessary that a respondentia loan (and the law on this point is the same, whether applied to respondentia or bottomry bonds,) should be made before the departure of the ship on the voyage, and that it may be made after the goods are at risk. Nor is it necessary that the money should be employed in the

^a 3 *Johns. Rep.* 352.

^b The *Alexander*, 1 *Dodson*, 278. The *Hero*, 2 *ibid.* 139.

^c The Sloop *Mary*, 1 *Paine's Rep.* 671. *Menetone v. Gibbons*, 3 *Term Rep.* 267. The bottomry bond may be given by the owner, without the concurrence of the master, or by the master, according to circumstances. The Duke of Bedford, 2 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 294. And it may be made by the owner, either in a foreign or a home port. The Brig *Draco*, 2 *Sumner*, 157.

^d *Valin's Com. tom. i.* 366. *Emerigon, tom. ii.* 484. *Cond'y's Marshall, vol. ii.* 747. a.

outfit of the vessel, or invested in the goods on which the risk is run. It is sufficient that the risk of the voyage be substantially and really taken, and the advance made in good faith for a maritime premium.^a The *lender is not presumed to lend upon the faith of *362 any particular appropriation of the money; and if it were otherwise, his security could not be avoided by any misapplication of the fund, where the risk was *bona fide* run upon other goods. The loan may be made, and the risk taken, upon the usual footing of policies of insurance, lost or not lost, and precisely as the ship was then in port; and if, before the hypothecation be given, the property be actually lost by any of the perils enumerated in it, the loss must be borne by the lender.^b

After the risk has ceased, by the safe arrival of the ship, marine interest ceases, and gives place to the ordinary legal interest, on the aggregate amount of the debt due, consisting of the money lent with maritime premium. This is understood to be the rule in the French law. The ordinary interest begins upon the accumulated sum when the marine interest ceases; and Boulay Paty follows the authority of Emerigon, and of the French judicial decisions, in support of this rule, and in opposition to the doctrine of Pothier and Pardessus, who insist, that no interest whatever accrues between the cessation of the maritime interest, and the judicial demand of the debt.^c

^a It is not necessary to the validity of a bottomry bond made by *the owner* of the vessel, that the money borrowed should be advanced for the necessities of the ship, or cargo, or voyage. The owner may employ the money as he pleases. But if made by *the master*, *virtute officii*, it must be for the ship's necessities, for the implied authority of the master extends no further. The *Brig Draco*, 2 *Sumner*, 157.

^b *Conard v. Atlantic Insurance Company*, 1 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 336.

^c *Emerigon*, tom. ii. 414. *Pothier, Traité du Pret. à la grosse aventure*, No. 51. *M. Pardessus, Cours de Droit Com.* tom. iii. n. 917. *Boulay Paty*, tom. iii. 80—89. *Marshall on Insurance*, vol. ii. 752, lays down the rule according to the opinion of Pothier, who holds that the ordinary interest, after the risk has ceased, commences only on the principal sum lent, and not on the

The French code^a prohibits all loans, in the nature of bottomry or repondentia, upon seamen's wages or voyages. A sailor is not generally in a situation to expect any great profit, which would justify a loan upon maritime interest, and wages are too slender a basis for a maritime loan, and the provision is dictated by sound policy. The English and American Courts of Admiralty have a broad equity jurisdiction over such contracts. The bottomry bond may be good in part, and bad in part; and if the premium has been unduly enhanced from a knowledge of the master's necessities, the court of admiralty, which acts *ex æquo et bono*, may moderate it, or refuse to ratify it.^b But if marine interest has not been stipulated, no court can supply the omission, and it will be taken to be a contract upon ordinary interest; for no new obligation can be inferred or reasoned out, by a commentary on the contract itself.^c

joint principal and maritime interest, for that would be compound interest. There are no English decisions on the point, and if the French law is to govern, it is decidedly against the opinion of Pothier. There is ground for the conclusion, that when the risk has been run, and the peril ceases, the loan, with the extraordinary premium, becomes an absolute debt, which ought to carry interest if the payment be delayed. The French law declares, and it is also the doctrine of Casaregis, that a bottomry contract, if made payable *to order*, or *bearer*, is negotiable like a bill of exchange, and is to be dealt with and protested in like manner. *Casaregis*, disc. 55. *Boulay Paty*, tom. iii. 97. *Code de Commerce*, art. 313.

^a *Code de Commerce*, art. 319.

^b 1 *Dodson*, 277. 283. *The Ship Packet*, 3 *Mason*, 255. *The Nelson*, 1 *Hagg. Adm. Rep.* 176. 326, 327. *The Cognac*, 2 *ibid.* 377. *The Hunter*, *Ware's Rep.* 255.

^c *Pothier, Traité du Pret. à la grosse*, n. 19. See, for further information on the subject of maritime loans, *Emerigon's Essay on Maritime Loans*, which is the most complete treatise extant on the subject. The substance of it has been ably incorporated into the work of M. *Boulay Paty*, on a *Course of Maritime Commercial Law*, and it has been closely and accurately translated, by John E. Hall, Esq., of Baltimore.

LECTURE L.

OF INSURANCE OF LIVES, AND AGAINST FIRE.

(1.) *Of insurance of lives.*

THESE insurances are liberal contracts, and while they create an advantageous investment of capital, they operate benevolently towards the public. Their usual purpose is to provide a fund for creditors, or for family connexions in case of death. The insurer, in consideration of a sum in gross, or of periodical payments, undertakes to pay a certain sum, or an annuity, depending upon the death of a person whose life is insured. The insurance is either for the whole term of life, or for a limited period. Such is the nature of these contracts, that they are well calculated to relieve the more helpless members of a family from a precarious dependence, resting upon the life of a single person; and they very naturally engage the attention and influence the judgment of those thinking men, who have been accustomed to reflect deeply upon the past, and to form just anticipations of the future.

The practice in Europe, of life assurances, is in a great degree confined to England, and it has within the last fifteen years been introduced into the United States.^a It is now slowly, but gradually, attracting the public attention and confidence in our principal cities. Accord-

^a The *Massachusetts Hospital Life Insurance Company* was incorporated in 1818.

ing to a maxim of the civil law, the life of a freeman was above all valuation: *liberum corpus æstimationem* *366 *non recipit*, and the nautical *legislation of some parts of Europe, on this subject, has been founded upon the principle, that it was unfit and improper to allow insurances on human life. They have been tolerated in Naples, Florence, and by the ordinances of Wisbuy, but they were condemned in the *Le Guidon*, as contrary to good morals, and as being the source of infinite abuse. So, insurances for life were expressly forbidden by the ordinance of Lewis XIV; and the prohibition was made to rest on the reason given in the civil law. The ordinances of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Middleburg, adopted the same rule, which, though true in some respects, was in this case very absurdly applied.^a The new French code has omitted any express provision on the subject, though Boulay Paty thinks that a prohibition is covertly but essentially contained in art. 334 of the code, and he inveighs vehemently against policies upon human life, as being gambling contracts of the most pernicious kind.^b Most of the commentators on the new code, as Delvincourt,^c Loaré,^d De Laporte, and Estrangin, concur in the same opinion. Pardessus,^e on the other hand, is in favour of the legality of such insurance; and

^a *Le Guidon*, ch. 16. art. 5. *Ord. of Wisbuy*, art. 66. *Ord. de la Mar. tit. Assurances*, art. 10. *Valin*, tom. ii. 54. *Pothier*, h. t. n. 27. *Emerigon*, tom. i. 198.

^b *Cours de Droit Com.* tom. iii. 366. 368. 496—506. *Istæ conditiones sunt plenæ tristissimæ eventus, et possunt invitare ad delinquendum.* *Grival*, dec. 57. n. 58. Boulay Paty says, that these life assurances ought to be left to their English neighbours. The English are willing they should be so left, and exult in the distinction, for Sergeant *Marshall*, in his *Treatise on Insurance*, vol. ii. 768, suggests that the prohibition of insurance on lives in France and Italy proceeds from motives of policy, founded on a startling sense of the great infirmity of their public morals, which would expose to hazard lives so insured.

^c *Inst. de Droit Com. Français*, tom. ii. 345:

^d *Esprit du Code de Commerce*, tom. iv. 75.

^e *Tom. ii. 303.*

this must have been the opinion of the French government, for a royal *ordinance of 1820 established a company for the purpose of insuring lives. *367

There are now two chartered life assurance companies established in France, and though the terms of insurance are moderate, and the companies extremely respectable, they have met with very little encouragement, and this grave species of insurance does not seem to be congenial to the taste and habits of either the French or Italians. In the Netherlands, life assurance societies are established with reasonable anticipations of success. An ordinance of the government gives them a monopoly, by excluding all foreign companies from interfering with the business on their native soil. The same exclusion exists in Denmark, while the life assurance institutions in that kingdom are said to do nothing. They are more likely to flourish in Germany than in any other part of continental Europe, judging from the experiment already made, and the character and dispositions of the people.^a

The life assurance companies in England commenced with the *Amicable Society*, in the beginning of the last century; and in 1827, there were, in the united kingdom, forty-four life assurance companies, all maintaining a zealous and dangerous competition. The companies used formerly to select and take only lives of health and vigour, but now, it is said to be the practice, to accept all lives proposed, where no positive disease is manifested. So, residence in any part of Europe is universally admitted, and the companies are very much exposed to frauds, and the consequent diminution of credit and confidence, by the assurance of bad lives, and sinking the average duration of lives insured much below the average dura-

^a *Edinburgh Review*, vol. xlv. 483—490. In 1828, a life insurance company was established at Gotha, in Germany, and has been attended with great success.

tion of human life.^a There is no doubt a good deal of intrinsic difficulty in the subject, and it requires no ordinary degree of science, skill, and experience, to form just and accurate rates of insurance, or tables of *368 annuities on *scales measuring truly the probabilities and value of life, in its various stages of existence, in different climates, in different employments, and in the vicissitudes of action to which it is subject.

(1.) The party insuring must have an *interest* in the life insured. The English statute of 14 Geo. III. c. 48, prohibited insurances on lives, when the person insuring had no interest in the life, and it prohibited the recovery under the policy of a greater sum than the amount or value of the interest of the insured in the life, and required the insertion in the policy of the person's name interested therein, or for whose benefit the policy was made. A *bona fide* creditor has an insurable interest in his debtor's life to the extent of his debt, for there is a probability, more or less remote, that the debtor would pay the debt if he lived.^b The insurance is frequently made a part of the creditor's security in loans of money. A person may insure his own life for the benefit of heirs or creditors, or he may insure the life of another in which he may be interested, and assign the policy to those who have an interest in the life. The policy is good for the creditor as a collateral security, though he may have other security, and being substantially a contract of indemnity against the loss of the debt, it ceases, as to the creditor, with the extinguishment of the debt.^c If it be assigned by way of security, it is not, in that case, extinguished by the payment of the debt, but the reversionary interest in the insured becomes the means of credit to him on other

^a *Edinburgh Review*, vol. xlv. 498. 500.

^b *Anderson v. Edie*, *Park on Insurance*, 6th edit. 575.

^c *Goodsall v. Boldero*, 9 *East's Rep.* 72.

occasions. The insurable interest in the life of another person, must be a direct and definite pecuniary interest, and a person has not such an interest in the life of his wife or child, merely in the character of husband or parent.^a But if a child be supported by its father, who is dependent on some fund terminable by his death, the child has an insurable interest *in the father's life.^b *369 So, it has been held, that a trustee who had a legal technical interest as executor, though not the beneficial interest in the life of another, may insure it.^c The necessity of an interest in the life insured, in order to support the policy, prevails generally in this country, because wager contracts are almost universally held to be unlawful, either in consequence of some statute provision, or upon principles of the common law.^d

(2.) We have seen that the *terms and conditions* of the

^a *Halford v. Kymer*, 10 *Barnw. & Cress.* 724. By the New-York Statute of April 1st, 1840, entitled "An act in respect to insurances for lives, for the benefit of married women," it is made lawful for any married woman, by herself and in her name, or in the name of any third person, with his assent, as her trustee, to cause to be insured, for her sole use, the life of her husband, for any definite period, or for the term of his natural life; and in case of her surviving her husband, the net amount of the insurance becoming due, shall be payable to her, to and for her own use, free from the claims of the representatives of the husband, or of any of his creditors. Such exemption not to apply where the amount of premium annually paid shall exceed \$300; and in case of the death of the wife before her husband, the amount of the insurance may be made payable after her death to her children, or their guardian, for their use.

^b *Lord v. Dall*, 12 *Mass. Rep.* 115.

^c *Kenyon*, Ch. J., in *Tidswell v. Ankerstein*, *Peake's Cases*, 151.

^d *Vide supra*, p. 278. The New-York Statute (*R. S.* vol. i. 662,) against wagers, does not, in express terms, extend to insurances on lives, as the statute of Geo. III does; but the general prohibition of wagers, bets, or stakes, depending "upon any casualty, or unknown or contingent event whatever," may constructively apply. The 10th section of the New-York act, shows that *insurances* were included in the prohibition, for it declares that the prohibition shall not extend so as to affect insurances "made in good faith, for the *security* or *indemnity* of the party insured." This implies that the insured must have a real beneficial interest in the life of another. The *bona fide* assignee of a life policy may sue in the name of the assignor, and equity will compel the assignor to permit the assignee to use his name. *Ashley v. Ashley*, 3 *Simons*, 149.

English policies are more relaxed now than formerly, but this is not the case with the American policies upon lives. They contain a condition, when relating to the lives of persons in the northern states, that the policy is to be void if the insured should die upon the high seas, or the great lakes ; or shall, without the previous consent of the company, pass beyond the settled limits of the United States and of the British provinces of the two Canadas, Nova-Scotia, and New-Brunswick ; or south of the states of Virginia and Kentucky ; and they all contain the like condition if the assured enter into the military or naval service ; or in case he should die by suicide, or in a duel, or by the hands of justice. The life insurance would be avoided upon the general policy of the law, on the execution of the assured for felony, without the insertion of this last condition.^a The basis of the insurance is a declaration in writing of the person making the insurance, as to the birth-place, age, residence, and employment of the party insured, with a description of the diseases or infirmity (if any) with which he has been afflicted. This declaration not being spread out at large upon the policy, is not strictly a warranty, and it is sufficient if it be given in good faith, and be true in substance. Whatever averment or representation is inserted in the policy becomes a warranty, and must be strictly true. But if

*370 there be no warranty, or *representation, or fraud, the insurer runs the risk of the goodness of the life ;^b and even a warranty that the person is in good health is not falsified by the fact that he was at the time subject to great inconvenience, and a partial palsy, in consequence of an old wound not dangerous to life ; or that he was troubled with spasms and cramps from fits

^a *Amicable Ass. Society v. Bolland*, 2 *Dow & Clark*, 1. *Holland v. Disney*, 3 *Russell*, 351. 4 *Bligh*. 194. N. S.

^b *Stackpool v. Simon*, at N. P. 2 *Marshall on Insurance*, 772.

of the gout. This has been held to be a reasonably good state of health within the warranty. The seeds of death are in every human constitution, and it is only requisite that there be not at the time any existing disorder tending to shorten life.^a

(3.) The life in the given case may be insured for the term of natural life, as is usual, or it may be insured for a definite period.^b In the case of a policy of the latter kind, if the party receives a mortal wound within the period, and dies after it has expired, the underwriter is discharged.^c All concealment or suppression of material facts avoids the policy. The same good faith is as requisite in this as in all other policies; and whether the suppression arises from fraud or accident is quite immaterial, if the fact be material to the risk, and that is a question for a jury.^d

II. *Of insurance against fire.*

By this insurance, the underwriter, in consideration of the premium, undertakes to indemnify the insured against all losses in his houses, buildings, furniture, ships in port, or merchandise, by means of accidental fire happening within a prescribed period. The premium is usually paid in advance, and the contract effected by the parties without the intervention of a broker.^e

^a *Ross v. Bradshaw*, 1 *Blacks. Rep.* 312. *Watson v. Mainwaring*, 4 *Taunton*, 763. *Willis v. Poole*, at N. P. 2 *Marshall on Insurance*, 771.

^b It is said to be now usual in the English policies on lives to state the day of the commencement and of the termination thereof, and to declare that both are inclusive. *Ellis on the Law of Fire and Life Insurance*, 136.

^c *Willes, J.*, 1 *Term Rep.* 260.

^d *Lindenau v. Desborough*, 8 *Barnw. & Cress.* 586. *Morrison v. Muspratt*, 12 *B. Moore*, 231. 4 *Bingham*, 61. S. C.

^e The offices of Fire Insurance Companies usually annex to their policies the various classes of hazards and rates of annual premiums. The lowest rate of premium is for buildings exposed to the least degree of hazard, as buildings of brick or stone covered with tile, slate, or metal, the window shutters of solid iron, gutters and cornices of brick, stone, or metal, and party walls above the

It has been made a question by some persons whether the negligence and frauds which the insurance of property from fire has led to, did not counterbalance all the advantages and relief which such insurances have afforded in cases of extreme distress. But the public judgment in England, and in this country, has long since decided that question;^a and insurance companies against fire
 *371 have *multiplied exceedingly, and extended their dealings to every part of the country, and excited and deserved public confidence, by reason of the solidity of their capital, and the skill, prudence, and integrity of their operations.^b

roof. The rate of premium rises in proportion to the increase of hazard, and is highest in buildings entirely of wood. The rate of premium depends likewise upon the fact, by whom and by what trade, or for what purpose the building is occupied, and whether as a private dwelling or how otherwise, and its situation with respect to contiguous buildings, and *their* construction, materials, and use. Goods are also classed, in respect to the rates of premium, into such as are *not hazardous, hazardous, extra hazardous*, and such as compose cases of *extraordinary risk*, and are the subject of *special* agreement. In England it is sometimes part of the contract of insurance, that the insurer is not to be liable for loss arising from ignition occasioned by natural heating of the articles insured, or by the misapplication of fire heat under process of manufacture. *Ellis on Fire and Life Insurance*, 25. Mr. Ellis infers, from the case of *Austin v. Drewe*, 6 *Taunton*, 436, that damage by *heat* alone, without *ignition*, is not covered by the ordinary fire policy, even though there be no express provision against a damage of that kind.

^a A late English traveller, Mr. Elliott, says that nearly all the houses in Berlin, the capital of Prussia, are insured against fire.

^b The great conflagration in the city of New-York, on the night of the 16th and morning of the 17th Dec., 1835, was unexampled in this country since fire insurance was in practice, in the rapidity and violence of its ravages, and in the amount of property destroyed. It, of course, absorbed the capital of many of the most solidly established Fire Insurance Companies, and rendered them insolvent. This was an extraordinary case, and without precedent, and was not within the reach of ordinary calculation. Fire insurance in England commenced about a century and a half ago, and is carried on by Joint Stock Companies with large capital, though there are others called *Contribution Societies*, in which every person insured becomes a member or proprietor, and participates in the profit and loss of the concern. *M'Culloch's Dictionary of Commerce*, art. *Insurance*. A *Mutual Assurance* association of this kind existed in New-York, for many years after the peace of 1783, and before incorporated companies with capital stock came in fashion. The New-York Contributionship Fire

We will consider, 1, the interest ; 2, the terms and construction of the policy ; 3, the adjustment of the loss.

(1.) *Of the interest in the policy.*

If policies were without interest, they would be peculiarly hazardous, by reason of the temptation which they would hold out to the commission of arson, and they would fall within the general prohibition, by statute, of wager policies.^a According to Lord King and Lord Hardwicke,^b an insurance against fire, without an interest by the insured in the property lost, at the time of insuring and at the time of the loss, was void even at common law. A creditor may have a policy on the house and goods of his debtor, upon which he has a lien or mortgage security, for that gives him a sufficient interest. So, a trustee, or agent, or factor, who has the custody of goods

Company was incorporated in April, 1822, on that basis. There are others of that kind existing now in some of the States. And since the public confidence in the Incorporated Insurance Companies with comparatively small capitals became impaired by reason of losses by the great fire in New-York, a voluntary private association of that kind, under the title of the *Alliance Mutual Assurance*, was instituted, December 23d, 1835. Formerly the English Fire Insurance Companies were at liberty to insure property in New-York, by means of an agency established here. This was deemed, by our citizens, as the safest source, owing to their great capitals, to apply to for indemnity against fire. But a different policy prevailed and finally gained the ascendancy with our Legislature. A prohibitory act applicable to such cases, was defeated in April, 1807, and again in March, 1809, by the objections of the Council of Revision, which were drawn and submitted to the Council by the author of this note, then a member of the Council. But on the 18th of March, 1814, the prohibition passed into a law. The Council of Revision at that time abandoned their former ground, though the individual member who brought forward the objections on the two former occasions, persevered in raising the same objection. The prohibition was originally confined to all foreign insurances against fire. But by the act of May 1st, 1829, ch. 336, the prohibition was extended to marine insurance and bottomry; and this is still the existing law in New-York. See *Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 714. vol. iii. 557. This prohibition is now relaxed and reduced to a small tax on premiums. *Laws of New-York*, February 21, 1837, ch. 30.

^a Vide *supra*, p. 278.

^b *Lynch v. Dalzell*, 3 Bro. P. C. 497. *Saddler's Company v. Badcock*, 2 Atk. 554.

for sale on commission, may insure them, and a *bona fide* equitable interest may be insured.^a In the case of *De Forest v. Fulton Fire Insurance Company*,^b the court carried this question of constructive interest to a still greater extent, and it was decided, that a commission merchant, consignee, or factor, having goods of the consignor or principal in his possession, has an insurable interest therein, not merely to the extent of his commissions, but to the

full value of the goods, without reference to his
 *372 lien. He was to be *deemed owner as to all the world, except his principal, for the purpose of an insurable interest. But it is usually made a condition in our American policies, that the nature of the property be disclosed, and goods held in trust, or on commission, must be insured *as such*, or they will not be covered by the policy.^c A person having an interest in the rent of buildings, may insure the rent from loss by fire within the prescribed period, and the claim would be for the loss of so much rent as would have arisen between the time of the fire and the end of the given period, if the peril had not intervened.^d And as in the case of marine insu-

^a *Lucena v. Crawford*, 3 Bos. & Pull. 75. 95. 98. 5 *ibid.* 289. S. C. 2 *Marshall on Insurance*, 789. *Locke v. North American Ins. Company*, 13 *Mass. Rep.* 67. An equity of redemption is an insurable interest. *Strong v. Manufacturers' Ins. Company*, 10 *Pick.* 40. A mortgagor and mortgagee may each insure the same building, so as to recover their respective interests therein, without disclosing the qualified nature of the interest, except the same be required. *Traders' Ins. Company v. Robert*, 9 *Wendell*, 404. *Jackson v. Mass. Mutual Fire Ins. Company*, *Sup. Court Mass.*, 1840. S. P.

^b 1 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 84.

^c If there be no such condition in the policy, and there be no questions put, the assured is not bound to disclose the nature of his title. *Strong v. Manufacturers' Ins. Company*, 10 *Pick: Rep.* 40.

^d If the policy be on a house which is rented to a tenant, and it be destroyed by fire, Mr. Bell considers it to be a difficult and unsettled question, whether the policy would cover the rent lost, as being part of the owner's loss, when the policy was silent as to rent *eo nomine*. See 1 *Bell's Com. on the Laws of Scotland*, 627. But I apprehend that with us such consequential damages would not be estimated, and that the claim of the assured would be confined to the direct loss of the building. On the insurance of a *house* or *ship*, the possible

rance, if the policy be *for whom it may concern*, it will cover any interest existing at its date.^a

(2.) *Of the terms and construction of the policy.*

A policy against fire is strictly a policy on time, and the commencement and termination of the risk are stated with precision. The English policies (and I presume the American also) contain the exception of damage by fire happening by "invasion, foreign enemy, or any military or usurped power whatsoever." It is sometimes added, "or by riot, or civil commotion," for the words "usurped power" mean invasion from abroad, or an internal rebellion, and not the power of a common mob.^b

The insured is bound in good faith to disclose to the insurer *every fact material to the risk, and *373 within his knowledge, and which, if stated, would influence the mind of the insurer in making or declining the contract.^c The strictness and nicety required in the contract of marine insurance, do not, it has been said, so strongly apply to insurances against fire, for the risk is generally assumed upon actual examination of the subject by skilful agents on the part of the insurance officers.^d

profits that might have arisen if the loss had not happened, is an incidental part of the loss and not recoverable under such a policy. 1 *Adolph. & Ellis*, 621. But a policy on a store and \$1000 on the stock of goods therein for six years, attaches to any goods the assured may have in the shop to the amount insured, at any time within the six years. *Lane v. Maine M. Fire Ins. Company*, 3 *Greenleaf*, 44.

^a *Jefferson Ins. Company ads. Cotheal*, N. Y. *Superior Court of Common Pleas*, March, 1829.

^b *Drinkwater v. London Assurance Company*, 2 *Wils.* 363. Fire by lightning is usually declared to be a loss within a fire policy. But books of accounts, written securities, or evidences of debt, title deeds, writings, money or bullion are not deemed objects of insurance, and they are usually specially excepted. Nor are jewels, plate, medals, paintings, statuary, sculptures, and curiosities, included in a policy of insurance, unless specified.

^c *Columbian Ins. Company v. Lawrence*, 2 *Peters' Sup. Court Rep.* 25. *Curry v. Com. Ins. Company*, 10 *Pick. Rep.* 535.

^d *Jolly v. Baltimore Equitable Society*, 1 *Harr. & Gill*, 295. But *Ch. J.*

Reasonable grounds of apprehension of loss from existing facts known to the insured, and denoting impending danger, must be stated to the insurer, or the policy will be void, even though there was no intentional fraud in the case.^a If there be a representation of facts, it is sufficient if the same be fairly made and substantially true; and if the representation be referred to in general terms in the policy, and not spread out at large on the face of the instrument, it is still only a representation, and does not amount to the technical warranty.^b When the policy contains a warranty, appearing upon the face of it, although written in the margin or transversely, it is construed with severity, and must be strictly complied with.^c And yet where a policy contained a clause prohibiting the use of the building for *storing therein* goods denominated in the memorandum annexed to the policy as hazardous; the keeping of such goods as oil, or spiritous liquors, by a grocer, in ordinary quantities, for his ordinary retail, was held not to be, under the circumstances, a storing of them within the policy.^d A representation that ground contiguous to the building insured is vacant, does not amount to a warranty, that it shall

*374 *continue vacant during the continuance of the risk, or prevent the insured from erecting a building upon it, provided he had not already formed and concealed that intention, and that the erection was not,

Savage, in *Fowler v. Ætna Ins. Company*, 6 *Cowen*, 673, held differently, and he saw no reason for a difference on this point between marine and fire insurance policies.

^a *Bufe v. Turner*, 6 *Taunton*, 338. *Walden v. Louisiana Ins. Company*, 12 *Louis. Rep.* 134.

^b *Jefferson Ins. Company ads. Cotheal*, *N. Y. Superior Court of Common Pleas*, March, 1829. *Delonguemere v. Tradesmen's Ins. Company*, *ibid.* 2 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 589. *Snyder v. Farmers' Ins. and Loan Company*, 13 *Wendell*, 92.

^c *Worsley v. Wood*, 6 *Term Rep.* 710. *Fowler v. Ætna Fire Ins. Company*, 6 *Cowen*, 673. *S. C.* 7 *Wendell*, 270. *Ellison Fire Insurance*, 29, 30.

^d *Langdon v. New-York Equitable Ins. Company*, 1 *Hall*, 226.

in point of fact, in any way the cause of the loss.^a So, if it was represented at the time of the insurance, that the building was connected with another building on one side only, and before the loss happened, it became connected on two sides, this does not avoid the policy, unless, in point of fact, the risk thereby becomes increased.^b The assured may exercise the ordinary and necessary acts of ownership over his buildings, and make the requisite repairs, without prejudice to his policy. A contrary rule would be so inconvenient as, in a great degree, to destroy this species of insurance. But if a loss accrues by means of gross negligence or misconduct of the workmen; or if the alterations in the building materially enhance the risk, and are not necessary to the enjoyment of it, or were not the exercise of ordinary acts of ownership, the insurers will be released from their contract.^c

The English statute of 9th May, 1828, has prudently protected the insurer from the impositions to which he is naturally exposed, by the practice of covering under one policy extended and cumulated subjects of risk. The statute requires that detached buildings, or goods therein, occasioning a plurality of risks, be valued and insured separately; and all insurances against fire, made upon two or more separate subjects or parcels of risk collectively, in one sum, are declared void. It is a condition of the policy, in most cases, that if there be any other insurance already made against loss by fire on the

^a *Stebbins v. Globe Ins. Company*, 2 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 632.

^b *Stetson v. Mass. Fire Ins. Company*, 4 *Mass. Rep.* 330.

^c *Stetson v. Mass. Fire Ins. Company*, 4 *Mass. Rep.* 330. *Jolly v. Baltimore Equitable Society*, 1 *Harr. & Gill*, 295. *Curry v. Commonwealth Ins. Company*, 10 *Pick. Rep.* 535. A loss by fire, in policies against fire on land, occasioned by the mere fault and negligence of the assured, his servants or agents, without fraud or design, is a loss within the policy. *Waters v. M. L. Ins. Company*, 11 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 213. *Shaw v. Robberds*, 1 *Neville & Perry*, 279. S. C. 6 *Adolph. & Ellis*, 75. The same rule in marine policies. *Supra*, p. 307. N. C.

property, and not notified to the insurers, *the policy is to be deemed void; and if there be any other insurance on the property afterwards made, the insurers are to have notice of it with reasonable diligence, and the same is to be duly acknowledged in writing, or that omission will also render the policy void.^a

Fire policies usually contain a prohibition against the assignment of them, without the previous consent of the company. But without this clause, they are assignable in equity, like any other chose in action, though to render the assignment of any value to the assignee, an interest in the subject matter of the insurance must be assigned also.^b This restriction upon assignments of the policy applies only to transfers before a loss happens, and it applies only to voluntary sales, and not to sales on execution.^c In some cases, the statute creating a fire insurance company, authorizes assignments of policies to the purchaser of the subject insured, and authorizes the assignee to sue in his own name, provided notice be given of the assignment before a loss happens, so as to allow the company, at their election, to return a ratable

^a *Reassurance* is a valid contract, in cases of fire, as well as marine policies. The reinsurance operates, not upon the risk, but upon the property covered by the original policy, and the requirements of the contract are satisfied, when those in the original policy are, and notice thereof be given to the reassurer. This species of insurance requires, as well as the primitive contract, the communication of all material information. *New-York B. Fire Ins. Company v. New-York Fire Ins. Company*, 17 *Wendell's Rep.* 359.

^b *Marshall on Insurance*, 800. The assignment of a policy *without notice to the office*, will not, under the English bankrupt system, prevent the interest in the policy from passing by a subsequent assignment in bankruptcy, on the ground that the policy, without the notice, remained under the disposing power of the bankrupt as reputed owner. *Ex parte Colville*, 1 *Montagu's Rep.* 110. If buildings insured be mortgaged, the policy is *ipso facto* assigned to the mortgagee. *Farmers' Bank v. M. A. Society*, 4 *Leigh*, 69. Policies against fire, being personal contracts, do not pass to a purchaser of the property, without the assent of the insurer. *Ætna Fire Ins. Company v. Tyler*, 16 *Wendell*, 385.

^c *Brichta v. Fayette Fire Ins. Company*, 2 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 372. *Strong v. Man. Ins. Company*, 10 *Pick. Rep.* 40.

proportion of the premium, and be exonerated from the risk.

(3.) *Of the adjustment of the loss.*

Settlements of losses by fire are made on the principle of a particular average, and the estimated loss is paid without abandonment of what has been saved.^a Damages and reasonable charges on removing, at a fire, articles insured, are covered by the policy. So there may be a general average for a sacrifice made by the insured for the common good, in a case of necessity. It is analogous to the law of contribution by co-securities.^b If a tenant erects a building on a lot held under a lease, with liberty to renew or remove the building *at *376 the end of the lease, and the building be destroyed by fire a few days before the end of the lease; though the building as it stood was worth more than the sum insured, and if removed, it would have been worth much less, yet the courts look only to the actual value of the building as it stood when lost, and they do not enter into the consideration of these incidental and collateral circumstances, in fixing on the true standard of indemnity.^c

It is usually stipulated in the policy, that in case of any prior or subsequent insurance on the same property, and of which due notice has been given, and a loss occurs,

^a As loss by fire is not generally a total loss, the valuation in the policy, says Mr. Bell, (*Com.* vol. i. 627,) is rather the fixing of a maximum beyond which the underwriters are not to be liable, than a conclusive ascertainment of the value. In France, valued policies against fire are rejected, and in *Wallace v. Insurance Company*, 4 *Miller's Louis. Rep.* 289, the policy and even the legality of valued policies on fire seemed to be questioned. With us, policies against fire are taken to be open ones, unless otherwise expressed. They are not invariably open policies. *Laurent v. Chatham Fire Ins. Company*, 1 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 41. *Alchorne v. Saville*, 6 *J. B. Moore*, 199.

^b *Welles v. Boston Ins. Company*, 6 *Pick. Rep.* 182.

^c *Laurent v. Chatham Fire Ins. Company*, 1 *Hall's N. Y. Rep.* 41.

the assured is not to recover beyond such ratable proportion of the damages as the amount insured by the policy shall bear to the whole amount insured, without reference to the dates of the different policies. The loss is to be certified upon oath, and the certificate of a magistrate, notary, or clergyman, is made necessary to be procured in favour of the truth and fairness of the statement of the loss, and the strict and literal compliance with the terms of these conditions is held indispensable to a right of recovery.^a If it be part of the contract that the insurer is to be liable only to the extent of the sum insured, and after payment for a partial loss a total loss ensues, the insurer is liable only for the difference between the sum already paid and the sum insured.^b The contract is confined to the parties, and, as a general rule, no equity attaches upon the proceeds of policies in favour of third persons, without some contract or trust to that effect. If the subject of the insurance be burnt during the continuance of the policy, the benefit of the policy goes to the personal representatives of the insured, unless by some act of the party entitled to the proceeds, they become clothed with the character of real estate.^c

^a *Worsley v. Wood*, 6 *Term Rep.* 710. *Rowmege v. Mechanics' Fire Ins. Company*, 1 *Green's N. J. Rep.* 110. *Columb. Ins. Company v. Lawrence*, 2 *Peters' Rep.* 25. *Savage*, Ch. J., in *Dawes v. N. R. Ins. Company*, 7 *Cowen*, 462. *Leadbetter v. Insurance Company*, 13 *Maine Rep.* 265. This last is a very strong case. If there be any fraud or false swearing by the assured in the exhibition of his proofs of loss, he forfeits his claim to a recovery. *Regnier v. Louisiana State Marine and Fire Ins. Company*, 12 *Louis. Rep.* 344.

^b *Curry v. Commonwealth Ins. Company*, 10 *Pick. Rep.* 535.

^c *Mildmay v. Folgham*, 3 *Vesey*, 472. *Lord King*, in *Lynch v. Dalzell*, 4 *Bro. P. C.* 432. edit. Tomlins. *Norris v. Harrison*, 2 *Madd. Ch. Rep.* 263. *Ellis on the Law of Fire and Life Insurance*, 81. *Columb. Ins. Company v. Lawrence*, 10 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 507. A mortgagee of the property, has no right or title to the benefit of the policy, taken by the mortgagor, unless it be assigned to him. Fire policies usually contain a provision for a renewal on payment of the premium; and some of the London policies of insurance against fire for one year or longer, are understood to operate for fifteen days beyond the time of the expiration of their policies. This is the case with the Sun Fire, and

Royal Exchange, and Phœnix Insurance Companies. *Hughes on Insurance*, 508.

There is an admirable summary of the law of contracts, express and implied, treated of in this and the preceding volume, to be seen in the *Principles of the Law of Scotland*, by Professor *Bell*, of the University of Edinburgh, 3d edition, 1833. The essential principles of the law of contracts, of *sale, hiring, bailment, surety, negotiable paper, partnership, maritime contracts of affreightment, average, salvage, bottomry and respondentia, marine insurance, and insurance against fire and of lives*, are stated with all possible brevity consistent with perspicuity, precision, and accuracy. The cases and authorities are annexed to each proposition, and the adjudged cases are given at large in some succeeding volumes as *illustrations* of the principles declared. I do not know of a more convenient and useful manual of the kind to the student and practising lawyer. Though the principles of the Scotch law are drawn from the civil law, yet they agree in most of the material points, with the doctrines and adjudications in the English and American law.

PART VI.

OF THE LAW CONCERNING REAL PROPERTY.

LECTURE LI.

OF THE FOUNDATION OF TITLE TO LAND.

IN passing from the subject of personal to that of real property, the student will immediately perceive that the latter is governed by rules of a distinct and peculiar character. The law concerning real property forms a technical and very artificial system; and though it has felt the influence of the free and commercial spirit of modern ages, it is still very much under the control of principles derived from the feudal policy. We have either never introduced into the jurisprudence of this country, or we have, in the course of improvements upon our municipal law, abolished all the essential badges of the law of feuds; but the deep traces of that policy are visible in every part of the doctrine of real estates, and the technical language, and many of the technical rules and fictions of that system, are still retained.

(1.) It is a fundamental principle in the English law, derived from the maxims of the feudal tenures, that the king was the original proprietor of all the land in

the kingdom, and the true and only source of
 *378 title.^a In this country we have *adopted the
 same principle, and applied it to our republican
 governments; and it is a settled and fundamental doc-
 trine with us, that all valid individual title to land within
 the United States, is derived from the grant of our own
 local governments, or from that of the United States, or
 from the crown, or royal chartered governments esta-
 blished here prior to the revolution. This was the
 doctrine declared in New-York, in the case of *Jackson v.*
Ingraham,^b and it was held to be a settled rule, that the

^a 2 *Blacks. Com.* 51. 53. 86. 105. Sir Francis Palgrave says, that the practical establishment of the theory that the king was the original proprietor of all the lands in the kingdom, was to be attributed to the constant working of the crown lawyers, who always presumed that the land was held by feudal tenure, until the contrary could be shown. *Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth*, vol. i. 584. The same principle of feudal tenure prevails in Scotland. *Bell's Prin. of the Law of Scotland*, sec. 676.

^b 4 *Johns. Rep.* 163. *Jackson v. Waters*, 12 *ibid.* 365. S. P. By the *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 718. sec. 1, the people are declared to possess the original and ultimate property in and to all lands within the jurisdiction of the state. It was declared by statute in Connecticut, in 1718, that no title to lands was valid, unless derived from the Governor and Company of the colony. *Revised Statutes of Connecticut*, 1784, p. 113. In the elaborately discussed case of *De Armas v. Mayor, &c., of New-Orleans*, 5 *Miller's Louis. Rep.* 132, it was admitted to have been uniformly the practice of all the European nations having colonial establishments and dominion in America, to consider the unappropriated lands occupied by savage tribes, and obtained from them by conquest or purchase, to be crown lands, and capable of a valid alienation, by sale or gift, by the sovereign, and by him only. No valid title could be acquired without letters patent from the King. See *Ibid.* p. 188. 195—197. 206. 213. 216. But it is said that purchases made at Indian treaties, under the competent sanction of the government of the United States, vest a valid title in the purchaser, without any patent. Baldwin, J., in *Mitchel v. United States*, 9 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 748. 756. 757. This opinion is, however, so contrary to the previous authorities on the subject, that I should apprehend it would be proper for further consideration.

In the English law it has always been considered a fundamental principle, that the king, by his prerogative, was entitled to all mines of gold and silver, whether in lands belonging to the crown, or to a subject. Lord Coke says, that the king has no such right, by virtue of his prerogative, in any other metals than gold and silver, for those metals alone are requisite for the coining of money for the use of his subjects. 2 *Inst.* 577, 578. In the great *Case of Mines*, in the Exchequer, (*Plowd.* 310. 336,) it was resolved, by a majority of the twelve judges, that if the mine, in the lands of a subject, was of copper, tin, lead, or iron, and had

courts could not take notice of any title to land not derived from our own state or colonial government, and duly verified by patent. This was also a fundamental principle in the colonial jurisprudence. All titles to land passed to individuals from the crown, through the colonial corporations, and the colonial or proprietary authorities. Even with respect to the Indian reservation lands, of which they still retain the occupancy, the validity of a patent has not hitherto been permitted to be drawn in question in a suit between citizens of the state, under the pretext that the Indian right and title, as original lords of

gold or silver intermixed, though of less value than the baser metals, the whole mine belonged to the crown, because the nobler metal attracted to it the less valuable, and the king could not hold jointly with the subject, and consequently he took the whole. The minority of the judges, and Plowden himself, dissented from this severe and unreasonable doctrine, and it was corrected by the Statutes of 1 *Wm. & Mary*, ch. 30, and 5 *Wm. & Mary*, ch. 6, which declared, that no mine of copper, tin, lead, or iron, should be adjudged a royal mine, though gold or silver might be extracted from it, but the crown was allowed to take the proceeds of the mine in such cases, provided that the king paid to the owner within thirty days after the ore should have been extracted and raised, at certain specified rates.

The Statute Law of New-York has asserted the right of the state, as sovereign, over mines to the extent of the English statutes, and with more definite limits. Every citizen being the owner of any mine, wherein ore may be discovered, opened, or wrought, in which, upon an average, two-third parts or more, are of copper, tin, iron, or lead, may hold and enjoy the same against the state, though if the average be less, the mine belongs to the people of the state in their right of sovereignty. (*Act*, 6th February, 1789, ch. 18. *N. Y. R. S.* vol. i. 198.) The *Revised Statutes* would seem to declare, that all mines, other than mines of gold or silver, or copper, tin, lead, or iron, belong exclusively to the state. If so, this is an extension of state claim, transcending the English royal prerogative, and in contradiction to the only exception required by statute (*Acts*, 25th February, 1789, ch. 32, and 28th February, 1789, ch. 44, and *N. Y. R. S.* vol. i. 198,) in state patents of all gold and silver mines. This express exception ought, in all sound construction, to exclude the state from any further exception or reservation in the general granting words in patents, for it was admitted, in the *Case of Mines*, already cited, that the king might alienate even royal mines, by apt and proper words.

What is the law of the other states on the subject of royal mines I am not able to say, though it is to be presumed that the exception of mines of gold and silver, is the usual *formula* in all government patents and grants by the United States, as well as by the several states.

the soil, had not been extinguished.^a It was also declared in *Fletcher v. Peck*,^b to be the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, that the nature of the Indian title to lands lying within the territorial limits of a state, though entitled to be respected by all courts until it be legitimately extinguished, was not such as to be absolutely repugnant to a seisin in fee on the part of the government within whose jurisdiction the lands are situated.^c

*379 *(2.) The history and grounds of the claims of the European governments, and of the United States, to the lands on this continent, and to dominion over the Indian tribes, have been since more largely and fully considered. In discussing the rights and consequences attached by the international law of Europe to prior discovery, it was stated in *Johnson v. M'Intosh*,^d as an historical fact, that on the discovery of this continent by the nations of Europe, the discovery was considered to have given to the government by whose subjects or authority it was made, a title to the country, and the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, as against all other European powers. Each nation claimed the right to regulate for itself, in exclusion of all others, the relation which was to subsist between the discoverer and the Indians. That relation necessarily impaired, to a con-

^a *Jackson v. Hudson*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 375.

^b 6 *Cranch's Rep.* 87.

^c This was the language of a majority of the court in the case of *Fletcher v. Peck*. It was a mere naked declaration, without any discussion or reasoning by the court in support of it; but Judge Johnson, in the separate opinion which he delivered, did not concur in the doctrine. He held that the Indian nations were absolute proprietors of the soil, and that practically, and in cases unaffected by particular treaties, the restrictions upon the right of soil in the Indians amounted only to an exclusion of all competitors from the market, and a preemptive right to acquire a fee-simple by purchase when the proprietors should be pleased to sell.

^d 8 *Wheat. Rep.* 543.

siderable degree, the rights of the original inhabitants, and an ascendancy was asserted in consequence of the superior genius of the Europeans, founded on civilization and Christianity, and of their superiority in the means, and in the art of war. The European nations which respectively established colonies in America, assumed the ultimate dominion to be in themselves, and claimed the exclusive right to grant a title to the soil, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. The natives were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion, though not to dispose of the soil at their own will, except to the government claiming the right of preemption. The practice of Spain,^a France, Holland, and England, *proved *380 the very general recognition of the claim and title to American territories given by discovery. The United States adopted the same principle, and their exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title by purchase or conquest, and to grant the soil, and exercise such a degree of sovereignty as circumstances required, has never been judicially questioned.^b The rights of the British govern-

^a By the laws of Spain, particular portions of the soil of Louisiana were allotted to the Indians, and care was taken to make the acquisitions valuable, by preventing the intrusion of white settlers. The *Laws of the Indies* directed, that when the Indians gave up their lands to the whites, others should be assigned to them, and the lands allotted to the Indian tribes by the Spanish officers, in pursuance of the laws of the Indies, were given to them in complete ownership, equally as if they were held under a complete grant. But as the Indians were considered in a state of pupillage, the authority of the public officers, who were constituted their guardians, was necessary to a valid alienation of their property. *Recap. des las Indias*, cited by Porter, J., in 18 *Martin's Rep.* 357—359, who speaks most liberally of the humane policy and justice of the Spanish laws in relation to the Indian tribes. See, also, translations from the *Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias*, in White's *new Recopilacion*, vol. ii. p. 34. 41. 59. 95, which show the anxious and paternal care with which the Spanish laws guarded the Indians from abuse and fraud.

^b As early as 1782 the American minister, Mr. Jay, told the Spanish minister, Count d'Aranda, that our right to the territories of the Indian nations compre-

ment within the limits of the British colonies, passed to the United States by the force and effect of the act of independence, and the uniform assertion of those rights by the crown, by the colonial governments, by the individual states, and by the Union, is, no doubt, incompatible with an absolute title in the Indians. That title has been obliged to yield to the combined influence which military, intellectual, and moral power gave to the claim of the European emigrants.

(3.) This assumed but qualified dominion over the Indian tribes, regarding them as enjoying no higher title to the soil than that founded on simple occupancy, and to be incompetent to transfer their title to any other power than the government which claims the jurisdiction of their territory by right of discovery, arose, in a great degree, from the necessity of the case. To leave the Indians in possession of the country was to leave the country a wilderness, and to govern them as a distinct people, or to mix with them, and admit them to an intercommunity of privileges, was impossible under the circumstances of their relative condition. The peculiar character and habits of the Indian nations, rendered them incapable *of sustaining any other relation with the whites than that of dependence and pupilage. There was no other way of dealing with them than that of keeping them separate, subordinate, and dependent, with a guardian care thrown around them for their protection.^a The rule that the Indian title

hended within the colonial chartered limits, was a question to be discussed and settled between us and the Indians; that we claimed the *right of preemption* with respect to them, and the *sovereignty* with respect to all other nations. *Life and Writings of John Jay*, vol. ii. 474.

^a It was shown in the case of *Mitchel v. United States*, 9 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 740, that it was part of the governor's oath in the Spanish colonies, as prescribed by the laws of the Indies, *that he should take care of the welfare, increase, and protection of the Indians.*

was subordinate to the absolute, ultimate title of the government of the European colonists, and that the Indians were to be considered as occupants, and entitled to protection in peace in that character only, and incapable of transferring their right to others, was the best one that could be adopted with safety. The weak and helpless condition in which we found the Indians, and the immeasurable superiority of their civilized neighbours, would not admit of the application of any more liberal and equal doctrine to the case of Indian lands and contracts. It was founded on the pretension of converting the discovery of the country into a conquest, and it is now too late to draw into discussion the validity of that pretension, or the restrictions which it imposes. It is established by numerous compacts, treaties, laws, and ordinances, and founded on immemorial usage. The country has been colonized and settled, and is now held by that title. It is the law of the land, and no court of justice can permit the right to be disturbed by speculative reasonings on abstract rights.

This is the view of the subject which was taken by the Supreme Court in the elaborate opinion to which I have referred. The same court has since been repeatedly called upon to discuss and decide great questions concerning Indian rights and title; and the subject has of late become exceedingly grave and momentous, affecting the faith and character, if not the tranquillity and safety, of the government of the United States.

In the case of *Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia*,^a it was held by a majority of the court, that the Cherokee nation of Indians, dwelling within the jurisdictional limits of *the United States, was not a *382 *foreign state* in the sense in which the term is used in the constitution, nor entitled as such to proceed in that

^a January term, 1831, 5 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 1.

court against the state of Georgia. But it was admitted that the Cherokees were *a state*, or distinct political society, capable of managing its own affairs, and governing itself, and that they had uniformly been treated as such since the settlement of our country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United States, recognise them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, and responsible in their political capacity. Their relation to the United States was nevertheless peculiar. They were domestic dependent nations, and their relation to us resembled that of a ward to his guardian; and they had an unquestionable right to the lands they occupied, until that right should be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government. The subject was again brought forward, and the great points which it involved reasoned upon and judicially determined, in the case of *Worcester v. State of Georgia*,^a and which was another case arising out of the operation of the laws of Georgia.

The legislature of that state, in the years 1828, 1829, and 1830, passed several penal statutes, in reference to the Cherokee nation and territory. The purport and effect of those laws was to demolish the Cherokee government and institutions, and annihilate their political existence as a nation; and to divide their territory among the adjoining counties in Georgia, and extend the civil and criminal law of the state over the Indian territory. Those laws dealt with them as if they were alike destitute of civil and political privileges, and were mere tenants at sufferance, without any interest in the soil on which they dwelt, and which had been uninterruptedly claimed and enjoyed by them and their ancestors as a nation from time immemorial. Their lands had been guaranteed to them as a nation, and the protection of the United States

^a 6 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 515.

pledged to them in their national capacity, and their existence, competence, and rights, as a distinct political *society, recognised, by treaties, made with *383 them in the years 1785, 1791, 1798, 1805, 1806, 1816, 1817, and 1819, by the government of the United States, under all the forms and solemnities of treaty compacts. The statutes of Georgia nevertheless prohibited the Cherokees, under highly penal sanctions, from the exercise, within the territory they so occupied, of any political power whatever, legislative, executive, or judicial. They were declared not to be competent witnesses in any court of the state, to which a white person might be a party, unless such white person resided in the Cherokee nation; and they were also declared to be incompetent to contract with any white person. Their territory was divided into sections, and directed to be surveyed and subdivided into districts, and disposed of by lottery among the citizens of Georgia. Their gold mines were taken possession of by force, and the use of them by the Indians prohibited. They were, however, declared to be protected in the possession of their *improvements, until the legislature should enact to the contrary*, or the Indians should voluntarily abandon them.^a

^a In the session of 1831-2, the legislature of Alabama also extended the civil and criminal jurisdiction of that state over all the Indian territory within its limits, and dealt with the Indians (Creeks and Cherokees) as being under the absolute control of the state. So, also, in the session of 1833, the legislature of Tennessee extended the laws and jurisdiction of the state over the tract of country within the boundary limits of the state in the occupancy of the Cherokees. But the extension, though in violation of the treaties existing between the United States and the Cherokees, was made with mild and reasonable qualifications, in respect to the Cherokees, compared with similar acts in some other states. It secured them in the enjoyment of their improvements and personal property, and allowed them to enjoy their native usages, and prevented entry upon or occupancy of any of the lands in their territory, by white men, and exempted the Cherokee Indians from any criminal jurisdiction under the act for offences committed by them within their territory, except for murder, rape, and larceny. It was in the spirit of the act of the legislature of New-York, of 12th April, 1822, asserting exclusive criminal jurisdiction over all crimes and

The Supreme Court of the United States, *in the case of Worcester*, reviewed the whole ground of controversy, relative to the character and validity of Indian rights within the territorial dominions of the United States, and especially in reference to the Cherokee nation within the territorial limits of Georgia. They declared that the right given by European discovery was the exclusive right to purchase, but this right was not founded on a denial of the right of the Indian possessor to sell. Though the right to the soil was claimed to be in the European governments, as a necessary consequence of the right of discovery and assumption of territorial jurisdiction, yet that right was only deemed such in reference to the whites; and in respect to the Indians, it was always understood to amount only to the exclusive right of purchasing such lands as the natives were willing to sell. The royal grants and charters asserted a title to the country against Europeans only, and *384 they were considered as blank *paper, so far as the rights of the natives were concerned. The English, the French, and the Spaniards, were equal competitors for the friendship and the aid of the Indian nations. The crown of England never attempted to interfere with the national affairs of the

offences committed within the Indian Reservations in the state, by and between Indians. The Tennessee act was founded on the necessity of the case, owing to the very reduced population of the Cherokees within the state of Tennessee, and the too great imbecility of their organization and authority to preserve order, and protect themselves from atrocious crimes. The criminal jurisdiction of New-York was vindicated on that ground in *Goodell v. Jackson*, 20 *Johns. Rep.* 716; and on the same ground the act of Tennessee was vindicated in their Supreme Court, in the case of the State *v. Foreman*, a Cherokee Indian, October, 1835. 8 *Yerger*, 256. But even that decision, ably as it was supported, was resisted, with equal ability, by Judge Peck, one of the members of the court, on the ground of subsisting treaties between the United States and the Cherokees, recognising their national and self-governing authority, and which treaties did not exist in the case in New-York.

Indians, further than to keep out the agents of foreign powers, who might seduce them into foreign alliances. The English government purchased the alliance and dependence of the Indian nations by subsidies, and purchased their lands when they were willing to sell, at a price they were willing to take, but they never coerced a surrender of them. The English crown considered them as nations competent to maintain the relations of peace and war, and of governing themselves under her protection. The United States, who succeeded to the rights of the British crown in respect to the Indians, did the same, and no more; and the protection stipulated to be afforded to the Indians, and claimed by them, was understood by all parties, as only binding the Indians to the United States as dependent allies. A weak power does not surrender its independence and right to self-government by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection. This is the settled doctrine of the law of nations, and the court concluded and adjudged, that the Cherokee nation was a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia cannot rightfully have any force, and into which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress. The court accordingly considered the acts of Georgia which have been mentioned, to be repugnant to the constitution, treaties, and laws of the United States, and consequently that they were, in judgment of law, null and void.

The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States was not the promulgation of any new doctrine, for the several local governments, before and since our revolution, never regarded the Indian nations within their territorial domains *as subjects, or members *385 of the body politic, and amenable individually to

their jurisdiction. They treated the Indians within their respective territories as free and independent tribes, governed by their own laws and usages, under their own chiefs, and competent to act in a national character, and exercise self-government, and while residing within their own territories, owing no allegiance to the municipal laws of the whites. The judicial decisions in New-York and Tennessee, in 1810 and 1823, correspond with those more recently pronounced in the Supreme Court of the Union, and they explicitly recognised this historical fact and declared this doctrine.^a The original Indian nations were regarded and dealt with as proprietors of the soil which they claimed and occupied, but without the power of alienation, except to the governments which protected them, and had thrown over them, and beyond them, their assumed patented domains. Those governments asserted and enforced the exclusive right to extinguish Indian titles to lands, enclosed within the exterior lines of their jurisdictions, by fair purchase, under the sanction of treaties; and they held all individual purchases from the Indians, whether made with them individually, or collectively as tribes, to be absolutely null and void. The only power that could lawfully acquire the Indian

^a Jackson *v.* Wood, 7 *Johns. Rep.* 295. Goodell *v.* Smith, 20 *ibid.* 693. Holland *v.* Pack, *Peck's Tenn. Rep.* 151. In 1830, the Supreme Court of Tennessee stated that the act of North Carolina of 1783, (and which was part of the statute law of Tennessee,) admitted that the Cherokees were an independent people and not citizens of that state; that they were governed by their own laws, and not subject to the legislature of North Carolina. The court declared that grants from that state of Indian lands were valid as between the state and the grantees, but that they were subject to the Indian right and title of exclusive occupancy and enjoyment. Blair & Johnson *v.* Pathkiller, 2 *Yerger*, 407. The legislature of New-York, so late as 1813, by statute, authorized the governor "to hold a treaty or treaties on the part of the people of this state, with the Oneida nation of Indians, or any other of the Indian nations or tribes within this state, for the purpose of extinguishing their claim to such part of their lands, lying within this state, as he may deem proper, for such sums and annuities as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties." *Laws of New-York*, 36th sess. ch. 130.

title was the state, and a government grant was the only lawful source of title admitted in the courts of justice. The colonial and state governments, and the government of the United States, uniformly dealt upon these principles with the Indian nations dwelling *within *386 their territorial limits. The Indian tribes placed themselves under the protection of the whites, and they were cherished as dependent allies, but subject to such restraints and qualified control in their national capacity, as was considered by the whites to be indispensable to their own safety, and requisite to the due discharge of the duty of that protection.^a

(4.) There has been considerable diversity of opinion and much ingenious speculation, on the claim of right to this country by the Europeans, founded on the title by discovery. We have seen that with respect to the English colonists in America, the claim was modified, and much of its extravagance destroyed, by conceding to the native tribes their political rights and privileges, as dependent allies, and their qualified title to the soil. As far as Indian rights and territories were defined and acknowledged by the whites by treaty, there was no question in the case, for the whites were bound by the

^a In *Mitchel v. United States*, 9 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 711. 745, 746, the Supreme Court once more declared the same general doctrine, that lands in possession of friendly Indians were always, under the colonial governments, considered as being owned by the tribe or nation, as their common property, by a perpetual right of possession; that the ultimate fee was in the crown or its grantees subject to this right of possession, and could be granted by the crown upon that condition; that individuals could not purchase Indian lands without license, or under rules prescribed by law; that possession was considered with reference to Indian habits and modes of life, and the hunting grounds of the tribes were as much in their actual occupation as the cleared fields of the whites, and this was the tenure of Indian lands by the laws of all the colonies. Grants and sales by the Indians at Indian treaties, under the sanction of the local governments, gave a valid title. The doctrine was in that case applied to grants of lands in Florida, from the Creek and Seminole Indians, under the sanction of the Spanish authorities.

moral and national obligations of contract and good faith. And as far as Indian nations had formed themselves into regular organized governments, within reasonable and definite limits necessary for the hunter state, there would seem also to be no ground to deny the absolute nature of their territorial and political rights. But beyond these points our colonial ancestors were not willing to go. They seem to have deemed it to be unreasonable, and a perversion of the duties and design of the human race, to bar the Europeans, with their implements of husbandry and the arts, with their laws, their learning, their liberty, and their religion, from all entrance into this mighty continent, lest they might trespass upon some part of the interminable forests, deserts, and hunting grounds of an uncivilized, erratic, and savage race of men. Nor could they be brought to entertain much respect for the loose and attenuated claim of such occupants, to the exclusive use of a country evidently fitted and intended by Providence to be subdued and cultivated, and to become the residence of civilized nations.

It was part of the original destiny and duty of
*387 the human *race to *subdue the earth and till the ground from whence they were taken*. The white race of men, as Governor Pownall observed, have been “land-workers from the beginning;” and if unsettled and sparsely scattered tribes of hunters and fishermen show no disposition or capacity to emerge from the savage to the agricultural and civilized state of man, their right to keep some of the fairest portions of the earth a mere wilderness, filled with wild beasts, for the sake of hunting, becomes utterly inconsistent with the civilization and moral improvement of mankind. Vattel did not place much value on the territorial rights of erratic races of people, who sparsely inhabited immense regions, and suffered them to remain a wilderness, because their occupation was war, and their subsistence drawn chiefly from

the forest. He observed that the cultivation of the soil was an obligation imposed by nature upon mankind, and that the human race could not well subsist, or greatly multiply, if rude tribes, which had not advanced from the hunter state, were entitled to claim and retain all the boundless regions through which they might wander. If such a people will usurp more territory than they can subdue and cultivate, they have no right to complain, if a nation of cultivators puts in a claim for a part, and confines the natives within narrower limits. He alluded to the establishment of the French and English colonies in North America, as being, in his opinion, entirely lawful, and he extolled the moderation of William Penn, and of the first settlers in New-England, who are understood to have fairly purchased of the natives, from time to time, the lands they wished to colonize.^a

The original English emigrants came to this country with no slight confidence in the solidity of such doctrines, and in their right to possess, subdue, and cultivate the American wilderness, as being, by the law of nature and the gift of Providence, open and common to the first occupants in the *character of cultivators of *388 the earth. The great patent of New-England, which was the foundation of the subsequent titles and subordinate charters in that country, and the opinions of grave and learned men, tended to confirm that confidence. According to Chalmers, the practice of the European world had constituted a law of nations, which sternly disregarded the possession of the aborigines, because they had not been admitted into the society of nations.^b But whatever *loose opinions might *389

^a *Droit des Gens*, c. 1. sec. 81. 209.

^b *Chalmers' Political Annals*, 676. The Puritans circulated a paper in England, immediately preceding their projected emigration to Massachusetts' Bay, entitled, *General Considerations for the Plantation of New-England*. *Mather's Magnalia*, vol. i. 65. edit. 1820. It was published at large in

have been entertained, or latitudinary doctrines inculcated, in favour of the abstract right to possess and colonize America, it is certain that in point of fact the colo-

Hutchinson's State Papers, (Boston, 1769, p. 27,) and it declared, that "the whole earth was the Lord's garden, and he had given it to the sons of Adam, to be tilled and improved by them. Why then should any stand starving for places of habitation, and in the mean time suffer whole countries, as profitable for the use of man, to lie waste without any improvement." In answer to the objection, that they had no warrant for taking land a long time possessed by other sons of Adam, it was stated, that what "was common to all was proper to none. This savage people ruleth over many lands without title or property, for they enclose no ground, neither have they cattle to maintain it. There was more than enough for them and us. By a miraculous plague, a great part of the country was left void of inhabitants. Finally, they would come in with good leave of the natives." We may also refer to an able paper, written by the Rev. Mr. Bulkley, of Colchester, in Connecticut, in 1724, entitled, "An inquiry into the right of the Aboriginal Natives to the Lands in America, and the Titles derived from them." *Massachusetts Historical Collections*, vol. iv. 159. In that treatise, the learned author confines Indian titles, which have any solidity or value, to those particular parcels of land which they had subdued and improved, and insists that the English had an undoubted right to enter, and appropriate for agricultural purposes, all the residue of the waste and unimproved lands in the country, as being common, and open to the first *bona fide* occupants. He contended, that in a state of nature, the only title to property was the labour by which the same was appropriated and cultivated, and that the Indian tribes were still in that imperfect state of civil policy which borders upon a state of nature, and the extensive tracts of country which they claimed as national property, was not subject to any regulation, or defined as property, and lay neglected in that common state wherein nature had left it. Cotton Mather, also, in his *Magnalia Christi Americana*, (vol. i. 72,) considered it as an instance of the most imaginable civility, that the English purchased several tracts of land of the natives, *notwithstanding the patent which they had for the country*. The great patent of New-England, granted by King James, in 1620, to the council at Plymouth, in England, (and which was by the patent incorporated by the name of "the council established at Plymouth, in the county of Devon, for the planting, ruling, and governing of New-England, in America,") recited, that the king's subjects had "taken actual possession of the continent mentioned in the patent, in the name and to the use of the king, as sovereign lord thereof; that there were no other subjects of any Christian king or state, by any authority from their sovereign lords or princes, actually in possession of any of the lands between the degrees of forty and forty-eight; that the country being depopulated by pestilence and devastation, the appointed time had come in which Almighty God had thought fit and determined that those large and goodly territories, deserted as it were by their natural inhabitants, should be possessed and enjoyed by such of his subjects as should be conducted thither; that the settlement would tend to the reducing and conversion of such savages as remained wandering in desolation and distress, to civil society and the Christian religion, and to the enlargement of the king's dominions." The grant was of all the continent between the fortieth and forty-

nists were not satisfied, or did not deem it expedient, to settle the country without the consent of the aborigines, procured by fair purchase, under the sanction of the civil authorities. The pretensions of the patent of King James were not relied on, and the prior Indian right to the soil of the country was generally, if not uniformly recognised and respected by the New-England Puritans.^a They always negotiated with the Indian nations as distinct and independent powers; and neither the right of pre-emption, which was *uniformly claimed and exer- *390-
cised, nor the state of dependence and pupilage under which the Indian tribes within their territorial limits were necessarily placed, were carried so far as to destroy the existence of the Indians as self-governing communities.^b The manner in which the people of this

eighth degrees of north latitude, and “in length by all the breadth aforesaid throughout the main land from sea to sea, provided the same, or any part, be not actually possessed or inhabited by any other Christian prince or state,” and to be called by the name of “New-England in America.” The grant was to forty corporators, consisting of noblemen, knights, and gentlemen of high distinction; and their successors were to be supplied from time to time by the choice of the company. The whole territory was granted to the corporation to be held of the crown in free and common socage, and with absolute power of legislation and government over the whole country, and with a complete monopoly of its trade. Subsequent grants of the soil of Massachusetts and Maine issued from this company. See the patent at large in *Hazard’s State Papers*, vol. i. 103, and in *Baylie’s Historical Memoir*, vol. i. 160, and in the *Plymouth Colony Laws*, edited and published by William Brigham, in 1836. The charter of the colony of New-Plymouth, in 1629, was granted by that company, and is also given at large in that last work.

^a The excellent Roger Williams, the earliest and clearest asserter of the rights and sanctity of conscience in matters of religion, wrote an essay, in which he maintained that an English patent could not invalidate the rights of the native inhabitants of this country; and it was at first condemned by the government in Massachusetts, in 1634, as sounding like treason against the cherished charter of the colony. *Bancroft’s History*, vol. i. 400.

^b When the Puritans of New-England first settled at Plymouth, and made treaties with the Indians, those treaties bore the language of dependence and submission; and the English accepted of the acknowledgments of the sachems that they were *dependent*, and *allies*, and *loyal subjects of King James*. *Morton’s New-England Memorial*, 64. 67. 236. *Baylie’s Historical Memoir*, vol. i. 66. 82. *Plymouth Colony Laws*, app. p. 305. edit. 1836. But when war

country, through all periods of their colonial history, treated and dealt with the Indians, is a subject of deep interest, and well worthy of the thorough and accurate examination of every person conversant with our laws and history, and whose bosom glows with a generous warmth for the honour and welfare of his country.

(5.) The settlement of that part of America now composing the United States, has been attended with as little violence and aggression, on the part of the whites, in a national point of view, as were compatible with the fact of the entry of a race of civilized men into the territory of savages, and with the power and the determination to reclaim and occupy it. The colony of Massachusetts, in 1633, prohibited the purchase of lands from the natives, without license from the government; and the colony of Plymouth, in 1643, passed

was about commencing with King Philip, in 1675, he insisted that all former agreements with Plymouth were, as he truly apprehended they were, agreements of amity and not of subjection, and the Indians regarded themselves as allies, and not as subjects of England. Those Indian stipulations were regarded by Massachusetts as amounting only to a state of qualified dependence. The Indians in Connecticut were always treated as friends and allies, and as a free people, though regarded in some degree as wards of the colony. The great object of the regulations in the Revised Statutes of Connecticut, of 1672 and 1702, was to protect, civilize, and christianize the Indians, and this protection is continued down to this day. *Baylie's Historical Memoir*, vol. ii. part 3. 23. *Trumbull's History of Connecticut*, vol. i. 342. *Revised Statutes of Connecticut*, 1821, p. 279. note. *Ibid.* p. 303. *Chalmers' Political Annals*, 398. As further evidence of the truth of the historical deductions mentioned in the text, we may refer to the king's proclamation of the 7th of October, 1763, after the treaty of Paris, founded on the immense acquisition of territory by England, under that treaty. It declared, "that the several nations or tribes of Indians with whom we were connected, and who live under our protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the possession of such parts of our dominions and territories, as, not having been ceded or purchased by us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their hunting grounds." "And all the lands and territories lying to the westward of the sources of the rivers, which fall into the Atlantic Ocean from the west or north-west, were declared to be reserved under the king's sovereignty, protection, and dominion, for the use of the said Indians; and all purchases, or settlements, or taking possession of any of the lands so reserved, without the king's special leave and license first obtained, were strictly forbidden." *Doddsley's Ann. Reg.* for 1763, p. 208.

a similar law. Very strong and authentic evidence of the distinguished moderation and equity of the New-England governments towards the Indians, is to be found in the letter of Governor Winslow, of the Plymouth colony, of the 1st May, 1676, in which he states, that before King Philip's war, the English did not possess one foot of land in that colony but what was fairly obtained, by honest purchase, from the Indian proprietors, and with the knowledge and allowance of the general court.^a The New-England annals abound with proofs of a just dealing with the Indians in respect to their lands. The people of all the New-England colonies settled their towns upon the basis of a title procured by fair purchase from the Indians, with the consent of government, except in the few instances of lands acquired by conquest, after a war deemed to have been just and necessary.^b Instances are to be met with in the early annals of New-England, of regular and exemplary punishment of white persons, for acts of injustice and violence towards the Indians.^c The Massachusetts Legislature, in 1633, threw the protection of its government over the Indians in the enjoyment of their improved lands, hunting grounds, and

^a *Hazard's Collections of State Papers*, vol. ii. 531—534. *Holmes' American Annals*, vol. i. 383. *Hubbard's Narrative*.

^b *Holmes' Annals*, vol. i. 166—169. 220. 231. note 4. 233. 245. 248. 259. 312. 317. *Winthrop's History*, vol. i. 259. *Hazard's State Papers*, vol. ii. *passim*. *Massachusetts Historical Collections*, *passim*. *Trumbull's Hist. of Connecticut*, vol. i. 113—117. *Sullivan's Hist. District of Maine*, 143—149. *Dwight's Travels*, vol. i. 167. *Baylie's Hist. Memoir*, vol. i. 287. *Statutes of Connecticut*, passed in 1702, 1717, and 1722. We find in the *Statutes of Connecticut* of 1838, special provisions enacted as late as 1834, 1835, and 1836, for the protection of the lands of the *Mohegan*, *Pequot*, and *Niantic* tribes of Indians within that state. So the *Revised Statutes of Massachusetts* of 1835, contain exemption of the Indians within that commonwealth from taxation, and allow them some special privileges, and provision for the support of common schools among the *Marshpee* Indians, but all marriages between them and the whites are declared void.

^c *Winthrop's Hist. of New-England*, vol. i. 34. 267. 269. *Baylie's Hist. Memoir*, vol. i. 245—248. *Morton's New-England Memorial*, 207.

fishing places, *by declaring that they should have relief in any of the courts as the English have.^a

The government of the colony of New-York has a claim equally fair with that of any part of America, to a policy uniformly just, temperate, and pacific, towards the Indians within the limits of its jurisdiction. While the Dutch held and governed the colony, the Indian titles were always respected, and extinguished by fair means, and with the consent of the natives. This policy was continued by their conquerors, and on the first settlement of the English at New-York, in 1665, it was ordained, that no purchase of lands from the Indians should be valid without the governor's license, and the execution of the purchase in his presence; and this salutary check to fraud and injustice was essentially continued.^b Regulations of that kind have been the invariable American policy. The king, by proclamation, soon after the peace of 1763, prohibited purchases of Indian lands, unless at a public assembly of the Indians, and in the name of the crown, and under the superintendence of his colonial authorities. A prohibition of individual purchases of Indian lands, without the consent of government, has since been made a constitutional provision in New-York, Virginia, and North Carolina. The colonists of New-York settled in the neighbourhood of the most formidable

*393 Indian confederacy known to the country, *and

^a *Holmes' Annals*, vol. i. 217, 218.

^b *Smith's Hist. of New-York*, vol. i. 39. *Duke of York's Laws*, in the *Collections of the New-York Historical Society*, vol. i. *Wood's Sketch of the First Settlement of Long Island*, 12. 22, 23. *Collections of the New-York Historical Society*, vol. i. 171. 211. 224. 227. 239. As evidence of the just and friendly disposition of the Dutch towards the Indians, we have the interesting fact, that the Minesink Valley, on the Delaware, was settled by Dutch emigrants as early as 1644; and being an industrious, quiet, and pious people, and having purchased the lands from the Indians, they lived in uninterrupted peace and friendship with them for upwards of one hundred years. *Preston's Notices of Minesink*, published 1829.

came in contact with their possessions. But the six nations of Indians, of which the Mohawks were the head, placed themselves and their lands under the protection of the government of New-York, from the earliest periods of the colony administration.^a They were considered and treated as separate but dependent nations, and the friendship which subsisted between them and the Dutch, and their successors, the English, was cemented by treaties, alliances, and kind offices. It continued unshaken from the first settlement of the Dutch on the shores of the Hudson and the Mohawk, down to the period of the American war; and the fidelity of that friendship is shown by the most honourable and the most undoubted attestations.^b And when we consider the long and distressing wars in which the six nations were involved, on our account, with the Canadian French, and the artful means which were used, from time to time, to detach them from our alliance, it must be granted, that the faith of treaties has no where, and at no time, been better observed, or maintained with a more intrepid spirit, than by those generous barbarians.^c

^a *Colden's History of the Five Nations, passim. Governor Pownall's Administration of the Colonies, 268—274. Journals of the Confederation Congress, vol. i. May 1, 1782.*

^b The speech of the Indian *Good Peter* to the commissioners at Fort Schuyler, in 1788, is strong proof of the fact. He said, that "when the white men first came into the country, they were few and feeble, and the five nations numerous and powerful. The Indians were friendly to the white men, and permitted them to settle in the country, and protected them from their enemies." *Collections of the New-York Historical Society, vol. iii. 326.*

^c *Colden's History of the Five Nations of Canada, dependent on the Province of New-York, vol. i. 84. et passim. Chalmer's Political Annals, 576.* The confederacy of the Iroquois or five nations (and which was known as the confederacy of the six nations after the Tuscaroras were admitted into the union) might afford the subject of an historical sketch, in the hands of a master, replete with the deepest interest and curiosity. It was distinguished, from the time of the first discovery of the Hudson down to the war of 1756, for its power, policy, and martial spirit. At the close of the seventeenth century, that confederacy was computed to contain 10,000 fighting men. *Burke's Account of the European Settlements in America, vol. ii. 193.* But this was a very ex-

In New-Jersey, the proprietaries very early secured all their titles by Indian purchases ; and all purchases
 *395 to be made, *without the consent of the govern-

aggerated computation, for, in 1677, an intelligent traveller, (*Wentworth Greenthalph*,) who visited the five nations, computed the whole number of fighting men at 2150. In 1747 they were supposed not to exceed 1500. The great influence of Sir William Johnson is said to have collected only 1000 Indians for so exciting an expedition as that against Montreal, in 1760. *Douglass' Summary of the British Settlements in North America*, vol. i. 185, 186. *Annual Register* for 1760. *Chalmers' Political Annals*, 609. In 1763, according to a census then taken, the number of warriors of the six nations amounted to 1950. *Stone's Life of Brant*, vol. i. 86. note. The five nations, during the time of their ascendancy and glory, extended their dominion on every side, and levied tribute on distant tribes. They blockaded Quebec for several months, about the year 1660, with 700 warriors. *Proud's History of Pennsylvania*, vol. ii. 294. *Hawkins' Quebec*, 305. The Mohawks were the terror and scourge of all the New-England Indians, and those dwelling west of Connecticut River paid them tribute. *Trumbull's History of Connecticut*, vol. i. They extended their conquests down the Hudson to Manhattan Island, and subdued the Canarse Indians on the west end of Long Island. *Wood's Sketch of the First Settlement of Long Island*, 1824, p. 24. The Iroquois pushed their conquests to Lake Huron, and fought desperate actions with the Hurons and the Chippewas on the borders of Lake Superior, and Mr. Schoolcraft very reasonably attributes their superiority in war over the western tribes to their early use of fire-arms instead of the bow and war-club. *Charlevoix (Travels in Canada)*, vol. i. 152. 167. 171.) speaks in strong terms of the power and fierceness of the Iroquois, who, as early as 1720, had almost extirpated the Algonquins, the Hurons, and other tribes of Canadian savages. Mr. *Thompson*, in his *History of Long Island*, New-York, 1839, p. 56, says, that the Iroquois or six nations were Algonquins, and that the Algonquin or Chippeway race of Indians, embraced anciently all the tribes in New-England, and New-York, and the fact is derived, he says, from identity of language. This point is not within my means of research; and recurring back to the Mohawks, Governor Colden was well acquainted with their history, and by means of his office of Surveyor General of the Province of New-York, he had access to the most authentic sources of information. He wrote the first part of his *History of the Five Nations* as early as 1727, and he says, that they carried their arms to the Carolinas and the banks of the Mississippi, and entirely destroyed many Indian nations. The Chevalier Tonti accompanied M. De la Salle in his expedition and discoveries on the great lakes and the Mississippi, in 1678—1684, and was appointed Governor of Fort St. Louis on the River Illinois, and he mentions the remarkable fact, that in 1684 about 500 Iroquois warriors came and attacked his fort, being jealous of the new establishment. Account of De la Salle's discoveries, by M. Tonti, inserted in the *Collections of the New-York Historical Society*, vol. ii. 286. In 1684, Lord Howard, Governor of Virginia, was under the necessity of meeting the chiefs of the five nations at Albany, in order, by negotiation, to check their excursions to the south. *Colden's History*, vol. i. 44—53. In the Indian war in Virginia, which terminated in 1677, all the Indian tribes on the east side of

ment, were, by a law, in 1682, declared to be void. In west New-Jersey, in 1676, the liberality of the Quaker influence went so far as to provide by law, that in all trials where Indians, being natives of the province, were concerned, the jury was to consist of six persons of the neighbourhood and six Indians.^a In 1758, the Indians, at a treaty at Easton, released, for a valuable consideration, all claims to lands in New-Jersey,^b and the legisla-

the Alleghany ridge became tributaries of the province, but protected by the whites in their persons and property. The five nations kept superior to any such subjection, and though their head quarters, or great council place, was at Onondaga, in the western part of New-York, they continued their hostile marches along the frontiers of Virginia. A treaty was at length made with them, in 1722, by which they stipulated not to cross the Potomac, or pass to the eastward of the great mountains; and the tributary Indians of Virginia agreed, on their part, not to pass the same to the north or west; and *by a colony statute, any tributary Indians violating the treaty were to be transported and sold as slaves.* 4 *Randolph's Rep.* 633. But the ambitious spirit and daring enterprise of the six nations continued to a much later period. An intelligent old Mohawk Indian communicated the fact to General Schuyler, that in his early life he was one of a party of Mohawks who left their castles on an expedition against the Chickasaws, in Carolina. The expedition was disastrous, and the Chickasaws destroyed them by an attack in ambush, and only two, of which he was one, escaped. His companion fled to St. Augustine, but he returned home by land, and supplied himself on his long journey, with food, by his bow and arrow. He cautiously avoided all Indian settlements, and did not see the face of a human being from the time he fled from the battle, in Carolina, until he reached the Mohawk castles. This anecdote I received, in the year 1803, from General Schuyler, who appeared to place implicit confidence in its accuracy; and no person was more competent to afford precise information on every subject connected with our colonial history, and Indian affairs, than that very intelligent and accomplished man.

The Six Nations of Indians within the State of New-York, by their paucity of numbers and insignificance, (with the exception perhaps of the Senecas,) have at last ceased to exist in a distinct national capacity as tribes, exercising self-government, with a sufficient competency to protect themselves. Upon this fact the laws of New-York (*Act of April 12, 1822, ch. 204. Revised Statutes, vol. ii. 697.*) have asserted the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the state over all crimes and offences committed on the Indian Reservations, as well as elsewhere. In September, 1836, there was a treaty concluded between the United States and the New-York Indians (being the remains of the six nations) relative to their voluntary removal to the Indian territory west of the state of Missouri, and it contained liberal provisions for their removal and support.

^a *Leaming & Spicer's Collections*, 273. 400, 401. 479. 667.

^b *Annual Register* for 1759, 191. In 1831, the legislature of New-Jersey passed an act to extinguish the title of the Delaware tribe of Indians to the

ture of Pennsylvania, in 1783, asserted it to have been their uniform practice, to extinguish Indian titles *396 by fair purchase. *The justice and equity of the original Indian purchases by William Penn, the founder of Pennsylvania, particularly at his memorable treaty of 1682, were known and celebrated throughout Europe.^a So, Governor Calvert, in 1633, planted Maryland, after fair purchases from the Indians; and in 1644, all Indian purchases, without the consent of the proprietary of the province, were declared, by law, to be illegal and void.^b There are also repeated proofs upon record, of purchases from Indians, which covered a considerable part of the lower country of Virginia; and Mr. Jefferson says, that the upper country was acquired by purchases made in the most unexceptionable form.^c The cases of unauthorized intrusions upon Indian lands happened in the early settlement of Virginia;^d for laws were very soon made in Virginia to protect Indians in their territorial possessions and rights from the frauds of the whites.^e Georgia was settled under similar good auspices; and Savannah, with a considerable tract of land, was purchased from the Creek Indians, by Governor Ogelthorpe, in 1733 and 1738, under the sanction of solemn treaties. In 1763, a large cession of lands in Georgia,

fisheries in the rivers and bays of the state by the payment of the consideration of \$2000, though the act declared that the right was to be considered as barred by a voluntary abandonment of the use of it.

^a *Watson*, in his *Annals of Philadelphia*, in 1830, has given some curious details respecting the localities of the spot where William Penn held his first Indian treaty, a treaty memorable in diplomatic annals for the simplicity and moral grandeur of the spectacle, and its auspicious and permanent influence upon the minds of the Indians. The chain of friendship then formed, continued, says Proud, (*History of Pennsylvania*, vol. i. 212,) uninterruptedly for more than seventy years.

^b *Chalmers' Annals*, 216.

^c *Jefferson's Notes on Virginia*, 153.

^d *Chalmers*, b. 1. 58.

^e *Abr. Laws of Virginia*, 96.

was also made by the Creeks, Cherokees, and other nations of Indians.

The historical facts and documents to which we have referred, relative to the acquisition of the Indian lands in this country, are sufficient to vindicate the justice and moderation *of our colonial ancestors. But *397 wars with the natives resulted, almost inevitably, from the intrusion of the whites. The origin of those wars is not imputable to any general spirit of unkindness or injustice on the part of the colonial authorities, though they sometimes exhibited signal and severe proofs of the display of superior power and cruel retaliation.^a There

^a The cases I allude to, in New-England, were the incursions upon the Indian settlements on Block Island; the extirpation of the Pequots; the occasional execution of sachems and other prisoners of war; the giving of rewards or a bounty for Indian scalps, and the sale of captives, including women and children, for slaves. See *Winthrop's History of New-England*, vol. i. 192—199. 232—237. *Ibid.* vol. ii. 131—134. *Penhallows' Indian Wars*. *Morton's New-England Memorial*, by Davis, app. 452—455. *Hutchinson's History of Massachusetts*, vol. i. 307. *Holmes' American Annals*, vol. i. 181. 237—241. 272. *Baylie's Historical Memoir*, vol. ii. *Trumbull's History of Connecticut*, vol. i. 112. In *Potter's Early History of Narragansett*, *passim*, to be found in the “Collections of the Rhode-Island Historical Society, vol. iii,” the injustice and cruelty of the early New-England Puritans in their dealings and wars with the Indians, are the subject of bold and severe animadversion. The most reprehensible conduct towards the Indians was that in Carolina, of fomenting hostilities among the tribes, in order to purchase or kidnap Indian captives, and sell them for slaves in the West Indies. Mr. Grahame, on the authority of Archdale, Oldmixon, Hewit, and Chalmers, states this fact, and says that it was not until after persevering and vehement remonstrances, that a law was procured, first to regulate, and then to extirpate this profligate practice. *Grahame's History of the American Colonies*, vol. ii. 135, 136. The Indians, except free Indians in amity with the government, formerly were, if they be not still, regarded in some of the states as fit subjects for slavery, like negroes, by applying to them the maxim that *partus sequitur ventrem*. *Stroud's Sketch of the Laws relating to Slavery*, 11, 12. *Butt v. Rachel*, 4 *Munf.* 209. *The State v. Van Wagenan*, 1 *Halsted*, 374. The American Indians, on every part of the coasts of America, were, for a long time after the discovery of Columbus, kidnapped and sold as slaves in Europe and the West Indies. The practice was as early as 1520, and continued for nearly two centuries. The public mind was deeply vitiated on this subject. The sale and slavery of Indians was deemed lawful, and the exile and bondage of captives in war, of all conditions, was sanctioned by the sternest Puritans. 1 *Bancroft's History*, 41. 43. 180—182. But the

were also, at times, acts of fraud and violence committed by individual colonists, prompted by cupidity and a consciousness of superior skill and power, and springing from a very blunt sense of the rights of savages.^a The causes of wars with the Indians were inherent in the nature of the case. They arose from Indian jealousy of the presence and location of white people, for the Indians had the sagacity to perceive, what the subsequent history of this country has abundantly verified, that the destruction of their race must be the consequence of the settlements of the English, and their extension over the country.^b And if wars with them were never

*398 *unjustly provoked by the colonial governments or people, yet they were, no doubt, stimulated on the part of the Indians, by the consciousness of impending

act of Virginia, in 1679, declaring Indian prisoners, taken in war, to be slaves to the soldiers taking them; and, another act, in 1682, declaring that all Indians, sold by other Indians to the colonists as slaves, should be slaves, were repealed as early as 1691. *Hudgins v. Wrights*, 1 *Henning & Munf.* 136. *Pallas v. Hill*, 2 *ibid.* 149; or according to the case of *Robin v. Hardaway*, *Jefferson's Rep.* 109, not until 1705, when Indian slave-laws ceased in Virginia.

^a *Hutchinson's History*, vol. i. 5. 283. *Holmes' Annals*, vol. i. 147, 148.

^b The war with the Pequots in 1637, and the confederacy of Indian nations formed in 1675, by Metacom, the sachem of the Wampanoags, commonly called King Philip, would seem to have been formed by the influence of these patriotic views on the part of the Indians. This is the conclusion as to those wars, which is drawn by an able and learned colonial annalist. *Chalmers' Political Annals*, 291. 393. So the efforts of Pontiac, in 1763 and subsequently, and of Tecumseh, between 1806 and 1814, to unite the Indian nations in the west, in a great confederacy, for expelling the whites from the Mississippi Valley, were made under the same impulse. The massacre of the whites in Virginia, in 1644, arose, says Governor Winthrop, (and he wrote from contemporary information which came from the Indians,) because the Indians saw the English took up all their lands, and would drive them out of the country. *Winthrop's History*, by *Savage*, vol. ii. 164. See, also, *Bancroft's History*, vol. i. 194, 195. The proud Mohawks more patiently submitted to their impending fate; for sagaciously dreading the rapid progress of the white population, they, in 1735, conveyed a very valuable part of their territory to the corporation of Albany, to take effect upon the total dissolution of their tribe, and this deed Governor Cosby afterwards wantonly destroyed. *Smith's History of New-York*, vol. ii. 30. The Mohawks, as the New-York House of Assembly observed, in an address, in 1764, (*Journals of the Assembly*, vol. ii. 765,) were the least populous, most easily managed, best affected, and most intelligent of all the Indians.

danger, the suggestions of patriotism, and the influence of a fierce and lofty spirit of national independence. In all their wars with the whites, the means and the power of the parties were extremely unequal, and the Indians were sure to come out of the contest with great loss of numbers and territory, if not with almost total extermination. There was always much in the Indian character, in its earlier and better state, to excite admiration, as there was, and still is, in their sufferings, to excite sympathy.

The government of the United States, since the period of our independence, has pursued a steady system of pacific, just, and paternal policy towards the Indians, within their wide spread territories. It has never insisted upon any other claim to the Indian lands, than the right of preemption, upon fair terms; and the plan of permanent annuities, which the United States, and the state of New-York, among others, have adopted, as one main ingredient in the consideration of purchases, has been attended with beneficial effects.^a The efforts of the national government to protect the Indians from wars with each other, from their own propensity to intemperance,

^a As evidence of the extent of the dealings of the United States with the Indians, and of the pecuniary expenditures and annuities granted to them, or on their account, under treaty stipulations, we may refer to the act of Congress of the 3d March, 1835, ch. 50, which made an annual appropriation to one million eight hundred and thirty thousand dollars and upwards, to the following nations and tribes, viz: The *six nations* of Indians in New-York, the *Senecas*, *Ottawas*, *Wyandotts*, *Munsees*, *Delawares*, the *Christian Indians*, the *Miamies*, *Eel River's Pottawattamies*, *Pottawattamies* of Huron, of the *Prairie*, of the *Wabash*, of *Indiana*; the *Chippewas*, *Winnebagoes*, *Menomonies*, the *Siouxs* of *Mississippi*; the *Yancton* and *Santie Bands*, *Omahas*, *Sacs* of *Missouri*, the *Sacs*, *Foxes*, *Ioways*, *Ottocs*, *Missourias*, *Kanzas*, *Osages*, *Kickapoos*, *Kaskasias*, and *Peorias*, the *Weas*, *Piankeshaws*, *Shawanees*, *Senecas* of *Lewis-town*, *Chocktaws*, *Chickasaws*, *Creeks*, the *Creeks* East, the *Creeks* West, the *Cherokees*, the *Cherokees* West, the *Quapaws*, the *Florida* Indians, and the *Pawnees*. Similar specific appropriations were made, in subsequent years, for Indian annuities, &c.; and these annual provisions for expenditures incurred on account of the Indians under the guardianship of the United States, cover annual stipulations, arising under Indian treaties, from the year 1790 down to this day.

from the frauds and injustice of the whites, and
*399 *to impart to them some of the essential blessings
of civilization, have been steady and judicious,
and reflect lustre on our national character.^a This affords
some consolation under a view of the melancholy contrast
between the original character of the Indians, when the
Europeans first visited them, and their present condition.
We then found them, a numerous, enterprising, and proud
spirited race; and we now find them, a feeble and degra-
ded remnant, rapidly hastening to annihilation. The
neighbourhood of the whites seems, hitherto, to have had
an immoral influence upon Indian manners and habits,
and to have destroyed all that was noble and elevated in
the Indian character. They have generally, and with
some very limited exceptions, been unable to share in the
enjoyments, or to exist in the presence, of civilization;
and judging from their past history, the Indians of this
continent appear to be destined, at no very distant period
of time, to disappear with those vast forests which once
covered the country, and the existence of which seems
essential to their own.^b

^a In the ordinance of Congress of 13th of July, 1787, for the *Government of the Territory of the United States, north-west of the river Ohio*, it was made a fundamental article of compact between the original states and the people and states in the said territory, that the utmost good faith should always be observed towards the Indians. Their lands and property should never be taken from them, without their consent. In their property, rights, and liberty they never should be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; and just and humane laws, should from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and friendship with them.

^b An able and well instructed writer in the *North American Review*, N. S. vol. xiii. (1826,) art. 5, has satisfactorily shown that the intentions of the government of the United States, in their treatment of the Indians, and in all their intercourse with them, have been uniformly just and benevolent. This was the case down to the year 1829. But under the administration of President Jackson, the policy and course of conduct of the government of the United States, in respect to the Indian tribes on the east side of the Mississippi, and south of the Ohio and the Potomac, has essentially changed. The Act of Congress of May 28th, 1830, ch. 148, first gave legislative sanction to the policy and plan of exchanging the Indian lands, within the limits of the individual states, for portions of the

unoccupied territory of the United States, west of the Mississippi, and for causing the Indian tribes or nations, east of the Mississippi, to be removed and established in that western territory. The plan was further matured by the Act of Congress of July 14th, 1832, ch. 228, and the execution of it became the systematic and settled policy of the administration of President Jackson. The protection which was directed to be afforded to the Indians, under the act of Congress of 30th March, 1802, and which was stipulated, by treaties, to be granted to them, has been withdrawn; and the Cherokees, in particular, have been left in a defenceless state, to the penal laws of the state of Georgia. The President, by his message to Congress, of the 15th of February, 1832, declared his conviction, "that the destiny of the Indians within the settled portion of the United States, depends upon their entire and speedy migration to the country west of the Mississippi," and that if any of the Indians repel the offer of removal, they must remain "with such privileges and disabilities as the respective states within whose jurisdiction they be, may prescribe." He said, again, in his message to Congress, of December 7th, 1835, that "the plan of removing the aboriginal people, who yet remain within the settled portions of the United States, to the country west of the Mississippi, ought to be persisted in till the object is accomplished, and prosecuted with as much vigour as a just regard to their circumstances will permit, and as fast as their consent can be obtained. All preceding experiments for the improvement of the Indians have failed. They cannot live in contact with a civilized community and prosper."

*The case of the southern Indians is one which appears to be, in every *400 view, replete with difficulty and danger; and especially when we consider the different and conflicting views which have been taken of their rights, by the supreme executive and judicial authorities of the Union.

Since the preceding part of this note was written, and in 1838, those Indians have finally been expelled, by military force, from the southern states, and transported across the Mississippi. President Van Buren, in his message to Congress, of the 4th December, 1838, entered into an elaborate vindication of the policy of the Federal Government in the removal of the Indian nations from the east to the west side of the Mississippi, and held that a mixed occupancy of the same territory by the white and red man, was incompatible with the safety and happiness of either, and that their removal was dictated by necessity. He stated that the exclusive and peaceable possession of their new territory, west of any of the states, was guaranteed to them by the United States, and that since the 4th of March, 1829, the Indian title to upwards of one hundred and sixteen millions of acres of land had been acquired, and that the United States had paid upwards of seventy-two millions of dollars to and on behalf of the Indians, in permanent annuities, lands, reservations, and the necessary expense of removal and settlement of them.

The condition of the Indian tribes in the north-western part of the United States, is also deplorably wretched. They have outlived, in a great degree, the means of subsistence in the hunter state, and the tribes west of Lake Michigan, and on the waters of the Upper Mississippi, are unable to procure the requisite food and clothing. They perish from diseases incident to savage life, and arising from scanty and unwholesome food, and listless indolence, and intemperance, and the want of every comfort. These causes operate as fatally as wasteful wars with each other. See observations of General Lincoln, in *Mass. Historical Collections*, vol. v. 6, and of the Rev. Dr. Kirkland, *ibid.* vol. iv. 67. Governor Clinton's Discourse before the New-York Historical Society, in the

Collections of the New-York Historical Society, vol. ii. 37. *Memoir of Governor Cass, of the Michigan Territory, addressed to the Secretary of War*, in October, 1821. *Major Long's Expedition to the Source of St. Peter's River*, in 1823, vol. ii. *passim*. Messrs. *Clark & Cass* in their *Report to Congress*, in 1829. They consider their country lost to them by encroachment and oppression, and they are irreclaimably jealous of their white neighbours. The restless and enterprising population on their borders, are exempt, no doubt, from much sympathy with Indian sufferings, and they are penetrated with perfect contempt of Indian rights. If it were not for the frontier garrisons and troops of the United States, officered by correct and discreet men, there would probably be a state of constant hostility between the Indians and the white borderers and hunters. They covet the Indian hunting grounds, and they must have them; and the Indians will finally be compelled by circumstances, annoyed as they are from without, and with a constantly and rapidly diminishing population, and with increasing poverty and misery, to recede from all the habitable parts of the Mississippi Valley, and its tributary streams, until they become essentially extinguished, or lost to the eye of the civilized world.

In June, 1834, a bill was introduced into the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, for establishing an *Indian Territory*, west of the Mississippi, extending from the Platte River on the north, and the state of Missouri and the Arkansas Territory on the east, to the Spanish Possessions south and west; and it was the favourite policy of the government to persuade all the Indian tribes, east of the Mississippi, to migrate and settle, as a confederacy of tribes on that territory. The bill provided a government for the confederacy, to be established, with the free consent of all the Indian chiefs, and to be governed by Indian chiefs, under the control and patronage of the government of the United States; and it provided that the Indian confederacy might send a delegate to Congress. But the bill met with so much opposition in the house, that it was laid upon the table, and never called up. An act of Congress was, however, passed on the 30th June, 1834, ch. 161, consolidating many of the former provisions in the laws since the year 1800, and altering others, and establishing a new Indian code. It provided that the part of the United States west of the river Mississippi, and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and also the part of the United States east of the Mississippi, and not within any state to which the Indian title has not been extinguished, should be taken and deemed to be the *Indian Country*. There was to be no trade with any of the Indians therein without a license from, and under the regulations of the general superintendent of the Indian affairs, or some agent thereof, and which licenses were subject to recall; no trader was to reside, or attempt to reside therein, without a license, nor must any foreigner go into the Indian country without a passport; no barter, except between Indians, and no persons, other than Indians, are to hunt, trap, take, or destroy any poultry or game within the limits of any tribes with whom the United States have treaties. No person is to drive or convey horses, mules, or cattle to range or feed on any Indian lands, without the consent of the tribe to whom the lands belong. The superintendent and agents of Indian affairs are authorized to remove from the Indian country all persons found there contrary to law, and the President of the United States may employ military force for that purpose. All persons making a settlement on any lands belonging, secured, or granted by treaty with the United States, to any Indian tribe, or surveying, or attempting to survey the same, or to designate boundaries, are liable to a penalty, and to be removed by

military force. All purchases from any Indian nation or tribe, must be by treaty authorized by law. It is made penal to interfere by message, talk, or correspondence with any Indian nation, tribe, chief, or individual, with intent to violate any treaty or law; or to sell, give, or dispose of to any Indian, in the Indian country, spirituous liquors or wine. The criminal laws of the United States are declared to be in force in the Indian country; but they are not to extend to crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian. In the repeal of most of the former statute provisions since 1800, relative to the Indians, the Intercourse Act of March 30th, 1802, is excepted, so far as respects the Indian tribes residing east of the Mississippi.

"Who can assure the Indians," says Tocqueville, (*De la Démocratie en Amérique*, t. 2. 298, 299,) "that they will be permitted to repose in peace in their new asylum? The United States engage to protect them, but the territory which they occupied in Georgia was guarantied to them by the most solemn faith. In a few years the same white population which pressed upon them in their ancestral territory, will follow them to the solitudes of Arkansâs, and as the limits of the earth will at last fail them, their only relief will be death."



LECTURE LII.

OF INCORPOREAL HEREDITAMENTS.

THINGS real consist of lands, tenements, and hereditaments. The latter is a word almost as comprehensive as property, for it means, any thing capable of being *inherited*, be it corporeal, incorporeal, real, personal, or mixed.^a The term real estate means an estate in fee or for life in land, and does not comprehend terms for years or any interest short of a freehold.^b A *tenement* comprises every thing which may be holden, so as to create a tenancy, in the feudal sense of the word, and no doubt it includes things incorporate, though they do not lie in tenure.^c Corporeal hereditaments are confined to *land*, which, according to Lord Coke,^d includes not only the ground or soil, but every thing which is attached to the earth, whether by the course of nature, as trees, herbage, and water, or by the hand of man, as houses and other buildings; and which has an indefinite extent, upwards as well as downwards, so as to include every thing terrestrial, under or over it.^e Incorporeal *tene- *402

^a *Co. Litt.* 6. a.

^b *Co. Litt.* 19, 20, and see, *supra*, vol. ii. 342. *Merry v. Hallett*, 2 *Cowen's Rep.* 497.

^c *Preston on Estates*, vol. i. 8. *Co. Litt.* 19. b. 20. a. *Doe v. Dyball*, 1 *Moore & Payne*, 330.

^d *Co. Litt.* 4. a.

^e 2 *Blacks. Com.* 18. There are exceptions to the general rule, that land includes every thing above and below the surface. Thus a man may have an inheritance in an upper chamber, though the lower buildings and the soil be in

ments and hereditaments comprise certain inheritable rights, which are not, strictly speaking, of a corporeal nature or land, although they are, by their own nature, or by use, annexed to corporeal inheritances, and are rights issuing out of them, or concern them. They pass by deed, without livery, because they are not tangible rights.^a These distinctions were well known to the civil law, and are clearly defined in Justinian's Institutes. They have their foundation in the nature of things, and very material legal consequences flow from them in practical jurisprudence. *Res corporales sunt quæ sua natura tangi possunt, veluti fundus; incorporales sunt quæ tangi non possunt et in jure consistunt, sicut usus fructus, usus et obligationes.*^b A freehold right in a pew in a church, may be classed among incorporeal rights, for the right only extends to the use of the pew for the purpose of sitting therein during divine service.^c The owner of the pew cannot dig a vault under it, or erect any thing over it, without the consent of the owners or trustees of the

another, and it will pass by livery. *Co. Litt.* 43. b. Ejectment will lie for a house without any land, and a house erected by A. on the land of B. with permission or under contract, belongs to A. as personal property. *Doty v. Gorham*, 5 *Pick. Rep.* 487. *Marcey v. Darling*, 8 *ibid.* 233. It is usual, in such a city as London, for different persons to have several freeholds in the same spot. The cellar may belong to one person, and the upper rooms to another. *Doe v. Burt*, 1 *Term Rep.* 701. The lease of a cellar, or other room in a house, gives no interest in the land; and if the house be destroyed, the lessee's interest is gone. *Winton v. Cornish*, 5 *Hammond's Ohio Rep.* 473. A grant of water does not pass the soil beneath, but it passeth a right of fishing. *Co. Litt.* 4. b.

^a *Bracton*, lib. ii. ch. 18. *Co. Litt.* 20. a. 49. a.

^b *Just. Inst.* 2. 2. A corporate right or privilege to select and acquire land for a corporate purpose, is declared to be an incorporeal hereditament, existing independent of, and prior to, any act of location or survey. *Canal Company v. Railroad Company*, 4 *Gill & Johnson*, 1.

^c The qualified interest of a party in a pew in a church, is an interest in real estate, and comes within the statute of frauds, and a parol contract for a pew beyond a year is void. *First Baptist Church of Ithaca v. Bigelow*, 16 *Wendell*, 28. In Maine, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, pews in a church are declared to be real estate. In New-Hampshire and in the city of Boston they are held to be personal estate. The *Revised Statutes of Massachusetts* made that exception in favour of Boston, as had been previously done by the statute of 1798.

church.^a It is a right subject to that of the trustees or owners of the church, who have the right to take down, rebuild, or remove the church, for the purpose of more convenient worship, without making any compensation to the pewholders for the temporary interruption; though it has been held, that if the church should be taken down unnecessarily, the pewholder was entitled to be indemnified for the loss of his pew. While the house remains, the right to the pew is absolute, and the owner may maintain ejectment, case, or trespass, according to circumstances, if he be disturbed in his right.^b

The incorporeal hereditaments which subsist by our law, are fewer than those known and recognised by the English law. We have no such rights as advowsons, tithes, dignities,^c and franchises of the chase; and those titles require *complicated regulations, and *403 have been a fruitful source of discussion. The

^a Ryder, Ch. J., *Sayer's Rep.* 177. *Daniel v. Wood*, 1 *Pick. Rep.* 102. 3 *ibid.* 346.

^b Gay v. Baker, 17 *Mass. Rep.* 435. *Howard v. First Parish, &c.*, 7 *Pick. Rep.* 133. *Baptist Church v. Witherell*, 3 *Paige's Rep.* 302. *Fisher v. Glover*, 4 *New-Hampshire Rep.* 180. *Price v. Methodist Church*, 4 *Ohio Rep.* 515. See *Pettman v. Bridger*, 1 *Phillemore's Eccles. Rep.* 316, as to pew rights under the ecclesiastical law. *Heeney v. St. Peter's Church*, 2 *Edw. V. Ch. Rep.* 608.

^c The law of dignities, though unknown to us, is of great importance in the English law, and it frequently brings into view deep investigations in regal and parliamentary antiquities. As matters for curious inquiry, we may particularly select two great peerage cases before the House of Lords, as being replete with antiquarian erudition and research. The cases I allude to, are, (1.) The case of the Earldom of Oxford, in the time of Charles I, in which the title and dignity of that Earldom, under the name of the noble house of Le Vere, was traced up through successive descents and generations to the time of William the Conqueror. The case at large, with the opinions of the judges, is reported in *Sir W. Jones' Reports*, 96. (2.) The case of the Barony of L'Isle, decided a few years ago, upon the claim of Sir John Shelley Sidney, who traced up his claim in a clear course of descent to the Countess of Shrewsbury, in the time of Edward IV. The Barony had fallen into abeyance, and slept in the tomb of the Countess of Warwick ever since the year 1421. But as no time bars in cases of peerage, it was, upon very plausible grounds, attempted to be revived in 1825. The case was reported by Mr. Nicolas. See the *London Law Magazine* for July, 1829, art. 3.

most litigious cases in the Exchequer Reports, are those relating to tithes ; and it is a great relief to the labours of the student, and a greater one to the duties of the courts, and infinitely more so to the agricultural interests of the country, that the doctrine of tithes is unknown to our law.

The incorporeal rights, which I shall now consider, are, 1. Commons ; 2. Ways, easements, and aquatic rights ; 3. Offices ; 4. Franchises ; 5. Annuities ; and 6. Rents.

I. The right of common is a right which one man has in the lands of another. The object is, to pasture his cattle, or provide necessary fuel for his family, or for repairing his implements of husbandry.^a

This right was intended, in early ages, for the encouragement of agriculture, and existed principally between the owner of a manor and his feudal tenants. “By the ancient common law,” said Lord Coke, when commenting upon the statute of Merton,^b “if a lord of a manor enfeoffed others of some parcels of arable land, the feoffees should have common appendant, in the waste ground of the manor, for two causes : (1.) As incident to the feoffment, for the feoffee could not plough and manure his ground without beasts, and they could not be sustained without pasture ; and, by consequence, the tenant shall have common in the wastes of the manor for his beasts of the plough ; and this was the beginning of common appendant. (2.) The other reason was, for maintenance and advancement of agriculture, which was much favoured in law.” The policy of the old law in favour of common of pasture, and of estovers, as being conducive to improvement in agriculture, has entirely changed, or become obsolete ; and this incorporeal right is now found

^a *Finch's Law*, 157.

^b 2 *Inst.* 86. 4 *Co.* 37. a.

to be an encumbrance rather than an advantage. The right of common *is little known or used in *404 this country, and probably does not exist in any of the northern or western parts of the United States, which have been settled since the revolution. The Ch. J. of Pennsylvania, while he admitted that a right of common was an estate well known in the law, declared that he knew of very few instances of rights of common.^a But the right is still known and enjoyed, and has been frequently a subject of litigation, in some parts of the state of New-York ; and it is interesting to perceive the nice distinctions, and the clear and accurate sense of justice, which arose and were applied to this head of the law.

(1.) *Of common of pasture and of estovers.*

Common of pasture was known at common law as common of pasture appendant, and common of pasture appurtenant. The first, or common *appendant*, is founded on prescription, and is regularly annexed to arable land. It authorized the owner or occupier of arable land to put commonable beasts upon the waste grounds of the manor, from the necessity of the case, and to encourage agriculture. The tenant was limited to such beasts as were *levant* and *couchant* on his estate, because such cattle only were wanting to plough and manure his land. It was deemed an incident to a grant of land, as of common right, and to enable the tenant to use his plough land. Common *appurtenant* may be annexed to any kind of land, and may be created by grant, as well as prescription. It allowed the owner to put in other beasts than such as plough or manure the land ; and, not being founded in necessity, like the other right, as to common-

^a Trustees of the Western University v. Robinson, 12 *Serg. & Rawle*, 33. We meet, however, with a discussion of the right of common in Carr v. Wallace, 7 *Watts' Pennsylvania Rep.* 394.

able beasts, was not favoured in the law.^a Common of estovers may be equally appendant or appurtenant.

The law concerning common appendant received great discussion and consideration, in *Bennett v. Reeve*,
*405 in 1740.^b *It was admitted to be the settled law, that common of pasture appendant belonged only to arable land, and could not be severed from it; and that if the land be divided ever so often, every little parcel was entitled to common appendant, but only for commonable cattle, or such as were necessary to plough and manure the tenant's arable land. The court of C. B., after two arguments, rejected the claim of a tenant, who, by the process of subdivision, claimed only a yard of land, to a right of common for sixty-four sheep. He was entitled only to a right of common for such cattle as were wanted to plough and manure his yard of land, and in this way the court brought his claim within reasonable limits.

Common of pasture, whether appendant or appurtenant, might be apportioned upon the alienation of the land to which the common belonged, because it was founded in necessity and common right. "God forbid," said Lord Coke,^c "that the law should not be so, for otherwise many commons in England would be avoided and lost." Thus, in *Wilde's case*,^d he being seised of forty acres of land, to which a right of common of pasture on two hundred adjoining acres for commonable cattle was appurtenant, sold five acres. It was held, that the alienee had a right of common appurtenant to the five acres, and that the alienation of part of the land did not destroy the right of common either of the alienor or alienee, but each

^a 2 *Blacks. Com.* 33. 3 *Cruise's Dig.* tit. *Common*.

^b *Willes' Rep.* 227.

^c 4 *Co.* 36.

^d 8 *Co.* 78.

retained a right of common proportioned to their estates. The warm language of Coke shows the deep conviction of that age, that these rights of common were indispensable to the tillage of the English tenantry. But the change of manners and property, and the condition of society in this country, is so great, that the whole of this law of commonage is descending fast into oblivion, together with the memory of all the talent and learning which were bestowed upon it by the ancient lawyers.

*There have been several cases on this subject *406 of the right of common of pasture, and of estovers, discussed in the Supreme Court of New-York, and the principles to be deduced from the ancient decisions were fully and accurately considered.

The first case I allude to was that of *Watts v. Coffin*,^a which was upon a lease executed before the revolutionary war, in which, by express covenant, the grantor had conveyed to the lessee in fee common of pasture, and reasonable estovers, out of the woods of the manor of Rensselaerwick, at Claverack. The grantor had cultivated, or, in ancient language, *approved* the manor lands, by leasing, so as to leave no common of estovers, or of pasture, and in that way had actually destroyed the exercise of the right under the covenant. The only question was, as to the remedy; and it was held, that the tenant could not set off that claim under the covenant, against the rent due upon the perpetual lease, but must resort to his covenant if any remedy existed. It was, however, left undecided, whether any right of common existed after the waste and unappropriated parts of Claverack had disappeared by the settlement and improvement of the country. In England, before

^a 11 Johns. Rep. 495.

the statute of Merton, 20 Henry III, it was supposed, that the lord could not improve any part of his waste grounds, however extensive they might be, provided another person had a grant of common of pasture therein, because the common issued out of the whole waste, and every part of it. But that statute, and the statute of Westminster 2, 13 Edward I, allowed him to do it, if he left sufficient common of pasture for the tenants; and this was all that any tenant could, in common justice, have required, before the provision of the statute. It is now well settled in the English law, that the owner of

lands, in which another has a right of common, may
*407 improve and enclose part of the common, *leaving
a sufficiency of common for the tenant. In those cases in which a right of common of pasture exists here, the right of the owner of the soil to improve, would seem necessarily to be subject to the same limitation, and to be exercised consistently with the preservation of a right of common.

The next case in which this right of common was discussed, was that of *Livingston v. Ten Broeck*.^a In that case, an ancient deed had conveyed a large tract of land in the manor of Livingston, with a right of common of pasture, and of estovers; and the court, in the decision of that case, recognised several principles of ancient law applicable to this right of common.

Thus, if a person seised of part of the land subject to common, should purchase part of the adjoining land entitled to common, here would be an unity of title in one and the same person to part of the land entitled to a privilege of common, and to part of the land charged with that privilege, or out of which the common was to be taken. This unity of title extinguished his right of com-

^a 16 Johns. Rep. 14.

mon, and upon this principle, that if it was to continue in his hands, his interest would induce him to take common for the land he purchased out of that part of the manor which he did not own, in order to relieve his own land of the burthen, and to cast it upon his neighbour. This temptation to abuse and fraud, the cautious policy of the old law would not permit. So, also, if a man, having common in a large field owned by several persons, purchased an acre from one of them, his right of common was extinguished upon the same principle. This was the rule declared in *Rotherham v. Green*,^a and the right of common became extinct equally in either case, by aliening or releasing part of the land entitled to common, and by purchasing part of the land charged with it. If it were otherwise, *the tenant of the residue might be charged with *408 the burthen of the whole common. The rule is, that this right of common shall not be so changed or modified by the act of the parties, as to increase, or even to create the temptation to increase, the charge upon the land out of which common is to be taken. An extinguishment of the right as to a portion of the land charged, is an extinguishment of the whole ; and this principle of ancient policy was illustrated in the case to which I have referred.

In *Leyman v. Abeel*,^b another branch of the same subject was brought under the consideration of the Supreme Court.

It was held, that incorporeal hereditaments descend by inheritance as real estate, and in that case, a right of

^a *Cro. Eliz.* 593.

^b 16 *Johns. Rep.* 30. So, also, in *Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff*, 10 *Wendell's Rep.* 639, it was adjudged, according to the doctrine of Lord Coke, in *Co. Litt.* 164. b, that *common of estovers* could not be apportioned. It is an entirety, and cannot be divided, for that might work oppression and injustice, by surcharging the land. If, therefore, a farm entitled to estovers be divided *by the act of the party* among several tenants, neither of them can take estovers, and the right is extinguished.

common of estovers which had descended to children, was held to be incapable of division between them, and this upon an old and just principle of law, to prevent the land from being doubly or trebly charged. In accordance with the case of the *Earl of Huntington v. Lord Mountjoy*,^a it was held, that a common in gross and uncertain, as the right to cut wood and dig turf, might be assigned, but it could not be aliened in such a way as to give the entire right to several persons, to be enjoyed by them separately. Lord Coke said,^b that if such a right of common descended to coparceners, as it was not partible, the eldest should have the right, and the rest should have contribution, or an allowance of the value in some other part of the inheritance. But if the ancestor left no inheritance from which to make compensation or recompense to the younger coparceners, one parcener was to have it for a time, and the other for the like time, so that no prejudice should accrue to the owner of the soil. This mode of enjoyment, alternately, or in *409 succession, was carried, in the *ancient law, to a ludicrous extent. Thus, says Coke, according to the rules to be found in Bracton, Britton, and Fleta, in the case of a common of piscary descending to two or more parceners, the one may have one fish, and the other the second; the one may have the first draught, and the other the second. If it be of a mill, the one was to have the mill for a time, and the other for the like time, or the one the first toll dish, and the other the second.

In the case in New-York last referred to, it was held, that this law was changed under the operation of our statute of descents, and that if such a right of common descended to several heirs as tenants in common, or

^a *Godbolt*. 17. *Co. Litt.* 164. b. S. C.

^b *Co. Litt.* 165. a.

parceners, it could not be divided, but there must be a joint enjoyment. They may jointly alien, but one tenant cannot convey alone, nor can the eldest heir take the whole of this indivisible right of common of estovers, and make recompense. It is a joint right, to be enjoyed jointly by the heirs, or their assignees; and upon the principle, that the land charged with the right is not to have an increase of burthen by the multiplication of claimants.

This right of common may be controlled by custom. It may be held subservient to a distinct right in the lord of the manor, founded on immemorial usage, to dig in the soil, without leaving sufficient herbage for the commoners.^a

(2.) *Of common of piscary.*

This is said to be a liberty, or right of fishery in the water covering the soil of another person, or in a river running through another man's land.^b A *common of fishery* is not an exclusive right, but one enjoyed in common with certain other persons; and Lord Holt said it was to be resembled to the case of other common.^c

The books speak likewise of a **free fishery*, as *410 being a franchise in the hands of a subject, existing by grant or prescription, distinct from an ownership in the soil. It is an exclusive right, and applies to a public navigable river, without any right in the soil. There is, also, a *several fishery*, which is a private exclusive right of fishery in a navigable river or arm of the sea, accompanied with the ownership of the soil. It is a grant along with the soil, though the soil may be granted without this several fishery; and it has likewise been

^a *Bateson v. Green*, 5 *Term Rep.* 411.

^b 2 *Blacks. Com.* 34. 39. *Cruise's Digest*, tit. *Common*, sec. 34.

^c 2 *Salk.* 637.

strongly asserted and maintained, that a several fishery may exist without the ownership of the soil.^a

But these distinctions between common of piscary, free fishery, and several fishery, seem to be quite unsettled in the books;^b and the authorities referred to by Mr. Hargrave^c throw embarrassment in the way of the attempt to mark with precision the line of discrimination between these several *rights of fishery. In a modern case,^d the judges took a distinction between a common fishery, (*commune piscarium*,) which may mean for all mankind, as in the sea, and a common of fishery, (*communiam piscariæ*,) which is a right, in common with certain other persons, in a particular stream; and the text writers were deemed to have spoken inaccurately when they confounded the distinction. The more easy and intelligible arrangement of the subject would seem to be, to divide the right of fishing into a right common to all, and a right exclusively in one or a few individuals.

^a *Com. Dig.* tit. *Prerogative*, D. 50. *Hale, de Jure Maris*, ch. 5. The case of the Royal Fishery of the Banne, *Davies' Rep.* 149. *Smith v. Kemp*, 2 *Salk.* 637. *Carter v. Murcot*, 4 *Burr. Rep.* 2162. *Seymour v. Lord Courtenay*, 5 *ibid.* 2814. Mr. *Angell*, in his valuable *Treatise on the Common Law in relation to Water Courses*, 6—10, has collected the authorities on the question, whether a several fishery may exist without the property in the soil. The reason of the thing, and the weight of authority, are in favour of the affirmative of the question; and he justly concludes that property, in water courses, may be subjected to every kind of restriction by positive agreement. In *Duke of Somerset v. Fogwell*, 5 *Barnw. & Cress.* 375, it was declared, that in ordinary cases the owner of a several fishery was to be presumed to be owner of the soil. He is, however, only *prima facie* owner of the soil. *Partheriche v. Mason*, 2 *Chitty's Rep.* 658.

^b See the discussions at the bar in *Freary v. Cooke*, 14 *Mass. Rep.* 488. Sir William Blackstone says, that a *free fishery* is an exclusive right. *Com.* vol. ii. 39, 40. But in *Seymour v. Lord Courtenay*, 5 *Burr. Rep.* 2814, Lord Mansfield declared, that it was essential to a free fishery that more than one person should have a coextensive right in the same subject. So, in *Melvin v. Whitting*, 7 *Pickering*, 79, it was held, that a free fishery was not an exclusive fishery.

^c *Harg. Co. Litt.* lib. 2. No. 181.

^d *Bennett v. Coster*, 8 *Taunton*, 183.

It was a settled principle of the common law, that the owners of lands on the banks of fresh water rivers, above the ebbing and flowing of the tide, had the exclusive right of fishing, as well as the right of property opposite to their respective lands *ad filum medium aquæ*; and where the lands on each side of the river belonged to the same person, he had the same exclusive right of fishery in the whole river, so far as his lands extended along the same. The right exists in rivers of that description, though they may be of the first magnitude, and navigable for rafts and boats, but they are subjected to the *jus publicum*, as a common highway or easement, for many navigable purposes. The common law, while it acknowledged and protected the right of the owners of the adjacent lands to the soil and water of the river, rendered that right subordinate to the public convenience, and all erections and impediments made by the owners to the obstruction of the free use of the river as a highway for boats and rafts, are deemed nuisances. This right of fishery in rivers not navigable, is also subject to the qualification of not being so used as to injure the private rights of others; and it does not extend to impede the passage of fish up the river by means of dams or other obstructions. The impediment was at common law a nuisance, and in Massachusetts it subjects *the party creating *412 it to a penalty given by statute.^a Under these reasonable qualifications, the right of private property in rivers was recognised at common law in the earliest ages,

^a *Weld v. Hornby*, 7 *East*, 195. *Commonwealth v. Chapin*, 5 *Pickering*, 199. The regulation of fisheries within the jurisdiction of the several states, is matter of statute provision, and the laws of Connecticut, in particular, have been many and very specific on the subject. *Statutes of Connecticut*, 1838, p. 269—285. But manufacturing machinery, and steamboats, and the insatiable cupidity and skill of fishermen, have prodigiously diminished the resort of the most valuable fish into the rivers of the northern states.

and it has been uniformly admitted down to this day.^a The law was laid down very clearly and emphatically in the case of the river Banne, in Ireland,^b which is regarded as a leading case, and a sound authority, and the doctrine of that case was, that a subject might have a several freehold interest in a navigable river or tide water, by special grant from the crown, but not otherwise; and that without such grant, or prescription which is evidence of a grant, the right of fishing was common. On the other hand it was held, that in rivers not navigable, (and in the common law sense of the term, those only were deemed navigable in which the tide ebbed and flowed,) the owners of the soil on each side had the interest, and the right of fishery; and it was an exclusive right, and extended to the centre of the stream opposite their respective lands. This case was followed by that of *Carter v. Murcot*,^c in which the K. B. recognised that doctrine in its fullest extent; and Sir Matthew Hale, in his treatise *De Jure Maris*,^d has not only laid down the same propositions, but he has discussed the subject with great and accurate learning, and it has become a text book of the highest authority.

This private right of fishery is confined to fresh water rivers, unless a special grant or prescription be shown; and the right of fishing in the sea, and in the bays and arms of the sea, and in navigable or tide waters,

*413 under the free and *masculine genius of the English common law, is a right public and common to every person; and if any individual will appropriate an exclusive privilege in navigable waters, and arms of

^a *Hale, De Jure Maris*, ch. 1, cites a record in the K. B., as early as 18 and 19 Edward I, in which this rule was asserted.

^b *Davies' Rep.* 149.

^c 4 *Burr. Rep.* 2162.

^d *Harg. Law Tracts*, art. 1.

the sea, he must show it strictly by grant or prescription.^a The common right of fishing in navigable waters, is founded on such plain principles of natural law, that it is considered by many jurists as part of the law of nations. The civil law declared, that the right of fishing in rivers, as well as in the sea, and ports, was common; and in some respects it went beyond the common law, for it held, that all rivers where the flow of water was perennial, belonged wholly to the public, and carried with it the right of fishery, as well as the public use of the banks.^b Bracton adopted the doctrine of the civil law, and held,^c that the right of fishing in rivers, and the use of the banks, was common *jure gentium*. But it is every where agreed, that this common right is liable to be modified and controlled by the municipal law of the land, and no person has a right to pass over the lands of others in order to get to the water. In *Blundell v. Catterall*,^d which called forth a very elaborate and learned discussion, the doctrine of the civil law, as stated by Bracton, was disclaimed, and it was held, that the public had no common law right of crossing the beach, or seashore, for the purpose of bathing in the sea, as against the lord of a manor who was owner of the soil of the shore, and had the exclusive right of fishing therein. So, also, in France, before their revolution, the right of fishing in navigable and not navigable rivers, was not common to all the subjects, but belonged *to the king, and such *414 individuals as under him possessed jurisdictional

^a *Hale, De Jure Maris*, ch. 4. Sir Matthew Hale, in Lord Fitzwalter's case, 1 *Mod. Rep.* 105. *Warren v. Matthews*, 1 *Salk. Rep.* 357. 6 *Mod. Rep.* 73. *Ward v. Creswell*, *Willes' Rep.* 265. *The Mayor, &c. of Oxford v. Richardson*, 4 *Term Rep.* 437. *Carter v. Murcot*, 4 *Burr. Rep.* 2162.

^b *Inst.* 2. 1. 2. *Dig.* 43. tit. 12, 13, 14, 15.

^c B. 1. c. 12. sec. 6.

^d 5 *Barnw. & Ald.* 263.

rights.^a The Napoleon code was formed upon the ruins of seigneurial and feudal rights, and it is declared, that rivers, and navigable or flutable streams, shores, and land between high and low water mark, were considered as dependencies of the public domain, and that the right of fishing was under the regulation of particular laws.^b It is now understood, that the owners of the lands on rivers not navigable or flutable, (*flottables*,) have the exclusive right of fishing therein, as well as the exclusive ownership of the soil composing the bed of the river. Though some communes attempted to appropriate that right to themselves, the claim was put down by decrees, and on the principle that the abolition of feudal rights, of which the right of fishing was one, was for the benefit, not of the communes, but of the feudal vassals, who had become free in their persons and property, and that there no longer existed any seigneurial rights.^c

The English doctrine, as to navigable rivers, and the common right as to the use thereof, and as to the right of fishing, as well as to the right to the soil, in rivers not navigable, in the common law sense of the term, has been declared to be the law in several of the

*415 United States.^d The legislature of *New-York, when they reenacted, in 1787, all the British

^a *Inst. Droit Français*, par Argou, tom. i. 214. *Pothier, Traité du Droit de Propriété*, No. 52.

^b *Code Napoleon*, No. 538. 715.

^c *Toullier's Droit Civil Français*, tom. iii. No. 144, 145, 146. *Questions de Droit*, par Merlin, tom. iv. tit. *Pêche*. The latter author has collected the ancient authorities in support of the seigneurial exclusive right of fishery in all streams not navigable, and the several decrees of the revolutionary governments abolishing those feudal and odious rights.

^d *The People v. Platt*, 17 *Johns. Rep.* 195. *Hooker v. Cummings*, 20 *ibid.* 90. Ex parte Jennings, 6 *Cowen's Rep.* 513. *Berry v. Carle*, 3 *Greenleaf's Rep.* 269. *Scott v. Willson*, 3 *N. H. Rep.* 321. *Commonwealth v. Charlestown*, 1 *Pick. Rep.* 180. *Adams v. Pease*, 2 *Conn. Rep.* 481. *Arnold v. Mundy*, 1 *Halsted's Rep.* 1. *Dane's Abr.* vol. ii. 692. sec. 13. *Browne v. Kennedy*, 5 *Harr. & Johns.* 195.

statutes that were deemed applicable to our situation, considered a *common of fishery*, as an existing right, for they provided the writ of *novel disseisin* for the disturbance of it.^a So, a franchise of a *several fishery*, at a particular place in a public river, has been admitted to exist, and an instance of such a grant was mentioned in the case of *Stoughton v. Baker*.^b The statute law of the colony of Massachusetts made some alterations in the common law. Each town might appropriate the right of free fishing in navigable rivers, within the town, and the right of free fishing was confined to householders. The legislature likewise assumed the regulation of the passage and protection of fish in streams not navigable, in the technical sense; and it is now considered that fisheries are, as at common law, the exclusive right of the owners of the banks of rivers not navigable, unless otherwise appropriated by statute, and that the right, unless secured by a particular grant or prescription, is held subject to legislative control.^c The *New-York Revised Statutes*^d have also deemed the regulation of fisheries in waters, navigable or not navigable, a matter of public concern; and they have regulated the time and mode of fishing in the waters of the state, and particularly in respect to certain kinds of fish, and in the waters of the upper Hudson. The Courts of Common Pleas in each county have likewise the authority, under certain checks and restrictions, to regulate the fishing in any of the *streams, *416 ponds, or lakes in their respective counties, and to

^a *Laws of New-York*, 10th sess. ch. 50. sec. 7.

^b 4 *Mass. Rep.* 527.

^c *Nickerson v. Brackett*, 10 *Mass. Rep.* 212. 216. *Waters v. Lilley*, 4 *Pick. Rep.* 145. *Ingraham v. Wilkinson*, *ibid.* 268. *Vinton v. Welsh*, 9 *ibid.* 37. *Cottrill v. Myrick*, 3 *Fairfield*, 222. 229. *Dane's Abr.* vol. ii. 688—712. or, ch. 68. In that chapter Mr. Dane has diligently collected the English and American authorities applicable to the subject.

^d Vol. i. 637, 638.

prevent the destruction of the fish therein. In *Jacobson v. Fountain*, and afterwards in *Gould v. James*,^a it was considered that a person might, by grant or prescription, have an exclusive right of fishery, even in an arm of the sea, or in a navigable river, where the tide ebbed and flowed; and, in New-Jersey, the right of several fishery has been attempted to be carried beyond the rule of the common law. The doctrine asserted was, that, in that state, the whole of the soil under its navigable and tide waters is individual and not public property, and that it passed in fee simple from the original proprietors under the royal patents to the present occupiers and grantees. The title was, originally, in the king, by right of discovery, according to the public law of Europe; and, it is said, he was competent to convey, and did convey the soil in New-Jersey, as well under navigable waters as elsewhere, to the Duke of York, and by him it was conveyed to Sir George Carteret and the representatives of Lord Berkeley, and from them the title passed, and has been regularly transmitted to the present owners of lands on the navigable waters of the state. Upon that broad foundation it was maintained, that the proprietors of land on rivers and waters, navigable as well as not navigable, had immemorially claimed and exercised the right to the soil, and to a several fishery in all waters within the state in front of their lands and shores, subject, nevertheless, to the *jus publicum*, or use of the same, as a public highway for all navigable purposes, and also subject to the regulations of the legislature for the passage and protection of fish.^b But whatever force might have been due to such an opinion, if the question was *res integra*, the law is now declared, after a very profound and exhausting

^a 2 *Johns. Rep.* 170. 6 *Cowen's Rep.* 369. *Rogers v. Jones*, 1 *Wendell*, 237. S. P.

^b *Griffith's Register*, tit. *New-Jersey*, art. *Fisheries*.

forensic discussion, to be, that there is no several fishery in the *navigable waters of New-Jersey, *417 but the same is common to all the people of the state.^a

Though the right of fishery in a navigable river be a common right, the adjoining proprietors have the exclusive right to draw the seine, and take fish on their own lands; and if an island or a rock, in tide waters, be private property, no person but the owner has the right to use it for the purpose of fishing.^b It has been further decided, that though the seashore, between high and low water mark, be held by grant as private property, the common right still exists to go there and fish, and even to dig and take shell fish; and if the owner of the soil claims an exclusive right, he must show a prescription for it, controlling the general right at common law.^c

In Pennsylvania, the English doctrine that no rivers are deemed navigable, so as to give the common right of fishing, except those where the tide ebbs and flows, has

^a *Arnold v. Mundy*, 1 *Halsted's Rep.* 1. The legislature of New-Jersey, by Act of 1826, have declared it to be unlawful for any persons, not resident citizens of the state, to use any net or seine, for the purpose of taking fish, in any of the rivers or waters within the jurisdiction of the state. *Elmer's Dig.* 205. But Pennsylvania and New-Jersey have, by mutual arrangement, concurrent jurisdiction over the waters of the river Delaware, to a certain extent, and the exercise of the right of fishery is exercised in conformity to such arrangements. See *Act of New-Jersey*, of 26 November, 1808. *Elmer's Dig.* 199. In Maryland it is also declared, that the king, before the revolution, had the right to grant lands covered by navigable waters, subject to the right of the public to fish and navigate them; and that this right, subject to the restriction, passed to the proprietors of Maryland by the royal grant, and that the right was then vested in the state. *Browne v. Kennedy*, 5 *Harr. & Johns.* 195. In Mr. *Angell's Treatise on the Right of Property in Tide Waters*, ch. 7, he has shown that a right of several fishery in navigable waters in front of their lands, may and does exist in individuals, by usage, in several of the states.

^b *Lay v. King*, 5 *Day's Rep.* 72. *The Commonwealth v. Shaw*, 14 *Serg & Rawle*, 9.

^c *Bagott v. Orr*, 2 *Bos. & Pull.* 472. *Peck v. Lockwood*, 5 *Day's Rep.* 22. But the case of *Bagott v. Orr*, may be considered as overruled by that of *Blundell v. Catterall*, 5 *Barnw. & Ald.* 268; and the doctrine in *Peck v. Lockwood* seems to be very questionable.

been held not to be applicable to the great rivers in that state, and that the owners of land on the banks of such rivers as the Susquehanna and Delaware, for instance, so far up as they are common highways, have no exclusive right *of fishing in the rivers opposite their respective lands. The right to fisheries, in such rivers, is declared to be vested in the state, and open to all the world ;^a and a similar exception to the rule of the common law has been suggested to exist in South Carolina.^b

The conclusion on this subject is, that a right of fishery in navigable or tide waters, below high-water mark, is a common right ; and if one or more individuals set up an exclusive right to a free or several fishery, it must be clearly shown by prescription or positive grant.^c In rivers and streams not navigable as tide waters, the owners of the soil over which they flow have, at common law, (and which common law has been generally recognised in these United States,) the exclusive right of fishing each on his own side, unless some other person can show a grant or prescription for a common of piscary, in derogation of the right naturally attached to the ownership of the soil ; and such right is held subject to the public use of the waters as a highway, and to the free passage of fish, and in subordination to the regulations to be prescribed by the legislature for the general good.

(3.) *Of the remedy for the disturbance of these rights.*

The disturbance of a right of common of pasture arises

^a Carson v. Blazer, 2 *Binney's Rep.* 475. Shrunk v. The President, &c. of the Schuylkill Navigation Company, 14 *Serg & Rawle*, 71.

^b Cates v. Wadlington, 1 *M'Cord's Rep.* 580.

^c Rogers v. Jones, 1 *Wendell*, 237. But if an individual plant a bed of oysters in a bay or an arm of the sea, and clearly designate and mark out the bed by stakes, it is not an interference with the common right of fishing in the bay, but the person who planted the oyster bed so designated, acquired a qualified property in them, sufficient to maintain trespass against any person who invaded that property. Fleet v. Hegeman, 14 *Wendell*, 42.

when a person who has no right interferes by putting in his cattle, or if he has a right to use the land for commonable cattle, by putting in those which are not commonable, or by surcharging the common by putting in more cattle than the pasture will sustain. In these cases, the owner of the soil has his action of trespass, and the commoner his special action upon the case, inasmuch as both the owner of the land, and the owner of the right of common, are injured. The common law gave to the commoner a writ of *admeasurement of pasture*, under which process a jury, with the *sheriff, apportioned *419 the quantity of cattle to the extent of the ground, and the number of proprietors. So, also, if the commoner be disseised, either of the common of pasture, of estovers, or of fishery, he may have, where statute regulations have not prevented it, a writ of *novel disseisin* to reinstate himself in the possession. Such injuries are now generally redressed by the more familiar and easy remedy of an action upon the case; and the mention of those old and obsolete actions in the first revision of the statute laws of New-York, in 1787,^a arose from the circumstance that the statute of Westminster 2, 13 Edward I, was literally transcribed. But the *New-York Revised Statutes*, which went into operation in 1830, have abolished the writ of *novel disseisin*, and all the other real actions; and the remedy for a violation of these incorporeal rights, is either by an action of ejectment, or a special action on the case, according to the nature of the right and the injury. The substitution of the action of ejectment for the possessory real actions has been effected also by statute in New-Jersey, and probably the ancient remedies have been superseded in most of the states of the Union by more convenient and familiar actions.

^a *Laws of New-York*, sess. 10. ch. 4. sec. 6, and ch. 50. sec. 7.

II. *Of ways, easements, and aquatic rights.*

(1.) *Of ways.*

This incorporeal hereditament is a right of private passage over another man's ground. It may arise either by grant of the owner of the soil, or by prescription, which supposes a grant, or from necessity.^a If it be a freehold right, it must be created by deed, though it be only an easement upon the land of another, and not an interest in the land itself.^b A right of way *ex vi termini* imports a right of passing in a particular line, and not the right to vary it at pleasure, and go in different directions. This would be an inconvenience to the owner of the land charged with the easement, and an abuse of the right.^c It is likewise a principle of law, that

*420 *nothing passes as incident to the grant of an easement, but what is requisite to the fair enjoyment of the privilege.^d

If it be a right of way in gross, or a mere personal right, it cannot be assigned to any other person, nor transmitted by descent. It dies with the person, and it is so exclusively personal, that the owner of the right cannot take another person in company with him.^e But when a right of way is appendant or annexed to an estate, it may pass by assignment when the land is sold to which it was appurtenant. Thus, in the case stated in *Staples v. Heydon*,^f if one be seized of lot A. and lot

^a 1 *Rol. Abr.* 391. tit. *Chimin private*, 10. A right of way, public or private, is held to be an incorporeal hereditament. Nelson, J., 12 *Wendell*, 98. Holman, J., 1 *Blackf.* 45. Cowen, J., 20 *Wendell*, 99. Mr. J. Cowen says, a public way, if not an hereditament in every sense, is certainly a *quasi* hereditament.

^b *Hewlins v. Shippam*, 5 *Barnw. & Cress.* 221.

^c *Jones v. Percival*, 5 *Pick. Rep.* 485.

^d *Lyman v. Arnold*, 5 *Mason*, 195.

^e *Finch's Law*, 17. 31. *Year Book*, 7. H. 4. 26. B.

^f 6 *Mod. Rep.* 3. 2 *Lord Raym.* 922. *Newmarch v. Brandling*, 3 *Swans-ton*, 99. S. C.

B., and he used a way from lot A. over lot B., to a mill, or to a river, and he sells lot A. with all ways and easements, the grantee shall have the same privilege of passing over lot B. that the grantor had.

A right of way may arise from necessity in several respects. Thus, if a man sells land to another which is wholly surrounded by his own land, in this case the purchaser is entitled to a right of way over the other's ground to arrive at his own land. The way is a necessary incident to the grant, and without which the grant would be useless.^a This principle was carried so far, in a modern case,^b as to be applied to a trustee selling land he held in trust, and to which there was no access but over the trustee's own land. The right of way in that case passed of necessity as incidental to the grant; for though he conveyed in the character of trustee, it could not be intended that he meant to make a void grant, and every deed must be taken most strongly against the grantor. Lord Kenyon said it was impossible to distinguish that from the ordinary case where a man granted a close surrounded by his own land. The general rule is, that when the use of *a thing is granted, *421 every thing is granted by which the grantee may have and enjoy such use. If one man gives another a license to lay pipes of lead in his land to convey water to a cistern, he may enter on the land and dig therein to mend the pipes.^c So, if a person has a shop on another's soil by permission, he has a right of ingress and egress as to the soil between the highway and the shop. The

^a *Clarke v. Cogge*, *Cro. Jac.* 170. *Oldfield's case*, *Noy's Rep.* 123. *Turnbull v. Rivers*, 3 *M'Cord's Rep.* 131. *Holmes v. Seely*, 19 *Wendell*, 507. All the authorities support the doctrine, says Mr. *Woolrych*, in his full and accurate *Treatise on the Law of Ways*, p. 21, that in the case of a grant of land without a reservation of any way, a way of necessity will pass as incident to the grant.

^b *Howton v. Frearson*, 8 *Term Rep.* 50.

^c *Twysden, J.*, in *Pomfret v. Ricroft*, 1 *Saund. Rep.* 321.

right is necessary to the enjoyment of the tenement.^a The maxim is, that *quando aliquis aliquid concedit, concedere videtur, et id, sine quo res uti non potest.*

^a Doty v. Gorham, 5 *Pickering*, 437. In *Chambers v. Furry*, 1 *Yeates' Rep.* 167, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held, that the owner of a ferry over a navigable stream, had no right to land, or receive freight on the adjoining banks, even though the landing place was a public highway, without the owner's consent. The dedication of ground for the purpose of a public road, was said to give no right to use it for the other purpose. This doctrine was afterwards referred to, recognised, and adopted by the same court, in *Cooper v. Smith*, 9 *Serg. & Rawle*, 26. The same principle is to be found in *Saville*, 11. pl. 29, where it is said, that in every ferry the land on both sides the water ought to belong to the owner of the ferry, for otherwise he could not land on the other side. But this strict and severe rule is somewhat relaxed in England; and in *Peter v. Kendal*, 6 *Barnw. & Cress.* 703, the K. B. denied the justness of the conclusion in *Saville*, and held, that the owner of a ferry need not have the property in the soil on either side. It was sufficient that the landing place was a public highway. It was a right incident to the ferry, to use such a landing place for the purposes of a ferry. This is the most reasonable conclusion, upon the right to the use of a public highway to which a ferry is connected.

In *Allen v. Farnsworth*, 5 *Yerger's Tenn. Rep.* 189, it was held, that the state, by virtue of the right of eminent domain, might establish ferries wherever the legislature should deem them necessary for the public easement, without any regard to the ownership of the soil, on making just compensation. But in point of fact all the statutes authorized the grant of the franchise by way of preference to the owners of the land on each bank of the river where the ferry was established. By the Tennessee act of 1807, ch. 25, the owner of the soil on each side of a river, is, in exclusion of all others, entitled to the ferry. Without statute provision, he is not, as a matter of right, and because he is owner, entitled to keep it. *Nashville Bridge Company v. Shelby*, 10 *Yerger's Rep.* 280. The case of *Pipkin v. Wynns*, 2 *Dev. N. C. Rep.* 403, recognises the same general right of the sovereign, but holds that the owner of the adjacent land is *entitled* to the preference, and if he refuses to exercise the franchise, it may be granted to another, *on making compensation* to the owner of the fee for the use of the soil, and this must be done, although there be a public highway leading to the river on both sides. This decision, like those in Pennsylvania, construe more strictly than the late English case, the easement of a public highway leading to the river. The law in Kentucky in respect to ferries is, that the owner of land on the river Ohio, is alone entitled to be the grantee of a ferry across it. It is a franchise incident to the land, and is valuable property. But no ferry is to be granted within a mile and an half of one previously established, unless in the opinion of the granting power, the public interest shall require it, and the abuse of that discretion is subject to judicial control. *Carter v. Kalfus*, 6 *Dana's Rep.* 43. Though a ferry franchise be a statutory incident to land, yet the beneficial interest may be transferred to another, and entitle him to the profits. *Kennedy v. Covington*, 8 *Dana*, 59. The statute provision in some of the western states is, that no person shall keep a ferry so as to demand and receive pay without a license to be granted and regulated by the county courts. *Revised Statutes of Missouri*, 1835.

If a man hath several distinct parcels of enclosed land, and he sells all but one surrounded by the others, and to which he has no way or passage except over one of the lots he has sold, it has been made a question, whether he be entitled to a right of way against his own deed, when he has been so improvident as to reserve none. It is said, in *Clarke v. Cogge*,^a that the law reserves to him a right of way in such case from necessity. But the position in that case seems to have been contrary to the doctrine in the prior case of *Dell v. Babthorp*,^b where it was held, that if a man had a close, and a wood adjoining it, and time out of mind a way had been used over the close to the wood, and he then sells the close to one man, and the wood to another, the grantee of the wood has no right of way over the close, for the grantor had excluded himself, as he had sold the close without reserving such a right; and as he had lost his right, he could not communicate any to the grantee of the wood. But in this last case, it did not appear to be necessary to go over the close in question to the wood, and there might have been another way to it; and the weight of authority is, that the grantor has a right of way to his remaining land, in case of necessity, when he cannot otherwise approach his land. The law presumes a right of way reserved, or rather gives a new way, from the necessity of the case, and the new right of way ceases with the necessity for it.^c This principle of law has been for a long time recognised. Thus, in *Packer v. Welsted*,^d decided in the Upper Bench under the protectorate of Cromwell, A. had three parcels of land, and there was a private way out of the first parcel

^a *Cro. Jac.* 170.

^b *Cro. Eliz.* 300.

^c *Holmes v. Goring & Elliott*, 2 *Bing. Rep.* 76. 9 *Moore*, 166. S. C.

^d 2 *Sid. Rep.* 39.

to the second, and out of the two first parcels to the third. B. purchased all these parcels, and then sold the two first to C. There was no way to the land not sold, but through the other two parcels; and the court adjudged, that the way continued from necessity, and that the party was not liable in trespass for using it. So, also, in *Dutton v. Tayler*,^a A. owned two closes, B. and C., and there was no passage to close B. but through close C.,
 *423 *and he sold close C., and it was held, upon plea and demurrer, that the right of way still existed from necessity, and that it was not for the public good that the close B. should be left uncultivated. This last case is supposed to be binding; and Lord Kenyon said, in *Howton v. Frearson*,^b that he was prepared to submit to the express authority of it, though his reason was not convinced, and he thought there were great difficulties in the question.

But the doctrine of the case of *Dutton v. Tayler*, received confirmation in *Buckby v. Coles*,^c where it was decided, that if a person owned close A. and a passage of necessity to it over close B., and he purchased close B., and thereby united in himself the title to both closes, yet if he afterwards sold B. to one person, without any reservation, and then close A. to another person, the purchaser of close A. has a right of way over close B. This case seems to put an end to all doubt as to the existence of a right of way from necessity, even over the land which the claimant of the way had previously sold.

If a right of way be from close A. to close B., and both closes be united in the same person, the right of way, as well as all other subordinate rights and easements, is extinguished by the unity of possession.^d But there is a

^a 2 *Lutw. Rep.* 1487.

^b 8 *Term Rep.* 50.

^c 5 *Taunt. Rep.* 311.

^d *Whalley v. Tompson*, 1 *Bos. & Pull.* 371.

distinction between a right of way existing from necessity, and one merely by way of easement or convenience. The former is not extinguished by the unity of possession, as a right of way to a church or market, or a right to a gutter carried through an adjoining tenement, or to a water course running over the adjoining lands.^a Sergeant Williams^b is of opinion, that the right of way, when claimed by necessity, is founded entirely *upon grant, and *424 derives its force and origin from it. It is either created by express words, or it is created by operation of law, as incident to the grant; so that in both cases the grant is the foundation to the title. If this be a sound construction of the rule, then it follows that, in the cases I have mentioned, the right of the grantor to a way over the land he has sold, to his remaining land, must be founded upon an implied restriction, incident to the grant, and that it cannot be supposed the grantor meant to deprive himself of all use of his remaining land. This would be placing the right upon a reasonable foundation, and one consistent with the general principles of law.

There is a temporary right of way over the adjoining land, if the highway be out of repair, or be otherwise impassable, as by a flood. But this right of going upon the adjoining land applies to public and not to private ways.^c A person having a right to a private way over another's land, has no right to go upon the adjoining land, even though the private way be impassable or foundrous, by being overflowed by a river. The reason given is, that the owner of the way may be bound to repair, and the impassable state of the private way may be owing to his own neglect; but if public roads become impass-

^a Popham, J., in *Jorden v. Atwood*, *Owen's Rep.* 121. *Shury v. Piggott*, 3 *Bulst.* 339. *Cruise's Dig.* tit. *Ways*, 23, 24. Note to 1 *Bos. & Pull.* 374.

^b Note 6, to 1 *Saund. Rep.* 323.

^c *Taylor v. Whitehead*, *Doug. Rep.* 745. *W. Jones*, 296. *Henn's case*, 3 *Salk.* 182. pl. 4. 2 *Blacks. Com.* 36.

able, it is for the general good that the people should be entitled to pass in another direction. There may be a distinction between a private way arising from necessity, and a private way founded on grant or prescription; and such a distinction was alluded to by one of the judges in *Taylor v. Whitehead*. If a person be obliged, of necessity, to go over another's farm to arrive at the land which the other sold him, and the private way assigned be destroyed by a flood or otherwise, he may, of right, cross the farm on another line, and he is not obliged, at his peril, to keep such a road of necessity in repair. By selling
 *425 land surrounded *with his own, the grantor has bound himself to furnish the purchaser a reasonable passage to it.

The right of way, as to a foot or tow path along the banks of navigable rivers, has been a subject of great discussion, and of much regulation in the laws of different nations.

In the civil law, the banks of public rivers and the seashore were held to be public. *Riparum usus publicus est; littorum quoque usus publicus est jure gentium.*^a The law of nations was here used for natural right, and not international law, in the modern sense of it; and it is stated in the Institutes of Justinian, that all persons have the same liberty to bring their vessels to land, and to fasten ropes to the banks of the river, as they have to navigate the river itself. These liberal doctrines of the Roman law have been introduced into the jurisprudence of those nations of Europe which have followed the civil, and made it essentially their municipal law. Thus, in Spain, the seashore is common to the public; and any one may fish, and erect a cottage for shelter. The banks of navi-

^a *Inst.* 2. 1. 4, 5. The bank of a river is that which contains the water in its utmost height. *Ripa ea putatur esse, quæ plenissimum flumen continet. Dig.* 43. 12. 3. 1.

gable rivers may also be used to assist navigation.^a In the French law, navigable or floatable rivers, as they are termed, have always been regarded as dependencies of the public domain, and the lands on each side subject to the servitude or burthen of towing-paths for the benefit of the public.^b

The English law was anciently the same as the Roman *law, if we may judge from the authority *426 of Bracton,^c who cites the words of the civil law, declaring the banks of navigable rivers to be as much for public use as the rivers themselves. So, Lord Holt held,^d that every man, of common right, was justified in going with horses on the banks of navigable rivers for towing. But Sir Matthew Hale, in his treatise *De Jure Maris*, and in which he has exhausted the learning concerning public property in the sea and rivers, and collected all the law on the subject, concluded that individuals had a right to a tow-path, for towing vessels up and down rivers, *on making a reasonable compensation to the owner* of the land for the damage.^e This condition, which he annexes to the privilege, shows, that, in his opinion, there was no such common right in the English law, inasmuch as it depended on private agreement with the owner of the soil. The point remained in this state of uncertainty, until the case of *Ball v. Herbert*, in 1789,^f brought the

^a *Institutes of the Civil Law of Spain*, by Doctors Asso and Manuel, b. 2. tit. 1. This is also the law in Louisiana; the banks of navigable rivers, though they are the property of those who possess the adjacent lands, are nevertheless subject to the public use so far that vessels may make fast to the shore and to the trees planted there, and they may be unloaded, and the goods deposited, and nets dried there. So, any persons may build cabins on the seashore for shelter, and fish from there, and moor ships, and dry nets there. *Civil Code*, art. 443. 446.

^b *Ferriere's Inst.* 2. 1. 4, 5, and note *ibid.* *Code Napoleon*, No. 538. 650.

^c Lib. 1. c. 12. sec. 6.

^d 1 *Lord Raym.* 725. 6 *Mod. Rep.* 163.

^e *Harg. L. T.* 85, 86, 87.

^f 3 *Term Rep.* 253.

whole doctrine into discussion. The case was respecting a claim to tow on the bank of the river Ouze, in Norfolk-shire, with men and horses, whenever it was necessary for the purposes of navigation, doing as little damage as possible. It was admitted that the Ouze was a navigable river where the tide ebbed and flowed. The question was, whether, at common law, the public had a right to tow vessels on the banks of either side of a navigable river; and it was investigated and argued with great ability. All the cases bearing on the question were collected and reviewed, and the court concluded that there was not, and never had been, any right at common law, for the public to tow on the banks of navigable rivers. The claim was directly contrary to common experience; and it was observed by Lord Kenyon, that the *427 navigators *on the Thames were frequently obliged, at several places, to pass from one side of the river to the other, with great inconvenience and delay, because they had no such general right. It was admitted, that on many navigable rivers, there was a custom to tow on the banks; but the privilege in those cases rested on the special custom, and not on any common law right. The statutes which have given a right of towing on parts of the Severn, Trent, and Thames, are evidence that no such general right before existed.^a

^a In New-York, it has been adjudged, after a very able and thorough examination of the question, that the public have not the right to use and occupy the soil of an individual adjoining navigable waters, as a public landing, and place of deposit of property in its transit, against the will of the owner. *Pearsall v. Post*, 20 *Wendell*, 111. On the other hand, it is held, in Missouri, that navigators and fishermen are entitled to the temporary use of the banks of the navigable rivers in that state, though owned by private individuals, for the purpose of landing and repairing their vessels, and exposing their sails and merchandise. But this use is only for transient purposes, and under restrictions. *O'Fallon v. Daggett*, 4 *Missouri Rep.* 343.

(2.) *Of easements and aquatic rights.*1. *Of riparian rights.*

It is a settled principle in the English law, that the right of soil of owners of land bounded by the sea, or on navigable rivers, where the tide ebbs and flows, extends to high-water mark ; and the shore below common, but not extraordinary high-water mark, belongs to the public ; and in England the crown, and in this country the people, have the absolute proprietary interest in the same, though it may, by grant or prescription, become private property. The public have at common law a right to navigate over every part of a common navigable river, and in England even the crown has no right to interfere with the channels of public navigable rivers.^a But grants of land, bounded on rivers, or upon the margins of the same, or along the same, above tide-water, carry the exclusive right and title of the grantee to the centre of the stream ; and the public, in cases where the river is navigable for boats and rafts, have an easement therein, or a right of passage as a public highway.^b The pro-

^a *Hale, De Jure Maris*, ch. 4, 5. *Rex v. Smith*, *Doug.* 425. *Williams v. Wilcox*, 1 *Willmore & Hodges*, 477. *Louisiana Civil Code*, art. 442, 443, 444. In Connecticut, it was held, in the case of *East-Haven v. Hemingway*, 7 *Conn. Rep.* 186, that the owners of land, adjoining a navigable river, have an exclusive right to the soil between high and low water mark, for the purpose of erecting wharves and stores. But see, *infra*, p. 432. note, cases *contra*, and the case of *Chapman v. Kimball*, 9 *Conn. Rep.* 38, also recognised the English rule ; and it is there held, that the riparian proprietor on a navigable river or arm of the sea, is not entitled to the seaweed which grows and accumulates on the bed below low-water mark. It belongs to the public. In the case of the *Canal Appraisers v. the People*, 17 *Wendell*, 571, Chancellor Walworth stated the true rule of the common law to be, that grants embracing within their bounds *rivers and streams above tide-water*, convey not only the banks, but the beds of the rivers or streams, and the islands therein, unless clearly, by the grant itself, excluded from it. But the right of the grantee, to the rivers or streams above tide-water, if they be navigable, is not absolute, but subject to the right of the public to use the waters as a highway, for the passage of boats, &c. The common law rule, however, does not apply to large navigable lakes, nor to rivers constituting the boundaries between New-York and other states.

^b *Deerfield v. Arms*, 17 *Pick.* 41. In Pennsylvania it is held, that the owners

prietors of the adjoining banks have a right to use the land and water of the river, as regards the public, in any way not inconsistent with the easement ; and neither the state, nor any other individual, has the right to divert the stream, and render it less useful to the owners of

*428 the soil.^a It *would require an express exception in the grant, or some clear and unequivocal decla-

of land on the rivers Delaware and Schuylkill, have a right to the land between high and low water mark, subject to the public easement or right to pass over it when covered by the water. *Ball v. Slack*, 2 *Wharton*, 508. By compact between Pennsylvania and New-Jersey, the river Delaware remains a common highway equally free and open to both states, but each state reserves the right of regulating the fisheries on the Delaware annexed to their respective shores, and each state exercises concurrent jurisdiction on the waters of the river. So, by compact, the boundary line between New-York and New-Jersey on the Hudson river, is the middle of the river, but the exclusive jurisdiction over the waters of the river and bay, but not reaching to the wharves and improvements on the Jersey shore, is in New-York. So, New-Jersey has exclusive jurisdiction over the waters of the sound between Staten Island and New-Jersey, with like reservations. Rights of property in each state reach to the middle of the rivers. *Elmer's Digest*, 562. The ordinance of Congress of 13th July, 1787, for the Government of the Territory of the United States, north-west of the river Ohio, declared it to be a fundamental provision to remain forever unalterable, that the navigable waters, leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between the same, should be common highways, and forever free. But this provision did not abolish or impair the common law principle, that he who owns the land on both banks, owns the entire river, subject only to the easement of navigation ; and he who owns the land upon one bank only, owns to the middle of the river, subject to the same easement. *Gavitt v. Chambers*, 3 *Ohio Rep.* 496. All the navigable waters in the western states and territories have, by successive acts of Congress, been declared public highways, as, see acts of May 18th, and June 1st, 1796, March 3d, 1803, March 26th, 1804, March 3d, 1811, February 20th, 1811, April 8th, 1812, June 4th, 1812, March 1st, 1817, May 8th, 1817.

^a *People v. Canal Appraisers*, 13 *Wendell*, 355. *Oliva v. Boissonnault*, *Stuart's Lower Canada Rep.* 524. In the case of the Canal Appraisers v. the People, 17 *Wendell*, 571, the judgment of the Supreme Court of New-York, in 13 *Wendell*, 355, was reversed, and the right of the state over waters, above the flow of the sea, for all public purposes, in derogation of individual rights, was declared. All rivers, in fact navigable, were deemed public rivers and subservient to public uses. Thus though the erection of a dam across the Hudson River, at the sloop-lock between Troy and Lansingburgh, destroyed the value of a waterfall, situate in the middle sprout of the Mohawk River, a tributary stream, the owner of the mill-site was held not entitled to damages or compensation, within the provision of the canal laws.

ration, or certain and immemorial usage, to limit the title of the owner, in such cases, to the edge of the river. Where a stream is used in a grant as a boundary or monument, it is used as an entirety to the centre of it, and to that extent the fee passes. *Prima facie*, said the vice chancellor of England,^a the proprietor of each bank of a stream is the proprietor of half the land covered by the stream. If the same person be the owner of the lands on both sides of the river, he owns the whole river to the extent of the length of his lands upon it. If a fresh water river, running between the lands of separate owners, insensibly gains on one side or the other, the title of each continues to go *ad filum medium aquæ*; but if the alteration be sensibly and suddenly made, the ownership remains according to the former bounds, and if the river should then forsake its channel and make an entire new one in the lands of the owner on one side, he will become owner of the whole river, so far as it is enclosed by his land. This is the general doctrine as to alluvions. If soil be formed by islands, or relict land out of the sea or a river, by slow and imperceptible accretion, it belongs in the case of the sea or navigable rivers to the sovereign, and in the case of rivers not navigable in the common law sense of the term, or above where the sea ebbs and flows, it belongs to the owners of the adjoining land.^b Islands situated in a river do not form any exception to this

^a *Wright v. Howard*, 1 *Simons & Stewart*, 190. Shaw, Ch. J., in *Deerfield v. Arms*, 17 *Pick. Rep.* 41, to the same point.

^b *Just. Inst.* 2. 1. 23. *Dig.* 41. 1. tit. *De Acq. Rer. Dominio*, 7. 1. *Puff.* 4. 7. 12. The civil law says, that the ground gained on a river by alluvion or imperceptible increase, belongs to the owner of the adjoining land *jure gentium*. This is also the rule of the common law. *Bracton*, lib. 2. ch. 2. *Hale, De Jure Maris*, ch. 6. 2 *Blacks. Com.* 261, 262. *King v. Lord Yarborough*, 3 *Barw. & Cress.* 91. 1 *Dow*, N. S. 173. S. C. *New-Orleans v. United States*, 10 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 662. *Schultes on Aquatic Rights*, p. 115—138. *Deerfield v. Arms*, 17 *Pick. Rep.* 41. If seaweed be cast on the *seashore* by slow degrees and gradual accumulation, it belongs as a marine increase to the riparian proprietor. *Emans v. Turnbull*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 322.

general principle, and they belong to the person who owns the land on that side of the river to which they are nearest, though, if they be situated so as to cover the middle of the river, they would belong in severalty to the owners on each side, according to the original dividing line, or *filum aquæ*, continued on from the place where the waters begin to divide. Each proprietor is entitled to a larger or smaller proportion of the alluvial formation and shore line, according to the extent of his original line on the shore of the river.^a

*429 *This principle of the common law has been recognised and prevails in the states of Maine, New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Maryland, Ohio, Virginia, and Louisiana.^b

^a *Hale, De Jure Maris*, ch. 1, 2, 3, 4. 6. *Bracton, De Acq. Rer.* lib. 2. ch. 2. sec. 2. *Dig.* 41. 1. 29. *King v. Smith, Doug. Rep.* 441. *Code Napoleon*, No. 561. *The People v. Court Appraisers*, 13 *Wendell*, 355. *Deerfield v. Arms*, 17 *Pick. Rep.* 41. *Toullier, Droit Civil*, tom. iii. p. 107; 108. If the waters of a river be divided by an island, and one-fourth of the stream descends on one side of the island, and the residue on the other, it was held in *Crooker v. Bragg*, 10 *Wendell*, 260, that the owner of the shore where the largest quantity of water flows, was entitled to the use of the whole water flowing on that side of the island.

^b *Berry v. Carle*, 3 *Greenleaf's Rep.* 269. *Morrison v. Keen, ibid.* 474. *Weston, Ch. J.*, in *Bradley v. Rice*, 13 *Maine Rep.* 201. In that case it was held, and so it had been, in *Waterman v. Johnston*, 13 *Pick. Rep.* 261, that where the land in a conveyance was bounded by a pond of water, the grant extended only to the margin of the pond. *Claremont v. Carlton*, 2 *N. H. Rep.* 369. *King v. King*, 7 *Mass. Rep.* 496. *Lunt v. Holland*, 14 *ibid.* 149. *Ingraham v. Wilkinson*, 4 *Pick. Rep.* 268. *Adams v. Pease*, 2 *Conn. Rep.* 481. *Warner v. Southworth*, 6 *ibid.* 471. In this last case it was held, that if a wide ditch or a wide stone wall constituted the boundary line, and the owner on one side conveyed his land, bounding the grantee on the ditch or wall, the same principle would apply, and the grant would extend to the centre of the ditch or wall. *Palmer v. Mulligan*, 3 *Caines' Rep.* 318. *The People v. Platt*, 17 *Johns. Rep.* 195. *Hooker v. Cummings*, 20 *ibid.* 90. *Ex parte Jennings*, 6 *Cowen's Rep.* 518. *Arnold v. Mundy*, 1 *Halsted's Rep.* 1. *Hayes, Ex'r. v. Bowman*, 1 *Randolph's Rep.* 417. *Mead v. Haynes*, 3 *ibid.* 33. *Home v. Richards*, 4 *Call*, 411. *Gavit v. Chambers*, 3 *Ohio Rep.* 495. *Browne v. Kennedy*, 5 *Harr. & Johns.* 195. *Morgan v. Livingston*, 6 *Martin's Louis. Rep.* 19. *Batture* was said to be a marine term, and denotes a bottom of sand, &c., rising towards the surface, and applies equally when the elevation has reached above

In Maine and Massachusetts, some alterations in *the common law have taken place; for by the *430 colony ordinance of 1641, and by usage arising therefrom, the proprietors of the adjoining land, on bays and arms of the sea, and other places where the tide ebbs and flows, go to low-water mark, subject to the public easement, and not exceeding one hundred rods below high-water mark. According to judicial constructions of that ordinance, the flats between high and low water mark may be occupied by wharves and other

the surface of the water, and the estate of the riparian proprietor which fronts to the river, takes a property in the batture as well as in the bank. In *Browne v. Kennedy* it was held, that if the state be entitled to the soil covered by a river not navigable, and grant the lands lying on such a river, and names the river as a boundary, the grantee becomes a riparian proprietor, and entitled to the land the river covers, *ad filum medium aquæ*. A variety of cases to the same effect, are cited in the learned note of the reporter, in 6 *Cowen's Rep.* 544; and they demonstrate the existence of the rule that a grantee, bounded on a river, (and it is almost immaterial by what mode of expression,) goes *ad medium filum aquæ*, unless there be decided language, showing a manifest intent to stop short at the water's edge. So, if a conveyance of land on the bank of a river, not navigable, be bounded *along the shore of the river*, the grantee still takes *ad filum aquæ*. *Starr v. Child*, 20 *Wendell*, 149. In the case of the Canal Commissioners *v. the People*, 5 *Wendell*, 423, the language of the judges of the Court of Errors, in New-York, was, that by the rule of the common law which prevailed here, grants of lands, bounded on rivers above tide water, extended *usque filum aquæ*, including the beds of rivers and the islands therein; and the exclusive right of fishing, unless the same was clearly intended to be reserved, but subject, nevertheless, to the right of the public to use the water as a highway. The right of the riparian owner to the stream, is as sacred as other private property, and the state cannot appropriate the water to public uses by artificial erections or improvements, without making compensation. *The People v. Canal Appraisers*, 13 *Wendell*, 355. Lands under the waters of navigable lakes are placed on the same footing with lands under the waters of navigable rivers, and they require a specific grant to enable the riparian proprietor to go beyond the shore, and the grant of the bed of such lakes can only be made to the owner of the adjoining land. This is the rule in New-York, equally as to the waters of navigable rivers and lakes. *New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 208. sec. 67. In Scotland, navigable lakes, though not considered strictly *inter regalia*, yet, if they form great channels of communication, Mr. Bell thinks there is some reason to regard them as *res publicæ*, and subject to public uses as a navigable river. *Principles of the Law of Scotland*, 171. In this country, our great navigable lakes are properly regarded as public property, and not susceptible of private property any more than the sea.

erections, provided the easement or passage be not too much obstructed.^a The common law, as we have already seen, has been rejected, or deemed inapplicable to the great inland rivers in Pennsylvania, and the owners of the land on the banks of them do not, as of course, acquire a right to the soil covered by the waters of the rivers, but the soil and waters of the rivers, with the rights and privileges incident thereto, remain in the public.^b In South Carolina the doctrine of the common

^a *Storer v. Freeman*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 435. *Dane's Abr.* vol. ii. 693, 694. Parker, Ch. J., in *Ingraham v. Wilkinson*, 4 *Pick. Rep.* 253. See, also, *supra*, p. 415. The colonial ordinance of 1641 extended the title of riparian proprietors to the low-water mark, and though it was originally limited to the Plymouth Colony, and afterwards annulled, yet the doctrine of it is held in Massachusetts and Maine to be part of the common law of those states. Parsons, Ch. J., in *Storer v. Freeman*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 438. *Lapish v. Bangor Bank*, 8 *Greenleaf*, 35. In the case of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts *v. Wright*, (*American Jurist*, No. 6. p. 135,) it was decided, in 1829, that a wharf extending into the navigable channel in Boston harbour, so as in the course of time to injure the navigation, was indictable as a public nuisance; and upon conviction, it was ordered to be abated at the expense of the defendants. See *Rex v. Lord Grosvenor*, 2 *Starkie*, 511, and *Hale, De Portibus Maris*, ch. 7. sec. 2. Whether the erection in such cases amounts to a common nuisance, is a question of fact. The law of Connecticut declares it to be a common nuisance to dam, stop, or obstruct any river, brook, stream, or run of water, or divert the same from its natural course, to the prejudice of any person, without liberty from the town, where such town has a right to grant it. *Revised Statutes of Connecticut*, 1821, p. 362.

^b *Carson v. Blazer*, 2 *Binney's Rep.* 475. *Shrunk v. President of the Schuylkill Navigation Company*, 14 *Serg. & Rawle*, 71. In *Starr v. Child*, 20 *Wendell*, 149, Mr. J. Bronson earnestly contended, that the rule of the common law, that the flow and reflow of the tide was the test of a public river, did not apply to the great fresh-water rivers of New-York, and that they belonged to the public; but the majority of the court adhered to and declared the common law rule. In Alabama the rule is, that every water course, suited to the ordinary purposes of navigation, whether the tide ebbs and flows or not, is a public highway, and the riparian owner cannot assert any private right of soil to the bed of the river beyond the low-water mark. The question in that state does not depend upon the common law test of the ebbing and flowing of the tide, for if the river be suited to the ordinary purposes of navigation, it is, by statute, declared to be a public highway, and the title to the bed of the river remains in the public, unless it has been expressly granted. *Bullock v. Wilson*, 2 *Porter's Rep.* 436. And it is competent to a state government to authorize the erection of a bridge across a navigable river, below where the coasting trade is carried on by licensed ves-

law on this subject has been held to be inapplicable; but as the common law still applies to rivers capable of being made navigable, and which possess obstructions to the passage of boats of every description, and *as *431 the adjoining owners in such cases go *ad filum aquæ*,^a the modifications which the common law has undergone do not seem to be very material. So, in North Carolina, the ebbing and flowing of the tide is not the sole test of a navigable river. If a river be deep enough for sea-vessels to navigate to and from the ocean, it is a navigable stream, and the boundary of the adjacent land, is not the thread or middle of the channel, but the edge of the water at low-water mark.^b

The seashore, according to Lord Hale's definition, is the ground between the ordinary high and low water mark, and it *prima facie*, and of common right, belongs to the king, but may be vested in a subject by prescription, or by grant, as if the king grants a manor *cum littore maris eidem adjacente*, the shore itself will pass.^c But it was said by the Ch. J., in *Arnold v. Mundy*,^d that a grant bounded upon navigable water, where the tide ebbs and flows, extended to high-water mark when the tide was high, and to low-water mark when the tide was low, and that the immediate space between high-water and low-water mark, might be reclaimed, and exclusively appro-

sels, provided the bridge be built with a draw, for the passing and repassing of vessels, free of expense. *The People v. S. and R. Railroad Company*, 15 *Wendell*, 113.

^a *Cates v. Wadlington*, 1 *M'Cord's Rep.* 580.

^b *Wilson v. Forbes*, 2 *Dev. Rep.* 30. *Ingram v. Threadgill*, 3 *ibid.* 59. In the latter case it was the language of the court, that in a river not navigable for the purposes of navigation, the right of fishing belongs to the riparian owners.

^c *Hale, De Jure Maris*, ch. 4, 5. *Constable's case*, 5 *Co.* 105. 107. b. The shore of a fresh river is where the land and water ordinarily meet. 6 *Cowen*, 547. By the *Civil Code of Louisiana*, art. 442, the seashore is declared to be that space of land over which the sea spreads in the highest water, during the winter season.

^d 1 *Halsted's Rep.* 1.

priated by the owner of the adjacent land, to wharves, buildings, and other erections.^a There may be a movable freehold, as is stated by Lord Coke;^b and if a grant was made of the seashore, the freehold would shift as the sea receded or encroached, and it would take all the soil that should, from time to time, be within high and low water mark.^c But I should apprehend the better opinion to be, that in ordinary grants of land bounded on the sea, or a river, the boundary limit must be stable, either at ordinary high or low water mark, and not subject to alternate change with the flux and reflux of the tide. In *Handley's Lessee v. Anthony*,^d it was considered as a general, natural, and convenient rule of construction in public grants of territory bounded by a river, instead of being

*432 bounded by the bank or *shore, to take the permanent river for the boundary line, and that would, of course, carry the line to ordinary low-water mark, and include the land left diurnally bare by the receding of the water. The rule was, in that case, applied to a country or state bounded by a river; and the English common law does not allow the riparian owner, under the grant of the sovereign, of lands bounded on tide-waters, to go beyond ordinary high-water mark.^e Such grants are

^a In Scotland the owner of land, bounded on the seashore, may prevent the encroachment of the sea by artificial operations, and thereby gain by embankments, holding the shore subject to the public uses. *Bell's Principles of the Law of Scotland*, 169.

^b *Co. Litt.* 43. b.

^c Bayley, J., in *Scratton v. Brown*, 4 *Barnw. & Cress.* 485.

^d 5 *Wheat. Rep.* 374.

^e Parsons, Ch. J., in *Storer v. Freeman*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 438. *Cortelyou v. Van Brundt*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 357. In *Kean v. Stetson*, 5 *Pickering*, 492, it was considered, that the whole of a navigable river included within high-water mark, on each side, was a public highway, and owners of the adjoining lands have no right to erect wharves and other obstructions between high and low water mark, if it materially injure or straiten the passage for vessels and boats. A grant or prescription to occupy the flats of a navigable river with wharves and other erections, is always upon the implied condition, that they do not essentially impair the public easement in the stream, for then the erection would become a nuisance.

construed most favourably for the king, and against the grantee; and Sir William Scott has vindicated^a such a rule of construction as founded in wise policy, for grants from the crown are made by a trustee for the public, and no alienation should be presumed that was not clearly and indisputably expressed.

2. *Of highways.*

Every thoroughfare which is used by the public, and is, in the language of the English books, "common to all the king's subjects," is a highway, whether it be a carriage-way, a horse-way, a foot-way, or a navigable river. It is, says Lord Holt, the *genus* of all public ways.^b The law with respect to public highways, and to fresh-water rivers, is the same, and the analogy perfect, as concerns the right of soil. The presumption is that the owners of the land on each side go to the centre of the road, and they have the exclusive right to the soil, subject to the right of passage in the public.^c Being owners of the soil, they have a right to all ordinary remedies for the freehold. They may maintain an action of ejectment for

^a 5 *Rob. Adm. Rep.* 182. In *Holister v. Union Company*, 9 *Conn. Rep.* 436, a grant on a navigable river was not construed so as to impede the reasonable improvement of the navigation, though remote and consequential damages to the banks or shores of the river might ensue.

^b *The Queen v. Saintiff*, 6 *Mod. Rep.* 255.

^c *Chatham v. Brainerd*, 11 *Conn. Rep.* 60. The law is well settled, that where a mere easement is taken for a public highway, the soil and freehold remain in the owner of the land, *encumbered only with the easement*, or right of passage in the public. And upon the discontinuance of the highway, the soil and freehold revert to the owner of the land. *Fairfield v. Williams*, 4 *Mass. Rep.* 427. *Perley v. Chandler*, 6 *ibid.* 454. *Stackpole v. Healy*, 16 *Mass. Rep.* 33. *Mayor, &c. of Savannah v. Steamboat Company*, *R. M. Charlton's Rep.* 342. *United States v. Harris*, 1 *Sumner*, 21. 37. *Nicholson v. Stockett*, 1 *Walker's Mississippi Rep.* 67. In the matter of *John and Cherry Streets*, 19 *Wendell*, 659. 666. *Nelson, J.*, 12 *Wendell*, 371. 373. It is a principle of the common law, and equally the law in every state, unless specially controlled. In one of the cases above cited, the owner was held to be restored to the use of the soil, though he had received compensation for it.

encroachments upon the road, or an assize if disseized of it, or trespass against any person who digs up the soil of it, or cuts down any trees growing on the side of the road, and *left there for shade or ornament.

The freehold, and all profits, belong to the owners of the adjoining lands. They may carry water in pipes under the highway, and have every use and remedy that is consistent with the servitude or easement of a way over it, and with police regulations.^a The established

^a 1 *Rol. Abr.* 392. B. 2 *Inst.* 705. *Lade v. Shepherd*, *Str. Rep.* 1004. *Gibbs*, Ch. J., 7 *Taunt. Rep.* 39. *Abbott*, Ch. J., 2 *Starkie's Rep.* 463. *Doe v. Pearsey*, 7 *Barnw. & Cress.* 304. *Goodtitle v. Alker*, 1 *Burr. Rep.* 133. 143. *Headlam v. Hedley*, 1 *Holt's N. P. Rep.* 463. *Cortelyou v. Van Brundt*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 357. *Jackson v. Hathaway*, 15 *ibid.* 447. *Makepeace v. Worden*, 1 *N. Hamp. Rep.* 16. *Peck v. Smith*, 1 *Conn. Rep.* 103. *Perley v. Chandler*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 454. *Robbins v. Borman*, 1 *Pick. Rep.* 122. *Adams v. Emerson*, 6 *Pick. Rep.* 57. *Writter v. Harvey*, 1 *McCord*, 67. *Bolling v. Mayor of P.*, 3 *Randolph*, 563. *Chambers v. Furry*, 1 *Yeates' Rep.* 167. *Pomeroy v. Mills*, 3 *Vermont Rep.* 279. *Gidney v. Earll*, 12 *Wendell's Rep.* 98. *Mayor, &c. of Savannah v. Steamboat Company*, *R. M. Charlton's Rep.* 342. The statute of New-York, (*N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 525,) allowing the owners of lands adjoining highways to plant trees on the sides of the road, and to bring actions of trespass for injuring them, assumes and affirms the principle of the common law in relation to such rights. It specially declares that all trees standing or lying on any land over which a highway is laid out are for the use of the owner of the land, except such as may be requisite to make or repair the highway or bridges on the land. Though a turnpike corporation has only an easement in the land over which the turnpike road is located, a grant of the use of the land necessary for the enjoyment of the franchise, as by erecting toll-houses, and digging wells and cellars for their accommodation, is necessarily implied. *Tucker v. Tower*, 9 *Pick. Rep.* 109. By the law of Louisiana, which follows in this respect the civil and not the common law, the soil of public highways is in the public. *Renthorp v. Bourg*, 4 *Martin's Rep.* 97. *Dig.* 43. 8. 2. 21. In the city of New-York, the rule is, that if a lot be sold, bounded on a street as designated on a map of the city, or of the owner's land, the purchaser takes the lot with the indefeasible privilege of a right of way in the street as an easement. The fee of the street remains in the vendor, but subject to the easement, and the value of his fee is but nominal. This right of way is founded on an implied covenant in the grant. The street is considered by means of the sale and map as dedicated to the public by the vendor, when the municipal authorities shall think proper to open the street. In the matter of *Lewis-street*, 2 *Wendell's Rep.* 472, *Livingston v. Mayor of New-York*, 8 *ibid.* 85, *Wyman v. Mayor of New-York*, 11 *ibid.* 486, the cases of *City of Cincinnati v. Lessee of White*, 6 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 431, and of the *Trustees of Watertown v. Cowen*, 4 *Paige's Ch. Rep.* 510, lay down the same rule, that if the owner of lands in

inference of law is, that a conveyance of land bounded on a public highway, carries with it the fee to the centre of the road, as part and parcel of the grant. The idea of an intention in a grantor to withhold his interest in a road to the middle of it, after parting with all his right and title to the adjoining land, is never to be presumed. It would be contrary to universal practice; and it was said, in *Peck v. Smith*,^a that there was no instance where the fee of a highway, as distinct from the adjoining land, was ever retained by the vendor. It would require an express declaration, or something equivalent thereto, to sustain such an inference; and it may be considered as the *general rule, that a grant of land bounded *434 upon a highway or river, carries the fee in the highway or river to the centre of it, provided the grantor at the time owned to the centre, and there be no words or specific description to show a contrary intent.^b But it is competent for the owner of a farm or lot, having one or more of its sides on a public highway, to bound it by express terms on the side or edge of the highway, so as to rebut the presumption of law, and thereby reserve to himself his latent fee in the highway. It is equally competent for the riparian proprietor to sell his upland to the top or edge of the bank of a river, and to reserve the stream, or flats below high-water mark, if he does it by

a city or village lays the same out in lots and streets, and sets apart ground for a public square or common, it is a dedication of the streets or square to the public, of which the grantees cannot be deprived.

^a 1 *Conn. Rep.* 103.

^b 1 *Roll. Abr.* 392. B. pl. 5. *Stevens v. Whistler*, 11 *East's Rep.* 51. *Headlam v. Hedley*, 1 *Holt's N. P. Cases*, 463. *Wright v. Howard*, 1 *Simons & Stewart*, 190. *Brown v. Kennedy*, 5 *Harr. & Johns.* 195. *Cortelyou v. Van Brundt*, 2 *Johns. Rep.* 357. *Jackson v. Hathaway*, 15 *ibid.* 447. *Canal Commissioners v. the People*, 5 *Wendell's Rep.* 423. *Lunt v. Holland*, 14 *Mass. Rep.* 149. *Hatch v. Dwight*, 17 *ibid.* 289. *Claremont v. Carlton*, 2 *N. H. Rep.* 369. *Morrison v. Keen*, 3 *Greenleaf*, 474. *Contra*, *Tyler v. Hammond*, 11 *Pick. Rep.* 193.

clear and specific boundaries.^a The purchaser, in such a case, takes the bank of the river as it is, or may thereafter be, by alluvion or decrease of the flow of the river. He takes it subject to the common incidents which may diminish or increase the extent of his boundaries.^b He may also convey the bed of a stream separate from the land which bounds it.^c

3. *Of servitudes and vicinage.*

The civil law treated very extensively of these incorporeal rights annexed to land ; and what in the common law are termed *easements*, or a right which one man has to use the land of another for a special purpose, went under the general denomination of *servitudes*, because they were charges on one estate for the benefit of another. Toullier defines servitudes to be real rights, *jura in re*, existing in the property of another. Like incorporeal hereditaments, they have been held not to pass without a grant.^d By virtue of such a right, the proprietor of the estate charged is bound to permit, or not to do, certain acts in relation to his estate, for the utility or accommodation of a third person, or of the possessor of an adjoining estate. The term is a metaphorical expression, borrowed from personal servitude, but the charge is entirely attached to real estates, and not to the person. *Servitutum ea natura est, ut aliquid patiatur aut non faciat. Servitutem non hominem debere sed rem.*^e

^a *Storer v. Freeman*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 435. 17 *ibid.* 229. *Jackson v. Hathaway*, 15 *Johns. Rep.* 447.

^b *Adams v. Frothingham*, 3 *Mass. Rep.* 352. *Scratton v. Brown*, 4 *Barnw. & Cress.* 485. *Dunlap v. Stetson*, 4 *Mason's Rep.* 349.

^c *Den v. Wright*, 1 *Peters' Cir. Rep.* 64.

^d *Orleans Navigation Company v. New-Orleans*, 2 *Martin*, 214.

^e *Dig.* 8. 1. 15. *Ibid.* 8. 5, 6. 2. *Toullier's Droit Civil Français*, tom. iii. n. 376. *Institutes of the Civil Law of Spain*, by Doctors Asso and Manuel, translated by L. F. C. Johnston, 1825. This digest of the civil jurisprudence of Spain collects summarily, and states with great precision, the Spanish law

The regulations in the civil law on the subject of urban and rural servitudes were just and equitable, and the provisions made to define and protect those rights, were far more minute and precise than those which are to be found *on the same subjects in the books of *436 the common law; and it is difficult to solve many questions arising on those rights, without having recourse to the solid and luminous principles of the civil law, which are of permanent and universal application.^a

In cities, where the population is dense, and the buildings compact, a great variety of urban services grow

concerning servitudes, both in town and country; (lib. 2. tit. 6,) and it appears to be a very close adoption of the distinctions of the civil law on the subject of rural and city services. The *Code Napoleon*, b. 2. tit. 4, has also condensed, and the *Civil Code of Louisiana* has borrowed from it, the principles of the civil law on the subject of servitudes. Before the promulgation of the code, there were many French treatises on servitudes, and in the *Repertoire de Jurisprudence*, par *Merlin*, and in his *Questions de Droit*, tit. *Servitude*, a crowd of Italian, German, and French treatises on servitudes are cited, and among them the *Traité des Servitudes*, by *Lalaure*, which, *Toullier* says, has been of great use to all succeeding writers. The subject is treated at large by *Merlin*, and he has enriched it with forensic discussions. The treatise by *Desgodets* was a simple commentary upon the law of buildings under the custom of Paris; but since the era of the code, *M. Le Page* has published two octavo volumes, entitled *Lois des Batimes, ou le Nouveau Desgodets*, in which the law of vicinage, in relation to city servitudes, is examined with great minuteness of detail. The *Traité du Voisinage*, in two volumes octavo, by *M. Fournel*, a French lawyer of the old régime, discusses at large the different subjects embraced by the law of vicinage, in an alphabetical or dictionary form; and he is a learned and voluminous writer, who has published several interesting tracts on various branches of the law, and who speaks with freedom and contempt of the great mass of laws and ordinances promulgated by the revolutionists in France prior to 1800, when the first edition of his work on the law of vicinage appeared. In those legislative assemblies, he says, there were *peu de jurisconsultes, beaucoup d'hommes de loi*. Since the new code, the *Traité des Servitudes, suivant les Principes du Code*, par *M. Pardessus*, is much regarded, and this eminent professor is always cited by *Toullier* with respect, though he combats with freedom many of his opinions. *Toullier* himself (tom. iii. 326—554,) has discussed the whole of this subject of servitudes upon the principles of the code, with his usual order, accuracy, and learning.

^a *M. Fournel*, when speaking of the Roman law in relation to this subject, says, that *Quelque chose que vous demandez aux lois Romaines, elles vous en fournissent la réponse*; and we may say of that law, as the younger *Pliny* said of *Titus Aristo*, who was an accomplished lawyer, and his particular friend; *Nihil est quod discere velis, quod ille docere non possit*.

out of the relation of vicinage. There is the right of *support*, which arises from contract, or prescription which implies a grant. This right is where the owner of a house stipulates to allow his neighbour to rest his timbers on the walls of his house. There is also the servitude of *drip*, by which one man engages to permit the waters flowing from the roof of his neighbour's house to fall on his estate. So there is the right of *drain*, or to convey water in pipes through, or over the estate of another. The right of *way* may also be attached to a house, entry, gate, well, or city lot, as well as to a country farm. These servitudes or easements must be created by the owner, and one tenant in common cannot establish them upon the common property without the consent of his co-tenant.^a The exercise of these urban and rural servitudes may be limited to certain times. The right of drawing water, for instance, from a neighbour's well, may be confined to certain hours, or a right of passage may be confined to a part of the day, or to a certain place.^b

^a *Dig.* 8. 1. 2. *Ibid.* 8. 2. 19. *Pothier, Coutume d'Orleans*, Int. to tit. 13, *des Servitudes*, art. 2. n. 6. See, also, his *Traité du Quasi-Contrat de Communauté*, *passim*. *Institutes of the Laws of Holland*, by Vander Linden, b. 1. ch. 11. sec. 2. *Institutes of the Civil Law of Spain*, by Doctors Asso and Manuel, b. 2. tit. 6. *Bell's Principles of the Law of Scotland*, p. 266—274. *Civil Code of Louisiana*, art. 734—738. In *Burge's Comm. on Colonial and Foreign Laws*, vol. ii. tit. *Servitudes*, the law of urban and rural servitudes, under the civil law, and the codes of those nations which have adopted and modified the civil law, is extensively considered. Servitudes, chargeable upon the estate in common, such as the right to enter, and search, and dig for coal, and carry it away, would go to alter, injure, waste, and destroy the estate; and any attempt to do it without common consent, or under some equitable modification to be prescribed on partition or otherwise, would subject the party to the action of trespass or waste, or to restraint by injunction at the instance of the dissenting co-tenant.

^b The law of vicinage rests on just foundations. Any act or default of the possessor of a tenement, to the injury of a party interested in the neighbouring tenement, becomes a nuisance. So, if a person, negligently and without ordinary prudence, constructs a hay-rick on the extremity of his land, and with great negligence suffers hay to remain liable to spontaneous ignition, and it takes

4. *Of party-walls.*

If there be a party-wall between two houses, and the owner of one of *the houses pulls it down, *437 in order to build a new one, and with it he takes down the party-wall belonging equally to him and his neighbour, and erects a new house and new wall, he is bound, on his part, to pull down the wall and reinstate it in a reasonable time, and with the least inconvenience; and if the necessity of the reparation of the old wall be established, the neighbour is bound to contribute ratably to the expense of the new wall. But he is not bound to contribute to building the new wall higher than the old one, nor with more costly materials. All such extra expense must be borne exclusively by him who pulls down and rebuilds.^a If the owner of a house in a compact town finds it necessary to pull it down, and remove the foundations of his building, and he gives due notice of his intention to the owner of the adjoining house, he is not answerable for the injury which the owner of that house may sustain by the operation, provided he remove his own with reasonable and ordinary care.^b Where there had been no party-

fire and burns his neighbour's house, he is liable in damages. *Vaughan v. Menlove*, 3 *Bingham's N. C. Rep.* 468. See, also, to the same point, *Turburoill v. Stamp*, 1 *Salk. Rep.* 13. *Barnard v. Poor*, 21 *Pick. Rep.* 378. The principle is that every man is so bound to deal with his own property, as not to injure the property of others.

^a *Campbell v. Mesier*, 4 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 334. *Pothier, Du Quasi-Contrat de Communauté*, No. 187—192. 220, 221.

^b *Peyton v. St. Thomas' Hospital*, 9 *Barnw. & Cress.* 725. *Masey v. Goyner*, 4 *Carr. & Payne*, 161. *Walters v. Pfeil*, 1 *Moody & Malkin*, 362. *Wyatt v. Harrison*, 3 *Barnw. & Adolph.* 871. But in this last case it is suggested, that if the house which is injured by the digging had been *ancient*, the rule might be otherwise, as that circumstance might imply the consent of the adjoining proprietor to its erection. Buildings which are ancient, or erected upon ancient foundations, or protected by prescription, cannot lawfully be disturbed by deep excavations or other improvements on adjoining lots. But otherwise a person may make reasonable improvements and excavations on his own ground, though they should injure or endanger an edifice on the adjoining land by digging near and deeper than its foundations, provided he exercises ordinary care and skill, and the injured party does not possess any special

wall, but the walls of the house pulled down stood wholly on its lot, yet if the beams of the other house rested upon the wall pulled down, and had done so for a period sufficient to establish an easement by prescription, the owner of the adjoining house would be entitled to have his beams inserted for a resting-place in the new wall. Such an easement is continual, without requiring the constant and immediate act of man; and it is an apparent one, shown by an exterior work; and, consequently, it has the qualities sufficient by the common law, and also deemed in the French law sufficient, to establish an easement by prescription.^a It has been held, in England,

standing partly on the land of each, are not tenants *438 in common, but each party continues owner *of his land, and has a right to the use of the wall, and a remedy for a disturbance of that right. But the common use of a wall separating adjoining lots belonging to different owners, is *prima facie* evidence that the wall, and the land on which it stands, belong equally to the different owners, in equal undivided moieties, as tenants in common.^b

privileges, protecting him from the consequences of such improvements, either by prescription or grant. *Lasala v. Holbrook*, 4 *Paige*, 169. *Richart v. Scott*, 7 *Watts*, 460. Whether due care has been used in the case is a question of fact for a jury. *Dodd v. Holme*, 3 *Neville & Manning*, 739. 1 *Adolph. & Ellis*, 473. S. C. The taking proper precautions to prevent injury to adjoining walls in disturbing foundations, is indispensable, to exempt the party from responsibility for special loss. *Trower v. Chadwick*, 3 *Bing. N. C. Rep.* 334.

^a *Code Napoleon*, No. 690.

^b *Matts v. Hawkins*, 5 *Taunt. Rep.* 20. *Cubitt v. Porter*, 8 *Barnw. & Cress.* 257. The building act of 14 Geo. III. ch. 78, has given to each party certain easements in the wall on the land of the other, and has made special and ample provision on the subject of houses and partition-walls in the city of London. Some statute regulations of that kind seem to be required in large cities, though in France the customs of Paris and Orleans have supplied the place of more minute statute provisions. We have in the Assize, enacted under Henry Fitz-Ailwyne, the first Lord Mayor of London, A. D. 1189, a very curious document respecting the regulation of party-walls. After the great fire, in the

5. *Of division-fences.*

In connexion with this subject of party-walls, may be mentioned the law concerning division-fences between

time of King Stephen, London began to be built of stone and tile. The walls were to be three feet in thickness, and each owner was to give half of the space for the wall. If any individual was aggrieved by the encroachment of his neighbour, he could restrain the workmen by giving security to the sheriff to appear and prosecute. The mayor and twelve sworn aldermen were to repair to the spot, and hear the allegations of the parties, and decide finally between them. The encroachment was to be corrected in forty days, or the sheriff executed the remedy. Sir *Francis Palgrave's Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth*, vol. ii. 172, 174, 175. This ordinance is evidence of a strong, vigilant, and civilized police in that rude and turbulent age. The work of Sir Francis surpasses any modern work whatever in ingenious and profound antiquarian erudition, relative to English legal antiquities.

Party-walls and buildings in the city of Philadelphia are specially regulated by statute. *Purdon's Digest*, 984, 985. And the operations of the English statute of Geo. III, on the rights of neighbouring proprietors, and the adjudications on those rights, are fully stated in *Gibbons on the Law of Dilapidations*, p. 110—125. So, in the city of Washington, by the fundamental regulations in buildings, established in 1791, it is a condition annexed to title, that when the owner of a lot builds a partition-wall between himself and his neighbour, he shall lay the foundations equally upon the lands of both, and any person who shall afterwards use the partition-wall, or any part of it, shall reimburse to the first builder a moiety of the charge of such part as he shall use. *Miller v. Elliot*, C. C. U. S. March Term, 1839.

In the city of New-York, the foundation of every building must be not less than six feet below the street or side-walk directly in front of it; and if not, the owner will not be entitled to recover damages, by the erecting with ordinary care of any adjoining building. *Laws of New-York*, April 10th, 1818, ch. 106. In respect to trees growing on or near the division line between two lots of land, it was held, that if the tree grows on the lot of A. with nearly an equal part of its roots spreading into the ground of B.; the tree, nevertheless, belongs to A. in whose soil the body of it is. *Masters v. Pollie*, 2 *Rol. Rep.* 141. Lord Holt held, that in such a case, A. and B. were tenants in common of the tree, though if all the root grew in the land of A., and the branches overshadowed the land of B., the branches followed the root, and the property of the whole tree was in A. *Waterman v. Soper*, 1 *Lord Raym.* 737. In *Holder v. Coates*, 1 *Moody & Malkin*, 112, the right was considered as turning upon the fact, in whose land was the tree first planted. The civil law made such a tree common property. *Inst.* 2. 1. 31. *Dig.* 41. 1. 7. 13. See, on this subject, *Code Civil*, art. 670, 671, 672, 673. In *Lyman v. Hale*, 11 *Conn. Rep.* 177, it was held, after an elaborate discussion, that if a tree stands on the land of A., and extend its roots into and its branches over the land of B., the tree, with all its roots and branches, and the fruit thereon, belong exclusively to A., and B. becomes a trespasser if he appropriates to his own use any of the overhanging fruit. This appears to have been the best considered, and is not only the latest, but the most simple and definite rule on the subject.

the owners of adjoining lands. These interests are generally the object of local statute regulations. The doctrine is, that at common law the tenant of a close was not bound to fence against an adjoining close, unless by force of prescription; and if bound by prescription to fence his close, he was not bound to fence against any cattle but such as were rightfully in the adjoining close. If not bound at common law to fence his land, he was nevertheless bound, at his peril, to keep his cattle on his own grounds, and prevent them from escaping.^a The legal

In New-York, by the statutes of March 19th, 1813, ch. 35. sec. 20, (and which is still in force,) the Common Council of the city of New-York was authorized to make rules and regulations for making, amending, and maintaining as well partition-fences as others, in the city. Under this power, the corporation have, by ordinance, (1833,) regulated partition fences and *walls*. It requires partition-walls to be made and maintained by the owners of the land on each side, and if the same can be equally divided, each party shall make and keep in repair one-half part. Disputes concerning the division of the wall, and the parts to be made or repaired by each owner respectively, or as to its sufficiency to be settled by the alderman and assistant of the ward. If the wall cannot be conveniently divided, it is to be made and kept in repair at joint and equal expense. A surplus wall, higher or lower than the regulation, to be at the individual expense of the owner; and on a neglect of contribution by one party, the other may make the whole wall, and recover from the other party his proportion of the expense. This same regulation applies to partition-fences.

^a *Rust v. Low*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 90. *Little v. Lathrop*, 5 *Greenleaf*, 356. *Holladay v. Marsh*, 3 *Wendell*, 142. Chancellor Walworth, in 18 *Wendell*, 221. *Stackpole v. Healy*, 16 *Mass. Rep.* 33. *Avery v. Maxwell*, 4 *N. H. Rep.* 36. *Wells v. Howell*, 19 *Johnson*, 385. The *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 353—355, and the *Revised Statutes of Ohio*, 1831, and of *Illinois*, 1833, have prescribed rules for making and maintaining sufficient division-fences between the owners of adjoining lands; but there is an express exception, in New-York and Ohio, in favour of owners choosing to let their lands lie open, and in that case I apprehend that, as a general rule, the respective owners would be remitted to their common law rights and duties. The equitable rule towards making and maintaining division-fences between adjoining owners of land, we find in the statutes of the old Plymouth colony. *Plymouth Colony Laws*, edit. 1836, p. 196. The principle of equitable contribution towards the erection and maintenance of division-fences between the owners of adjoining lands exists independent of statute provisions. In the matter of *R. & S. Railroad Company*, 4 *Paige*, 553. It is to be found in the institutions of those nations which are founded upon the civil law. *Code Napoleon*, art. 653. 655, 656. *Civil Code of Louisiana*, art. 683—686. *Institutes of the Laws of Holland*, by *J. Vander Linden*, b. 1. ch. 11. sec. 3.

obligation of the tenants of adjoining lands to make and maintain partition-fences, where no prescription exists, and no agreement has been made, rests entirely on positive provisions by statute; and trespass will lie against the owner of cattle entering on the grounds of another, though there be no fence to obstruct them, unless he can protect himself by statute, or prescription, or agreement.^a The public have no rights, even in a public highway, but a right of way or passage; and if cattle be placed in the highway for the purpose of grazing, and escape into an adjoining close, the owner of the cattle, unless he owns the soil of that part of the highway on *which *439 he placed his cattle, cannot avail himself of the insufficiency of the fences, in excuse of the trespass.

6. *Of running-waters.*

Important questions have arisen in respect to the use of running-waters, between different proprietors of portions of the same stream; and such questions are daily growing in interest, as the value of water-power is more and more felt in manufacturing establishments.

Every proprietor of lands on the banks of a river, has naturally an equal right to the use of the water which flows in the stream adjacent to his lands, as it was wont to run, (*currere solebat*,) without diminution or alteration.

^a Churchill v. Evans, 1 Taunt. 529. The statute law of Alabama, regulating partition-fences, (*Laws of Alabama*, 362,) gives an action for damages against the owner of cattle breaking into any grounds "enclosed with a strong and sound fence." This would imply that, in that state, no suit lies, if there be no protecting fence. And in New-York, by statute of April 18th, 1838, ch. 261, if any person liable to erect or repair a division-fence, shall neglect or refuse to do it, he shall have no action for damages incurred, but shall be liable for all damages accruing by reason of such neglect or refusal, to the lands, crops, &c., of the party injured. See the very provisional statute law of Connecticut, on the subject. *Statutes of Connecticut*, 1838, p. 250—258. The statute of Mississippi defines a lawful fence to be one "five feet high, well staked and ridered, or sufficiently locked, and so close that the beasts breaking into the enclosure, could not creep through." *Revised Code of Mississippi*, 1824, p. 334.

No proprietor has a right to use the water, to the prejudice of other proprietors, above or below him, unless he has a prior right to divert it, or a title to some exclusive enjoyment. He has no property in the water itself, but a simple usufruct while it passes along. *Aqua currit et debet currere*, is the language of the law. Though he may use the water while it runs over his land, he cannot unreasonably detain it, or give it another direction, and he must return it to its ordinary channel when it leaves his estate. Without the consent of the adjoining proprietors, he cannot divert or diminish the quantity of water which would otherwise descend to the proprietors below, nor throw the water back upon the proprietors above, without a grant or an uninterrupted enjoyment of twenty years, which is evidence of it.^a This is the clear and settled general

^a *Dig.* 39. 3, 4. 10. *Code*, lib. 3. t. 34. l. 7. *Pothier, Traité du Contrat de Société*, second app. No. 236, 237. *Toullier*, tom. iii. 88. n. 133. *Luttrell's case*, 4 *Co.* 87. a. *Brown v. Best*, 1 *Wils. Rep.* 174. *Bealey v. Shaw*, 6 *East's Rep.* 208. *Wright v. Howard*, 1 *Simon & Stewart*, 190. *Newman v. Anderson*, 1 *Barnw. & Ald.* 258. *Williams v. Morland*, 2 *Barnw. & Cress.* 915. *Mason v. Hill*, 3 *Barnw. & Adolph.* 304. 5 *Ibid.* 1. S. C. *Gardner v. Village of Newburgh*, 2 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 162. *Belknap v. Belknap*, *ibid.* 463. *Merritt v. Parker*, 1 *Coxe's N. J. Rep.* 460. *Tyler v. Wilkinson*, 4 *Mason*, 397. *Coalter v. Hunter*, 4 *Randolph*, 58. *Hammond v. Fuller*, 1 *Paige*, 197. *Hutchinson v. Coleman*, 5 *Halsted*, 74. *King v. Tiffany*, 9 *Conn. Rep.* 162. *Blanchard v. Baker*, 8 *Greenleaf*, 253. *Omelvany v. Jaggars*, 2 *Hill's S. C. Rep.* 634. 640. *St. Louis v. St. Louis*, *Stuart's Lower Canada Rep.* 575. *Martin v. Jett*, 12 *Louisiana Rep.* 501. In the case of *Barron & Craig v. Corporation of Baltimore*, (*American Jurist*, No. 4. p. 203,) the Corporation, in the exercise of their municipal powers, diverted certain streams from their natural channels to a point near the plaintiff's wharf on navigable water within the harbour and city of Baltimore, to which point a large deposit of sand and earth was carried down by the streams, and injured the value of the wharf. It was held, that a private action lay for the damage arising from this corporate act. It is stated to have been a rule in the French law that the owner of the higher land had a right to divert a stream to his own utility, and that the owner of the land below could not contest it in the absence of a grant. *Merlin, Rep. Jurisp. tit. Cours d'Eau*. But the civil code very equitably qualified this doctrine. *Code Civil*, art. 641. 643, 644.

The right respecting running-streams, between adjoining proprietors of lands, are regulated by very precise rules in Pennsylvania. Thus, in *McCalmont v. Whittaker*, 3 *Rawle*, 84, the water-power belonging to a riparian owner, was

doctrine on *the subject, and all the difficulty that arises consists in the application. The owner must so use and apply the water, as to work no material injury or annoyance to his neighbour below him, who has an equal right to the subsequent use of the same water, nor can he, by dams or any obstruction, cause the water injuriously to overflow the grounds and springs of his neighbour above him.^a Streams of water are intended for the use and comfort of man; and it would be unreasonable, and contrary to the universal sense of mankind, to debar every riparian proprietor from the application of the water to domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing purposes, provided the use of it be made under the limitations which have been mentioned; and there will, no doubt, inevitably be, in the exercise of a perfect right to the use of the water, some evaporation and decrease of it, and some variations in the weight and velocity of the current. But *de minimis non curat lex*, and a right of action by the proprietor below would not necessarily flow from such consequences, but would depend upon the nature and extent of the complaint or injury, and the manner of using the water. All that the law requires of the party, by or over whose land a stream passes, is, that he should use the water in a reasonable manner, and so as not to destroy, or render useless, or materially diminish, or affect the application of the water by the proprietors above or below on the stream. He must not shut the

considered as consisting of the difference of level between the surface where the stream in its natural state first touches his land, and the surface where it leaves it. The stream under that limitation of right might be occupied in whole, or in part, or not at all, without endangering the right or restricting the mode of its enjoyment, unless there has been an actual, prior, adverse occupancy protected by the statute of limitations. The riparian owner by digging on his own land cannot legally lower the surface of the water standing in a pool on the land above him, nor can he enter and lower the surface of the water as it leaves his land by deepening the channel in the land below him.

^a *Neal v. Henry*, 1 *Meigs' Tenn. Rep.* 17.

gates of his dams and detain the water unreasonably, or let it off in unusual quantities, to the annoyance
 *441 *of his neighbour.^a Pothier lays down the rule very strictly, that the owner of the upper stream must not raise the water by dams, so as to make it fall with more abundance and rapidity than it would naturally do, and injure the proprietor below.^b But this rule must not be construed literally, for that would be to deny all valuable use of the water to the riparian proprietors. It must be subjected to the qualifications which have been mentioned, otherwise rivers and streams of water would become utterly useless, either for manufacturing or agricultural purposes. The just and equitable principle is given in the Roman law: *Sic enim debere quem meliorem agrum suum facere, ne vicini deteriore faciat.*^c

^a *Beissel v. Stroll*, 4 *Dallas' Rep.* 211. *Palmer v. Mulligan*, 3 *Caines' Rep.* 307. *Weston v. Alden*, 8 *Mass. Rep.* 136. *Colburn v. Richards*, 13 *Mass. Rep.* 420. *Cook v. Hull*, 3 *Pick. Rep.* 269. *Runnels v. Bullen*, 2 *N. H. Rep.* 532. *Tyler v. Wilkinson*, 4 *Mason*, 397. *Merritt v. Brinckerhoff*, 17 *Johns. Rep.* 306. *Van Bergen v. Van Bergen*, 3 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 282. *Williams v. Morland*, 2 *Barnw. & Cress.* 910. *Thompson v. Crocker*, 9 *Pick.* 59. *Johns v. Stevens*, 3 *Vermont Rep.* 308. *Pugh v. Wheeler*, 2 *Dev. & Battle*, 50. In *Howell v. McCoy*, 3 *Rawle*, 256, the rule *sic utere tuo ut alienum non ledas*, in its application to the doctrine in the text, was laid down with precision and accuracy. It was held, that a person had a right to so much of the water of a stream running across his land as was needful and proper for supplying his tanyard and bark-mill, and that he was bound to return the water so diverted, and not necessarily used and consumed in his business, without unnecessary diminution and waste, into the natural channel below, and that he was bound to return it without polluting or poisoning it by admixture with unwholesome substances, to the injury of the owner below. This was in accordance with the sound doctrine of the common law, as declared in *Aldred's case*, 9 *Co.* 57. b, prohibiting acts creating a nuisance to one's neighbour.

So, again, in *Arnold v. Foot*, 12 *Wendell*, 330, where a spring of water rises in the land of A. and runs a stream to the land of B., it was held, that A. has no right to divert the stream from its natural channel, though it be not more than sufficient for his domestic uses, and for the irrigation of his land. He may use it for domestic uses, and for his cattle, but not to irrigate his land, if that would exhaust the running-stream. *Brown v. Best*, 1 *Wilson*, 174. S. P. *Smith v. Adams*, 6 *Paige*, 435. S. P.

^b *Traité du Contrat de Société*, second app. No. 236.

^c The *Code Napoleon*, No. 640, 641, 643, 644, and the *Civil Code of*

7. *Easements acquired and lost by prescription.*

(1.) This natural right to the use of *waters*, as an incident or particular easement to the land, may be abridged, or enlarged, or modified, by grant or prescription. Though a stream be diminished in quantity, or corrupted in quality, by means of the exercise of certain trades, yet if the occupation of the party so taking or using it has existed for so long a time as to raise the presumption of a grant, and which presumption is the foundation of title by prescription, the other party whose land is below must take the stream subject to such adverse right; and twenty years exclusive enjoyment of the water in any particular manner, affords, according to the English law, and the law of New-York, Massachusetts, and several other states, presumption of such a grant.^a But nothing short *of a contract, or of such a time of enjoyment *442 of water diverted from the natural channel, or interrupted by dams, or other obstructions, or materially changed in its descent or character, will justify the owner as against any land-owner above or lower down the stream, to whom such alterations are injurious. In the character of riparian proprietors, persons are entitled to

Louisiana, art. 656, 657, establish the same just rules in the use of running-waters. So, in *Missouri*, the regulation of grist-mills, and mill-dams, is deemed a matter of public concern, and subject to statute prescriptions. *Revised Statutes of Missouri*, 1835.

^a The time of limitation varies in particular states. Thus, in *Connecticut* and *Vermont*, the term of prescription is fifteen years, and in *South Carolina*, five years. *Manning v. Smith*, 6 *Conn. Rep.* 289. *Martin v. Bigelow*, 2 *Aikens*, 184. *Anderson v. Gilbert*, 1 *Bay's Rep.* 375. In *Louisiana* the time of prescription varies according to the subject, from three to thirty years. *Civil Code*, art. 3435—3476. But I presume, that generally, in this country, we follow the English time of prescription. It was so understood by Ch. J. Parker, in *Gayetty v. Bethune*, 14 *Mass. Rep.* 49, and so, also, in *Gilman v. Tilton*, 5 *N. H. Rep.* 231. In *Louisiana*, the right of *drift* is acquired by prescription, on an enjoyment of ten years without complaint. *Vincent v. Michel*, 7 *Louis. Rep.* 52. In *Pennsylvania*, the time requisite to defeat the right to an incorporeal hereditament, by non-user, is twenty-one years. *Dyer v. Dupui*, 5 *Wharton*, 584.

the natural flow of the stream without diminution to their injury, and to them may be applied the observation of Whitlock, J., in *Shury v. Piggott*,^a that a water-course begins *ex jure naturæ*, and having taken a course naturally, it cannot be diverted. But, on the other hand, the owners of artificial works may acquire rights by actual appropriation, as against the riparian proprietor, and the extent of the right is to be measured by the extent of the appropriation, and the use of the water for a period requisite to establish a conclusive presumption of right. In such a case, the natural right of the riparian proprietor becomes subservient to the acquired right of the manufacturer.^b The general and established doctrine is, that an exclusive enjoyment of water, or of light, or of any other easement, in any particular way, for twenty years, or for such other period less than twenty years, which in any particular state is the established period of limitation,^c and enjoyed without interruption, becomes an adverse enjoyment sufficient to raise a presumption of title as against a right in any other person, which might have been,
 *443 but was not asserted.^d *The right is confined

^a 3 *Bulst. Rep.* 339.

^b *Brown v. Best*, 1 *Wils. Rep.* 174. *Bealey v. Shaw*, 6 *East's Rep.* 208. *Tyler v. Wilkinson*, 4 *Mason*, 397. *Hatch v. Dwight*, 17 *Mass. Rep.* 289.

^c *State v. Wilkinson*, 2 *Vermont Rep.* 480. *Cuthbert v. Lawton*, 3 *M'Cord*, 194. Less than the prescribed term of limitation, may, under circumstances, raise the presumption of the dedication of land to the public use. *State v. Catlin*, 3 *Vermont Rep.* 530.

^d *Shaw v. Crawford*, 10 *Johns. Rep.* 236. *Bealey v. Shaw*, 6 *East*. 214. *Johns v. Stevens*, 3 *Vermont Rep.* 316. But the making and enjoying window-lights for twenty years, will not conclude the owner of the adjoining premises, and prevent him from building up against such lights, unless there be evidence of his knowledge of the fact as a sufficient foundation for presuming a grant. And the presumption of knowledge of the windows will not be made against the owner, merely from the fact that he had a tenant in possession during the time, who might be altogether indifferent and careless as to the encroachment. *Daniel v. North*, 11 *East*, 372. No time short of twenty years will legalize a nuisance, and it is no defence to an action, on the case for a nuisance, in carrying on the business of a tallow-chandler, that the defendant had carried on a noxious and

to the extent, and the mode of the enjoyment during the twenty years. All that the law requires is, that the mode or manner of using the water should not be materially varied, to the prejudice of other owners; and the proprietor is not bound to use the water in the same precise manner, or to apply it to the same mill, for such a construction of the rule would stop all improvements in machinery.^a He is only not to vary the enjoyment to the prejudice of his neighbour. He may, by his erections and dams, increase the quantity of the water appropriated, or increase the velocity of the current below, provided no material injury be produced to the land or works of the occupant of the stream below him, or to his enjoyment of them. This presumption of title founded on that enjoyment, is equally well established in English^b and American law.^c To render *the enjoyment *444

offensive trade for three or even ten years before the plaintiff became possessed of his premises. *Bliss v. Hall*, 4 *Bingham*, 183.

^a *Palmer v. Kebblewhaite*, 2 *Show*. 250.

^b *Lewis v. Price*, *Esp. Dig.* 636. *Bradbury v. Grinsell*, 2 *Saund. Rep.* 175. a. *Brown v. Best*, 1 *Wils. Rep.* 174. *Bealey v. Shaw*, 6 *East's Rep.* 208. *Balston v. Bensted*, 1 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 463. *Saunders v. Newman*, 1 *Barnw. & Ald.* 258. *Barker v. Richardson*, 4 *ibid.* 578. *Lewis v. Cross*, 2 *Barnw. & Cress.* 686. *Williams v. Morland*, *ibid.* 910. *Livatt v. Wilson*, 3 *Bing. Rep.* 115. *Gray v. Bond*, 2 *Brod. & Bing.* 667. *Wright v. Howard*, 1 *Simon & Stewart*, 190. *Mason v. Hill*, 3 *Barnw. & Adolph.* 304.

^c *Hazard v. Robinson*, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 272. *Sherwood v. Burr*, 4 *Day's Rep.* 244. *Ingraham v. Hutchinson*, 2 *Conn. Rep.* 584. *Stiles v. Hooker*, 7 *Coven's Rep.* 266. *Campbell v. Smith*, 3 *Halsted's Rep.* 139. *Cooper v. Smith*, 9 *Serg. & Rawle*, 26. *Strickler v. Todd*, 10 *ibid.* 63. *Tyler v. Wilkinson*, 4 *Mason*, 397. *Belknap v. Trimble*, 3 *Paige*, 577. In Massachusetts, the common law remedy against a mill-owner, for overflowing another's land, is taken away, and a special and more limited remedy substituted. The Provincial statute of 1713, allowed the dams of corn and saw mills to stand, though they should cause the land of others to be overflowed, and the injured party was, by a particular process, to have an annual compensation in damages assessed by a jury. Mills, in the infancy of the country, were public easements, and required marked encouragement. But this statute was substantially, and Ch. J. Parker thinks incautiously, renewed in 1796, when the necessity of such encouragement to mill erections had ceased, and lands had generally risen in value. *Stowell v. Flagg*, 11 *Mass. Rep.* 364. The *Massachusetts Revised Statutes* of 1836, p. 676, continued in substance the colony act, with equitable

of any easement for twenty years a presumption *juris et de jure*, or conclusive evidence of right, it must have been continued, uninterrupted or pacific, and adverse, that is, under a claim of right, with the implied acquiescence of the owner.^a The time of enjoyment requisite for the prescription is deemed to be uninter-

and careful regulations. But the exceptionable principle of the act is, that it allows the land above the mill to be overflowed, in the first instance, at the pleasure of the mill-owner, and leaves the injured party to seek his compensation subsequently. There are similar statute provisions in the states of Maine, Rhode Island, and Virginia; and they appear, said the Ch. Justice, to be material and unjustifiable abridgements of the common law right to the enjoyment of property. The statute in Massachusetts of 1713, and which was continued in Maine, under the modified statutes of 1821 and 1824, was deemed so inequitable and oppressive to the owners of lands overflowed, that in 1838 a bill was prepared by one, and submitted to another legislature, in the state of Maine, for repealing the acts on the subject, so as to leave rights and remedies as to overflowing lands by mills, to the operation of the common law, as is the case in most of the other states. In Virginia, the statute regulation concerning the use of running-streams, and the erection of mill-dams, provides, that if a person owning land on both sides of a stream wishes to build a dam, he may apply at once, without notice to the owners of the land above and below, for a writ *ad quad damnum*. The jury summoned under that writ are to examine the lands above and below belonging to others, and declare the damages that would arise to the several proprietors, who are then to be summoned, and the court determines whether, under all the circumstances, leave ought to be given to build the dam. If given, the party applying is laid under certain conditions for preventing the obstruction of the passage for fish and ordinary navigation, and convenient crossing of the water-course, as should seem meet. The applicant, upon paying the damages assessed to the parties entitled, may proceed to erect his mill and dam. 2 *Revised Code*, c. 235. *Crenshaw v. Slate River Company*, 6 *Randolph*, 245. There is a similar provision, if a person, desirous to build a mill, owns the land only on one side of the stream. 1 *Revised Code of Virginia*, 277. *Revised Code of Mississippi*, 1824, p. 336. There are statute provisions of a similar nature in Illinois, relative to the erection of mills and dams affecting other riparian owners. *Revised Laws of Illinois*, edit. 1833. And in Indiana, the act of 1831, declares minute regulations respecting grist-mills and millers. So, in Pennsylvania, by statute of March 23, 1803, the owners of lands adjoining navigable streams of water, except the rivers Delaware, Lehigh, and Schuylkill, may erect dams for mills and other water-works, and use the requisite water therefor, provided they do not obstruct or impede the navigation of the stream, or prevent the fish from passing up the same.

^a *Bracton*, lib. 2. c. 23. sec. 1. *Ibid.* lib. 4. c. 38. sec. 1. *Co. Litt.* 113. b. *Code Napoleon*, art. 2229. *Sargent v. Ballard*, 9 *Pick.* 251. *Rowland v. Wolfe*, 1 *Bailey's S. C. Rep.* 56. *Corning v. Gould*, 16 *Wendell*, 531. *Colvin v. Burnet*, 17 *Wendell*, 564.

rupted when it is continued from ancestor to heir, and from seller to buyer. It must be a lawful continuation from one person to another, and any *in- *445
 interruption of the enjoyment by an adverse claim and possession, destroys the prescription.^a

The cases usually say, that this right, acquired by twenty years undisturbed and uninterrupted enjoyment of an easement, is founded on the presumption of a grant or release, and if so it is not an absolute title, but one that is liable to be rebutted by circumstances, and is to stand good until the presumption of title be fully and fairly destroyed. This was the doctrine so late as the cases of *Campbell v. Wilson*,^b and of *Livett v. Wilson*,^c and it is the prevalent language in all the books, English and American. But some of the later English authorities seem to give to this presumption the most unshaken stability, and they say it is conclusive evidence of title. In *Tyler v. Wilkinson*,^d where the whole law on the subject is stated with learning, precision, and force, the presumption is even made to be one *juris et de jure*, and to go to the extinguishment of the right in various ways, as well as by grant. The operation of the presumption, founded on the fact of the uninterrupted enjoyment of the easement for twenty years, is said to exist, notwithstanding personal disabilities of particular proprietors might have intervened, and where, in the ordinary course of proceedings, grants would not be presumed.

The nature and extent of the right acquired by prior occupancy of a running-stream becomes frequently an important and vexatious question between different riparian proprietors. *If I am the first person who ap- *446

^a *Inst. Justin.* lib. 2. tit. 6. sec. 7, 8. *Sargent v. Ballard, supra.*

^b 3 *East's Rep.* 294.

^c 3 *Bing. Rep.* 115.

^d 4 *Mason*, 397.

plies the water of a running-stream to the purpose of irrigation, or of a mill, I cannot afterwards be lawfully disturbed in any essential degree, in the exercise of my right, though I may not have enjoyed it for twenty years, provided the water be used by me in such a reasonable manner, as not to divert the natural course of the stream from the lands below, or essentially to destroy the same use of it as it naturally flowed over the lands of the proprietors

above and below me.^a Prior occupancy short of
 *447 *the statute term of prescription, and without consent or grant, will not confer any exclusive right, as between different riparian proprietors, to the use of a running-stream.^b If, however, the prior occupant has enjoyed the use of water in any particular mode for twenty years, so as to have acquired a title by prescription, he is, in that case, entitled to remain undisturbed in his possession, in the mode, and to the extent commensurate with the right as it has been acquired and defined by enjoyment.^c But if the prior use of the stream should

^a *Platt v. Johnston*, 15 *Johns. Rep.* 213. In *Hatch v. Dwight*, 17 *Mass. Rep.* 289, the Ch. J. went beyond the doctrine in the text, for he said, that the first occupant of a mill-site, by erecting a dam and mill, had a right to water sufficient to work his wheels, even if it should render useless the privilege of any one above or below upon the same stream. If the right of prior occupancy, in the case stated, did not go thus far, the water-privilege would seem to be rendered wholly useless for mill purposes to all parties. A more limited rule was laid down in *Martin v. Bigelow*, 2 *Aikens' Vermont Rep.* 184; for it was there held, that a mere prior occupancy of a running-stream by a mill, did not prevent another person from using the same water above, on the same stream, in a prudent way, unless the mill below had been erected and the water used for it more than fifteen years, being the period of limitation. The court said, that the common law on this point was not applicable in Vermont, as it would go to allow the person who erected the first mill on a small stream to control and defeat all mill privileges on the same stream above him. So, in *Anthony v. Lapham*, 5 *Pick.* 175, it was declared, that the owner of land, through which a natural stream flows, may use it for watering his cattle or irrigating his land, but he must use it in the latter way so as to do the least possible injury to his neighbour below, and he must return the surplus into the natural channel.

^b *Tyler v. Wilkinson*, 4 *Mason*, 401, 402.

^c *Saunders v. Newman*, 1 *Barnw. & Ald.* 258. *Van Bergen v. Van Bergen*, 3 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 282. *Sherwood v. Burr*, 4 *Day's Rep.* 244.

have been materially altered within the twenty years, to the injury or annoyance of any adjoining occupant, who had, in the mean time, possessed himself of the use of the water, the title by prescription would be wanting as to such *alterations, and they would be unlaw- *448 ful, and, consequently, a ground of action.^a

(2.) The elements of *air and light* are rights or incidents attached to the enjoyment of real estate, and the law gives weight and effect to the first appropriation of them. They may be classed under the head of incorporeal hereditaments, and the Roman law considered things of this kind, consisting in rights and privileges, as *res incorporales*.^b If I build my house close to my neighbour's wall I cannot compel him to demolish it, though it may obstruct my light, for the first occupancy is in him. On the other hand the owner of a house will be restrained by injunction, and be liable to an action upon the case, if he makes any erections or improvements so as to obstruct the *ancient* lights of an adjoining house. The lights must be ancient to entitle them to this special protection, and it would seem, from the opinion of the judges in *Bury v. Pope*,^c that lights of thirty or forty years standing were not deemed ancient within the purview of the old rule on the subject. There was no doubt, as early as the English revolution, that window-lights which had become established by the legal time of prescription, were entitled to be protected against obstructions.^d In modern times the period of prescription or limitation has been shortened, and the uninterrupted and exclusive enjoyment of window-lights for twenty years, has been held to be sufficient to raise a presumption of title to the unobstructed enjoyment of

^a *Goodrich v. Knapp*, M. S. case, decided in the Supreme Court of New-York, 1828.

^b *Inst.* 2. 2.

^c *Cro. Eliz.* 113.

^d *Villers v. Bell*, 1 *Show.* 7. *Palmer v. Fletcher*, 1 *Lev.* 122.

that protection.^a In *Daniel v. North*,^b it was considered as settled law, that twenty years quiet and uninterrupted possession of window-lights was sufficient ground for a jury to presume a grant or covenant, provided there was evidence that the owner or landlord (and not the tenant merely) of the opposite premises had knowledge during the twenty years of the fact. The right so acquired is not absolute, but *prima facie* evidence only of right, and it is liable to be rebutted and destroyed by proof to the contrary, and it is likewise subject to qualifications. Thus ancient lights are entitled to protection as such in the precise mode, and to the extent enjoyed during the period which gave them the claim to be ancient lights, and no further.^c Nor can a person sustain a claim to an ancient window-light, in derogation of his own grant of the adjoining ground without reservation.^d

This doctrine of ancient lights, or, in the language of the writers on the civil law, borrowed from the law itself, of “servitudes of lights or prospect” attached to estates, is laid down with great precision in the Pandects, and in the codes of those modern nations which have made the civil law the basis of their municipal law;^e and it is evidence of much civilization and refinement in the modifications of property. But the doctrine is not much relished in this country, owing to the rapid changes and improve-

^a Wilmot, J., 1761, in Lewis v. Price, *Esp. Dig.* 636. 2d edit. S. C. *Williams' Saund. Rep.* vol. ii. 175. note a. b. c. *Darwin v. Upton*, *Williams*, note *ibid.* 3 *Term*, 159, cited by Buller, J. *Back v. Stacy*, 2 *Russell*, 121.

^b 11 *East's Rep.* 371.

^c *Martin v. Goble*, 1 *Campb. N. P. Rep.* 320.

^d *Palmer v. Fletcher*, *supra*. *Cox v. Matthews*, 1 *Vent.* 237. Holt, Ch. J., in *Roswell v. Pryor*, 6 *Mod.* 116. *Crompton v. Richards*, 1 *Price*, 27. *Story v. Odin*, 12 *Mass. Rep.* 157. By the custom of the city of London, a man may build to any height, upon ancient foundations, although he darkens his neighbour's lights thereby, provided all the four walls belong to him. A reversioner may recover for obstructing ancient lights, to the injury of his reversionary interest. *Shadwell v. Hutchinson*, 3 *Carr. & Payne*, 615.

^e *Vide supra*, p. 436. n. a.

ments in our cities and villages. A prescriptive right, springing up under the narrow limitation in the English law, to prevent obstructions to window-lights, and views, and prospects, or, on the other hand, to protect a house or garden from being looked in upon by a neighbour, would affect essentially the value of vacant lots, or of lots with feeble and low buildings upon them. It was admitted, in *Mahan v. Brown*,^a that a man might open a window in his own house overlooking the privacy of B., and unless the right to the window-light had been secured by grant, acquiescence, or otherwise, the only remedy for B. would be the erection, on his own soil, of an obstruction opposite the offensive window, and in that way shut out the light. At length the Supreme Court of New-York, in *Parker v. Foote*,^b went so far as to declare that the modern English doctrine, on the subject of lights, was an anomaly in the law, and not applicable to the condition of the cities and villages in this country. The injury resulting from window-views was deemed rather speculative, and not analogous to the case of ways, commons, markets, water-courses, &c., where the injury was direct, palpable, and material, and the same rule of presumption ought not to apply to two classes of cases so essentially different. Though this incorporeal servitude of lights is familiar to the laws of all civilized nations, and is, under due regulations, a very valuable incident to the enjoyment of property, there does not seem to be any well founded objection to the decision in the case last referred to, so far as it goes to declare that the enjoyment of the easement must be uninterrupted for the period of twenty years, and under a claim or assertion of right, and with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner; and that the presumption of right, under these circumstances, is not an

^a 13 *Wendell*, 261.^b 19 *Wendell*, 309.

absolute bar, and conclusive, but it may be explained and repelled, and is only a matter of evidence for a jury to infer the right.

(3.) The right to the enjoyment of free and pure *air*, as incident to the estate, is likewise under the protection of the law. If, therefore, any thing offensive be erected so near the house of another, as to corrupt or pollute the air, it becomes a nuisance, and an action lies for the injury. On the other hand, if a tan-yard, for instance, renders the air of the house and garden, subsequently established, adjoining it, less pleasant and salubrious, the nuisance is remediless as to the person who voluntarily plants himself near it.^a

S. *Easements lost by abandonment.*

A right acquired by use may, however, be lost by non-user, and an absolute discontinuance of the use for twenty years affords a presumption of the extinguishment of the right in favour of some other adverse right.^b As an enjoyment for twenty years is necessary to found a presumption of a grant, the general rule is, that there must be a similar non-user to raise the presumption of a release. The mere non-user of an easement, for twenty years, will afford a presumption of a release or extinguishment, but not a very strong one, in a case unaided by circumstances; but if there has been, in the mean time, some act done by the owner of the land, charged with the easement, inconsistent with, or adverse to the existence of the right, a

^a 2 *Blacks. Com.* 402, 403. *Com. Dig.* tit. *Action upon the Case for a Nuisance*, A. C. *Rex v. Cross*, 2 *Carr. & Payne*, 483.

^b *Prescott v. Phillips*, decided in 1797, and reported in 2 *Evans' Pothier*, 136. *Lawrence v. Obee*, 3 *Campb. Rep.* 514. Bracton laid down the same principle, that incorporeal rights acquired by use may be equally lost by disuse. Lib. 4. *De assisa novæ disseisinæ*, ch. 38. sec. 3. *Corning v. Gould*, 16 *Wendell*, 531. This last case contains a full and learned view of the law on the subject.

release or extinguishment of the right will be presumed.^a The doctrine of the civil law was, that a servitude was presumed to have been released or renounced, when the owner of the estate to which it was due permitted the owner of the estate charged with it to erect such works on it, as a wall, for instance, which naturally and necessarily hindered the exercise of the right, and operated to annihilate it. The mere sufferance of works to be erected, repugnant to the *enjoyment of the ser- *449 vitude, would not raise the presumption of a release, unless the sufferance continued for a time requisite to establish a prescription; or the works were of a permanent and solid kind, such as edifices and walls, and presented an absolute obstacle to every kind of enjoyment of the easement. There must be a total cessation of the exercise of the right to the servitude, during the entire time necessary to raise the presumption of extinguishment, or there must have been some permanent obstacle permitted to be raised 'against it, and which absolutely destroyed its exercise.^b If the act which prevents the servitude be incompatible with the nature or exercise of it, and be by the party to whom the servitude is due, it is sufficient to extinguish it; and if it be extinguished for a moment, it is gone forever.^c

^a See the reasoning of Sir William D. Evans, in *Evans' Pothier*, vol. ii. 136. In the case of *Wright v. Freeman*, 5 *Harr. & Johns*. 477, a presumption of extinguishment by non-user, of a right of way for twenty years, was held to be admissible, but it was fortified in that case, by acts of the party, and these acts were relied on by the court. Mr. Justice Story, in *Tyler v. Wilkinson*, says, that the proprietors of *Sergeant's trench* were entitled to so much, and no more of the water of the river, as had been accustomed for twenty years to flow through their trench, to and from their mills, whether actually used or necessary for the mills, or not. See, also, *White v. Crawford*, 10 *Mass Rep.* 183.

^b Dig. 8. 6. 5. Voet. *Com. ad Pand.* lib. 8. tit. 6. sec. 5. 7. *Toullier's Droit Civil Français*, tom. iii. n. 673. *Repertoire de Jurisprudence*, par Merlin, tit. *Servitude*, ch. 30. sec. 6. ch. 33. Toullier says, that the article *Servitude*, in the *Repertoire*, is composed with great care. *Civil Code of Louisiana*, art. 815, 816. *Haight v. Proprietors of the Morris Aqueduct*, 4 *Wash. Cir. Rep.* 601.

^c *Taylor v. Hampton*, 4 *M'Cord's Rep.* 96. The statute of 2 and 3 William

Unity of possession of the estate to which an easement is attached, and of the estate which the easement encumbers, is, in effect, an extinguishment of the easement. But this does not apply to a way of necessity; and though it be suspended by the unity of possession, it revives by necessary implication, when the possession is again severed.^a Nor is a water-course extinguished by unity of possession, and this from the necessity of the case, and the nature of the subject. This was settled after a very elaborate discussion, in *Shury v. Piggott*,^b and that case was accurately examined and deliberately confirmed, in all its parts, in *Hazard v. Robinson*. But the use of water, in a particular way, by means of an
 *450 *aqueduct, may be extinguished by the unity of possession and title of both the parcels of land connected with the easement; and if the adverse enjoyment of an easement be extinguished, within the period of prescription, by the unity of title, and the land which possesses the easement be shortly thereafter separated again from the land charged with the easement, by a reconveyance, the right to be acquired by user, must commence *de novo* from the last period.^c As to light and air, the right to them is acquired by mere occupancy, and will continue so long only as the party continues the enjoyment, or shows an intention to continue it. A person may lose a right to ancient lights by abandonment of them, within a less period than twenty years, if he

IV. ch. 71, declared, that no claim to any way or other easement, or to any water-course, or the use of any water, should be defeated by showing the commencement of the right or user at any time prior to twenty years enjoyment; and after forty years the right should be deemed absolute. So a claim to the use of light, enjoyed for twenty years without interruption, should be deemed absolute.

^a 1 *Saund. Rep.* 323. note 6. Story, J., in *Hazard v. Robinson*, 3 *Mason's Rep.* 276.

^b 3 *Bulst. Rep.* 339. *Popham's Rep.* 166.

^c *Manning v. Smith*, 6 *Conn. Rep.* 289.

indicates an intention, when he relinquishes the enjoyment of them, as by building a blank wall to his house, never to resume it. It is the modern doctrine, that the ceasing to enjoy such an easement will destroy the right, provided the discontinuance be absolute and decisive, and unaccompanied with any intention to resume it within a reasonable time; and it is a wholesome and wise qualification of the rule, considering the extensive and rapid improvements that are every where making upon real property.^a

9. *Easements lost by dedication to the public.*

Dedications of land for public purposes, as for charitable and religious uses, and for public highways and village squares, enure as grants, and may be valid, without any specific grantee *in esse* at the time, to whom the fee could be conveyed.^b And if a street be designated by public commissioners, duly authorized, as passing over certain lands, and the owner subsequently conveys part of the land as lots, *bounding them on such a street*, this is held to be a dedication of the land, over which the street passes, to the public use, and on opening the street, the purchaser can only obtain a nominal sum as a compensation for the fee.^c But it has been an unsettled question what length of time was requisite to create the presumption of a valid dedication of a highway to the public. It

^a *Moore v. Rawson*, 3 *Barnw. & Cress.* 332.

^b *Town of Pawlet v. Clark*, 9 *Cranch*, 292. *City of Cincinnati v. White*, 6 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 431. *Brown v. Manning*, 6 *Ohio Rep.* 303. *Watertown v. Cowen*, 4 *Paige*, 410.

^c In the matter of *Thirty-second-street*, 19 *Wendell*, 128. In the case of *Pearsall v. Post*, 20 *Wendell*, 119—137, Mr. Justice Cowen learnedly and ably discussed the subject, and he considered the doctrine to be rather novel and anomalous, that a grant, either in religious or other cases, could be good, when there was no person in existence capable of taking any thing under it. He held, also, that dedications of lands or easements, to the public, were to be confined to common highways, streets, and squares, and that all other easements were founded on the presumption of a grant between competent parties.

seems to be agreed that some portion of time is necessary to establish a presumptive dedication of it. Thus, in the case of *The Trustees of Rugby Charity v. Merryweather*, before Lord Kenyon, at the London sittings,^a eight years free use of a way by the public, with permission of the owner, was deemed quite sufficient time for presuming a dereliction of the way to the public; and

Lord Kenyon referred to a case in which six years
*451 had been held sufficient. This decision *has been much questioned in subsequent cases. In *Wood-ger v. Hadden*,^b the language of the court was, that time was a material ingredient in the foundation of the presumption. In that case, nineteen years' use of a street for a public highway was held not to be clear and decisive, and therefore not sufficient evidence of a dedication of it to the public. Again, in *Wood v. Veal*,^c it was adjudged, that no dedication of a highway to the public, by a tenant for years, though it were for ninety-nine years, or by any other person except the owner of the fee, would be binding upon such owner; and it was intimated by Lord Tenterden, that during the progress of the requisite time, the highway ought to have been used as a thoroughfare. The true principle on the subject, to be deduced from the authorities, I apprehend to be, that if there be no other evidence of a grant or dedication, than the presumption arising from the fact of acquiescence on the part of the owner, in the free use and enjoyment of the way as a public road, the period of twenty years, applicable to incorporeal rights, would be required, as being the usual and analogous period of limitation. But if there were clear, unequivocal, and decisive acts of the owner, amounting to an explicit manifestation of his will to make

^a 11 *East*, 375. note.

^b 5 *Taunton*, 125.

^c 5 *Barnw. & Ald.* 454.

a permanent abandonment of the road, those acts would be sufficient to establish the dedication within any intermediate period.^a In *Hatch v. Dwight*,^b it was declared, upon the same principle, that if a mill-site, unoccupied, be abandoned by the owner, evidently with an intent to leave it unoccupied, it would be unreasonable that the

^a See, further, *Rex v. Lloyd*, 1 *Campb.* 260. *Lethbridge v. Winter*, *ibid.* 263. note. *Rex v. Inhabitants of St. Benedict*, 4 *Barnw. & Ald.* 447. *Jarvis v. Dean*, 3 *Bing.* 447. In *Pritchard v. Atkinson*, 4 *N. H. Rep.* 1, seventeen years were, in that case, deemed to be a sufficient period. *State v. Catlin*, 3 *Vermont Rep.* 530. S. P. In the case of *State v. Trask*, 6 *ibid.* 355, it was held, that if land be laid out as a public common for the purpose of a court house, and the public acquire an interest in it as such, it is deemed a dedication to the public use, and it cannot be reclaimed, though the use be discontinued. But see *contra, supra*, p. 432. note. In the case of *New-Orleans v. the United States*, 10 *Peters' U. S. Rep.* 662, in which the doctrine of dedication of property to public uses was largely and learnedly discussed, it was held not to be essential that the right to use the property, so dedicated, should be vested in a corporate body. It may exist in the public, and have no other limitations than the wants of the community at large. And if buildings be erected on, or grants made of part of the land so dedicated, by the party making it, such acts would not disprove the dedication, or affect the *vested* rights of the public. I should apprehend that the last proposition must be taken with some qualifications, for the fact might raise the question, as a matter of evidence, whether the property was ever legally vested in the public, or irrevocably dedicated to it; and if it had been, whether non-user by the public, and an adverse claim by the original owner, might not, in the lapse of time, bar the public, for in this country time may create a bar to the sovereign's right. Thus, by the *New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 292, the people are not to sue or implead any person, in respect to lands, by reason of any right or title, unless the right or title accrued within twenty years before suit brought, or the people had received the rents and profits within twenty years, the case of liberties of franchise excepted. There is a similar provision in the *Revised Statutes of Massachusetts*, part 3. tit. 5. ch. 119. sec. 12. It was held, in *Willoughby v. Jenks*, 20 *Wendell*, 96, that to give a title in the occupant of a lot, bounding on a street dedicated to the public, to the soil *usque flum viæ*, the street must have been accepted by the public as such. Until such acceptance the street remains the property of the original proprietor, subject to the easement or right of way of purchasers of lots adjoining the street.

There has been considerable discussion of the question, whether there may be a *partial* dedication of a highway to the public, as for foot passengers, or for horses and not for carts, or for carts except those carrying coal. The better opinion would seem to be, that the public must take *secundum formam doni*, and that the dedication may be definite, not only as to time, but as to the mode of use. *Lethbridge v. Winter*, 1 *Campb.* 263. note. *Marquis of Stafford v. Coyney*, 7 *Barnw. & Cress.* 257.

^b 17 *Mass. Rep.* 299.

other riparian proprietors, above and below, should be prevented, by fear of suits, from making a profitable *452 use of their sites.

10. *Of rights by license.*

The law is solicitous to prevent all kinds of imposition and injury, from confidence reposed in the acts of others ; and a parol license to do an act, on one's own land, affecting injuriously the air and light of a neighbour's house, is held not to be revocable by such neighbour after it has been once acted upon.^a Such a license is a direct encouragement to expend money, and it would be against conscience to revoke it, as soon as the expenditure begins to be beneficial. The contract would be specifically enforced in equity. Such a parol license to enjoy a beneficial privilege is not an interest in land within the statute of frauds. If, however, a parol license be granted for a temporary purpose, as the permission to erect a dam, it has been held to terminate with the decay of the dam, as the purpose of the license has then been fulfilled.^b In *Liggins v. Inge*,^c the court distinguished between licenses which, when countermanded, leave the party in *statu quo*,

^a *Webb v. Paternoster*, *Palmer's Rep.* 71. 2 *Eq. Ca. Abr.* 522. *Short v. Taylor*, cited *ibid.* *Winter v. Brockwell*, 8 *East's Rep.* 308. *Le Fevre v. Le Fevre*, 4 *Serg. & Rawle*, 241. *Rerick v. Kern*, 14 *ibid.* 267. *Bridges v. Blanchard*, 3 *Neville & Manning*, 691. But, in *Cocker v. Cowper*, in 1 *Crompton, Meeson & Roscoe*, 418, it was held, that a verbal license was not sufficient to confer an easement in another's land, and that it was revocable, though acted upon. It has also been decided, that a license in writing *without deed*, to hunt on the grounds and fish in the waters of the grantor, was void. *Bird v. Higginson*, 4 *Neville & Manning*, 505. So, a license to erect a building on another's land, cannot be revoked so entirely as to make the person who erected it a trespasser for entering and removing it after the revocation. *Barnes v. Barnes*, 6 *Vermont Rep.* 383.

^b *Hepburn v. McDowell*, 17 *Serg. & Rawle*, 383. A parol license to enjoy an easement is countermandable, whilst it remains executory. *Wallis v. Harrison*, 4 *Meeson & Welsby*, 538.

^c 7 *Bing. Rep.* 682.

and licenses for the construction of buildings and works, which are not revocable.

The modern cases distinguish between an easement and a license. A claim for an easement must be founded upon grant by deed or writing, or upon prescription which supposes one, for it is a permanent interest in another's land, with a right at all times to enter and enjoy it. But a license is an authority to do a particular act, or series of acts, upon another's land, without possessing any estate therein. It is founded in personal confidence, and is not assignable, nor within the statute of frauds.^a This distinction between a privilege or easement carrying an interest in land, and requiring a writing within the statute of frauds to support it, and a license which may be by parol, is quite subtle, and it *becomes *453 difficult, in some of the cases, to discern a substantial difference between them. The case of *Wood v. Lake*,^b which held a parol agreement for the liberty to stack coal upon any part of the close of another, for seven years, to be valid, was questioned at the time by Mr. Justice Foster, and it has been since forcibly attacked by Sir Edward B. Sugden, in his *Treatise of the Law of Vendors and Purchasers*,^c and was questioned also in 1 *Johnson's Ch. Rep.* 143; and yet that case has been recognised, and the doctrine of it sanctioned, by Lord Ch. J. Gibbs,

^a *Kerr v. Connell*, *Berton's N. Brunswick Rep.* 151. *Woodbury v. Parshley*, 7 *N. H. Rep.* 237. *Mumford v. Whitney*, 15 *Wendell*, 380. S. P., where it was held, that such a *license* by parol was valid, but that a parol agreement to allow a party to enter and erect a dam for a *permanent* purpose, was void within the statute of frauds, for it was the transfer of an *interest* in the land. If we understand the license, said Ch. J. Savage, as it is defined here in the text, there is no difficulty on the subject. It is a mere authority to do a particular act, as to hunt, or fish, or erect a temporary dam, and conveys no interest, and the license is executory, and may be revoked at pleasure, but acts done under it before the revocation are no trespass.

^b *Sayer's Rep.* 3.

^c P. 56. 3d London edit.

in *Taylor v. Walters*.^a The decision in *Cook v. Stearns*^b narrows the limits assigned to a parol license, while, on the other hand, the cases of *Ricker v. Kelly*, and *Clement v. Durgin*,^c seem to approach and favour the more questionable doctrine in *Wood v. Lake*.^d

*454 *III. *Of offices.*

Offices are another species of incorporeal hereditaments, and they consist in a right, and corres-

^a 7 *Taunton*, 373.

^b 11 *Mass. Rep.* 533.

^c 1 *Greenleaf*, 117. 5 *ibid.* 9.

^d It was held, in *Bridges v. Purcell*, 1 *Dev. & Battle, N. C. Rep.* 492, that a parol license to overflow one's land by a mill-pond could be revoked, and at all events it ceased with the life of the grantor. Mr. Justice Gaston, who gave the opinion of the court, was disposed to question the doctrine on this subject, in the cases of *Liggins v. Inge*, *Webb v. Paternoster*, and *Taylor v. Walters*; and he held, that the decision in *Wood v. Lake* was clearly wrong. A mere license is revocable, though acts done under it until countermanded, are lawful. This was the amount of the reasoning in the case in North Carolina. *Beidelman v. Foulk*, 5 *Watts*, 308. *Couch v. Burke*, 2 *Hill's S. C. Rep.* 534. *S. P.* But an interest in land once passed cannot be revoked. *Jackson v. Buel*, 3 *Johns. Rep.* 298.

On the subject of easements and aquatic rights, I have derived much aid and facility in my researches, from the three valuable treatises of Mr. Angell, which treat of *water-courses*, of *tide-waters*, and of the *rights acquired by adverse enjoyment for twenty years*. In those essays, the author has faithfully collected the law and authorities applicable to the subject, and accompanied his digest of them with free and judicious criticism. The disturbances of incorporeal rights, relative to partition-walls, foundations of buildings, the diversion of water, obstruction of lights, &c., amounting to nuisances, are also well and fully discussed in *Gibbons on the Law of Dilapidations and Nuisances*, ch. 10. In the propositions of the English Parliamentary commissioners on the subject of real property, it was submitted, that adverse enjoyment during twenty years of any profit or easement in or over the soil of another, should be *prima facie* evidence of a right, but one liable to be rebutted by proof, that the owner had been under disability; or that the land had been under a lease, or that there was a life interest therein, but such proof was not to be open to the lessee or tenant for life. The adverse enjoyment for sixty years was to be conclusive evidence of a right, without regard to the disabilities of the parties, or the state of the title to the land. The non-user of any profit or easement in or over the soil of another during twenty years, was to be *prima facie* evidence of its extinguishment, but liable to be rebutted. I should have apprehended that all those propositions, except the sixty years' provision, were already part of the English law, and that it was useless to have proposed them.

pondent duty, to execute a public or private trust, and to take the emoluments belonging to it.^a Offices, in England, may be granted to a man in fee, or for life, as well as for years, and at will.^b In the United States, no public office can properly be termed an hereditament, or a thing capable of being inherited. The constitution, or the law of the state, provides for the extent of the duration of the office, which is never more permanent than during good behaviour.^c Private ministerial offices only can be classed as hereditaments, and I do not know of any such subsisting among us. It would not be consistent with our manners and usages, to grant a private trust or employment to one, and his heirs, in fee; though I do not know of any positive objection to such a contract in point of law. But in the revision of the statute law of New-York, in 1787, most of the provisions in the ancient English statutes relative to office were re-enacted. It was provided, among other things,^d that if a man be unduly disturbed in his office, a writ of novel disseisin should be maintained for offices in fee, and for life, as well as for lands and tenements. This regulation was taken from the statute of Westminster 2d, 13 Edw. I, and it was

^a *Finch's Law*, 162.

^b 2 *Blacks. Com.* 36.

^c In *Hoke v. Henderson*, 4 *Dev. N. C. Rep.* 18, 19, it was decided, that a clerk's office, which was held during good behaviour, and many other public offices were, under certain limitations, *the subject of property*, like every other thing corporeal or incorporeal, from which men can earn a livelihood. And if another should unlawfully usurp the office, the owner might have an action for damages for the expulsion, and a *mandamus* to restore him to the possession and emoluments of the office. In the able and elaborate opinion delivered by Judge Nicoll, in the case of the *State v. Dews*, *R. M. Charlton's Georgia Rep.* 397, it was held, that public officers in this country were public agents or trustees, and had no proprietary interest or private property in their offices beyond the constitutional tenure and salary (if any) prescribed; and that official rights and powers flowing from their offices, might be changed at the discretion of the legislature, during their continuance in office. The custody of a jail, for instance, it was held, might, without the violation of any constitutional right, be taken by statute from the sheriff and vested in the city corporation.

^d *Laws of New-York*, sess. 10. ch. 50. sec. 7.

probably a very useless provision, and it has been omitted in the last revision of the laws of New-York, which went into operation in January, 1830. But we have (and very properly) re-enacted^a the substance of the statute of 5 and 6 Edw. VI, ch. 15, *against buying and selling offices*, and it prohibits the sale of any office, or the deputation
 *455 *of any office, or taking any fee or reward therefor.

The offence is made a misdemeanor, and is likewise punished with the loss of the office; but it does not apply to the case of a deputy agreeing to pay his principal part of the profits of an office, and to be allowed to reserve another part to himself as a compensation for his services.^b The object of the statute was to prevent corruption in office, and it alludes only to corrupt bargains and sales of offices, and not to the fair and necessary appointments of deputies with a reasonable allowance, though on this point there have been some refined distinctions established.

If an officer has a certain salary, or certain annual profits, a deputation of his office, reserving a sum not exceeding the amount of his profits, has been held not to be contrary to the statute, because the principal is entitled to the fees and perquisites of the office, and the deputy to a recompense for his labour in the execution of it. So, if the profits be uncertain, the deputy may lawfully agree to pay so much out of the profits, for in that case he cannot be charged for more than he receives. But if the office consists of uncertain fees and profits, and the deputy agrees to pay a certain sum annually, without restricting the payment to the proceeds of the profits, it would be a sale within the statute; and the case is not altered by

^a *New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 696. sec. 35, 36, 37. The legislature of Virginia, in 1792, re-enacted the statute of 5 and 6 Edw. VI. *Revised Code of Virginia*, edit. 1814, vol. i. p. 79.

^b *Gulliford v. De Cardonell*, 2 *Salk. Rep.* 466.

the office yielding more in contingent profits than the amount of the money stipulated to be paid.^a It would also be a contract within the purview of the statute, for the deputy to secure all the profits to the person appointing him, for this would infallibly lead to extortion in the deputy.^b

*The statute in New-York would seem to be *456 broader than the English statute of 5 and 6 Edw.

VI, for it has omitted the explanatory and restrictive words in that statute, applying it to "office or offices, or any part or parcel of them that shall in anywise touch or concern the administration or execution of justice;" and the preamble shows, that it was intended to apply to "places where justice is to be administered, or any service of trust executed." In England, the place of under-marshal of London is a service of public trust, and yet it has been held to be saleable, because it only concerned the police of the city.^c If, however, the statute of New-

^a *Godolphin v. Tudor*, 2 *Salk. Rep.* 468: *S. C. Willes' Rep.* 575. note. *Garforth v. Feron*, 1 *H. Blacks.* 328. *Noel v. Fisher*, 3 *Call's Rep.* 215. *Becker v. Ten Eyck*, 6 *Paige*, 68. In *Tappan v. Brown*, 9 *Wendell's Rep.* 175, it was decided, that if a person receiving a *deputation to a public office*, which entitles him by law to a certain *per centage* upon the fees and emoluments of his principal, agrees to perform the duties at a *fixed salary*, the agreement is in violation of the act against buying and selling offices, and is void; although it be not certain that the stipulated sum would be less than the per centage allowed by law.

^b *Layng v. Paine*, *Willes' Rep.* 571. *Becker v. Ten Eyck*, 6 *Paige*, 68. If the deputy of a public officer be entitled by law to certain fees and perquisites as deputy, and he agrees to give the officer appointing a portion of such fees or perquisites, it is a purchase of the deputation, and void under the statute. *Ibid.* The statute of 5 and 6 Edw. VI, has been re-enacted in Virginia, with the addition of a *proviso*, that the act was not to prohibit the appointment, and acting of any deputy clerk, or deputy sheriff, who shall be employed to assist their principals in the execution of their respective offices. *Prima facie* this proviso would seem to have been unnecessary, but it has been decided under it, that where a sheriff farmed his shrievalty to G., whom he appointed his deputy for a sum in gross, to be paid him by G., who was to discharge all the duties, and take all the emoluments of the office, the contract was lawful! *Salling v. McKinney*, 1 *Leigh*, 42. Upon this construction the proviso rises into great importance.

^c Lord Hardwicke, in *Butler v. Richardson*, 1 *Atk. Rep.* 210. *Amb. Rep.* 73.

York should not admit of a more comprehensive construction than the one from which it was taken, yet the principles of the common law supply all deficiencies; and many agreements for the sale of offices that are not within the statute of Edw. VI have been held void, as being against public policy. The sale of any office in which the public are concerned, is held to be against principles of public policy, and an offence at common law. If A. should agree to allow to B. a certain proportion of the profits of an office in the king's dock-yards, in case the latter retired, and he succeeded to the appointment, the agreement would be void, as not supported by a valid consideration.^a

The provisions and rules of the ancient common law were remarkably provident in respect to the public
 *457 interest; and *an office of trust, that concerned the administration of justice, could not be granted for a term of years, for then it might vest in executors and administrators, if the officer should die within the term; and it would be impossible that the law should know beforehand, whether the representatives would be competent to discharge the trust. This was so ruled by Lord Coke, and others, in *Sir George Reynel's case*, respecting the office of marshal of the marshalsea.^b Sir Henry Finch, in his *Discourse*,^c held that the grant of an office to an ignorant man, who had no skill at all, was utterly void; as if the king, by his letters patent, made a clerk of the crown in the K. B., who had no experience in office, and was utterly insufficient to serve the king and people.

^a *Parsons v. Thompson*, 1 *H. Blacks. Rep.* 322. *Blachford v. Preston*, 8 *Term Rep.* 89. Best, Ch. J., in *Richardson v. Mellish*, 9 *Moore*, 435.

^b 9 *Co.* 95. In *Hoke v. Henderson*, 4 *Dev. N. C. Rep.* 23, it was declared, that the legislature could lawfully confer a clerk's office for life, or during good behaviour, or during pleasure, or for any term of years determinable with life at an earlier day. This could only apply to cases in which the constitution had not prescribed the tenure.

^c Page 162.

The general rule is, that judicial offices must be exercised in person, and that a judge cannot delegate his authority to another. I do not know of any exception to this rule with us, though in England there are several.^a What is a judicial, and what is a ministerial function, has been sometimes a matter of dispute. In *Medhurst v. Waite*,^b Lord Mansfield said it was taking the definition too large, to say that every act, where the judgment was at all exercised, was a judicial act, and that a judicial act related to a matter in litigation. But a ministerial office may be exercised by a deputy, though a deputy cannot make a deputy, according to the maxim, *delegata potestas non potest delegari*. The distinction between a deputy and an assignee of an office, as stated by Lord Coke, in the *Earl of Shrewsbury's case*,^c will serve to explain the application of the statute against buying and selling offices to assignees and not to deputies. An assignee of an office, he says, is a person who has an estate *or *458 interest in the office itself, and doth all things in his own name, and for whom his grantor shall not answer. But a deputy hath not any estate or interest in the office. He is but the officer's shadow, and doth all things in the name of the officer himself, and nothing in his own name, and his grantor shall answer for him.^d

^a 4 *Inst.* 291. *Molins v. Werby*, 1 *Lev. Rep.* 76.

^b 3 *Burr. Rep.* 1259.

^c 9 *Co.* 42.

^d As the ancient statute of 5 and 6 Edw. VI, against the sale of offices, has been revived and re-enacted in New-York, it might have been as well to have also re-enacted the statute of 12 Richard II, (A. D. 1388,) entitled, an act that *none shall obtain offices by suit, or for reward, but upon desert*. They all seem to have constituted parts of one ancient system, and to have been dictated by the same provident and generous spirit. It declared, that the appointing power who should "ordain, name, or make justices of the peace, sheriffs, customers, comptrollers, or any other officer or minister of the king, should be firmly sworn not to ordain, name, or make any, for any gift or brocage, favour or affection; and that none which pursueth by him, or by other, privily or openly, to be in any manner of office, shall be put in the same office, or in any other." This

IV. *Of franchises.*

Franchises are certain privileges conferred by grant from government, and vested in individuals. In England they are very numerous, and are understood to be royal privileges in the hands of a subject.^a They contain an implied covenant on the part of the government not to invade the rights vested, and on the part of the grantees to execute the conditions and duties prescribed in the grant. Some of these franchises are presumed to be founded on a valuable consideration, and to involve public duties, and to be made for the public accommodation, and to be affected with a *jus publicum*, and they are necessarily exclusive in their nature. The government cannot resume them at pleasure, or do any act to impair the grant, without a breach of contract. The privilege of making a road, or establishing a ferry, and taking tolls for the use of the same, is a franchise, and the public have an interest in the same; and the owners of the franchise are liable to answer in damages, if they should refuse to transport an individual without any reasonable excuse, upon being paid or tendered the usual rate of fare.^b The obligation between the government and the owner of such franchises is mutual. He is obliged to provide and maintain facilities for accommodating the public, at all times, with prompt and convenient passage. The law, on the other hand, in consideration of this duty, provides him a recompense, by means of an exclusive toll, to be exacted from persons who use the road or ferry, and, of course, it will protect him against any new establishment which is calculated to draw away his

statute, said Lord Coke, (*Co. Litt.* 234. a,) was worthy to be written in letters of gold, but more worthy to be put in due execution.

^a 2 *Blacks. Com.* 37. *Finch's Law*, 164.

^b *Beekman v. Saratoga and Schenectady Railroad Company*, 3 *Paige*, 45. *Paine v. Patrick*, 3 *Mod. Rep.* 289. 294. Story, J., in *Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge*, 11 *Peters' Rep.* 639.

custom to his prejudice. An estate in such a franchise, and an estate in land, rest upon the same principle, being equally grants of a right or *459 privilege for an adequate consideration. If the creation of the franchise be not declared to be exclusive, yet it is necessarily implied in the grant, as in the case of the grant of a ferry, bridge, or turnpike, or railroad, that the government will not, either directly or indirectly, interfere with it, so as to destroy or materially impair its value. Every such interference, whether it be by the creation of a rival franchise or otherwise, would be in violation or in fraud of the grant. All grants or franchises ought to be so construed as to give them due effect, by excluding all contiguous competition, which would be injurious, and operate fraudulently upon the grant. The common law contained principles applicable to this subject, dictated by sound judgment and enlightened morality. It declared all such invasions of franchises to be nuisances, and the party aggrieved had his remedy at law by an action on the case for the disturbance, and in modern practice he usually resorts to chancery, to stay the injurious interference by injunction.^a We have

^a 22 Hen. VI. 14. b. Paston, J. *Bro. action sur le case*, pl. 57. tit. *Nuisance*, pl. 12. 2 *Rol. Abr.* 140. pl. 20. 140. pl. 1, 2, 3. F. N. B. 184. *Yard v. Ford*, 2 *Saund. Rep.* 172. 3 *Blacks. Comm.* 218, 219. *Tripp v. Frank*, 4 *Term Rep.* 666. Lord Holt, in the case of *Keeble and Hickeringall*, *Holt's Rep.* 20. *Newburgh Turnpike Company v. Miller*, 5 *Johns. Ch. Rep.* 111. 4 *ibid.* 160. S. P. *Dartmouth College v. Woodward*, 4 *Wheaton's Rep.* 518. *Huzzey v. Field*, 2 *Crompton, Meeson & Roscoe*, 432. It has been usual in the grant of a franchise to exclude in express terms all interference within specified distances. By a general act in Illinois, (*Revised Laws of Illinois*, 1833,) a ferry or toll-bridge privilege, created by statute, excludes all other establishments of the kind within three miles of the same. So, the act of Georgia of 21st December, 1835, creating the *Chattahoochee Railroad Company*, excludes for twenty-five years, all other railroads running parallel thereto within twenty miles. This is in affirmance of the common law rule, and it is the wisest course, for it prevents all uncertainty and dispute as to what are reasonable distances in the given case, and what would amount to an unlawful interference. In *Dyer v. Tuskaloosa Bridge Company*, 2 *Porter's Alabama Rep.* 296, it was

nothing to do with a great proportion of the franchises that occupy a large space in the treatises on English law ; and whoever claims an exclusive privilege with us, must show a grant from the legislature. Corporations, or bodies politic, are the most usual franchises known in our law ; and they have been sufficiently considered in a former volume. These incorporated franchises seem, indeed, with some impropriety, to be classed by writers among hereditaments, since they have no *inheritable* quality, inasmuch as a corporation, in cases where there is no express limitation to its continuance by the charter, is supposed never to die, but to be clothed with a kind

held, after an elaborate discussion, that the erection of a toll-bridge under legislative grant, within a short distance of a ferry previously held under a county court license, so as to prove a great injury to it, was not an unconstitutional act, nor an exclusive grant of a ferry, and that the license was taken subject to the paramount discretion of the legislature. Other ferries may be established along-side of ferries *opposite to towns*, in the discretion of the court, and in like manner bridges may be established along-side of ferries. The statute law of Alabama only provided that no ferry should be established within two miles of *another ferry* already established. So, one toll-bridge cannot be established within three miles of *another toll-bridge*. This case was deemed to be warranted by statutory construction, otherwise it would seem to be hardly consonant with general principles.

But the case of *Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge*, (11 *Peters*, 420,) is of more momentous import, and contains and establishes a doctrine subversive of that in the text, and which goes very far to destroy the security and value of legislative franchises. The court declared, by Mr. Chief Justice Taney, that public grants were to be construed strictly, and that nothing passed as against the state by implication, in diminution of the legislative powers requisite to accomplish the end of their creation. It was accordingly decided that the grant by statute to the Charles River Bridge Company of the right, founded on a valuable consideration, to build a bridge over that river, and to take toll, contained no engagement from the state of Massachusetts, nor any implied contract that the privilege to erect another bridge contiguous thereto, and on the same line of travel, and which might create competition, and diminish or destroy its income, should not be granted within the period of the operation of the grant ; that as no grant of any such exclusive privilege, or any contract of the kind was *expressed*, none was to be intended or inferred. There was no constructive franchise or privilege admitted, and the decision rested on legislative sovereignty, and its all-surpassing powers. Mr. Justice Story dissented from this extraordinary doctrine and decision, and with his customary learning and ability.

of legal immortality.^a Special privileges conferred upon towns and individuals in a variety of ways, and for numerous purposes, having a connexion with the public interest, are franchises.

*V. *Of annuities.*

*460

An annuity, says Lord Coke,^b is a yearly sum stipulated to be paid to another, in fee, or for life, or years, and chargeable only on the person of the grantor. If it be agreed to be paid to the annuitant and his heirs, it is a personal fee, and transmissible by descent like an estate in fee, and forfeitable for treason as an hereditament,^c and for that reason it belongs to the class of incorporeal hereditaments. It is chargeable upon the *person* of the grantor, for if the annuity was made chargeable upon land, it would then become a rent charge, and descend to the heirs as real property.^d The remedy for a failure in the payment of the annuity, was anciently by the original writ of annuity, but now the remedy is by a personal action of debt or covenant on the instrument by which the annuity is created. Unless the grantor grants the annuity for himself and his heirs, the heirs of the grantor are not bound, for the law presumes, by the omission to name them, that he did not intend to include them in the obligation.^e

^a They are nevertheless deemed incorporeal hereditaments, and shares in a railroad incorporated company have, in Kentucky, been adjudged to be real estate, which descends as realty, and of which a widow might be endowed. *Price v. Price*, 6 *Dana's Rep.* 107.

^b *Co. Litt.* 144. b.

^c *Co. Litt.* 2. a. *Nevil's case*, 7 *Co.* 34. b.

^d *Co. Litt.* 144. b.

^e *Co. Litt.* 144. b. Mr. *Ellis*, in a recent treatise, entitled "*The Law of Fire and Life Insurance and Annuities*," has collected and arranged all the law on the subject of *annuities for lives*. An annuity, as well as a judgment, is presumed to be satisfied after twenty years, if nothing has been done under it.

VI. *Of rents.*

Rents are the last species of these incorporeal hereditaments, and they form a very important and interesting title under this branch of the law.

(1.) *Of the various kinds of rents.*

Rent is a certain profit in money, provisions, chattles, or labour, issuing out of lands and tenements, in retribution for the use, and it cannot issue out of a mere privilege or easement.^a There were, at common law, according to Littleton,^b three kinds of rent, viz. rent service, rent charge, and rent seck. *Rent service* was where
 *461 the tenant held his land by *fealty, or other corporeal service, and a certain rent; and it was called rent service, because there was some corporeal service incident to the tenancy, as fealty, homage, or other service.^c A right of distress was inseparably incident to this rent. *Rent charge*, or fee-farm rent, is where the rent is created by deed, and the fee granted; and as there is no fealty annexed to such a grant of the whole estate, the rent charge was not favoured at common law. The right of distress is not an incident, and it requires an express power of distress to be annexed to the grant, which gives it the name of a rent charge, because the lands are, by the deed, charged with a distress.^d *Rent seck*, *siccus*, or barren rent, was rent reserved by deed, without any clause of distress,

^a 2 *Blacks. Com.* 41. *Gilbert on Rents*, 9. *Co. Litt.* 142. a. *Buszard v. Capel*, 3 *Barnw. & Cress.* 141.

^b *Sec.* 213.

^c *Litt. s.* 213. *Co. Litt.* 142. a.

^d *Litt. s.* 217. *Co. Litt.* 143. b. *Gilbert on Rents*, 155. In the case of *Ingersoll v. Sargeant*, 1 *Wharton*, 337, the law on this head is learnedly reviewed and discussed by Mr. Justice Kennedy, and it is declared that the statute of *Quia Emptores* (18 Edw. I.) was never in force in Pennsylvania, and that a rent, reserved to grantor and his heirs, in the grant of lands in fee, is a *rent service*, and not a *rent charge*. The release of part of the ground from the rent does not therefore extinguish the whole, and the remainder of the land remains subject to a due proportion of the rent.

and in a case in which the owner of the rent had no future interest or reversion in the land. The owner of the rent was accordingly driven to the slow and tedious remedy by a writ of annuity, or a writ of assize.^a But the statute of 4 Geo. II. c. 28, abolished all distinction between the several kinds of rent, so far as to give the same remedy by distress in cases of rents seck, rents of assize, and chief rents, as in the case of rent reserved upon a lease. The statute of New-York,^b has not adopted that provision in so many words, but it gives the remedy by distress in all cases where any certain services, or certain rents reserved out of lands or tenements remain due. The remedy is extended equally to the grantees, and assignees of the lessor, and to the heirs, executors, and administrators of the party entitled.

There is, therefore, the same universal remedy by action and by distress, for every species of rent or service lawfully due, when the same is certain.^c

The *tenancy that will authorize a distress does *462 not necessarily require a formal lease, and it may

^a *Litt.* s. 213. 217, 218. 235, 236. *Co. Litt.* 150. b. 160. a. *Gilbert on Distresses*, 6.

^b *New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 747. sec. 18. 20, 21, 22.

^c *Cornell v. Lamb*, 2 *Cowen's Rep.* 652. *Smith v. Colson*, 10 *Johns. Rep.* 91. The case of *Cornell v. Lamb* assumes that a reversionary interest must be subsisting in the person who distrains; but that case arose prior to the *New-York Revised Statutes*, and when the extended provision in those statutes had not been adopted. The restriction as to the necessity of a reversionary interest mentioned in that case, seems to be now removed by the 18th section of the statute above cited. A doubt was suggested, in the case of *Cornell v. Lamb*, whether the right of distress could exist, in those cases where the land was *allodial*, without an authority for that purpose in the lease or contract. To establish the right of distress at common law, without any power in the lease, there always existed a rent due, a reversionary interest in the landlord, and fealty due as incident to the tenure of *free and common socage*. To remove this doubt, it was declared by the *New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 718. sec. 4, rendering all lands in the state *allodial*, that the abolition of tenures should not take away or discharge any rents or services certain, which had been, or might be created or reserved. This was intended to subject *allodial* lands to the incidents which before applied to *socage* tenures.

be implied from circumstances, and a parol lease will be sufficient.^a

The best way of reserving perpetual rents, if it be intended that rents should always be of the same value, is to stipulate that the payment be in kind, such as wheat, or other produce, or in cattle or poultry. This was the almost universal practice in ancient times, and a great proportion of the ancient leases in New-York, in the manor counties, were of that description. By the statute of 18 Eliz., one-third part of the rent upon college leases was directed to be reserved in corn, to be paid either in corn, or at the current prices at the nearest public market. We have an instance in New-York of the same

provident foresight in the act *instituting the university*,^b and limiting its annual income to 40,000

bushels of wheat. This arrangement saves the interest of the persons in whose favour rent is reserved from sinking by the depreciation of money, owing to the augmentation of gold and silver, and the accumulation of paper credit. The rents which have been reserved in corn, says Doctor Smith, have preserved their value much better than those which have been reserved in money.^c

In the feudal ages, a great proportion of the produce of the land went as rent to the landlord. The cultivators

^a Knight v. Bennett, 3 Bing. Rep. 361. Cornell v. Lamb, 2 Cowen's Rep. 652. Jacks v. Smith, 1 Bay's Rep. 315. It was to be presumed that in those states in which the English law of distress for rent has been essentially preserved, the remedy had equally been extended to every kind of rent. But I should infer that this was not the case in Virginia, for in the *American Jurist*, No. 8, the question is raised, and discussed with much acuteness and research, *whether in Virginia, on the conveyance of land in fee simple, reserving rent, the feoffor, without an express stipulation to that effect, has a right of distress*. The writer concludes in the affirmative, and that on a feoffment in fee with a reservation of rent, the feoffee thereby becomes a tenant, and the feoffor a landlord, with the remote reversionary interests called a reverter.

^b Laws of New-York, sess. 36. ch. 69. sec. 1.

^c Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, vol. i. 34. 187.

of the soil were generally bondsmen, or tenants at will, whose labours in peace, and services in war, were equally at the command of the landlord. In modern times, the rent of land has been tripled and quadrupled, but the produce of the land, in the progress of improvement, has been increased in a much greater proportion, and the amount of the yearly produce of land is several times greater than the amount of the yearly rent.^a

(2.) *When, and how far not payable.*

1. *Of eviction.*

It is a rule of law, that the rent must be reserved to him from whom the land proceeded, or to his lawful representatives, and it cannot be reserved to a stranger. Thus, if A. leases a lot, or parcel of land, to B., on a certain rent, the payment of that rent cannot be reserved to C.; and the reason is, that the rent is payable as a return for the possession of the land, and it must, therefore, be rendered to the person from whom the land passed.^b It was also, on the same ground, decided, in *Prescott v. De Forest*, and afterwards in *Cornell v. Lamb*,^c that the right of distress for rent was incident to the reversion, and that no other person could distrain

*but he who owned the reversion. The person *464 who distrains must have some reversionary interest to sustain the right.^d If the landlord dies before the rent becomes due, it goes to the heir as incident to the reversion; but if he dies after the rent had become payable, it goes to the executor or administrator as part of the personal estate, and the executor or administrator has the same remedy by action or by distress, for the recovery of all such arrears, that the testator or intestate

^a *Smith's Wealth of Nations*, vol. i. 333.

^b *Litt. s.* 346. *Co. Litt.* 143. b.

^c 16 *Johns. Rep.* 159. 2 *Cowen's Rep.* 652.

^d This is altered in New-York by statute. Vide *supra*, p. 461.

might have had if living.^a If the tenant be evicted from the lands demised to him, by a title paramount, before the rent falls due, he will be discharged from the payment of the rent, for the obligation to pay ceases when the consideration for it ceases, and which was the enjoyment of the land.^b But if the lawful eviction by paramount title, be of part only of the demised premises, the rent is apportionable, and the eviction a bar *pro tanto*.^c So, if there be an actual expulsion of the tenant from the whole, or a part, by the lessor, before the rent becomes due, and be continued until after the rent becomes due, the entire rent is suspended;^d but no offensive or outrageous conduct on the part of the landlord, as by erecting a nuisance in the neighbourhood of the demised premises, will be sufficient.^e

2. Destruction of the premises.

*465 *The cases have afforded a full discussion of the interesting question, how far a tenant is excused from the payment of rent, when he is deprived, even by inevitable necessity or misfortune, and without any default on his part, or on the part of the landlord, of the enjoyment of the premises. In *Taverner's case*,^f

^a 1 *Saund. Rep.* 287. n. 11. *Strafford v. Wentworth, Prec. in Ch.* 555. *Rockingham v. Penrice*, 1 *P. Wm.* 177. *Laws of New-York*, sess. 36. ch. 63. sec. 18. *New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 747. sec. 21, 22. 2 *Dana's Ken. Rep.* 54. A purchaser of the reversion at sheriff's sale, is entitled to the rent becoming payable after the execution of the deed. *Bank of Pennsylvania v. Wise*, 3 *Watts' Penn. Rep.* 394.

^b 2 *Rol. Abr. tit. Rent*, O. 1 *Saund. Rep.* 205. n.

^c *Stevenson v. Lambard*, 2 *East's Rep.* 576. *Lansing v. Van Alstyne*, 2 *Wendell's Rep.* 561.

^d *Salmon v. Smith*, 1 *Saund. Rep.* 202. 204. note 2. *Co. Litt.* 143. b. *Ascough's case*, 9 *Co.* 135. *Page v. Parr*, *Styles' Rep.* 432. *Timbrell v. Bullock*, *ibid.* 446. *Pendleton v. Dyett*, 4 *Coven's Rep.* 581. *Bennet v. Bittle*, 4 *Rawle*, 339. The same principle applies if the tenant has been obliged to pay rent to a person having a prior and better title to it. *Sapsford v. Fletcher*, 4 *Term Rep.* 511.

^e *Pendleton v. Dyett*, *ub. sup.*

^f 1 *Dyer's Rep.* 55. b.

which arose in 34 and 35 Hen. VIII, a man made a lease of land, and of a flock of sheep, rendering a certain rent, and all the sheep died. The question was, whether the tenant could have relief from this calamity, at the expense of his landlord, by an apportionment of the rent. It was very much debated, and different opinions were entertained by the sergeants and judges who discussed the subject. Some of them thought there was good reason and equity to apportion the rent, or, in other words, to make a proportional deduction for the loss of the sheep. But others held to the contrary opinion, and that though the sea, or an inundation, should gain upon the land, or part of it be burnt by wildfire, the entire rent must issue out of the remainder, and that it would be different if part of the land should be recovered from the tenant by a title paramount to that derived from his landlord. The point was left unsettled by this early decision, but the opinion of those who were for the payment of the entire rent, gained a decided superiority in the course of the subsequent century.

In *Paradine v. Jane*,^a an action of debt was brought for rent, upon a lease for years, and the defendant pleaded, by way of excuse for the non-payment of the rent, that he had been driven from the premises by public enemies, viz. by Prince Rupert and his soldiers. The case was fully and ably argued before the King's Bench, during the time of the civil wars, in the reign of Charles I. It was insisted, that by the law of reason, a man ought not to pay rent when he could not enjoy, without any default on his part, the land demised *to him, and *466 that the civil and canon law exempted the party in such a case. But Rolle, J., (the same person who was author of the abridgement,) overruled the plea, and held,

^a *Aleyn's Rep.* 26. *Styles' Rep.* 47.

that neither the hostile army, nor an inundation, would exempt the tenant from paying rent. The same doctrine has been continued to this day; and it is well settled, that upon an express contract to pay rent, the loss of the premises by fire, or inundation, or external violence, will not exempt the party from his obligation to pay the rent. The case of *Hallett v. Wylie*,^a was decided on that principle; and the principal English authorities were reviewed. Since that decision, the point has been presented and decided the same way in the English C. B., in *Baker v. Holtzapffel*,^b and the unsettled question, whether a court of equity would grant relief to the tenant against the landlord's claim at law for rent, has also been put at rest by the decision in *Hare v. Grove*,^c in the English Exchequer, and of *Holtzapffel v. Baker*,^d in the English Court of Chancery. In both of these cases, the Court of Equity refused to interfere in favour of the tenant, who was considered as having no equity against the effect of his own express agreement to pay the rent. The same rule prevails equally in England, and in this country, in the case of an express covenant to pay rent;^e but it is understood that, by the civil law, the prætor would exempt the tenant from paying rent, or modify the obligation, according to equity, when the property was
 *467 destroyed by fire, inundation, or violence, *or the crops failed by a bad season.^f So, Lord North-

^a 3 *Johns. Rep.* 44.

^b 4 *Taunt. Rep.* 45.

^c 3 *Anst. Rep.* 687.

^d 13 *Vesey's Rep.* 115. See, also, to the same point, *Leeds v. Chatham*, 1 *Simon*, 146, and *Lamott v. Sterrétt*, 1 *Harr. & Johns.* 42.

^e *Pollard v. Shaeffer*, 1 *Dallas' Rep.* 210. *Fowler v. Bott*, 6 *Mass. Rep.* 63. *Wagner v. White*, 4 *Harr. & Johns.* 564. *Leeds v. Chatham*, 1 *Simon*, 146, *contra*. *Ripley v. Wightman*, 4 *M' Cord*, 447. *Gates v. Green*, 4 *Paige*, 355.

^f *Dig.* 19. 2. 15. 2. *Ibid.* 50. 17. 23. *Code*, 4. 65. 8; and see the copious annotations in the Elzevir edition of the *Corpus Juris Civilis*, annexed to the

ington, in *Brown v. Quilter*,^a thought it very clear, that a man should not pay rent for what he cannot enjoy, if occasioned by an accident which he did not undertake to meet. But I apprehend that the law, as it is now settled on that point, rests on solid foundations of justice and policy. It is to be observed, that the case only applies to *express* agreements to pay; and if a party will voluntarily create a duty or charge upon himself, he ought to abide by it when the other party is not in fault, and when he might have provided, if he had chosen, against his responsibility in case of such accidents. The loss of the rent must fall either on the lessor or lessee, and there is no more equity that the landlord should bear it than the tenant, when the tenant has engaged expressly to pay rent, and when the landlord must bear the loss of the property destroyed. The calamity is mutual; and there is much weight in the observation of the counsel, in one of the cases referred to, that these losses by fire may often proceed from the carelessness of tenants; and if they can escape from the rent, which they may deem inconvenient, by leaving the property carelessly exposed, it might very much lessen the inducements to a reasonable and necessary vigilance on their part.

Inevitable accident will excuse a party from a penalty, but will not relieve him from his covenant to perform. Thus, in a case as early as 28 and 29 Henry VIII,^b the party covenanted to sustain and repair the banks of a river, under pain of forfeiture of 10*l.*, and the banks were destroyed suddenly *by a great flood. The *468

article in the code. The doctrine of the civil law is also followed in the French law, and in the law of other countries which follow the civil law. *Code Civil*, n. 1722. 1733. 1 *Bell's Com.* 452. *Civil Code of Louisiana*, art. 2667. *Puffendorf*, (b. 5. c. 6. sec. 2,) considers the rule of the civil law to be just and equitable.

^a *Amb. Rep.* 619.

^b 1 *Dyer*, 33. a.

court held, that he was bound to repair, but was not subjected to the penalty. And in the modern cases,^a it has been held, that the lessee or the assignee of a lease, in which the lessee covenanted for himself and his assigns, absolutely to repair, was bound to repair, notwithstanding the buildings were accidentally destroyed by fire. And if the premises be out of repair, the tenant cannot make repairs at the expense of the landlord, or deduct the amount of them out of the rent, unless there be a special agreement for that purpose between the tenant and his landlord.^b But if the tenant be not under any agreement to repair, and the premises become unsafe and useless from want of repairs, the tenant from year to year may quit without notice, and he would not be liable, in an action for use and occupation, for any rent after the occupation had ceased to be beneficial.^c

When rent is due, a tender upon the land is good, and prevents a forfeiture. The tenant is not bound to go and seek the landlord, provided the contract be silent as to the place of payment, and yet a personal tender to the landlord, off the land, is also good.^d The time of payment depends upon the contract; and if there be no special agreement to the contrary, the payment would be due either yearly, half-yearly, or quarterly; according to the usage of the country, and the presumed intention to conform to it. If there be no usage in the case, the rent is due at the end of the year. But in the city of New-York, it is provided by statute, that, in the absence of any special agreement, the rent is payable quarterly, and the hiring terminates on the first of May thereafter.^e

^a The Earl of Chesterfield *v.* Duke of Bolton, *Com. Rep.* 627. *Bullock v. Dommitt*, 2 *Chitty's K. B. Rep.* 603. *S. C.* 6 *Term Rep.* 650.

^b *Mumford v. Brown*, 6 *Coven's Rep.* 475.

^c *Edwards v. Hetherington*, cited in *Salisbury v. Marshall*, 4 *Carr. & Payne*, 65.

^d *Walter v. Dewey*, 16 *Johns. Rep.* 222. *Gibbs, Ch. J., Soward v. Palmer*, 8 *Tamnt. Rep.* 277. *Hunter v. Le Conte*, 6 *Coven's Rep.* 723.

^e *New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 744. sec. 1.

3. *Of apportionment.*

On the subject of the apportionment of rent, there are several distinctions to be noticed. There are two modes of apportioning rent. The one is, by granting the reversion of part of the land out of which the rent issues; the other, by granting part of the rent to one person, and part to another.^a It is laid down as a general rule, in the more ancient cases, that if the owner of a rent service purchased part of the land out of which the rent issued, the rent was to be apportioned according to its just value, and the tenant was discharged of the rent, in a ratio to the land purchased. But if a man had a rent charge, and purchased or released part of the land out of which the rent issued, the whole rent was held to be extinguished.^b The objection to the doctrine of the apportionment of rent was, that it exposed the tenant to several suits or processes of distress, for a thing which was originally entire, and he ought not to be obliged to pay his rent in different parcels, and to several landlords, when he contracted to pay, in one entire sum, to one person. But the convenience of mankind dictated the necessity of an apportionment of rent in a variety of cases. Though it was a principle of the common law that an entire contract could not be apportioned, yet the apportionment of rent was, under certain circumstances allowed by the common law, either on severance of the land from which it issued, or of the reversion to which it was an incident. A person has a right to sell the whole or any part of his reversionary interest in land. It may be necessary to divide his estate out on rent among his children, or to sell part to answer the exigencies of the family; and it would be intolerable if such a necessary sale worked an extinguishment of the

^a Abbott, Ch. J., 5 *Barnw. & Ald.* 876.

^b *Litt.* sec. 222. *Co. Litt.* 147. b. 148. a. Talbot's case, 8 *Co.* 104. 106. *Gilbert on Rents*, 152. 163, 164.

whole rent. The rent passes as an incident to the purchaser of the reversion, and the tenant may always avoid several suits and distresses by a punctual payment
 *470 *of his rent. The rent is to be apportioned among the several owners of the reversion or of the rent, according to the value of the land; and whenever the question becomes a litigated one in a court of justice, it is the business of the jury, upon evidence produced, to apportion the rent to the value of the land. These things are now generally regulated by the agreement of parties, whenever a sale of part only of the demised premises is made, and the tenant has no concern with the transaction, since he pays no more than his stipulated rent, and to the claimants in the proportions settled by themselves. There is no doubt, therefore, that a rent charge may be apportioned, whenever the reversioner or owner of the rent either releases part of the rent to the tenant, or conveys part of the land to a stranger.^a The rent is also liable to apportionment by act of law, as in cases of descent and judicial sales.^b If the landlord enters upon part of the demised premises by wrong, the better opinion is, that it suspends the payment of the whole rent until the tenant be restored to the whole possession, for the lessor ought not to be able so to apportion his own wrong as to oblige the tenant to pay any thing for the residue;^c but the rule is otherwise in the case of a lawful entry into part of the demised premises, by the authority of the tenant himself.^d

^a *Co. Litt.* 143. a. *Gilbert on Rents*, 163. *Farley v. Craig*, 6 *Halsted*, 262.

^b *Wotton v. Shirt*, *Cro. Eliz.* 742. *Litt. sec.* 224. 1 *Rol. Abr.* tit. *Apportionment*, D. pl. 3, 4, 5. The judicial sales spoken of in the cases cited, were those in which part of a rent charge was extended on execution, and it was held good, though the tenant might be liable to two executions.

^c 1 *Rol. Abr.* 940. n. *Gilbert's Law of Executions*, 283. *Smith v. Raleigh*, 3 *Campb.* 513. *Briggs v. Hale*, 4 *Leigh*, 484.

^d *Hodgkins v. Robson*, 1 *Vent. Rep.* 276. *Vaughan v. Blanchard*, 1 *Yeates' Rep.* 176.

The rule at common law was, that neither law nor equity would apportion rent as to time, and, therefore, if the tenant for life gave a lease for years, rendering a yearly rent, and died in the course of the year, the rent could not be apportioned, and the tenant would go free of rent for the first part of the year. The principle was, that an entire contract could *not be appor- *471 tioned. The imperfect performance of it depending on various acts, could not reasonably afford a title to the whole, and from the complex nature and uncertain value of part performance, it could not afford a title to any part of the stipulated consideration.^a But the statute of 11 Geo. II, c. 19. sec. 15, supplied the principle, that apportionment should be made of rent in respect to time in such cases, and that part of the statute has been re-enacted or adopted in this country.^b

^a *Bro. Abr.* tit. *Apportionment*, pl. 7. 26. Clun's case, 10 *Co.* 127. Jenner v. Morgan, 1 *P. Wm.* 392. The Master of the Rolls, in *Hay v. Palmer*, 2 *ibid.* 502. *Cutter v. Powell*, 6 *Term*, 320. Annuities and servants' wages, like rents, were not in general apportionable at common law, and the rule seemed to be applicable to all periodical payments becoming due at fixed intervals. If a servant was hired for the month or year, and the service ceased within the time, there was no apportionment of wages for the actual time of service, though the rule operated in some cases most unjustly. *Bro. Abr.* tit. *Apportionment*, pl. 13. 22. 26. Countess of Plymouth v. Throgmorton, 1 *Salk.* 65. But the old rule is now held to be relaxed, and wages, it is understood, may be apportioned, upon the principle that such is the reasonable construction of the contract of hiring. Lawrence, J., 6 *Term*, 326. *McClure v. Pyatt*, 4 *M'Cord*, 26. *Bacot v. Parnell*, 2 *Bailey's S. C. Rep.* 424. And though annuities are not subject to apportionment, like rent, under the statute of 11 Geo. II, yet if the annuitant dies within the quarter or year, as the case may be, and the annuity was given for maintenance in infancy, or for the separate maintenance of a feme-covert, equity will apportion the annuity up to the day of the annuitant's death, on the principle that the allowance was necessary. *Hay v. Palmer*, 2 *P. Wm.* 531. *Pearly v. Smith*, 3 *Atk.* 260. *Howell v. Hanforth*, 2 *Blacks. Rep.* 1016. 17 *Serg. & Rawle*, 173. S. P. Dividends, or moneys invested in stock, are also held not to be, as a general rule, apportionable, either in law or equity. *Wilson v. Harmer*, 2 *Ves.* 672. *Rasleigh v. Master*, 3 *Bro.* 99.

^b *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 747. sec. 22. 17 *Serg. & Rawle*, 171. Ex parte Smith, 1 *Swanst. Rep.* 333. The editor has annexed a learned note to the last case, on the doctrine of apportionment as existing both before and since

3. *Of the remedy.*

The remedy provided by law for the recovery of rent, depends upon the nature of the instrument or
 *472 contract by *which payment is secured. The suit may be an action of covenant, or debt, or assumpsit, for the use and occupation of the land. The landlord may also re-enter, or recover possession of the land, by the action of ejectment, for non-payment of rent, provided half a year's rent or more be in arrear, and no sufficient distress can be found; and if the tenant, in such a case, does not redeem within six months after execution issued, the land will be deemed discharged from the lease or contract.^a But the more usual, prompt, and effectual remedy, is by distress, which was provided by the common law, and has been regulated and greatly improved by statute in England and in this country.

In New-York we have adopted the common law on the subject of distress for rent, and we have likewise re-enacted the substance of the English statutes of 52 Hen. III, 3 Edw. I, 13 Edw. I, 21 Hen. VIII, 17 Car. II, 2 W. and M., 8 Anne, and 4 and 11 Geo. II,^b and which statutes were made on purpose to control abuses, and mitigate the rigour of the common law, as well as render more certain and effectual the right of re-entry on the part of the landlord. The English common and statute law, in relation to distress for rent, and the relief of landlords, has been generally, and, I apprehend, essentially adopted in several

the statute of 11 Geo. II. The statute of 4 William IV, ch. 22, in amendment of the act of 11 Geo. II, declared that all rents service, rents charge, and other rents, annuities, dividends, and *all other payments of every description, made payable at fixed periods*, should be apportioned, and it provided for the recovery of the apportioned parts from the last period of payment.

^a This was the provision of the statute of 4 Geo. II, and it is adopted in New-York, (*N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 505,) and probably in several of the other states.

^b *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 747. sec. 18—24. *Ibid.* vol. ii. 500—505.

of the other states, as, for instance, in New-Jersey,^a Pennsylvania,^b Delaware, Indiana,^c Illinois,^d Maryland, Virginia,^e Kentucky, Mississippi,^f South Carolina, and Georgia;^g but the whole law has been judicially declared, in North Carolina, to be irreconcilable with the *spirit of their laws and government, and to be of *473 no force in that state.^h It is deemed to be equally objectionable, in the opinion of judicial authority, in South Carolina, and fit to be abolished, as being an unreasonable and oppressive relict of the feudal system, and repugnant to the policy of our institutions.ⁱ The common law method of distress for rent is expressly abolished by statute in

^a *Elmer's Dig.* 134. 302.

^b *Purdon's Penn. Dig.* 870—873.

^c In Indiana the landlord cannot distrain in person or by his bailiff, but under the statute of 1824, he must go before a justice of the peace, and on oath obtain a warrant to a constable to make the distress, and if the tenant replevies the goods, he gives bond to prosecute the landlord and not the officer. *Harris v. M'Faddin*, 2 *Blackf. Ind. Rep.* 70. *Statutes of Indiana*, 1838, p. 472.

^d *Revised Laws of Illinois*, edit. 1833.

^e Act of 1792. *Revised Code of Virginia*, vol. i. 214.

^f *Revised Code of Mississippi*, 1824.

^g *Hartshorn v. Kierman*, 2 *Halsted's Rep.* 29. *Hoskins v. Paul*, 4 *ibid.* 110. *Woglam v. Cowperthwaite*, 2 *Dallas' Rep.* 68. *Garret v. Hughlet*, 1 *Harr. & Johns.* 3. *City Council of Charleston v. Price*, 1 *M'Cord's Rep.* 299. *Dorsey v. Hays*, 7 *Harr. & Johns.* 370. *Neale v. Clautice*, *ibid.* 372. *Smith v. Meanes*, 16 *Serg. & Rawle*, 375. *Ridge v. Wilson*, 1 *Blackford's Ind. Rep.* 409. *Wright v. Matthews*, 2 *ibid.* 187. *Mayo v. Winfree*, 2 *Leigh*, 370. *Jones v. Murdaugh*, *ibid.* 447. *Cripps v. Talvande*, 4 *M'Cord*, 20. *Burket v. Boude*, 3 *Dana's Ken. Rep.* 209. *Walker's Miss. Rep.* 170. 349. *Hale v. Burton*, *Dudley's Rep.* 105.

^h *Dagleish v. Grandy*, *Cam. & Nor. Rep.* 22. *Deaver v. Rice*, 3 *Battle's Rep.* 431.

ⁱ *Youngblood v. Lowry*, 2 *M'Cord's Rep.* 39. But, notwithstanding this strong language, the law of distress is still in force in South Carolina, and the statute of 1803, even allows landlords to distrain for double rent from the demand of possession, when the tenant holds over for three months after notice to quit. *Talvande v. Cripps*, 3 *M'Cord*, 147. *Reeves v. M'Kenzie*, 1 *Bailey*, 497. It is worthy of notice, that the process of distress, and the taking of pledges, was the Anglo-Saxon mode of enforcing the appearance of the defendant in suits at law. No other process was originally known to the common law. The free and sturdy Saxons would not submit to personal arrest. *Palgrave's Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth*, vol. ii. 133.

Alabama.^a In Louisiana, the English remedy for rent essentially prevails, for the lessor has a right of pledge on the movable effects of the lessee found upon the premises, and also on the movable effects of third persons being in a house or store on the premises by their consent, express or implied. The right does not extend to goods transiently or accidentally on the premises, and the lessor may exercise his right of seizing the goods while on the land, or within fifteen days after they are removed, provided they continue to be the property of the lessee.^b In the New-England States, their law of attachment on mesne process may have superseded the law of distress for rent; but under their attachment laws, the principles of the common law doctrine of distress seem to have been essentially assumed, subject to the same checks and limitations which, under the English statute law, and modern decisions, have modified and improved it.^c I shall, therefore, proceed to consider the remedy by distress for rent, upon the principles of the English common and statute law, as being incorporated into the jurisprudence of most of the United States.

The exorbitant authority and importance of the feudal aristocracy, and the extreme dependence, and even vassalage of the tenants, was the occasion of introducing the law of distresses, and which summary remedy is applicable to no other contracts for the payment of money,

^a *Toulmin's Dig.* 702. act 1812.

^b *Civil Code of Louisiana*, art. 2675—2679.

^c *Potter v. Hall*, 3 *Pick. Rep.* 368. The regulation of the law of distress was made by statute in Massachusetts as early 1641. *Digest of Massachusetts Laws*, 1675. The remedy by the writ of replevin for goods distrained or impounded, is regulated by statute in Connecticut. *Revised Statutes*, 1821, and by statute in 1838, the writ of replevin is extended to debts taken by process of foreign attachment. *Statutes of Connecticut*, 1838, p. 506. The same remedy was provided for goods impounded or distrained, by the *Plymouth Colony Laws*, 1671. See Bingham's edit. p. 256. 275.

than those between landlord and tenant. The non-payment of rent, or non-performance *of any *474 other stipulated service, was originally, by the feudal law, a forfeiture of the feud, and the lord was at liberty to enter and reassume it. The severity of those feudal forfeitures was then changed, and intended to be softened into the right of distress, which was borrowed, as Baron Gilbert supposes,^a from the civil law, for by that law the creditor had a right to seize a pledge in order to obtain justice. So, under the feudal law, instead of insisting upon an absolute forfeiture of the land, or even of the right of the lord to enter and hold the lands until the tenant had rendered his service, the law substituted the seizure of the cattle, and other movables found upon the land, and allowed them to be detained as a pledge until the damages were paid. This power of distress, as anciently used, was soon found to be as grievous and oppressive as the feudal forfeiture. It was equally distressing to the tenant to be stripped in an instant of all his goods and chattels, for arrearages of rent, as it was to be turned out of the possession of his farm. The power of distraining for rent, and other feudal services, became an engine of the most insupportable tyranny and oppression.^b These abuses were first stated in the statute of 51 Hen. III, *De Distractione Scaccarii*, wherein it is mentioned, that the commonalty of the realm had sustained great damage by wrongful taking of distresses for the king's debts; and it provided, that when beasts should be distrained and impounded, the owner might feed them without disturbance; and that the things distrained should not be sold until the expiration of fifteen days; and that if there were any chattels to distrain, neither beasts of the plough, nor sheep, should be distrained;

^a *Gilbert on Distresses*, 2.^b *Gilbert on Distresses*, 3.

and that the distress should be reasonable in amount, according to the estimation of neighbours. In the following year, the statute of Marlebridge, in the 52 Hen.

III, was passed, providing more generally against
 *475 the abuse of the *right of distress, and that statute stated the abuses of landlords in strong language :

Magnates graves ultiones fecerunt, et districtiones quosque redemptiones recipiunt ad voluntatem suam. What made the grievance more insupportable was, that the lords refused to permit the king's courts to take cognizance of the distresses which they had made at their own pleasure, and, therefore, as Sir Edward Coke observes, they assumed to be judges in their own causes, contrary to the solid maxim of the common law.^a This statute restored the authority of the regular courts, and ordered all distresses to be reasonable, and that whoever made an excessive distress, should be grievously amerced. The distress was not to be taken or driven out of the county, and it was not to be made upon the public highway, and a remedy by replevin was given for a wrongful distress. By these salutary provisions, the power of distress was confined to the original intention of the law, which was to seize the tenant's goods by way of pledge, in order to compel him to perform his feudal engagements.^b

The common law also imposed several benign restrictions upon this summary and somewhat perilous authority of distress. It forbade perishable articles to be distrained, because all pledges ought to be returned in the same good condition as when taken. It forbade the tools and implements of a man's trade, as well as the beasts of the plough, to be distrained, provided other articles could be found ; because the taking of such articles would tend to produce an utter inability in the tenant to

^a 2 *Inst.* 102, 103.

^b *Gilbert on Distresses*, 4. 34.

redeem the pledge.^a The goods were also to be put into a pound, and there kept safely, without being used by the landlord, until they were redeemed.^b

*But if the tenant was disposed to controvert *476 the legality of the distress, either by denying any rent to be due, or by averring it to be paid, the law provided him with a remedy by the writ of replevin ; which was a writ authorizing the sheriff to take back the pledge and deliver it to the tenant, on receiving security from him to prosecute the writ to effect, and to return the chattels taken, if he should fail in making good his defence.^c

In modern times, the whole policy of the law respecting distresses has been changed. It was inconvenient, if not absurd, that property should be kept in an inactive state in order to compel a man to perform his stipulated payment. A distress at this day is no more than a summary mode of seizing and selling the tenant's property, to satisfy the rent which he owes ; and the extent and manner of the operation have been changed, and made entirely reasonable and just, and equally conducive to the security of the landlord and the protection of commerce.

When rent is due and unpaid, and when no judgment in a personal action has been had for the recovery of the same,^d the landlord, upon demand, may enter imme-

^a 2 *Inst.* 132, 133. *Gilbert on Distresses*, 35, 36.

^b *Cro. Jac.* 148. A tender of amends comes too late after the goods are impounded, for they are then in the custody of the law. *Pilkington's case*, 5 *Co.* 76. a. It is good while the chattels remain in the custody of the distrainor. *Browne v. Powell*, 12 *B. Moore*, 454. *Hilson v. Blain*, 2 *Bailey's S. C. Rep.* 168.

^c In New-Hampshire, judgment for the defendant in replevin is not for the return of the goods, but for the value of the chattels replevied in damages. *Bell v. Bartlett*, 7 *N. H. Rep.* 178.

^d *New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 500. sec. 2. In Maryland, by statute, in 1832, the remedy by distress for rent, payable in grain or other produce, was

diately, by himself or his agent,^a upon the demised premises, and distrain any goods and chattels that are to be found there, belonging to the tenant or others; and this right of the landlord to distrain any goods and chattels upon the premises, is founded upon reasons of public policy, to prevent collusion and fraud.^b But

regulated. In Pennsylvania, judgment in debt for rent, without satisfaction, does not take away the remedy by distress. *Bantleon v. Smith*, 2 *Binney's Rep.* 146.

^a As a check to abuse in the exercise of the right of distress, the *New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 501. sec. 3. 8, require every distress to be made by the sheriff or one of his deputies, or by a constable or marshal of the city or town, and upon the previous affidavit of the landlord or his agent, of the amount of rent due, and the time when. So, in Georgia, the distress warrant is to be granted by a justice of the peace. *Prince's Dig.* 1837, p. 687.

^b *Gorton v. Falkner*, 4 *Term Rep.* 565. *Jones v. Powell*, 5 *Barnw. & Cress.* 647. A stranger's goods on the land may be distrained even for a rent charge. *Saffery v. Elgood*, 1 *Adolph. & Ellis*, 191. In Virginia, by statute, in 1818, the property of strangers found upon the premises, is exempted from distress. 4 *Randolph*, 334. In *Gorton v. Falkner*, Mr. J. Ashurst considers the foundation of the principle that the goods of the stranger may be taken to be, that the landlord is supposed to give credit to the visible stock on the premises, and he ought, therefore, to have recourse to every thing he finds there. But the Chief Justice, in *Brown v. Sims*, 17 *Serg. & Rawle*, 138, was of opinion, that the right of distraining a stranger's goods on the premises, rested on no principle of reason or justice, and he thought that the constantly growing exceptions to that part of the law of distress, would, in the end, eat out the rule itself. So, again, in *Riddle v. Welden*, 5 *Wharton*, 1, the Ch. J. of Pennsylvania, looked very unfavourably upon the extent of the English law of distress, and it was adjudged in that case, that the effects of a lodger and boarder were exempt from distress for rent due from the keeper of the boarding-house, and it was considered that the whole law of special exemptions rested on the principle of public convenience. In New-Jersey, by statute, the goods on the premises not belonging to the tenant are exempted from distress for rent due from the tenant. *New-Jersey Revised Laws*, 201. sec. 8. *Elmer's Dig.* 135. This is also the case in Illinois. *Revised Laws of Illinois*, 1833. In Ohio, the writ of replevin lies for goods and chattels wrongfully detained, but I do not perceive in the "enacted and revised" laws of Ohio, of 1831, any allusion specially, to distress for rent. The statute law of Missouri allows the writ of replevin, in the case of goods wrongfully taken or wrongfully detained, but in no other case, and it is silent as to the remedy by distress for rent. It gives remedy by action for the recovery of rent. *Revised Statutes of Missouri*, p. 376. The Kentucky statute of 1811, on this subject, gives the landlord a right to distrain the goods of his tenant or sub-tenant *only*, and thus exempts from the distress warrant the goods of all other persons, even those *bona fide* purchased of the tenant, and still remaining on the premises. And this power of distress for rent does

this inconvenient *privilege is subject to many exceptions. Articles that may be temporarily placed upon the land by way of trade, and belonging to third persons,^a are exempted from distress, on the broad principle of public convenience, and for the benefit of commerce. The goods of a guest, or a horse at a public inn, or sent to a livery stable to be taken care of, or the goods of a boarder at a boarding-house, or corn at a mill, or cloth at a tailor's shop, or goods delivered to a person exercising a public trade, to be wrought or managed in the way of his business, or a grazier's cattle put upon the land for a night, on the way to market, or goods deposited in a warehouse or with an auctioneer for sale, or on storage in the way of trade, or goods of a principal in the hands of a factor, are not distrainable for rent.^b The exemption would seem to be general in those cases in which the course of business necessarily puts the tenant in temporary possession of the property of his customers.^c With respect to the cattle of a stranger found upon the land, there is this distinction, that if they broke in they are distrainable immediately, but if the fences were bad, they are not distrainable, until the owner, after notice, has

not extend to the interest of a mortgagor, or his equity of redemption in goods mortgaged. *Snyder v. Hitt*, 2 *Dana's Ken. Rep.* 204. *Craddock v. Riddleberger*, *ibid.* 212.

^a *Hoskins v. Paul*, 4 *Halsted*, 110.

^b 2 *Saund. Rep.* 289. a. n. 7. *Gisbourne v. Hurst*, 1 *Salk. Rep.* 249. 3 *Blacks. Com.* 8. *Gilman v. Elton*, 3 *Bro. & Bing.* 75. *Co. Litt.* 47. a. *Thompson v. Mashiter*, 1 *Bing. Rep.* 283. *Matthias v. Mesnard*, 2 *Carr. & Payne*, 353. *Brown v. Sims*, 17 *Serg. & Rawle*, 138. *Youngblood v. Lowry*, 2 *M'Cord's Rep.* 39. *Adams v. Grove*, 1 *Crompton & Meeson*, 380. *Riddle v. Welden*, 5 *Wharton*, 1. If a stranger's goods be on the demised premises without his fault, and he endeavours to reclaim them with due diligence and without any voluntary delay, they are not in that case and in that plight distrainable for rent. So, the purchaser of goods at sheriff's sale, must remove them in a reasonable time, (and which is very short,) or they will be liable to distress for rent. *Gilbert v. Moody*, 17 *Wendell's Rep.* 354.

^c This was a principle declared by the Ch. J. of Pennsylvania, in *Brown v. Sims*, 17 *Serg. & Rawle*, 138, and *Riddle v. Welden*, 5 *Wharton*, 1.

neglected to take them away.^a Corn and grass, whether growing or cut, are seizable by way of distress, and those articles and cattle may be secured or impounded upon the premises, and there sold.^b The distress must *478 be reasonable, and it cannot *be made in a public highway, or removed out of the county.^c The highway, in particular, ought to be secure to the tenant for the intercourse of commerce, and the preservation of peace and good order.

Nor can beasts of the plough, sheep, or implements of a man's trade, be taken for rent, so long as other property can be found; but they may be distrained if not in actual use at the time, and there be no other sufficient distress on the premises.^d In the case of *Simpson v. Hartopp*,^e the question was, whether a stocking frame, in the actual use of a weaver at the time, was distrainable for rent; and after two distinct arguments, at different terms, it was adjudged, that it was not. Lord Ch. J. Willes took an accurate and elaborate view of the law on the subject; and it was stated, that there were several sorts of things not distrainable at common law. 1. Things annexed to the freehold, such, for instance, as furnaces, millstones,

^a In South Carolina, estrays, though *levant et couchant*, are not distrainable for rent, but the cattle of third persons, put on the premises with the consent of the owners, are liable to distress. *Reeves v. M'Kenzie*, 1 *Bailey's Rep.* 497.

^b Corn growing, and sold on *fi-fa.*, and left on the land to be reaped, is not distrainable for rent accruing after seizure on the execution. *Wright v. Dewes*, 3 *Neville & Manning*, 790. *Peacock v. Purvis*, 2 *Brod. & Bing.* 362. S. P.

^c By the *New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 501. sec. 5, 6, the distress cannot be driven out of the town, except to a pound within three miles distance, and within the same county; and all beasts and chattels taken at one time, must be kept, as near as may be, in the same place. Nor can goods distrained be removed if tender of the rent be made before they are impounded or removed. *Vertue v. Beasley*, 2 *Moody & Malkin*, 21.

^d *Gorton v. Falkner*, 4 *Term Rep.* 565. *Fenton v. Logan*, 9 *Bing. Rep.* 676. 2 *Inst.* 132, 133. *New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 502. sec. 13. In Louisiana, the landlord has a privilege, by way of pledge, on the tools of a tradesman found on the premises, for the payment of rent. *Parker v. Starkweather*, 19 *Martin*, 337.

^e *Willes' Rep.* 512.

and chimney pieces. 2. Things delivered to a person exercising a public trade, to be worked up or managed in the way of his trade, as a horse at a smith's shop, material sent to a weaver, a horse brought to an inn; though, with respect to a carriage at a livery stable, it has since been determined,^a that it was not privileged from distress for rent by the lessor of the stable. 3. Cocks or sheaves of corn.^b 4. Beasts of the plough and instruments of husbandry. 5. Instruments of a man's trade. These two last sorts were only exempted from distress *sub modo*;

*that is, upon the supposition that there was other *479 sufficient distress. The court, in that case, held, that the stocking frame was privileged from distress while the party was actually using it, even though there was no other distress on the premises. If it had not been in actual use, it might have been distrained; and if things in actual occupancy could be distrained, it would, as Lord Kenyon observed,^c perpetually lead to a breach of the peace. The case of *Webb v. Bell*,^d seems to have laid down a contrary doctrine to a certain extent; for it was there held, that two horses, and the harness fastened to a cart laden with corn, might be distrained for rent. But Lord Ch. J. Willes doubted the law of that case; and even in the case itself a doubt is suggested, whether, if a man had been upon the cart, the whole team would not have been privileged for the time. In Massachusetts,

^a *Francis v. Wyatt*, 3 *Burr. Rep.* 1498. This case was questioned as to the accuracy of the report, by Mr. J. Patterson, in *Brown v. Shevil*, 4 *Neville & Manning*, 277, where it was held, that all goods sent by a tradesman to be wrought upon in the trade, were, while in his custody, protected from distress; and that the rule applied to the case of a beast sent to a butcher to be slaughtered for the sender.

^b Cocks and sheaves of corn are distrainable in England by statute, but as there is no such statute in Indiana, the common law rule prevails. Given *v. Blann*, 3 *Blackf. Ind. Rep.* 64.

^c *Storey v. Robinson*, 6 *Term Rep.* 138. *Fenton v. Logan*, 9 *Bing. Rep.* 676. S. P.

^d 1 *Sid. Rep.* 440.

under their law of attachment upon mesne process, which is analogous to the common law doctrine of distress for rent, it has been held, that a stage-coach at a tavern, in preparation, and nearly ready to depart, might be attached; and the court inclined to think, that stage-coaches, steamboats, and vessels in actual use, might be attached, though the decision did not go to that broad extent.^a

^a *Potter v. Hall*, 3 *Pick. Rep.* 363. The *New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 501, 502. sec. 10. *Ibid.* 367. sec. 22, specially exempt spinning wheels, weaving looms, and stoves, kept for use in a dwelling-house, books not exceeding \$50 in value, and kept and used as part of the family library, a pew occupied by the family in a place of public worship, sheep to the number of ten, with their fleeces, and the cloth manufactured from them, one cow, two swine, and a few necessary articles of provisions and furniture, as well as wearing apparel and bedding, and owned by a householder, and the necessary tools of a mechanic to the value of \$25, from distress for rent, as well as from execution. So, certain articles, as looms, spinning wheels, stoves, wool, flax, &c., to 20 lbs. weight, loaned or furnished to indigent widows and females, are exempt from distress, and from execution. *New-York Statutes*, April 15th, 1814, ch. 141. But things annexed to the freehold for the purpose of trade or manufacture, and not fixed into the wall of any building, so as to be essential to its support, and grain, grass, and roots, whether growing or gathered and remaining on the land, may be distrained. On the other hand, personal property deposited with, or hired, or lent to the tenant with the consent of the landlord, cannot be distrained; nor can the property of others which accidentally strays on the premises, or is deposited with a tavern-keeper, or the keeper of a warehouse, in the usual course of their business, or deposited with any person for the purpose of being repaired or manufactured. *Ibid.* vol. ii. 502. sec. 10. 14. The property of boarders at taverns and boarding-houses, is also exempted in New-York from distress for rent. *Laws of New-York*, sess. 56. ch. 200. The statute laws of the other states, no doubt, exempt from execution and distress, or other legal process, necessary articles, requisite to keep families from suffering, including all necessary tools of a man's trade or for limited agricultural business. 5 *Mass. Rep.* 313. 4 *Conn. Rep.* 450. 2 *Wharton*, 26. *Acts of Georgia*, December 22d, 1822, and 1834. *Act of Maine*, 1838, ch. 307. The statute of Alabama, in 1832, is exceedingly liberal on this point. It exempts from all legal process "two cows and calves, 500 lbs. of meat, 100 bushels of corn, all books, a pair of work oxen, all tools or implements of trade, 20 head of hogs," &c. The statute law of Kentucky, of 1828, exempts from execution against a housekeeper with a family, one work beast, and no more of that kind of property; and the statute of Michigan (1839,) exempts from execution private libraries, not exceeding in value, in the whole, \$100.

By the Roman law, the landlord's lien for his rent of a farm was confined to the produce of the field. Neither cattle, nor implements of husbandry, nor furniture, were included. But the rule varied in the case of houses rented, and the

After the distress has been duly made, if the goods be not replevied within five days after notice, the statute of New-York has provided, that the goods shall be forthwith appraised, and sold at public vendue, under the superintendence of a sheriff or constable, toward satisfaction of rent.^a And this law of distress is liable to so much abuse on the part of the landlord, and tenants are so often driven to desperate expedients to elude the promptitude and rapidity of the recovery, that the law has been obliged to hold out the penalty of double damages against the one, if he distrains when no rent is due, and of treble damages against the other, if he unlawfully rescues the goods distrained.^b If the tenant holds over, the possession may be recovered in New-York, by the landlord, under a new and summary course of proceeding.^c The proceeding applies to tenants for years, and from year to year, or for part of a year, or at will, or at sufferance, and to the assigns, under tenants or legal representatives of such tenant; and it applies to holding over after the expiration of the term without permission, or after default in the payment of rent pursuant to contract. But in the case of a tenancy *at will, or sufferance, one *481 month's previous notice in writing to the tenant, to remove, must have been given; and in case the proceeding be for non-payment of rent, there must have been a previous demand for the rent, or three days'

permanent movables within the house were liable to distress for rent. *Dig.* 20. 2. 7. 1.

^a *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 504. sec. 24, 25, 26; and within ten days after the sale, the officer must file, in the office of the town clerk, the original warrant of distress, and the original affidavit of the landlord or his agent. *Ibid.* 501. sec. 9.

^b *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 504. sec. 23. 27.

^c *Ibid.* 512. sec. 28. In Connecticut summary process to obtain possession is also given in favour of the owner, when the lessee holds over. *Revised Statutes of Connecticut*, 1821, p. 307. There is probably a summary remedy to obtain possession as against a lessee, who ought to quit, given by statute in the states generally.

notice in writing, to pay, or deliver the possession.^a This summary remedy for non-payment of rent applies also where the tenant has been discharged under any insolvent act, as to his debts or person, or after the estate has been sold under an execution against such person.^b But it does not apply, when it shall appear that satisfaction for the rent might have been obtained by distress, and the whole provision is general, and applies to every part of the state. At common law, distress could only be made on the land out of which the rent issues;^c but now by statute, if the tenant carries away his goods, before or after the rent becomes due, leaving the rent unpaid, the goods of such tenant are not only liable to be seized wherever found, at any time within thirty days after the rent becomes due, though the removal may have been at any time within six months preceding, but the tenant forfeits double the value of the goods if the removal was fraudulent.^d And in order to give further and

^a *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 745. sec. 7, 8, 9. vol. ii. 513. sec. 28. A mortgagor after forfeiture is not that kind of tenant who can be dispossessed in this summary way. *Roach v. Cosine*, 9 *Wendell's Rep.* 227.

^b *Ibid.* vol. ii. 513. sec. 28. In Pennsylvania, under their statutes, a summary remedy for recovery of possession is given to the landlord when the tenant removes without leaving goods sufficient to pay three months' rent, and the tenant refuses to give security to pay it. *Fraytag v. Anderson*, 1 *Ashmead*, 98. *Black v. Anderson*, *ibid.* 127. But this remedy does not deprive the landlord of his action for the rent, though he may have repossessed himself of the premises. *Rubicum v. Williams*, *ibid.* 230.

^c This doctrine was enforced with great strictness in the case of *Buszard v. Capel*, (8 *Barnw. & Cress.* 141. 6 *Bingham*, 150. S. C. on error,) where it was decided, that a barge attached to a wharf by a rope could not be distrained for rent by the lessor of the wharf, though the land on which the wharf stood was demised, and the use of the land in the river Thames opposite the wharf, between high and low water mark, was demised as appurtenant to the wharf, but not the land itself over which the barge floated when it was distrained.

^d *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 502. sec. 15. 503. sec. 16, 17. *Reynolds v. Shuler*, 5 *Cowen's Rep.* 323. The statute of New-York goes further than the English statute of 11 George II, or the statute of Pennsylvania of 1772, for by them the goods must have been removed after the rent was due, to authorize the landlord to distrain them. *Grace v. Shively*, 12 *Serg. & Rawle*, 217. The

effectual *security to the rent of the landlord, the statute of 8 Anne, c. 14, declared, (and that provision has been very generally re-enacted in this country,) that no goods of a tenant, or of any other person being on the premises, and liable to distress, can be taken on an execution at the instance of a creditor, until arrears of rent due at the time, and not exceeding one year, be previously deducted.^a The sheriff must have notice (and either written or parol is sufficient) of the landlord's claim, otherwise he is not bound to know who the landlord is, or what rent is in arrear.^b The one year's rent to the landlord, in case of execution against the personal property of the tenant, refers to the last year's rent;^c and by the *Revised Statutes of New-York*, if the tenant denies that rent is due as claimed, he may tender a bond with sureties to the officer to pay all rent due, not exceeding one year's rent. The bond is to be executed to the landlord, and delivered to him, and for his use, by the officer, and it is to be received as a substitute for his lien on the execution.^d

Pennsylvania statutes of 1772 and of 1825 (the last being a supplement to the other) require the removal to be fraudulent. *Purfel v. Sands*, 1 *Ashmead's Rep.* 120. The law in Louisiana goes beyond the statute in New-York, for if the tenant removes his goods from the premises, and abandons them, he becomes liable at once for the rent of the whole term *due and to become due*. The tenant is considered as withholding from the landlord the *pledge* he had for the rent, but execution only goes for the rent actually payable, and so *toties quoties* monthly during the period of the term. The doctrine was taken from the Roman law, and the equity of it recommended it strongly to the Louisiana courts. *Christy v. Cazanave*, 2 *Martin*, N. S. 451. *Reynolds v. Swain*, 13 *Louisiana Rep.* 193.

^a *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 746. sec. 12—17. *Russell v. Doty*, 4 *Cowen's Rep.* 576. Statutes of Virginia, Kentucky, &c. 2 *Dana's Ken. Rep.* 203. *Purdon's Dig. Penn.* 373.

^b *Smith v. Russell*, 3 *Taunt. Rep.* 400. *Alexander v. Mahon*, 11 *Johns. Rep.* 185. *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 746. sec. 12, 13. *Waring v. Dewberry*, *Str.* 97. *Burket v. Boude*, 3 *Dana's Ken. Rep.* 213. *Van Rensselaer v. Quackenboss*, 17 *Wendell*, 34.

^c *Bradby on Distress*, 118.

^d *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 746. sec. 12—17. The process and forms of the summary proceeding in New-York, to oust the tenant wrongfully holding over, are given in a note to the case of *Nichols v. Williams*, 8 *Cowen*, 1. If the

This power of the landlord does not extend to the seizure of goods, as a distress for rent, when the goods have been sold *bona fide*, and for a valuable consideration, either by the tenant himself, or by execution, before the seizure was made.^a But a mortgage of the goods is said *483 not *to be a sale within the provision, so as to protect them from distress.^b And if the interest of the tenant in the term has ceased, and the tenancy ended, and the tenant, with his goods, removed from the premises, a distress for rent could not formerly be made, though it be within thirty days from the termination of the tenancy.^c The remedy by distress, according to the common law, assumed the tenancy to continue, and ceased with it;^d but by a provision in the statute of 8 Anne, (and which has been adopted in this country,^e) the remedy by distress is extended to six months after the determination of the tenant's lease, whether the lease be for life, for years, or at will. It was made necessary, under the statute, that the landlord's title and the tenant's possession should equally have continued, but by the *New-York Revised Statutes*, it is declared generally, that the distress may be made upon any goods remaining or removed, in the same manner, within the same time, and under the same provisions and restrictions, as if the tenancy had not ended.^f

tenant for life or years, or any other person coming in under or by collusion with such tenant, wilfully holds after demand and one month's notice to quit, he is chargeable at the rate of double the yearly value of the land, and the special damages, and equity cannot afford him any relief. *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 745. sec. 11. Double rent is likewise given if a tenant gives notice of his intention to quit, and does not remove pursuant to notice. *Ibid.* sec. 10.

^a *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 503. sec. 16. *Neale v. Clautice*, 7 *Harr. & Johns*. 372. S. P. *Craddock v. Riddlesberger*, 2 *Dana's Ken. Rep.* 209. 211.

^b *Reynolds v. Shuler*, 5 *Cowen's Rep.* 323.

^c *Terboss v. Williams*, 5 *Cowen's Rep.* 407.

^d *Co. Litt.* 47. b. *Pennant's case*, 3 *Co.* 64. *Stanfill v. Hicks*, 1 *Lord Raym.* 280.

^e *N. Y. Revised Statutes* vol. ii. 500. sec. 1.

^f *Ibid.* vol. ii. 500. sec. 1. *Ibid.* 503. sec. 16. The remedy by distress, if the goods be removed, is confined to thirty days after the removal, and if remain-

The distress may also be made, under the above limitations, for all the arrears of rent arising during the tenancy, though the rent of several years should happen to be in arrear.^a

ing upon the demised premises, to six months from the determination of the lease. *Bukup v. Valentine*, 19 *Wendell*, 554. The New-York statutes have likewise given a summary remedy to the landlord, with the aid of a magistrate, in cases where the premises are deserted, and the rent left in arrear. *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 512. A like summary remedy to obtain possession, where there are not goods on the premises sufficient to pay the rent, is given by statute in Pennsylvania, in 1830.

^a *Braithwaite v. Cooksey*, 1 *H. Blacks*. 465. *Ex parte Grove*, 1 *Atk.* 104. *Wright v. Williams*, 5 *Cowen's Rep.* 501. *Blake v. De Liesseline*, 4 *M' Cord*, 496. *Sherwood v. Phillips*, 13 *Wendell's Rep.* 479. The English real property commissioners, in their report in 1829, proposed that no person should bring any action, or distrain for any arrears of rent, after six years from the time when the same became due. This provision was incorporated into the statute of 3 and 4 William IV, c. 27, but it does not apply to actions of debt for rent *upon any indenture of demise*: they may be brought in such cases within twenty years. It was held, in *St. Mary's Church v. Miles*, 1 *Wharton*, 229, that mere lapse of time, without demand of payment, was no evidence by presumption that the *ground rent*, (which the case says is favoured in law,) founded on deed, has been released or extinguished, though it may raise a presumption that *the arrears* have been paid.

There is a variety of opinion in the books as to the recovery of interest upon rent in arrear. In *covenant* for rent payable in money, interest has been allowed. *Clark v. Barlow*, 4 *Johns. Rep.* 133. *Obernmyer v. Nichols*, 6 *Binney*, 159. 4 *M' Cord's Rep.* 59. S. P. So, in debt for rent, *Dennison v. Lee*, 6 *Gill & Johns*. 333. On the contrary, in *Cook v. Wise*, 3 *H. & Mumf.* 463—501, interest was held not to be recoverable by way of damages in debt for rent, for the party had his remedy by distress. But all the cases agree that, under the remedy by *distress*, the rent only, and not interest by way of damages, is recoverable. *Braithwaite v. Cooksey*, 1 *H. Blacks*. 465. *Lansing v. Rattoone*, 6 *Johns. Rep.* 43. *Dennison v. Lee*, 6 *Gill & Johns*. 333. All the statute provisions relative to the remedy by distress, assume this principle. It is also adjudged, that the remedy by distress exists only in cases where the rent is by the agreement of the parties made *certain*, either in money or services, or can be reduced to certainty. *Valentine v. Jackson*, 9 *Wendell's Rep.* 302. The *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 747. sec. 18, give the remedy by distress, when any "certain services or certain rent," reserved out of land, is due. They allow the owner of a wharf in the city of New-York, to distrain for *wharfage* any goods and chattels on board of any vessel which has used the wharf, though the vessel had removed from the wharf to another part of the city. See *New-York Revised Statutes*, (edit. 1813,) vol. ii. sec. 212. 217.

Whenever goods are wrongfully distrained, the owner may recover them by an action of replevin. This action of replevin lies also in other cases where goods have been tortiously taken or detained. *Pangburn v. Patridge*, 7 *Johns. Rep.*

But the object of this work will not permit me to descend into greater detail, and I am obliged to be confined to a general view of the law on the subject of rent, and the remedy to recover it. The contract for rent, and the remedy, are in constant use and application; and in the cities and large towns there are few branches of the law that affect more sensibly the interests of every class of the people.^a The law may be deemed rather prompt

140. See, also, 6 *Binney*, 2; 16 *Serg. & Rawle*, 300; *Baker v. Fales*, 16 *Mass. Rep.* 147; *Pease v. Simpson*, 3 *Fairfield*, 261; *Seaver v. Dingley*, 4 *Greenleaf*, 306; 12 *Wendell's Rep.* 32; 14 *Johns. Rep.* 87; 15 *ibid.* 402; 19 *ibid.* 31; 20 *ibid.* 467; 1 *Wendell's Rep.* 109, to the same point. *Revised Code of Indiana*, edit. 1838, p. 476. 2 *Blackf. Ind. Rep.* 174. 176. note 3. *Statute of Ohio*, 1831. The *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. ii. 522, have also granted the writ of replevin whenever goods have been wrongfully taken, or are wrongfully detained. But the statute provides that replevin shall not lie for goods taken by warrant for any tax, assessment, or fine, nor for goods seized on execution or attachment, unless they be goods exempted by law from such process, nor unless the party hath a right at the time to reduce the goods into his possession.

In Indiana, by statute, 1831, replevin lies for goods unlawfully detained, though they may have been lawfully taken. 2 *Blackf. Ind. Rep.* 176. note 3. 418. note. So the writ lies in Michigan, Illinois, and Missouri, for goods wrongfully taken or detained. *Territorial Act of Michigan*, April 4th, 1833. *Revised Laws of Illinois*, edit. 1833, p. 503. *Skinner v. Stouse*, 4 *Missouri Rep.* 93. The decisions in Massachusetts and Maine that replevin will lie for goods unlawfully detained, though not preceded by a tortious taking, were founded upon the statutes of 1789 and 1821. In New-Jersey the statute regulating the action of replevin, lies for goods *taken and wrongfully detained*, and it is a close adoption of the English statute law on the subject. *Elmer's Dig.* 466. When it is said in the books that replevin will not lie for goods taken *in execution*, the rule is to be taken to be limited to cases in which the writ of replevin is sued out by the defendant in the execution. The taking of the goods of a *stranger* is a trespass, and replevin lies, as the cases above cited show, when goods are tortiously taken, and therefore goods taken in execution may be replevied by a stranger to it. *Winnard v. Foster*, 2 *Lutw.* 1191. *Rooke's case*, 5 *Co.* 99. *Platt, J.*, in *Clark v. Skinner*, 20 *Johns. Rep.* 467. *Dunham v. Wyckoff*, 3 *Wendell's Rep.* 280. *L. & P. Company v. Holborn*, 2 *Blackf. Ind. Rep.* 267. *Brewster v. Curtis*, 3 *Fairfield*, 51. *American Jurist*, No. 23. art. 4, where this point is elaborately and ably discussed. In Virginia, by statute in 1823, the writ of replevin is confined to the cases of distress for rent. 1 *Robinson's Pr.* 403.

^a The modern regulations on the subject of distresses for rent, are founded on the statutes of 2 W. & M. c. 5; 8 Anne, c. 14; 4 Geo. II, c. 28; 11 Geo. II, c. 19; and those statutes have been re-enacted, with some improvements, in New-York, and doubtless form the basis of our American law on the subject of

and strict with respect to the interests of the landlord, but I am inclined to think it is a necessary provision, and one dictated by sound policy. It is best for the tenant that he should feel the constant necessity of early and punctual performance of his contract. It stimulates to industry, economy, temperance, and wakeful vigilance; and it would tend to check the growth and prosperity
*of our cities, if the law did not afford the land- *485
lords a speedy and effectual security for their rents, against the negligence, extravagance, and frauds of tenants. It is that security which encourages moneyed men to employ their capital in useful and elegant improvements. If they were driven in every case to the slow process of a suit at law for their rent, it would lead to vexatious and countless lawsuits, and be, in many respects, detrimental to the public welfare.

distress for rent, in all those states where that remedy prevails. The statute of 11 Geo. II, c. 19, seems to have been, for instance, very strictly adopted and followed in Pennsylvania and Maryland. 12 *Serg. & Rawle*, 218. 7 *Harr. & Johns*. 372, 373.

LECTURE LIII.

OF THE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF TENURE.

TENURE is inseparable from the idea of property in land, according to the theory of the English law. All the land in England is held mediately or immediately of the king. There are no lands to which the term tenure does not strictly apply, nor any proprietors of land, except the king, who are not legally tenants. To express the highest possible interest that a subject can have in land, the English law uses the terms fee-simple, or a tenancy in fee, and supposes that some other person retains the absolute and ultimate right. The king is, by fiction of law, the great lord paramount, and supreme proprietor of all the lands in the kingdom, and for which he is not bound by services to any superior. *Prædium Domini Regis est directum Dominium, cujus nullus author est nisi Deus.*^a So thoroughly does this notion of tenure pervade the common law doctrine of real property, that the king cannot grant land to which the reservation of tenure is not annexed, though he should even declare, in express words, the grant to be *absque aliquo inde reddendo*.^b Sir Henry Spelman^c defines a feud to be *usus fructus rei immobilis subconditione fidei; vel jus utendi prædio alieno*. The vassal took the profits, but the property
*of the soil remained in the lord, and the *seignory* *488

^a *Co. Litt.* 1. b. 65. a. 2 *Blacks. Com.* 105.

^b *Bro. tit. Tenures*, 3. 52. 6 *Co.* 6. b. 9 *Co.* 123. a. *Wright on Tenures*, 137, 138.

^c *Treatise of Feuds and Tenures by Knight Service*, c. 1. *Glossarium Voce Feodum*.

of the lord and the vassal's *feud* made together, saith Spelman, that "absolute estate of inheritance, which the feudists, in time of old, called *allodium*."

This idea of tenure pervades, to a considerable degree, the law of real property in this country. The title to land is essentially allodial, and every tenant in fee-simple has an absolute and perfect title, yet, in technical language, his estate is called, an estate in fee-simple, and the tenure free and common socage. I presume this technical language is very generally interwoven with the municipal jurisprudence of the several states, even though not a vestige of feudal tenure may remain. In many of the states, there were never any marks of feudal tenure, and in all of them the ownership of land is essentially free and independent. By the statute of New-York, of the 20th February, 1787,^a entitled, *An Act Concerning Tenures*, the legislature re-enacted the statute of 12 Car. II, c. 24, abolishing the military tenures, and turning all sorts of tenures into free and common socage. Under that statute, all estates of inheritance at common law, were held by the tenure of free and common socage; but all lands held under grant of the people of the state, (and which included, of course, all the lands in the western and northern parts of the state which have been granted and settled since the revolution,) were declared to be allodial and not feudal, and to be owned in free and pure *allodium*.^b The *New-York Revised Statutes*, which took effect on the first day of January, 1830, went the entire length of abolishing the existing theory of feudal tenures of every description, with all their incidents, and declaring all lands within the state to be allodial, and that the entire and absolute property was vested in the owners, according to the nature of their respective estates,

^a *Laws of New-York*, sess. 10. c. 36.

^b This is precisely the statute law of New-Jersey. *Elmer's Dig.* p. 82.

subject only to the liability to escheat.^a But though the distinction, *in this country, between *489 feudal and allodial estates, either does not exist at all, or has become merely nominal, it will be impossible for the student to understand clearly and accurately the doctrine of real property, and the learning which illustrates it, without bestowing some attention to the history and character of feudal tenures.

I. Of the origin and establishment of feudal tenures on the continent of Europe.

Some writers have supposed, that the sources of feuds were not confined to the northern Gothic nations who overturned the western empire of the Romans; and that an image of feudal policy had been discovered in almost every age and quarter of the globe.^b But the resemblances which have been suggested are too loosely stated, and are too faint and remote, to afford any solid ground for comparison. The institutions which seem to have been most congenial to the feudal system, were to be found in the Roman policy. The relation of patron

^a *New-York Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 718. sec. 3.

^b Voët, in his *Digressio de Feudis*, sec. 1, and Mr. Hargrave, in note 1. to lib. 2. *Co. Litt.*, have referred to the several authors by whom this opinion has been advanced, and also by whom it has been refuted. I would further add, that the feudal policy is declared by Dr. Robertson to have existed in its most rigid form among the ancient Mexicans; and the government of the Birman empire is said to exhibit, at this day, a faithful picture of Europe during the feudal ages. The same resemblances have been traced among the Mahrattas, and the Rajpoots in Hindostan, and also in the island of Ceylon. *Robertson's History of America*, b. 7. vol. ii. 280. *Col. Symes' Embassy to Ava*, vol. ii. 356. *Asiatic Annual Register* for 1799, tit. *Miscellaneous Tracts*, 116. *Col. Tod's Annals of Rajpootana*, reviewed in *Edinburgh Review*, No. 103. Niebuhr says, the feudal system was obstinately preserved among the states or cities of the Etruscans, prior to the dominion of the Romans. The governments were rigid aristocracies, with kings elected for life, and the labouring classes were serfs. *History of Rome*, vol. i. 99. 101. Gibbon discovered in the governments of the ancient Parthian and Persian empires, the essence of the feudal system, in grants, by the king to the nobles, of lands and houses, on condition of service in war. *Gibbon's History*, vol. i. 329. 342.

and client resembled, in some respects, the
 *490 *feudal lord and vassal, and Niebuhr, in his
History of Rome,^a declares that relation to have
 been the feudal system in its noblest form. The grants
 of forfeited lands, by the Roman conquerors to their
 veteran soldiers, as a recompense for past service, and
 more especially the grants of the Emperor Alexander
 Severus, and in the time of Constantine, on the condition
 of rendering future military service, afford the most
 plausible argument for deducing the feudal customs and
 tenures from the Roman law. There were, however,
 strong and essential marks of difference between the two
 systems. The connexion between the patron and client
 was civil, and not military, and the Roman estates and
 military grants were stable, and of the nature of allodial
 property. The leading points of difference between the
 Roman and feudal jurisprudence, in relation to land, have
 been abundantly shown, by the most able and the most
 learned of the modern legal antiquaries.^b

^a Vol. i. 99.

^b *Hargrave's* note 1. to lib. 2. *Co. Litt.* *Butler's* note 77. to lib. 3. *Co. Litt.* *Sullivan's Treatise on the Feudal Law*, lec. 3. Mr. *Spence*, in his work entitled, *An Inquiry into the Origin of the Laws and Political Institutions of Modern Europe*, London, 1826, p. 5. 32, &c., has examined the Roman policy on this subject, and studied the Roman laws, and particularly the Theodosian code, with the utmost attention. He has drawn from that copious source of legal antiquities, a body of facts to sustain and illustrate the theory, that the barbarians adopted, in a great degree, the laws and institutions of the Romans, as they found them in the provinces which they invaded and subdued. His conclusion would apply better to France than to any other part of Europe. In Spain, it is said that the early Spanish lawgivers disliked the Roman laws, and drove them from their tribunals. The Visigoths prohibited the use of them. See *Institutes of the Civil Law of Spain*, by *Asso & Manuel*, pref. A historian more learned, even in the antiquities of Spain, than, probably, either of those Spanish doctors, admits that the Visigoths of Spain indulged their subjects at first with the enjoyment of the Roman law, but at length they composed a code of civil and criminal jurisprudence, which superseded those foreign institutions. *Gibbon's History of the Roman Empire*, vol. vi. 378. The Gothic king of Spain, *Recesvinto*, prohibited the use of the Roman law in the courts, and the Visigothic code (of which the *Fuero Juzgo* was a Spanish translation) was the civil and criminal statute law of Spain during the Gothic ages, and prior to the

The better, and the prevailing opinion, is, that the origin of the feudal system is essentially to be attributed

Partidas; and the civil part of that code contained strong marks of the influence of the Roman law infused into it by the Spanish clergy. See *Edinburgh Review*, vol. xxxi. art. 5, on the Gothic laws of Spain, in which the subject is handled with profound learning.

On the other hand, the Theodosian code, and the books of the juris-consults, authorized by that code, were the law of Gaul, when it was conquered by the Visigoths, Burgundians, and Franks; and those laws continued to be almost universally observed under the kings of the first race, and the *Breviarium* contributed to preserve the knowledge and use of the Roman law among the West-Goths. But eventually the use of the Roman law was interdicted in the West-Gothic empire. The Emperor Charlemagne, in the year 783, caused the Theodosian code to be transcribed from the abridgment of it in the edition of Alaric, king of the Visigoths; and that abridgment of the code, which is sometimes called the Anian Breviary, or the *Lex Romana* of the Visigoths, was the only one from which a knowledge of the civil law was gained by the jurists of Gaul, prior to the recovery of the Pandects. *Histoire du Droit Français*, par l' *Abbe Fleury*, c. 6. 11. The *Breviarium Aniani*, so called after Anian, the first minister of Alaric, was published at the beginning of the sixth century, by order of Alaric, and it was compiled essentially from the Theodosian code, and partly from the codes of Gregorius and Hermogenes, and the writings of Roman juris-consults; and it was, in its turn, superseded by the more popular and vigorous doctrines of the feudal system. Its poverty is incredible, says Savigny, when viewed in connexion with the rich materials from which it was formed. There is no doubt that villenage, or the servitude of the glebe, existed in the Roman provinces before the German conquests. This appears from the contents of the code *De Agricolis, et Censitis, et Colonis*. Code, lib. 2. tit. 47; and Montesquieu has justly and sagaciously inferred, even from the laws of the Burgundians, that predial servitude existed in Gaul before it was invaded by those barbarians. *Esprit des Loix*, liv. 30. c. 10. But this humble service bore no resemblance to grants by military chiefs to their freeborn soldiers and companions, on condition of rendering future military service. M. Savigny, in his *History of the Roman Law during the Middle Ages*, vol. i, (translated from the German by E. Cathcart,) contends, from a full examination of original documents, that the Roman law was kept up after the German conquests, by the aid of Roman judges, and the former inhabitants in the provinces continued in the possession of their personal freedom and property to a considerable degree. They preserved their separate manners and laws, and there arose a system of *personal rights and laws*. The Roman and his German conqueror resided in the same city or place, each under his own laws. It often happened, said Bishop Agobard, in his letter to Louis le Debonnaire, that five men, each under a different law, might be found walking or sitting together. At first, only two laws were admitted: the law of the victors, which was properly a territorial law, and the law of the vanquished provincials, which was personal. In process of time, the laws of other German races conquered by the Franks were acknowledged along with the laws of the victor and of the vanquished Romans. In the Burgundian collection of laws, it was declared, that *Inter Romanos, Romanis legibus præcipimus*

to the northern *Gothic conquerors of the Roman Empire. It was part of their military policy, and devised by them as the most effectual means to secure their conquests. The chieftain, as head or representative of his nation, allotted portions of the conquered lands, in parcels, to his principal followers, and they, in their turn, gave smaller parcels to their sub-tenants or vassals, and all were granted under the same condition of fealty and military service.^a The rudiments of the feudal law have been supposed, by many modern feudists, to have existed in the usages of the ancient Germans, as they were studied and described by Cæsar and Tacitus.^b But there *could not have been any thing more among the ancient Germans, than the manners and state of property fitted

judicari. Ibid. vol. i. 100. 103. With the Burgundians, the Roman lands were divided between the Burgundians and Romans. The former took half of the house, and two-thirds of the cultivated lands, and one-third of the bondsmen. The West-Goths also deprived the Romans, by allotment or partition, of two-thirds of their lands. *Ibid.* 279. 283. In Italy, the East-Goths, under Odoacer, took one-third of the land. *Ibid.* 315, 316. But the Lombards, who succeeded to the Greek dominion in Italy, took only one-third of the *produce* of the Roman estates, and the Romans were apportioned among the Lombards as their *hospites*, or guests, and were chargeable with the above tribute. M. Savigny insists, that the Roman civil institutions in the provincial cities were generously allowed by the Burgundians, West-Goths, Franks, and Lombards, to be retained by the vanquished. *Ibid.* 387—434. In like manner, after the conquest of Lombardy by Charlemagne, it was left to the inhabitants to choose whether they would be judged by their own, the Roman, or the French law.

^a Craig's *Jus Feudale*, lib. 1. *Dieg.* 4. sec. 4. *De Feudorum Origine et Progressu.*

^b Sir Henry Spelman, on *Feuds and Tenures by Knight Service*, c. 2. *Glossarium, voce Feodum.* Grotius, *De Jure Belli et Pacis*, lib. 1. c. 3. sec. 23. Wright on *Tenures*, c. 1. p. 6, 7. Sullivan on *Feudal Law*, lec. 3. Dalrymple's *Essay on Feudal Property*, c. 1. *Hic contractus (scilicet feudalis) proprius est Germanicarum gentium, ne que usquam invenitur, nisi ubi Germani sedes posuerunt.* This is the language of Grotius, and that of Craig is to the same effect: *Hæc sunt juris feudalīs prima cunabula, hæc feudorum infantia ab usu et consuetudine ferocissimarum gentium, quæ ab Aquilone in Romanum orbem incurrerant, primum nata et introducta. Jus Feudale*, 1. 4, 5. In a few passages of Cæsar and Tacitus, concerning the customs of the Germans, may be seen, says Dr. Sullivan, the old feudal law, and all its original parts, in embryo.

and prepared for the introduction of the feudal tenures. Land, with them, was not subject to individual ownership, but belonged as common property to the community, and portions of it were annually divided among the members of each respective tribe, according to rank and dignity.^a The German nations beyond the Rhine and the Danube, prescribed limits to the march of the Roman legions; and while the latter successfully established the government, arts, institutions, and laws of their own country, in Spain, Gaul, and Britain, the free and martial Germans resented every such attempt, and preserved unimpaired their native usages, fierce manners, and independent genius.^b

*The traces of the feudal policy were first distinctly perceived among the Franks, Burgundians, and Lombards, after they had invaded the Roman provinces. They generally permitted the Roman institutions to remain in the cities and towns, but they claimed a proportion of the land and slaves of the provincials, and brought their own laws and usages with them.^c The crude codes of the barbarians were reduced to writing after they had settled in their new conquests, and they

^a *Cæsar De Bel. Gal.* b. 6. *Tacitus, Mor. Ger.* c. 5. 11. 26.

^b *Velleius Pater.* b. 2. c. 117, 118. It was their custom, said the Germans to Julius Cæsar, delivered down to them from their ancestors, to oppose, not to implore, whoever made war upon them. *Cæsar, De Bel. Gal.* 4. 6. The German tribes had national institutions before their conquests, and they were societies of freemen, who possessed, in their collective capacity, all powers, legislative and judicial. The nobles, as to power, were merely freemen. The land was divided into districts, and the judicial power was in all the freemen of the district, and the Count presided at the public meetings, and commanded the tribes in war. The other classes, distinct from the freemen, were bondmen and slaves. *Savigny's History of the Roman Law during the Middle Ages*, vol. i. c. 4.

^c The barbarian conquerors of Gaul and Italy generously allowed every man to elect by what law he would be governed. *Esprit des Loix*, b. 28. c. 2. *Hallam on the Middle Ages*, vol. i. 83. But Savigny insists, that the law by which every man was to be governed, was determined by birth, and not by election or free choice, and he enters into an elaborate and critical discussion on the point. *History of the Roman Law*, vol. i. 134—150.

supplanted, in a very considerable degree, the Roman laws.^a The conquered lands which were appropriated by the military chiefs to their faithful followers, had the condition of future military service annexed, and this was the origin of fiefs and feudal tenures. The same class of persons who had been characterized as volunteers or companions in Germany, became loyal vassals under the feudal grants.^b

These grants, which were first called benefices, were, in their origin, for life, or perhaps only for a term *495 of years.^c *The vassal had a right to use the land, and take the profits, and he was bound to render in return such feudal duties and services as belonged to a military tenure. The property of the soil remained in the lord from whom the grant was received. The right to the soil, and to the profits of the soil, were regarded as

^a *Esprit des Loix*, b. 28. *passim*. *Ibid.* b. 30. c. 6, 7. 9. Montesquieu has given a very interesting account of the institutions and of the character of the laws of the northern nations, which they introduced and established in France, Spain, and Italy, and the struggle which those laws and usages maintained with the provincial laws of the Romans. See, also, *Spence's Inquiry*, b. 3. c. 2, 3.

^b *Esprit des Loix*, b. 3. c. 16.

^c *Hallam on the Middle Ages*, vol. i. 89, insists, in opposition to most of the writers on the feudal system, that these beneficiary grants were never precarious and at will. He controverts, on this point, the position of Craig, Spelman, Du Cange, Montesquieu, Mably, Robertson, and all the other feudists. It is worthy of notice, that Lord Ch. B. Gilbert, in his *Treatise on Tenures*, 2. 8, considered feuds to have been originally for life. Sir Francis Palgrave says, that the feudal benefice was never held for a shorter term than the life of the grantee, and that the Teutonic nations took their plan of the beneficiary or feudal tenure from the Roman beneficiary system, which consisted in the assignment of a particular portion of land as the price of military service. *The Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth*, vol. i. 495—501. The uncertainty that pervades this subject seems to be the necessary result of the unfixedness, disorder, and chaos into which every thing was thrown during the transition state from the migratory and predatory life of barbarians to the settled life of cultivators. This is the view of the subject taken by M. Guizot, in his *History of Civilization in Europe*, and he says, that benefices for years, for life, and hereditary benefices, existed together at the same time, and that even the same lands passed in a few years, through these different stages. Even the institutions of monarchy, of the feudal relation of lord and vassal, and assemblies of freemen, existed at the same time, and were continually confounded and continually changing.

separate and distinct rights. This distinction continued when feuds became hereditary. The king or lord had the *dominium directum*, and the vassal or feudatory, the *dominium utile*; and there was a strong analogy between lands held by feudal tenure, and lands held in trust, for the trustee has the technical legal title, but the *cestui que trust* reaps the profits. The leading principle of feudal tenures, in the original and genuine character of feuds, was the condition of rendering military service.^a Prior to the introduction of the feudal system, lands were allodial, and held in free and absolute ownership in like manner as personal property was held. Allodial land was not suddenly, but very gradually supplanted by the law of tenures, and some centuries elapsed between the first rise of these feudal grants and their general establishment.^b

They were never so entirely introduced as to abolish all vestiges of allodial estates. Considerable portions of land in continental Europe continued allodial, and to this day, in some parts of it, the courts presume lands to be allodial until they are shown to be feudal, while, in other parts, they presume the lands to be feudal until they are shown to be allodial.^c

^a The definition of a *fief*, according to Pothier, and which he took from Dumoulin, is an estate in land held under the charge of fealty, homage, and military service. *Traité des Fiefs*, part 1. ch. prelim. sec. 1. 3.

^b *Hallam*, vol. i. 97. 112, says, that five centuries elapsed before allodial estates had given way, and feuds had attained to maturity; and he considers that the establishment of feuds on the continent was essentially confined to the dominions of Charlemagne, and that they had not great influence, either in the peninsula or among the Baltic powers.

^c *Voet*, in his *Digressio de Feudis*, sec. 4. *Com. ad Pand.* lib. 38, says, that if it be uncertain whether an estate be feudal or allodial, the presumption is in favour of its being allodial, as being the free and natural state of things. And in Germany allodial estates are prevalent even to this day. *Heinec. Elem. Jur. Germ.* tom. vi. 230, 231. The feudal tenures and services existed in France down to the period of the late revolution; but in those parts of France governed by *le droit écrit*, all lands were presumed to be allodial until the contrary was shown; while in the *pays coutumiers* the rule was, that there was no land without a lord, and those who pretended their lands were free were bound

The precise time when benefices became hereditary, is uncertain. They began to be hereditary in the age of Charlemagne, who facilitated the conversion of allodial into feudal estates.^a The perpetuity of fiefs was at last established by a general law, which allowed fiefs, in imitation of allodial estates, to descend to the children of the possessor.^b The perpetuity of fiefs was established earlier in France than in Germany; but throughout the continent, it appears, they had become hereditary, and accompanied with the right of primogeniture, and all the other incidents peculiar to feudal governments, long before the era of the Norman conquest.^c

to prove it. *Inst. au Droit Français*, par Argou, tom. i. 195. But now, in France, the feudal law, with all its rights and incidents, is abolished, as being incompatible with freedom and social order. *Toullier, Droit Civil Français*, tom. iii. 64. *Ibid.* tom. vi. 192. So, in the United Netherlands, feudality was abolished, and all fiefs declared allodial, when the government was revolutionized by the French arms.

^a *Craig, Jus Feudale*, lib. 1. *Dieg.* 4. sec. 10. The *Abby de Mably*, in his *Observations sur l'Hist. de France*, b. 2. c. 5. note 3, says, that Louis le Debonnaire, the son and successor of Charlemagne, first rendered fiefs hereditary in France; but a greater authority says, that hereditary benefices existed under the first race of French kings, or before Pepin, the father of Charlemagne. *Hallam on the Middle Ages*, vol. i. 91.

^b This was by a capitulary of Charles the Bald, A. D. 877. *Esprit des Loix*, b. 31. c. 25.

^c *Craig*, in his *Jus Feudale*, lib. 1. *Dieg.* 4, *De Feudorum Origine et Progressu*, has given an interesting summary of the history of feuds. He traces them from their infancy, when they were precarious, or at will, to their youth, when they were for life, or descended to the sons only, between the year 650 and the ascension of Charlemagne, in the year 800; and to their advancement towards maturity under the reign of the Emperor Conrad II, when they descended to grand-children and to brothers in the case of paternal feuds; *in feudo paterno, et non in feudo noviter acquisito*. The last step in the advancing progress of feuds, was when they were clothed with the general attributes of hereditary estates. See, also, *Consuetudines Feudorum*, b. 1. tit. 1. 8; b. 2. tit. 11. *Esprit des Loix*, b. 31. c. 28, 29, 31, 32. *Inst. au Droit Français*, par Argou, tom. i. b. 2. c. 2, *Des Fiefs*. *Hallam on the State of Europe during the Middle Ages*, vol. i. 91. 96. The Book of Fiefs, under the title of *Consuetudines Feudorum*, is supposed (*Spelman's Glossary, Voce Feodum*) to have been compiled by two Milanese lawyers, A. D. 1170, from the law of fiefs in Lombardy; but *Voet*, in his *Digressio de Feudis*, sec. 2, says, that it is uncertain who were the authors of the collection. This code of feudal

The *right of primogeniture, and preference of males in the line of succession, became maxims of inheritance in pursuance of the original military policy of the feudal system. It was the object of these rules to preserve the fee entire and undivided, and to have at all times a vassal competent, from his sex and age, to render the military services which might be required. The practice of subinfeudations, or *arriere fiefs*, by the higher ranks of feudal vassals, grew with the growth of tenures, and they were created on the same condition of military service by the inferior vassals to their immediate lords. The feudal governments gradually assumed the appearance of combinations of military chieftains, in a regular order of subordination, but loosely connected with each other, and feebly controlled by the monarch, or federal head.

It would appear, at first view, to be very extraordinary, that such a free and rational species of property as allodial, and which was well calculated to meet the natural wants of *individuals, and the exigencies *498 of society, should ever, in any one instance, have been voluntarily laid aside, or exchanged for a feudal tenure. As a general rule, the allodial proprietor had the entire right and dominion. He held of no superior to whom he owed homage, or fealty, or military service. His estate was deemed subservient to the purposes of commerce. It was alienable at the will of the owner.^a

law is usually annexed to the *Corpus Juris Civilis*, and, therefore, conveniently accessible to the American lawyer. It is the source from which modern lawyers and historians have drawn much of their knowledge of the feudal jurisprudence of continental Europe. Mr. Butler says, it attained more authority in the courts of justice than any other compilation, and was taught classically in most of the academies of Italy and Germany. It has justly, according to Craig, the force and authority of law, by the consent of almost all nations; *ex consensu pene omnium gentium*.

^a The term allodial is said to have been derived from *al*, which signified *integer*, and *od*, which signifies *status*, or *possessio*; so that *al-od*, or *allodium*,

It was a pledge to the king for the good behaviour of the subject, and was liable to forfeiture for crimes against the state. It was a security to individuals for the performance of private contracts, and might be taken and sold for debt. It passed to all the children equally by inheritance. In these respects allodial estates were *499 the very reverse of lands held by a feudal *tenure.

Land under that servitude was locked up from commerce, and from that control over it by the owner, which is so necessary in the intercourse and business of social life. But it appears to be well ascertained, that the feudal policy was gradually adopted throughout Europe, after the overthrow of the western empire, upon the principle of self-preservation. The turbulent state of society, consequent upon the violent fall of that empire, and the want of regular government competent to preserve peace and maintain order and justice, encouraged and recommended the feudal association. A feudal lord and his vassals, connected by the mutual obligation of

signified *integra possessio*, or absolute dominion. This etymology of the word, Dr. Gilbert Stuart says, was communicated to him by a learned Scotch judge. *Stuart's View of Society in Europe*, 205. Whether this idea be well founded, or be merely ingenious, (for Dr. Robertson, in his *View of Society*, prefixed to his history of Charles V, note 8, quotes a German Glossary which makes *allodium* to be compounded of the German particle, *an* and *lot*, i. e. land obtained by lot,) it at least corresponds with the character of allodial estates. Mr. Crabb, in his *History of the English Laws*, (p. 11,) gives another origin of *allodium*. He says it was derived from a privative, and *lode*, or *leude*, a vassal, that is, without vassalage. This he took from *Spelman*, who in his *Glossary*, voce *Allodium*, mentions the same derivation. Mr. Hallam says, that allodial lands are commonly opposed to beneficiary or feudal, and in that sense the words continually occur in ancient laws and documents. But it sometimes stands simply for an estate of inheritance, and hereditary fiefs are frequently termed *allodia*. See his *View of the State of Europe during the Middle Ages*, (vol. i. 80,) a work which appears to be equally admirable for vigour of mind; for profound research; for manly criticism, and for the spirit of freedom. In the French law, *Franc-aleu* signifies allodial land, or an estate entirely free, and not holden of any superior, and wholly exempt from all seigniorial rights and services. *Inst. au Droit Français*, par *Argou*, tom. i. 194. *Allodium est proprietas quæ a nullo recognoscitur*. *Ferriere's Dict. tit. Franc-aleu*.

protection and service, acted in concert and with efficacy. The strength and spirit of these private combinations made amends for the weakness of the civil magistrate. A proud and fierce feudal chief was sure to revenge any injury offered to himself or any of his dependants, by the united force of this martial combination. Much higher compositions were exacted, even by law and in the courts of justice, for injuries to vassals, than to allodial proprietors.^a They were, in some measure, in the condition of aliens or outlaws, in the midst of society; and the feudal tenants, united by regular subordination under a powerful chieftain, had the same advantage over allodial proprietors, as has been justly observed by an eminent historian,^b which a disciplined army enjoys over a dispersed multitude; and were enabled to commit, with impunity, all injuries upon their defenceless neighbours. Allodial proprietors, being thus exposed to violence, without any adequate legal protection, were forced to *fly for shelter within the enclosure of the feudal *500 association. They surrendered their lands to some powerful chief, paid him the reverential rites of homage and fealty, received back their lands under the burdensome services of a feudal tenure, and partook of the security of vassals, at the expense of the dignity of freemen. Allodial estates became extinguished in this way and from these causes, and the feudal system gradually spread, and was extended over the principal kingdoms of Europe.^c

^a Montesquieu, in his account of the changes of allodial into feudal estates, says, it was the privilege of a vassal of the king, by the Salic and Riparian laws, to pay 600 sous for the murder of a vassal, and 200 sous for killing a freeman or allodial proprietor, whether Frank or barbarian, and only 100 sous for killing a Roman! *Esprit des Loix*, b. 31. c. 8.

^b *Hume's History of England*, appendix, vol. ii.

^c *Esprit des Loix*, b. 31. c. 8. *Robertson's History of Charles V*, vol. i. note 8, annexed to his View of Society. *Hallam's View of Society in the Middle Ages*, vol. i. c. 2. 93, 94. *Stuart's View of Society in Europe*, b. 1.

A state of anarchy, according to Mr. Hallam, was the cause, rather than the effect, of the general establishment of feudal tenures. The original policy of the system was generous and reasonable, for it had in view public defence and private protection. Very able and eloquent champions of the cause of civil liberty, have admitted, that the feudal system was introduced and cherished by the spirit of freedom; and that it had a tendency, before the original design of it was perverted and abused, to promote good faith, to purify public morals, and to refine and elevate social sympathies.^a

But this same loyal association, which was so auspicious in its beginnings as in a great degree to destroy the value of allodial property, degenerated in process of time,
 *501 and became *the parent of violence and anarchy, promoted private wars, and led to a system of the most grievous oppression. Except in England, it annihilated the popular liberties of every nation in which it prevailed, and it has been the great effort of modern times to check or subdue its claims, and recover the free enjoyment and independence of allodial estates.^b

c. 2. sec. 3. *Spence's Inquiry*, 346. This last writer shows, from the capitularies of Charlemagne, that in his time there was scarcely a person in his widely extended empire, who was not the vassal either of the monarch, or of some bishop, or count, or other powerful individual.

^a Dr. *Stuart's View*, b. 2. c. 1. sec. 1. *Hallam, supra*, vol. i. 99. 178, 179. Sir Henry Spelman, in his *Treatise of Feuds and Tenures*, c. 2, viewed the feudal law in the same light. "It was," he observes, "carried by the Lombards, Saliques, Franks, Saxons, and Goths, into every kingdom, and conceived to be the most absolute law for supporting the royal estate, preserving union, confirming peace, and suppressing robbery, incendiaries, and rebellions."

^b The feudal system still exists in full force and destructive energy in Hungary, where the entire surface of the soil is possessed by the nobles. They are, themselves, exempt from taxation, and the peasants have no political rights, and are held under rigorous feudal subjection. There is likewise a partial continuance of the feudal institutions in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, and strongly and oppressively in Galicia. *Turnbull's Austria*, vol. ii. ch. 15.

(2.) *Of the history of feudal tenures in England.*

England was distinguished above every part of Europe for the universal establishment of the feudal tenures. There is no presumption or admission in the English law, of the existence of allodial lands. They are all held by some feudal tenure. There were traces of feudal grants, and of the relation of lord and vassal, in the time of the Anglo-Saxons, but the formal and regular establishment of feudal tenures in their genuine character, and with all their fruits and services, was in the reign of William the Conqueror.^a

^a The ordinances of William the Norman, establishing the feudal tenure of lands, to be held *jure hereditario in perpetuum*, are quoted as authentic by the most learned of the English lawyers; (*Wright on Tenures*, 65—76. *Blacks. Com.* vol. ii. 50;) and they are collected in *Lambard's Archaionomia*, 170. *L. L. Conq. Wm.* I, c. 52. 55. Those laws purport to have been enacted, *per commune concilium totius regni*. Sir Francis Palgrave, in his *Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth*, vol. ii. 83, gives the original text, hitherto unpublished, of the statute or capitular of the laws and customs granted by William the Conqueror to the English, and professing to be the same as the laws of Edward the Confessor. It is a curious and interesting monument of the written Anglo-Saxon law first diffused into the common law. It is devoted principally to criminal jurisprudence, and relates specially to pecuniary fines and the efficacy of frankpledges. Vassals were bound to the soil, and could not depart, nor, on the other hand, could they be expelled by their lords. No Christian could be sold to a foreign country, nor especially to infidels. No sales of any chattel, to the value of four denarii, without four witnesses of the burgh or country village. He granted peace and immunity to the holy church. Death was to be inflicted for many crimes, but not for slight ones; *non enim debet pro repara deleri factura, quum ad imaginem suam Deus condidit et sanguinis sui pretio redemit*; the force of Christianity as well as of penal law was thus applied to the preservation of peace, and the security of persons and property.

It has been a subject of great dispute, and one which has occasioned the most laborious investigations, whether feudal tenures were in use among the Saxons. This is to us a question of no moment, and it is no where any thing more than a point of speculative and historical curiosity; but even in that view it may command the attention of the legal antiquarian. Though, in a general sense, military services and feuds might have been known to the Anglo-Saxons, yet the weight of authority, even in opposition to such names as Coke and Selden, would rather seem to be in favour of the conclusion, that hereditary fiefs, with their servitudes, such as aid, wardship, marriage, and perhaps relief, (for Sir Henry Spelman and Mr. Hallam differ on that point,) were introduced by the Conqueror. *Spelman* wrote his great work on *Feuds and Tenures by Knight Service*, to refute the

The tenures which were authoritatively established in England, in the time of the Conqueror, were principally

argument of the Irish Judges, and to support the position in his *Glossary*, that feuds were introduced at the Norman conquest, and he insists that feuds were not hereditary in England under the Saxon dynasty. He declares, that there is not a single charter in the Saxon tongue, before the conquest, in which any feudal word is apparently expressed. His discussion of the general question is distinguished for its acuteness and research, and he has been followed in his opinion, either wholly or in a great degree, by Sir Matthew Hale, Sir Martin Wright, Sir William Blackstone, and Mr. Butler. To these great authorities may be added the equal name of Mr. *Burke*, who, in his admirable *Abridgment of English History*, b. 2. c. 7, maintains the position, that the Anglo-Saxons, those ruthless conquerors, who swept before them the laws, language, and religion of the ancient Britons, and lived in savage ignorance amid the ruins of Roman arts and magnificence, knew nothing of hereditary fiefs, or any thing analogous to feudal tenures. *Craig*, in his learned and elaborate work on the feudal law, is equally of opinion with *Spelman*, (and he preceded *Spelman* in this inquiry,) that the feudal law was first introduced into England by William the Conqueror. *Jus Feudale*, lib. 1. *Dieg.* 7.

Mr. *Turner*, on the other hand, in his *History of the Anglo-Saxons*, throws the weight of his authority, and great Saxon learning, into the opposite scale. He says, there can be no doubt, that the most essential part of what has been called the feudal system, actually prevailed among the Anglo-Saxons. He admits, that though all their lands were charged with the *trinoda necessitas*, yet that the military service (the most material of those three servitudes) might be commuted by a pecuniary mulct, and lands were hereditary without primogeniture. These admissions destroy the force of his conclusion. *Turner's History*, vol. ii. 541, 542, or appendix, No. 4. b. 6. c. 3. In the recent *History of Boroughs and Municipal Corporations in England*, by *H. A. Merewether* and *A. J. Stephens*, (vol. i. 69,) they are also of opinion, that the material parts of the feudal tenure did exist before the conquest, and that the Normans brought over only some of the more severe provisions, and heavier services of the feudal tenure. Mr. *Reeve* and Mr. *Hallam* perceive, in the dependence in which free, and even noble tenants, held their estates of other subjects under the Anglo-Saxon constitution, much of the intrinsic character of the feudal relation, though in a less mature and systematic shape than it assumed after the Norman conquest. *Reeve's History of the English Law*, vol. i. 9. *Hallam on the Middle Ages*, vol. ii. c. 8. part 1. It would be presumption in me, even if the occasion called for it, to attempt much discussion of such a question, inasmuch as I have no means of access to original documents. There is one, and only one Saxon monument which I have examined, and I would suggest, though with very great diffidence, that the Anglo-Saxon laws, as collected and translated from Saxon into Latin, by *William Lambard*, in his *Archaionomia*, (Whelock's edit. Cambridge, 1644,) seem to show sufficiently, by their silence on the topic of feuds, and by the general tenor of their provisions, that the feudal system was not then in any kind of force or activity. These laws are the crude productions of a semi-barbarous race. Their chief objects were, (1.) The preservation of

of *two kinds, according to the services annexed. They were either tenures by *knight service*, in which the services,

the peace. (2.) The settling the rate of pecuniary mulcts or compositions for all sorts of crimes, and when corporal punishment was resorted to, the prescription was cruel. (3.) The settling the ceremonies of religious observances, and the oaths of purgation and proof in judicial trials. (4.) The regulation of the fraternities of frankpledges. Those laws are evidence, however, of the existence and great extent of the evils of predial and domestic servitude; and they show, also, even amidst their gross superstitions, numerous indications of the civilizing genius of Christianity, and the effect of religious discipline and restraint, in taming savage manners, and inculcating upon the minds of a rude and illiterate people the obligations of peace, good order, and justice. As the Anglo-Saxon laws contained very few regulations concerning private civil rights, it has been supposed that those rights were under the government of Roman laws remaining with the original natives. An impenetrable obscurity appears to hang over the subject of the Anglo-Saxon institutions, and the toilsome, deep, acute, and spirited researches of Sharon Turner and Sir Francis Palgrave, in Anglo-Saxon history, involve the reader in a labyrinth of investigation, from which he derives little benefit, and finds it difficult to preserve his courage in the investigation. Sir Francis Palgrave says, that the laws of Alfred are entirely silent with respect to those institutions, which, according to later historians, are to be ascribed to his sound policy and wisdom. A considerable portion of the Anglo-Saxon law was never recorded in writing, and we have not a single law, and hardly a single document, from which the course of the descent of land can be inferred. *Palgrave's Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth*, vol. i. p. 47. 59. The feudal system was created by the union of Roman laws and barbarian usages, and as to the perplexed question relative to the existence or non-existence of an Anglo-Saxon feudal system, Sir Francis concludes that the main difference between Anglo-Saxon feudality and the Norman feudal system, consisted in the establishment in the latter era of a more certain canon of descent and inheritance. The claim of the heir became an absolute right, and the lord lost any discretionary power of denying the renewal of the grant. Feudal principles were applied under the Saxon king Egbert, to insure the supremacy of the crown. The beneficiary system had been long before interwoven with the municipal law. It was now enforced upon the dependants of the crown, and introduced from Germany, where feudality had become a mighty engine of power in the Carlovigian empire. *Ibid.* vol. i. ch. 19. p. 576—587.

It is worthy of observation, and goes in confirmation of the conclusion, that the English law of feuds was essentially of Norman, and not of Anglo-Saxon origin; that allodial lands were changed into feudal, throughout the kingdom of Scotland, and the feudal structure completed there, about the same time with the like revolution in landed property in England. This event took place under Malcolm III, who began his reign, A. D. 1057. *Dalrymple's Essay on the History of Feudal Property*, 20, 21. Though Craig admits that the feudal law was unknown in Scotland before the year 1000, yet he is of opinion that it was introduced into Scotland before it was used in England; and he insists that it existed in Scotland, with the incidents of wardship, marriage, and relief, some time before the conquest. *Jus Feudale*, lib. 1. *Dieg.* 8.

though occasionally uncertain, were altogether of a military nature, and esteemed highly honourable, according to the martial spirit of the times ; or they were tenures by *socage*, in which the services were defined and certain, and generally of a predial or pacific nature.^a Tenure by knight service, in addition to the obligation of fealty and the military service of forty days in a year, was subject to certain hard conditions. The tenant was bound to afford *aid* to his lord by the payment of money, when his lord stood in need of it, on certain emergent calls, as, when he married his daughter, when he made his son a knight, or when he was taken prisoner. So, when a tenant died, his heir at law was obliged to pay a *relief* to the lord, being in the nature of a compensation for being permitted to succeed to the inheritance. If the heir was under age, the lord was entitled to the *wardship* of the heir, and he took to himself the profits of the land during the minority. Various modes were devised to elude the hardships of this guardianship in chivalry, incident to the tenure by knight service. The lord had also a right to dispose of his infant ward in *marriage*, and if the latter refused, he or she forfeited as much as was arbitrarily assessed for the value of the match. If the tenant aliened his land, he was liable to pay a *fine* to the lord, for the privilege of

Another question arising in the ancient history of the English law is, whether the great similarity between the ancient laws of England and those of the Duchy of Normandy, was produced by the exportation of the English laws into Normandy, or the importation of the Norman laws into England. Sir *Matthew Hale*, in his *History of the Common Law*, c. 6, will not allow, as Lord Coke had refused to allow before him, that the English took their laws from the Norman race, and he insists that the laws of Normandy were, in the greater part thereof, borrowed from the English. He appeals to the *Grand Coutumier de Normandie*, and which, he says, was compiled after the time of King John. This venerable code of Norman laws and usages is interesting to those persons who are fond of the study of legal antiquities. I am indebted to the kindness of an English lawyer for the possession of a copy of the work, in Norman French, with a Latin commentary, neatly printed at Rouen, A. D. 1539.

^a *Wright on Tenures*, 139—142.

selling. Lastly, if the tenant died, without leaving an heir competent to perform the feudal services, or was convicted of treason or felony, the land *escheated* or reverted to the feudal lord.^a

The greatest part of the lands in England were held by the tenure by knight service; and several of these fruits and consequences of the feudal tenure, belonged also to tenure in socage. The oppression of the feudal conditions of *relief*, *wardship*, and *marriage*, was enormously severe for many ages after the Norman conquest, and even down to the reign of the Stuarts. Upon the death of the tenant *in capite*, his land was seized by the crown, and an *inquisitio post mortem* taken before the escheator, stating the description and value of the estate, and the name and age of the heir. The adult heir appeared in court and did homage to the king, and paid his relief and recovered the estate. If the heir was a minor, the land remained in wardship until he was of age, and sued out his writ *de ætate probanda*, and under that process he procured his release from wardship. The sale of the marriage of the heir, whether male or female, was a valuable perquisite to the king or his grantee. The ward was in contempt if he or she refused the proffered match. In the reign of Henry II, the crown wards were inventoried *like the slaves of a plantation, and *506 according to the assizes of Jerusalem, the matron

^a *Littleton's Tenures*, b. 2. *Wright on Tenures*, *passim*. 2 *Blacks. Com.* c. 5. Mr. *Hallam*, vol. i. 101—106, vol. ii. 23, says, that reliefs, fines upon alienation, escheats, and aids, were feudal incidents belonging to feuds, as established on the continent of Europe; and that wardship and marriage were no parts of the grant or feudal system, but were introduced into England, and, perhaps, invented by the rapacious feudal aristocracy, under the Norman dynasty. He, however, gives instances of their prevalence afterwards all over Europe.

The Master of the Rolls, in the great case of *Burges v. Wheate*, 1 *Eden's Rep.* 177, says, that the right of escheat was not founded on want of an heir, but of a tenant to perform the services; and that the words had been used promiscuously, because, before the power of alienation, want of tenant and heir was the same thing, for, at the death of the ancestor, none but the heir could be tenant.

of sixty years might refuse a husband without incurring the penalties of a contempt.^a The abuses of the feudal connexion took place equally in other parts of Europe, but the spirit of rapacity met with a more steady and determined resistance, by the English of the Saxon blood, than by any other people. This resistance produced the memorable national compact of *Magna Charta*, which corrected the feudal policy, and checked many grievances of the feudal tenures; and the intelligence and intrepidity of the House of Commons, subsequent to the era of the great charter, enabled the nation to struggle with better success than any other people against the enormous oppression of the system.

A feoffment in fee did not originally pass an estate in the sense we now use it. It was only an estate to be enjoyed as a benefice, without the power of alienation, in prejudice of the heir or the lord; and the heir took it as a usufructuary interest, and in default of heirs the tenure became extinct, and the land reverted to the lord. The heir took by purchase, and independent of the ancestor, who could not alien, nor could the lord alien the seignory without the consent of the tenant. This restraint on alienation was a violent and unnatural state of things, and contrary to the nature and value of property, and the inherent and universal love of independence. It arose partly from favour to the heir, and partly from favour to the lord, and the genius of the feudal system was originally so strong in favour of restraint upon alienation, that by a general ordinance mentioned in the *Book of Fiefs*,^b the hand of him who knowingly wrote a deed of alienation, was directed to be struck off.

The first step taken to mitigate the severe restriction

^a *Sullivan's Lectures*, lec. 13. *Harg.* n. 65. to lib. 2. *Co. Litt.* *Q. Review*, No. 77. p. 59.

^b *Lib.* 2. tit. 55.

upon *alienation of the feudal estate, was the power of alienation by the tenant with leave of the lord, and this tended to leave the heir dependent upon the ancestor. The right of alienation was first applied to the lands acquired by the tenant by purchase; and Glanville says,^a that, in his time, it was, generally speaking, lawful for a person to alien a reasonable part of his land by inheritance, or purchase, and if he had no heirs of his body, he might alien the whole of his purchased lands. If, however, he had a son and heir, he could not disinherit him, and alien the whole, even of his purchased lands. The restraint was almost absolute when the tenant was in by descent, and quite relaxed when he was in by purchase; and there was no distinction on this subject, whether the fief was held by a military or socage tenure. The free alienation of land commenced with burgage tenures, and was dictated by the genius of commerce.^b The next variation in favour of the tenant was the right to alien without the lord's license, when the grant was to him and his heirs and assigns, and the general right of alienation seems to have been greatly increased, and extensively established, in the age of Bracton.^c The tenant gained successively the power of alienation, if the grant was only to him and his heirs; and the power to charge, or encumber the land. The lord's right was still further affected by acts of parliament, and judicial determinations, for the fee was made subject by *elegit* to the tenant's debts, and also by process under the statutes merchant and staple.^d It was further, and as early as the reign of Edw. III, made subject to the dower of the wife.^e Subinfeudation was also an indirect mode of transferring the fief,

^a B. 7. c. 1.

^b Dalrymple's *Essay on Feudal Property*, c. 3. sec. 1.

^c Bracton, b. 2. c. 5. sec. 4. 7; c. 6. fo. 18. b; c. 27. sec. 1.

^d West. 2, 13 Ed. I, c. 18; also, 13 Ed. I. *De Mercatoribus*, and 27 Ed. III,

^e Bro. tit. *Dower*, pl. 64.

and resorted to as an artifice to elude the feudal restraint upon alienation; and by the time the statute of *Quia Emptores*, 18 Edw. I, was enacted, prohibiting subinfeudations to all but the king's vassals, this feudal restraint had essentially vanished, and the policy of that statute was to recall the stability and perpetuity of landed estates.^a

Successive improvements in the character of the estate, and the condition of the tenant, greatly relieved the nation from some of the prominent evils of the feudal investiture. But the odious badges of the tenure still existed; and Lord Bacon, in his speech at a conference before the Lords, on behalf of the Commons, in the reign of James I, strongly recommended, by way of composition with the crown, the abolition of wards and tenures, as having become troublesome and useless.^b At length, upon the restoration of Charles II, *tenure by knight service, with all its grievous incidents, was by statute

^a Sir Thomas Clarke, the Master of the Rolls, in *Burgess v. Wheate*, 1 *Eden's Rep.* 191, has given a short, but clear view of the progress of the feudal estate in its recovery from the feudal restraint of non-alienation. See, also, Mr. Butler's note 77, lib. 3. *Co. Litt.* V. No. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11; and see, especially, the able and learned history of the alienation of land, in *Dalrymple's Essay on Feudal Property*, c. 3.

^b *Lord Bacon's Works*, vol. iii. 359. It appears, by the directions given by order of James I, to the Master of the Wards, that the king, while he sought to restrain the abuses, set a high value on his prerogative rights of wardship and marriage. There was a yearly inquisition directed to be taken by persons of credit, for each county, of the persons and lands in wardship, to be certified and returned into the exchequer; and though Lord Bacon declared that the policy, spirit, and utility of the military tenures were entirely gone, yet it appears that the people were grievously oppressed by "feudaries, and other inferior ministers of like nature, by colour of the king's tenures;" and the royal instructions were, that "the vexations of escheators and feudaries be repressed, which, upon no substantial ground of record, vex the country with inquisitions and other extortions; and that the Master of Wards take special care to receive private information from gentlemen of quality and conscience in every shire, touching these abuses." So late as the reign of Charles I, the Earl of Warwick, as grantee of the wardship of an heiress, extorted 10,000*l.* sterling for his consent to a marriage on every account desirable. *Lord Bacon's Works*, vol. iii. 364—368. *Sullivan's Lectures on Feudal Law*, lec. 13.

abolished, and the tenure of land was, for the most part, turned into free and common socage, and every thing oppressive in that tenure was also abolished. The statute of 12 Charles II, essentially put an end to the feudal system in England, although some fictions, (and they are scarcely any thing more,) founded on the ancient feudal relation and dependence, are still retained in the socage tenures.

(3.) *Of the doctrine of tenure in these United States.*

Socage tenure denotes lands held by a fixed and determinate service, which is not military, nor in the power of the lord to vary at his pleasure. It was the certainty, and pacific nature of the service, duty, or render, which made this species of tenure such a safeguard against the wanton exactions of the feudal lords, and rendered it of such inestimable value in the view of the ancient English. It was deemed by them a point of the utmost importance, to change their tenures by knight service into tenure by socage. Socage tenures are, however, of feudal extraction, and retain some of the leading properties of feuds, as has been shown by Sir Martin Wright, in his learned treatise on tenures;^a and which work has been freely followed by Sir William Blackstone, in his perspicuous and elegant, and we may truly add, masterly disquisitions on the feudal law. Most of the feudal incidents and consequences of socage tenure, were expressly abolished in New-York, by the act of 1787; and they were wholly and entirely annihilated by the *New-York Revised Statutes*, as has been already mentioned.^b They were also abolished by statute, in Connecticut, in 1793;^c and they have never existed,

^a P. 141—144.

^b *Supra*, p. 378.

^c The *Statutes of Connecticut*, 1833, p. 339, declared, that “every proprietor in *fee-simple* of lands,” had an absolute and direct dominion and property in the same. They were declared to be “vested with an allodial title.”

or they *have ceased to exist, in all essential respects, in every other state. The only feudal fictions and services which can be presumed to be retained in any part of the United States, consist of the feudal principle, that the lands are held of some superior or lord, to whom the obligation of fealty, and to pay a determinate rent, are due. The act of New-York, in 1787, provided, that the socage lands were not to be deemed discharged of "any rents certain, or other services incident, or belonging to tenure in common socage, due to the people of this state, or any mean lord, or other person, or the fealty or distresses incident thereunto." The *Revised Statutes*^a also provide, that "the abolition of tenures shall not take away or discharge any rents or services certain, which at any time heretofore have been, or hereafter may be, created or reserved." The lord paramount of all socage land was none other than the people of the state, and to them, and them only, the duty of fealty was to be rendered; and the quit-rents which were due to the king on all colonial grants, and to which the people succeeded at the revolution, have been gradually diminished by commutation, under various acts of the legislature, and are now nearly, if not entirely extinguished.

In our endeavours to discover the marks or incidents which with us discriminated socage tenure from allodial property, we are confined to the doctrine of fealty, and of holding of a superior lord. Fealty was regarded by the ancient law as the very essence and foundation of the feudal association. It could not on any account be dispensed with, remitted, or discharged, because it was the *vinculum commune*, the bond or cement of the whole feudal policy.^b Fealty was the same as *fidelitas*. It was an oath of fidelity to the lord, and to use the words of Little-

^a *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 713. sec. 4.

^b *Wright on Tenures*, 35. 55. 133. 140. 145.

ton,^a when a freeholder doth *fealty to his lord, he shall lay his right hand upon a book, and shall say, "Know ye this, my lord, that I shall be faithful and true unto you, and faith to you shall bear, for the lands which I claim to hold of you, and that I shall lawfully do to you the customs and services which I ought to do at the terms assigned: so help me God and his saints." This oath of fealty everywhere followed the progress of the feudal system, and created all those interesting ties and obligations between the lord and his vassal, which, in the simplicity of the feudal ages, they considered to be their truest interest and greatest glory. It was also the parent of the oath of allegiance, which is exacted by sovereigns in modern times. The continental jurists frequently considered homage and fealty as synonymous; but this was not so in the English law, and the incident of homage was expressly abolished in New-York by the act of 1787, while the incident of fealty was expressly retained. Homage, according to Littleton, was the most honourable and the most humble service of reverence that a franktenant could make to his lord; but it is quite too abject and servile a ceremony of submission, allegiance, and reverence, to be admissible at this day.

Lands held by socage tenure (and all lands granted or patented before the revolution are so held)^b would

^a Sec. 91.

^b The tenure prescribed in all the early colonial charters or patents, was free and common socage, being "according to the free tenure of lands of East-Greenwich, in the county of Kent, in England; and not *in capite* or by knight's service." See, the great patent of New-England, granted by King James in 1620; the charter of Massachusetts in 1629; the prior charter of Virginia in 1606; the charter of the Province of Maine in 1639; the Rhode Island charter in 1663; the Connecticut charter in 1662; the Maryland charter in 1632; the act of the General Assembly of the colony of New-York, of 13th May, 1691; (*Bradford's edit. of Colony Laws*, printed 1719;) the charter of Pennsylvania in 1681; the patent of 1662, of Carolina; the charter of Georgia in 1732. These charters, or the substance of them, are to be seen in most of our early colonial documentary collections, annalists, and historians; and the substance of them

seem, in theory, to have been chargeable with this oath of fealty; and every tenant, whether in fee, for life, or for years, was, by the English law, obliged to render it when required, as being an indispensable service, due to the lord of whom he held. Fealty was at common law deemed inseparable from tenure of every kind, except the tenure in frankalmoigne; but a tenant at will was not bound to it, as his estate was too precarious; and though Littleton says, that a tenant for years was bound to render fealty to the lessor, Mr. Hargrave has referred

to some cases which raise a doubt upon that point.^a

*512 He also observes, that no statute has *ever varied the law of fealty, and that the title to fealty still remains, though it is no longer the practice to exact its performance. However, if required, it must be repeated on every change of the lord, and the remedy for compelling the performance of fealty is by distress.^b Sir Matthew Hale^c says, the oath of fealty may be due to an inferior lord, and then the oath must have the saving *salva fide et ligentia domini regis*. It may be exacted in England by landlords, and lords of manors, from tenants other than tenants at will, or from year to year. The New-York statute of 1787 saved the services incident to tenure in common socage, and which it presumed might be due, not only to the people of the state, but to any mean lord, or other private person, and it saved the fealty

is accurately condensed and stated in *Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States*, vol. i.

^a *Littleton*, sec. 117. 130, 131, 132. 139. *Co. Litt.* 63. a. 67. b. *Harg. n.* 13. to lib. 2. *Co. Litt.*

^b *Harg. n.* 20. to lib. 2. *Co. Litt.* The distress^{*} was also the remedy of the feudal lord for enforcing his claim to *relief*, and the validity of his title was tried on the part of the heir in the action of replevin. Case of *The Provost of Beverly*, 40 Edw. III. 9. By the *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 747. sec. 18, distress is a remedy given for all certain services, as well as certain rent reserved out of lands, and due.

^c *H. P. C.* vol. i. 67.

and distresses incident thereunto. But this doctrine of the feudal fealty was never practically applied, nor assumed to apply to any other superior than the chief lord of the fee, or, in other words, the people of the state, and then it resolved itself into the oath of allegiance which every citizen, on a proper occasion, may be required to take. Lord Coke did not designate any very material difference between the oath of fealty, and the general oath of allegiance, though he raised the question as to the difference which might exist between them;^a but Sir Matthew Hale,^b in a long and learned dissertation, undertakes to explain the difference between the oath of allegiance and the oath of fealty. Under the New-York statute, 1787, fealty, in the technical sense of the feudal law, was a dormant and exploded incident of feudal *tenure;^c and by the Revised Statutes, *513 even the fiction has become annihilated, unless it may be supposed to be lurking in the general declaration, that “the people of this state, in their right of sovereignty, are deemed to possess the original and ultimate property in and to all lands within the jurisdiction of the state.”^d

^a *Co. Litt.* 68. b.

^b *H. P. C.* vol. i. 62—70.

^c In *Cornell v. Lamb*, 2 *Cowen's Rep.* 652, it was declared, by Woodworth, J., that fealty was not, in fact, due on any tenure in this state, and had become altogether fictitious. The statute of 1787 would seem, according to the feudal theory, not to have been penned with philological accuracy, when it declared, that the *tenure* of all lands derived from the people of this state should be allodial, and not feudal. Allodial estates have no mark of tenure, and are enjoyed in absolute right, and tenure signifies the holding of a superior lord. Sir Henry Spelman says, that the first place in which he met with *tenure* in a feudal sense, was among the laws of the Saliques and Germans, in the constitution of the Emperor Conrad, about the year 915, when *beneficia*, afterwards called *fiefs*, first became hereditary. *Spelman's Treatise on Feuds*, c. 3. *Tenure est la manière par quoy les ténements sont tenus des Seigneurs. Custum. de Norm.* cited by Sir Martin Wright on *Tenures*, 139. note. But the statute did not commit any mistake, because it used the word, not in a feudal, but in the popular sense, for right or title, in like manner as in England, the king, whose inheritance cannot possibly import a *tenure*, is said to be seized in his demesne as of fee.

^d *N. Y. Revised Statutes*, vol. i. 718. sec. 1.

Thus, by one of those singular revolutions incident to human affairs, allodial estates, once universal in Europe, and then almost universally exchanged for feudal tenures, have now, after the lapse of many centuries, regained their primitive estimation in the minds of freemen. Though the doctrine of a feudal tenure by free and common socage may be applicable to the real property in this country, chartered and possessed before our revolution, and though every proprietor should be considered as holding an estate in fee-simple, none of the inconveniences of tenure are felt or known. We have very generally abolished the right of primogeniture, *514 *and preference of males, in the title by descent, as well as the feudal services, and the practice of subinfeudation, and all restraints on alienation. Socage tenures do not exist any longer, in some of the United States, while they still exist, in theory at least, in others; but where they do exist, they partake of the essential qualities of allodial estates. An estate in fee-simple means an estate of inheritance, and nothing more, and in common acceptation it has lost entirely its original meaning as a beneficiary or usufructuary estate, in contradistinction to that which is allodial. It was used even by Littleton and Coke, to denote simply an inheritance; and they are followed by Sir Martin Wright, and Sir William Blackstone.^a Whether a person holds his land in pure *allodium*, or has an absolute estate of inheritance in fee-simple, is perfectly immaterial, for his title is the same to every essential purpose. The distinction between the two estates has become merely nominal, and a very considerable part of Littleton's celebrated treatise on tenures, on which Lord Coke exhausted his immense stores of learning, has become obsolete. But those parts of it which have ceased to be of modern application, will,

^a *Co. Litt.* 1. 2 *Blacks. Com.* 106.

nevertheless, continue, like the other venerable remains of the Gothic system, to be objects of examination and study, not only to the professed antiquarian, but to every inquisitive lawyer, who, according to the advice of Lord Bacon, is desirous “to visit and strengthen the roots and foundation of the science.”^a

^a *C'est un beau spectacle que celui des loix féodales : un chêne antique s'élève : il faut percer la terre pour les racines trouver.* Montesquieu's account of the feudal laws is the best and most solid part of his work. He traces them up to the forests of Germany, and shows that they were suggested by the usages, promoted by the policy, and matured by the martial genius of the ancient Germans. Those fierce tribes of barbarians, having long been inured to turbulent warfare, at length broke through the restraints imposed by disciplined valour, put to flight the Roman eagles in all the northern provinces of the empire, and finally prostrated the most extensive and best cemented monarchy which had ever insulted and enslaved mankind.









